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INTRODUCTION 
The recent renaming of the NASA Office of Advanced Research 
and Technology as the Office of Aeronautics and Space Technology 
emphasizes the new stress being placed on aeronautical research 
by the Federal government in general, and NASA in particular. 
Aeronautical research at NASA now engages 5,300 people with an 
annual budget of $110 million dollars and addresses such problems 
as: 
Major reductions in aircraft noise, 
particularly by developing a very 
quiet short-haul aircraft. 
Improved automated air traffic 
control 
Encouragement of development of 
vehicles for both high- and low-
density short-haul markets. 
Development of an experimental 
approach to test and verify not only 
technical concepts, but also marke t 
characteristics, social benefits and 
the like. 
Research and development are essential to the solution of 
current problems, as they always have been. They are also 
essential if the full potential of civil aviation is to be 
realized. However, it must be recognized that neither today's 
nor tomorrow's problems are sOlely technological. Solutions will 
involve not only traditional applications of the physical sciences 
but also the techniques of economic analysis and the social 
sciences. Technological advances are subject to a variety of 
institutional constraints which can be categorized as regulatory, 
legal, financial, social, attitudinal and the like. All of these 
factors must be examined and are an essential part of both the 
problems and their solutions. 
Although it is realized that NASA's role in seeking solutions 
to these problems is essentially technical, it is imperative that 
the technologist be familiar with the additional constraints that 
the social and legal systems impose on technical designs. As 
an example, future aircraft engines must not only provide more 
thrust, but they must do so economically and quietly. 
The purpose of the summer workshop was to provide a 
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background and insight into these non-technical areas for NASA 
personnel who will be involved in both the direction and 
implementation of the technical programs to ensure end products 
that are acceptable to the market place and the public in 
general. As was stated in the CARD study: 
" ... the scope of civil aviation research 
and development should be expanded to 
increase emphasis on nonphysical sciences 
such as economics and sociology." 
The workshop consisted of a two-week series of lectures 
and discussions by leading academic government and industry 
personnel in the field of flight transportation, covering the 
interface between technology and the remaining aspects of the 
air system. 
The workshop was held at Waterville Valley, New Hampshire. 
This site was chosen, because it is away from the normal 
business setting, thus freeing participants from the daily 
interruptions of their office routines and offering them a fresh 
setting in which to immerse themselves in the subject material. 
The presentations, as reported here, are not compiled 
chronologically but rather they are grouped according to major 
topic and also from the more basic to the more advanced within 
each topic. This is done so as to give the reader the proper 
background and continuity (see Table of Contents). 
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DEVELOPMENT OF THE AIR TRANSPORT INDUSTRY 
Nawal Taneja 
Flight Transportation Lab 
M. I. T. 
July 10, 1972 
Abstract 
The presentation will focus on the major developments 
in the U.S. scheduled air transport industry both domestic 
and international, together with a brief history of the 
European air transport system. The role and formulation 
of the U.S. Civil Aeronautics Board, International Civil 
Aviation Organization, and International Air Transport 
Association will also be covered. 
I 
/~ 
.The early development of the commercial air transport 
industry was made possible through government financial support, 
although this support varied in nature and degree from country to 
country. In Europe most of the research and development in early 
aviation was undertaken in one way or another for defense purposes. 
In the United states, since the transportation of mail had always 
been the function of the gOvernment, public funds were justified 
to develop the system. Even the "bush-pilots" in Canada were 
so~ewhat dependent on government support. In general. this 
financial aid consisted of air mail payments, grants for offering 
service on certain routes, outright monetary gifts, aircraft 
development costs, extremely low interest loans to purchase 
aircraft and special depreciation allowances. It was assumed 
that these supports would be temporary and that eventually the 
industry would become self-supporting. 
Prior to the first World War, the United states lagged behind 
Europe in the development of aircraft, with France considered the 
pioneer in design and production of early heavier-than-air aircraft. 
1 
According to one source, at the beginning of the first World War, 
France had 140~ airplanes, Germany 1000, Russia 800, Great Britain 
400, and the United states 23. One explanation for this is the 
amount of military aviatio:l bud'Jet for each of these co'.mtries. 
For example, by 1913 the military aviatio:l budget in France had 
reached almost 7.5 million dollars. while the figllrefor the 
1. CAB Publication - Reference 1. Page 204 
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Jnited states w'~s closer to $125,000. 
Although the history of the cOlnmercial air transport 
Lndustry can be traced back to 1905; apart from some of the 
~xperimental flights and routes, regularly sched'lled air services 
.. ere not offered until 1918 in the U.S. and 1919 in Europe. In 
,eneral, the development of the industry focused o~ the trans-
Jortation of mail in the united states and passengers in Europe. 
rhe U. S. m"dl service wa.s inaugurated on May 15, 1918 on the 
~ew York-Washington route using army equipment and personnel and 
Eive months later the air transport part of the service was taken 
)ver by the post Office Department. The fleet consisted mostly 
Jf war-surplus aircraft with some new aircraft specially built 
for the Post Office Department. By December the service was 
)ffered in the New York - Chicago market and within two years 
transcontinental air mail service was in operation between New York 
and San Francisco with the airplane flying durtng the day only. 
[n Europe, after the war, England, France and Germany, all within 
a few months of each other, started scheduled air services. In 
3ermany Deutsche Luft Reederei began operating a passenger service 
3 
in February 1919 betw;en Berlin and Weimar via Leipzig; in France 
~arman Airli~es started scheduled operations on the Paris-London 
and Paris-Brussels routes; and in England, Aircraft Transport and 
------
2. Miller and Sawers - Reference 2. Page 9. 
3. Davies - Reference 3. Pages 11-20. 
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Travel offered scheduled service in August on the Lo~don­
Paris route. 
The fleets of these early airlines consisted mostly of 
single and twin-engined bombers which were modified to carry 
passengers. The British and the French used the early biplanes 
with capacity ranging from four totw'~lve seats, while the 
Germans used the Junker monoplanes. These aircraft had very 
limited payload capacity, cruising speed and range. By the mid-
twen·c t,~s t:hese early care lers had upgraded the fleets to tri-
motors and development was underway for radial air cooled engines 
which were more powerful and more efficient. 
Since the transportation by air crossed national frontiers, 
a need arose for establishing some principles of international 
law regarding aerial navigation and a state's sovereignty over its 
airspace. The Aeronautical Commission of the Peace Conference 
held in Paris in 1919, established the basic rule of international 
law regarding commercial aviation. This law stated that every 
nation has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace 
above its territory. Although, the united States did not ratify 
this convention, the pan American convention signed in Havana in 
1928 agreed to most of the principles of the Paris convention. 
Also in 1919, six European nations, Denmark, England, Germany, 
Holland, Norway and Sweden, jointly created an organization 
called the International Air Traffic Association, the predecessor 
of the present International Air Transport Association. The 
initial functions of the organization were to clarify international 
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aviation law and to standardize aviation technology. The main 
aim of the member airlines was to standardize the conditions and 
facilities of air travel between their countries. 
The mid-1920's represented a period of consolidation in 
Europe. In many cases the government made consolidation and 
sometimes partial state ownership a necessary condition for 
subsidy. For example, Imperial Airways was incorporated in 
England by merging four separate companies. The Civil Air Trans-
port Subsidies Committee (Rambling Committee) organized in 1923 
recommended that the existing four carriers should be merged 
into one Imperial Airways, partially government owned, which 
received a total subsidy of one million pounds, spread in de-
creasing amounts over a ten year period. 
Expansion to other countries and continents was largely a 
result of the European countries expanding operations within their 
colonial empires. The Belgians, for example, set up services 
in the Congo in 1920. Since the Treaty of Versailles restricted 
the Germans from manufacturing aircraft and operating any German 
international airline, they followed a strategy of setting up 
local operations in various countries around the world, beginning 
with South America. The objective was to initially develop local 
airlines in as many countries as possible and eventually to con-
nect them with a trunk service operating from Germany. using 
this strategy, Germany set up local lines in South America, 
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Eastern and Central Europe, and eventually persia and China. 
Other countries to realize the potential of air transpor-
tation were often the ones with poor communication due to natural 
barriers such as forests, rivers, and mountains, creating a situ-
ation for the establishment of air services. For the most part, 
though, these countries had no aviation industry and exploited 
some tie with those nations who did in order to obtain aircraft 
for their air services. In Australia, mail service was started 
in 1919 on the west coast between Perth and Derby by West 
Australian Airways. The following year Qantas started the mail 
service in the east. By the early twenties, similar service was 
started in Canada, Japan, Latin America, Middle East and South 
Africa. 
In the U.S., while business was not too successful over short 
distances, great opportunities existed for long-haul transportation 
of the mail. This was well demonstrated by the time savings 
produced in an experimental flight from San Francisco to New York. 
taking about 34 hours. By 1924 the transcontinental flight time 
had further been reduced when the operation had been extended to 
include night service. The introduction of more reliable and 
durable engines, radio communication and navigational aids sig-
nificantly improved the reliability of airline operations. Although 
there had been a number of early attempts at regular air passenger 
service in the United States, it was not until 1925 that service 
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was offered on a year-around basis on the Los Angeles-San Diego 
route. The 120 mile trip took an hour and a half and cost $17.50 
one-way or $26.50 round trip. From here on. the passenger traffic 
began to grow rapidly and by 1930. the passenger traffic in the 
united States was about equal to the rest of the world taken 
together. In Europe. Deutsche Lufthansa was the leading air-
line in 1930 having carried well over 100.000 passengers. In 
France in the same year. four airlines put together had carried 
less than fifty percent of the passenger traffic carried by the ( 
German carrier. 
The significant passenger traffic growth resulted in the 
development of larger capacity aircraft. For a long time. however. 
aircraft speed remained around 100 miles per hour. Although. up 
until the late twenties. Europe had maintained the lead in aircraft 
development. the united States took over this leadership in a 
relatively short period. While the total number of aircraft 
produced in the united States in the year 1924 amounted to ap-
proximately 60. the number increased to about 5.500 during 1929. 
The u.S. leadership in aircraft development began with the Ford 
Tri-motor of 1926. continued with the Boeing 247 and received 
world acknowledgement in 1935 with the DC-3. The DC-3 had a 
capacity of 21 passengers and a speed of almost two hundred miles 
per hour. This aircraft revolutionized the air transport industry. 
Due to its much lower direct operating costs. the carriers were 
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able to lower the fares and increase traffic. Miller and Sawers 
show that by the end of 1941, almost 800 DC-3's were delivered 
and over half of these were delivered to the airlines. 
The Post Office Department in the u.s. operated the mail 
flights until 1927 in spite of the fact that protests were heard 
from the railroads in the early twenties regarding governmental 
competition in the transportation of mail. As a result of these 
protests the Air Mail Act of 1925 (Kelly Act) was passed to 
encourage commercial aviation and to transfer the air mail 
transportation operation to private carriers on the basis of 
competitive bids. Initially the contracts were awarded for 
four-year periods. Under competitive bidding the most significant 
contracts were awarded to Boeing Air Transport for the San 
Francisco-Chicago route and to National Air Transport for the 
New York-Chicago route. The transcontinental route was linked 
by about a dozen feeder routes such that almost every major city 
in the united States was linked on the air mail system. 
The problem in the united States during this time period 
was that the mail revenues were too low to justify capital expense 
for better equipment. Poor equipment, on the other hand, resulted 
in poor, service which in turn led to even lower revenues. Part 
of the unwillingness of the carriers to invest in new equipment 
resulted from the fear of losing mail contracts and the lack of 
adequate passenger traffic. The carriers needed some government 
- 8 -
backing and the public needed assurance that air transportation 
was safe, fast and within their means. 
There were four major factors which encouraged the deveiop-
ment of the U.S. air transport industry at this very critical 
time. First, the Air Commerce Act of 1926 initiated the 
development by the federal government of civil airways, navigational 
aids, and provided for the regulation of safety. This Act, 
therefore, relieved the private carriers from heavy investments 
in ground facilities for air navigation. Second, Charles 
Lindbergh's transatlantic flight proved to be very timely in 
stimulating the early development of the air passenger market. 
Third, the Daniel Guggenheim Fund enabled an experiment to 
operate a "model airline" to encourage the development of pas-
senger traffic, which was sometimes considered as a financial 
liability. Fourth, the Kelly Act was amended to include pro-
visions whereby the original four year mail contracts could be 
extended to ten years, thereby promoting increased investment in 
the industry. 
During this time period, most of the airlines in the world 
were still dependent on government subsidies. Again according to 
the research of Miller and Sawers, the French airlines received 
the highest amount of government financial support. In 1928 
only ten percent or so of the airline revenues came from com-
mercial operations. In Germany Lufthansa's commercial operations 
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accounted for roughly 30 percent of the total income. The 
data on the exact amount of subsidy by country are not readily 
available. Estimates are available, however, for the development 
costs of the air mail transportation system in the United states. 
4 
According to Warner's research, the United states government 
paid roughly ten million dollars for developing the early trans-
port system. This estimate is based on a total government ex-
penditure of roughly $17.5 million for the nine year period from 
1918 to 1927, while Warner estimated the income for this period 
to be roughly $7.5 million based on the real value of inventory 
and capital items in hand and the receipts for postage during 
the nine year period. 
In the summer of 1927, Juan Trippe, who was connected with 
Colonial Airways at the time, learned that the Post Office Depart-
ment was considering an air mail contract between Key West, Florida 
and Havana, Cuba. There were two carriers in operation in Florida, 
pan American and Florida Airways and neither of these two com-
panies had the necessary financial backing or the equipment to 
negotiate the contract for the transportation of mail between Cuba 
and the United states. Although Pan American had acquired a con-
tract from the Cuban government to fly the mail between the U.s. 
and Cuba, the company did not, however,possess the landing rights. 
4. Warner - Reference 4. Page 29 
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Trippe flew over to Havana and negotiated an exclusive flying 
permit between the U.S. and Cuba, ensuring that only Pan Am 
could operate on this route. 
In 1928, the Foreign Air Mail Act was passed authorizing the 
Postmaster General to award contracts for the transportation of 
mail by air to foreign countries and territorial possessions of 
the united States. The carrier selected to offer foreign air mail 
services was Pan American. Since Pan American had already acquired 
the necessary landing privileges in other Latin American countries, 
virtually all of the foreign air mail contracts were awarded to 
the company at the highest rate permissible under the Act. 
Initially the U.S. government did not negotiate the develop-
ment of the international routes with these Latin American nations. 
Pan American on its own initiative went ahead and made private 
agreements with these foreign nations for landing rights in their 
country and since Pan American was not in a position to offer 
exchange landing rights, the agreements were made without reciprocal 
landing rights in the united States. With mail payments authorized 
by the Foreign Air Mail Act of 1928, and with exclusive landing 
rights, Pan American showed rapid development. 
Although passenger travel was growing fairly rapidly by the 
end of the twenties, prior to 1929, there was no uniform law 
regarding the rights of the passengers, ownership of freight, or 
liability of the carriers. In 1929, an International Diplomatic 
Conference on Private Air Law was held in Warsaw, poland 
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to establish the law regarding the liability of the airlines 
in international air transportation, towards their passengers and 
cargo in the event of an accid2nt. The result of this was the 
Warsaw Convention, which initially limited the carriers' liability 
to $8,300 for each passenger. The limit on the liability was 
doubled by the Hague Protocol of 1955 and further increased to 
$75,000 by the Montreal Agreement of 1966. 
In the united states, the Air Mail Act of 1925 was once 
again amended in 1930 (now called the MCNary-Watres, or Watres 
Act). This Act authorized the exchange of air mail contracts 
for air mail route certificates with further authority to extend 
or consolidate routes. Furthermore, the Act authorized payment 
for the transportation of mail based on space available and 
distance flown rather than the mail load carried. 
It has been said that the Postmaster General, Walter Brown 
was the chief planner of the Watres Act. He wanted to restructure 
the industry from a random assortment of short unconnected mail 
routes to a stable integrated nationwide airline system. He 
intended to expand passenger services and establish a self-
sufficient air transport industry. His plan was to set up three 
major transcontinental routes coordinated and integrated with 
several feeder routes. Brown felt that the smaller companies were 
under capitalized and nearly all of them completely dependent 
upon the government contracts for their survival. He was con-
- 12 -
vinced that the salutian was to. eliminate cempetitive bidding 
and to. use the mail pay to. suppart the carriers wham he censidered 
streng eneugh to. centribute to. the develepment ef cammercial 
aviatien. 
He was able to. achieve this by first awarding mail cantracts 
to. the lewest bidder who. shewed a daily aperatian fer a peried ef at 
least six menths aver a reute ef 250 miles in length and, secendly, 
threugh extensien ar censelidatio.n ef reutes which in his epinien 
were in the public interest. The previsien previding the sub-
stitutien ef mail centracts fer ten-year reute certificates had 
already been in existence. The extensian and censelidatien 
pravisian allawed the establishment ef majar transcentinental 
reutes. Finally, the ferm ef payment represented an indirect 
subsidy which enabled the carriers to. purchase and aperate larger 
aircraft and develep the passenger market. Mail centracts were 
nat necessarily awarded to. the lawest bidder because there was 
no. guarantee that the lewest bidder wauld be able to. survive the 
cut-threat campetitian. Hewever, cases when a cantract was given 
to. a larger carrier aver a smaller carrier the larger carrier was 
ebliged to. buy eut the smaller carrier at a "fair" price. 
Semewhat similar develepments were taking place in Eurape. 
Far example, the Empire Air Mail Scheme which included previsians 
that all mail dispatched to. er frem these parts ef the British 
Cemmanwealth served by Imperial Airways wauld autamatically be 
- 13 -
carried by air. This scheme enabled Imperial to intensify 
the services and capacity it offered in the knowledge that 
much of its payload was guaranteed. On this basis, Imperial 
Airways introduced faster aircraft with more frequent service. 
This program provided the carrier with sUbstantial subsidy for 
development in addition to reimbursement for the costs of trans-
porting mail. 
During early 1933, charges were made against Brown for 
collusion, illegal administration and unfair mail awards. A 
special investigating committee was set and hearings began in 
September 1933. Although during the investigation it became 
clear, among other things, that almost all of the mail contracts 
were awarded to three carriers, some writers claim that the invest-
igation did not probe deeply into the causes of Brown's actions 
or the sincerity of his national plan. The result of the invest-
igation was that the President cancelled all mail contracts 
held between the post Office Department and the private carriers. 
The Army Air Corps was asked to fly the mail. Severe weather 
and flying over unknown routes caused some fatal accidents with 
about a dozen deaths in the first few weeks. As a result of 
this the transportation of the mail was curtailed and finally 
came to a standstill in June, 1934. 
The Air Mail Act of 1934 set up a threefold control of the 
air transport industry in the United States. The air mail contracts 
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were to be awarded by the Post Office Department. The Interstate 
Commerce Commission was put in charge of setting "fair and reason-
able" rates for the transportation of air mail and the Bureau of 
Air Commerce in the Department of Commerce was made responsible 
for the regulation of safety. Under this Act, mail contracts were 
to be awarded on the basis of competitive bidding. Furthermore, 
the carriers involved in the previous "collusion" charges could 
not be awarded the contracts, a stipulation which caused the 
carriers to change their corporate names. In addition, the Act 
made holding companies illegal and, therefore, separated the histor-
ical affiliation between the major airlines and the aircraft manu-
facturers. Finally, the Act also established a five-man Federal 
Aviation Commission to study and recommend future aviation policy 
for the Federal Government. The most important recommendation of 
this commission was that a single independent agency should be 
created to regulate civil aviation. 
Meanwhile, on the international scene, the determination of 
landing rights at foreign ports was still the responsibility of 
the carrier, and Trippe with his position secure in Cuba, had 
been negotiating exclusive landing rights from the governments of 
the other Latin-American nations. A decision was made to offer 
flying boat services based out of Miami and this became the gate-
- 15 -
way to the Caribbean and Latin America. The use of flying 
, 
boats had two definite advantages: First, whereas airports 
were scarce, sheltered bodies of water were. plentiful; and 
second, the flying boats seemed to provide' a measure of safety 
in case of a forced landing at sea. 
Pan American expanded very aggressively through outright 
purchase of local airlines or companies if it proved necessary 
commercially and/or legally. For instance, having won rights to 
the Caribbean, Pan American proceeded to expand service to the 
west coast of South America and to Argentina. This was achieved 
through the formation of Pan American-Grace Airways, Inc., 
(Panagra) of which Pan American held 50 percent of the stock and 
w. R. Grace, the steamship company held the other 50 percent of 
the stock. The firm W. R. Grace and Company ran ships, banks, 
warehouses, stores, and dominated almost the entire economy on the 
west coast of South America. From the political and economic 
points of view, this proved to be a great asset for Pan Am's 
expansion. There were certain other advantages to the formation 
of Panagra, for example, the Grace Line steamers provided the 
radio weather service needed for air transportation. Similar 
acquisitions of airlines gave Pan American a dominance in Latin 
America. 
Negotiations for the North Atlantic route had begun as early 
as 1929 resulting in preliminary agreements to offer service twice 
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a week between the united states and England. However, the 
British insisted that Pan American could not offer the service 
until such time when a British carrier could also offer similar 
service. Since the British did not possess an appropriate com-
mercial aircraft capable of flying the North Atlantic, service 
was delayed. In the meantime, Trippe involved himself with 
establishing service on the Pacific. Survey flights were made 
as early as 1931. While the northern Great Circle route 
(Seattle-Alaska-Siberia-Japan) required landing permission from 
Russia and Japan, the central-Pacific route contained fueling 
points which were American possessions. The mid-Pacific route 
linked San Francisco and Manila via Hawaii, Midway, Wake and 
Guam. In October 1935, Pan American received the trans-Pacific 
mail contract for service from San Francisco to Manila (Philippines). 
The service was extended to passengers in 1936 and in 1937 the 
route was expanded to Hong Kong. By 1940, Pan Am had also ex-
panded its trans-Pacific route from Hawaii to New Zealand and 
Australia. 
On the u.S. domestic scene, the air transport industry was 
passing through a state of ruinous competition. Some carriers 
were submitting ridiculously low bids to obtain the air mail 
contracts and routes. Many of the smaller carriers could not bid 
against the giants, and public investment was beginning to shrink. 
Legislation was needed to financially stabilize the' industry by 
providing control of competition, assurance of the operation of 
the carrier, and an end to the confusion of responsibility 
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through the establishment of a single regulatory agency. 
The civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 placed the development, 
regulation and control of air carriers under the jurisdiction 
of a single independent administrative body later known as the 
Civil Aeronautics Board. This Act broadened the scope of safety 
regulation and subjected the airlines to economic regulation. 
The regulation of the industry was performed with "public interest" 
and "public convenience and necessity" as main considerations. 
The major functions of the CAB were to approve passenger fares, 
freight and mail rates, certificate carriers, monitor competition, 
and approve mergers and subsidies. 
Under the "grandfather" clause of the Civil Aeronautics Act 
of 1938, 16 remaining airlines were given permanent certificates 
of convenience and necessity for routes which each of them 
possessed at the date of adaptation of the Act. The Board also 
certificated the Railway Express Agency as an indirect air carrier 
with exemptions from the economic provisions of the Civil Aero-
nautics Act. The nonscheduled carriers were not required to have 
certificates of public convenience and necessity and were also 
exempt from economic regulation by the Board. 
Pan American introduced the first regular scheduled mail 
service on the Atlantic in May 1939, between New York, Lisbon and 
Marseilles. One month later a similar mail service was offered 
to England via Newfoundland and Ireland and in July of 1939 
passenger service was opened to both countries. The transatlantic 
crossing took approximately 29 hours using the Boeing 314 flying 
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boat. The British began a similar service in August. Initially, 
the passenger fare was set at $375 one way or $675 round trip. 
By 1940, the U.S. government's policy towards exchanging 
landing rights had changed. The landing privileges on international 
airports were to be negotiated by the Department of State and 
subject to presidential approval. The CAB was to decide as to 
which United States carrier should be authorized to operate the 
negotiated routes. This, in essence, put an end to Pan American's 
monopoly on negotiating and operating exclusive landing rights. 
with the beginning of World War II, pan American's projected 
expansion came to a halt. The U.S. government took over the trans-
atlantic operations with Pan American and American Export Airlines 
being the sole operators. Regular schedules were maintained on 
the Atlantic and the Pacific. Furthermore, a lot of the aircraft 
belonging to the U.S. domestic airlines were either purchased or 
leased by the government. With very few aircraft left in their 
hands, the carriers were forced into more efficient operations 
and greater utilization from their fleet on restricted routes 
which received service. Most of the airlines began to show 
profit during the war years due, basically, to high load factors, 
high utilization of equipment and elimination of discount fares 
such as for round trips and those offered to credit card holders. 
During the War normal airline operations were curtailed 
throughout Europe due to shortage of equipment or enemy action. 
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Passenger traffic dropped to about a third of the level achieved 
in 1939. Britain's air transport industry felt a very severe 
impact. The routes of BOAC had to be restructured completely: 
the Empire Route had to by-pass Europe and the North Atlantic 
service was discontinued while the carrier concentrated in keeping 
open critical lines of communication. The airlines of Allied 
countries were cooperative in transporting government officials, 
military personnel and supplies. In Germany Lufthansa's commercial 
operations were ended abruptly. 
The War was responsible for the rapid technical and operational 
development of transport aircraft. Many refinements were intro-
duced to the aircraft which were in existence prior to the War. 
Aircraft introduced during the War period such as the DC-4 and 
the Lockheed Constellation possess higher payload capacity, range 
and speed. Other areas where refinements were introduced rapidly 
included radio communication, navigational aids, instrument flying 
and airport facilities. 
Towards the end of the war, many nations were interested in 
formulating a universal international air transport pOlicy with 
regard to commercial air rights and in establishing rules governing 
technical and navigational aspects. In 1944, at the invitation 
of the United States, 54 nations sent their representatives to 
the Chicago Conference to formulate universal international air 
transport policy for international travel and commerce. Due to 
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the conflicting interests of the various nations present at the 
conference, an agreement was not reached to provide a means for 
exchanging commercial rights to fly in and out of independent nations. 
Basically, there were two conflicting views-- one of relatively com-
plete competitive freedom desired by the u.s. having the aircraft, 
experience, and finances to dominate such a state of affairs; and the 
other of rather heavily regulated operations supported by most other 
nations in their poor economic state following the War and fearing 
5 just such a U.S. dominance from which they might never escape. The 
British wanted to set up an international agency to control capacity, 
frequency and fares. The routes were to be assigned through bilateral 
agreements. The Americans, on the other hand, agreed that the routes 
should be negotiated through bilateral agreements, but the internation-
al agency should perform a consultative function only with respect to 
economic regulation. Instead they suggested, the agency should be re-
stricted to control the technical side of the air transportation. 
The outcome of the Conference was an establishment of the Inter-
national Air Services Transit Agreement and the Provisional Internat-
ional civil Aviation Organization (PICAO). The former agreement allow-
ed civil aircraft of the signatories to (a) fly across another nation's 
territory (if the nation was a participant to the agreement) without 
landing and (b) land for non-commercial purposes. The function of 
PICAO was to coordinate the activites of the nations signing any agree-
ment made at the Chicago Conference. 
5. See Robert Thornton - Reference 5 
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This organization was also to act as an arbitrator in case of 
conflicts between the various member states. PICAO, however, 
did not possess any economic powers to be applied to the inter-
national air transport industry. 
In 1945, the International Air Transport Association (lATA) 
was formally established at Havana, Cuba. This organization super-
seded the original one formed in 1919. Unlike the old organization, 
the principal function of the new lATA was to control rates on 
international routes. There are no provisions for controlling 
capacity or frequency. The extent of capacity was to be nego-
tiated in the bilateral agreements. In addition, some of the 
functions of the old lATA were still to be performed by the new 
lATA. The two most important provisions in the functioning of 
lATA with regard to controlling fares are: (1) a pro~osed tariff 
has to be approved unanimously by all the members (2) the approved 
tariff is still subject to the approval of the aeronautical 
agency of each of the member nations, which would be affected by 
the proposed tariff. 
Since the Chicago Conference did not result in an agreement 
to decide on a means of exchanging commercial rights, representa-
tives from Great Britain and the united States met in Bermuda in 
1946 to exchange operating rights between the two nations. The 
Bermuda Agreement resulted in the famous "five freedoms" of the 
air. The first two freedoms were essentially agreed at the 
Chicago conference, namely to fly across and to land for non-
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commercial purposes in another nation's territory. The remaining 
freedoms are: to disembark passengers and cargo in a foreign 
country which originated in the carrier's horne country; to pick 
up passengers and cargo from a foreign country destined for the 
carrier's horne country; to transport passengers and cargo from 
one foreign country to another foreign country. The freedom 
classification is based on the origin and destination of the 
passenger and the nationality of the airline and not the pas-
senger. For instance, a Canadian in London boarding a flight 
to Rome is a third freedom on a British carrier, fourth freedom 
on an Italian carrier and fifth freedom on a U.S., Canadian or 
a French carrier. 
Most countries were in favor of the Bermuda type of agree-
ment for exchanging international traffic rights for commercial 
civil aviation. The terms of the original Bermuda Agreement 
between the united Kingdom and the United States are fairly 
liberal. For example, the agreement did not include provisions 
for restricting frequencies or number·of carriers of either country. 
Since then, however, the policies of countries have changed. For 
instance, in 1966, a special bilateral agreement was signed be-
tween the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. to provide service between New 
York and Moscow. This agreement is different in format from the 
usual Bermuda type, since it contains provisions on the number of 
frequencies that may be operated between the two countries 
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as well as a designation of the carrier which may operate these 
flights. 
In international operations, a country may sometimes designate 
two or more national carriers to offer parallel services on a 
given route. The united states has authorized this type of 
designation on the North Atlantic. London is served, for example, 
by National, Pan Am, TWA, and Seaboard, the all-cargo carrier. 
The decision for multi-designation on an international route 
involves many factors, such as density of the route, the extent 
of traffic generated by each country, the market share of the 
carriers of each country, fifth freedom traffic, national interest, 
etc. While some of these factors are market related and based 
on simple economics, others are of a political nature and as such 
very difficult to evaluate. 
After the War, Pan American was a strong promoter of the 
"chosen instrument" concept. Under this concept, all international 
services were to be operated by a single carrier. Again the con-
cept involves many factors such as prestige, defense, public 
interest, competition with subsidized carriers, the value of the 
market, etc. In the united States, the Civil Aeronautics Board, 
however, favored competition. As early as 1942, American Export 
Airlines (a shipping company) was awarded a temporary certificate 
to offer transatlantic service. The Board justified this by 
saying that an additional carrier would improve the service and 
serve as a yardstick for comparison of costs. Soon after the war, 
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Pan American was given further competition when another u.s. 
carrier, TWA, and a number of foreign flag carriers were author-
ized to offer scheduled service on the North Atlantic. 
with expansion of routes, excess capacity, and heavy 
investment committed in larger and faster aircraft, the u.s. 
domestic air transport industry was facing economic crisis in 
1948. The scheduled carriers were facing another problem, that 
of competition from the nonscheduled carriers which came into 
existence at the end of the War. These nonscheduled operations 
were started by ex-military personnel who purchased the war-
surplus aircraft. The Board exempted these nonscheduled carriers 
from the economic regulation to carry passengers and/or property 
in the case of domestic operations and property only in the case 
of international operations on selected heavy traffic routes. 
The Board's exemption was based on the assumption that the service 
provided by these carriers would supplement the scheduled carriers. 
In order to improve the economic situation of the industry, the 
Board authorized high mail rates. This was supplemented by 
larger passenger traffic growth due to the introduction of lower 
fares, partly a result of the economics of larger and faster 
aircraft and partly due to management initiative in introducing 
differential pricing mechanisms such as coach-type service and 
family fare plans. 
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The other line of development in the aviation industry after 
the War, was the air freight. Although, in the united states 
the history of air freight dates back to 1930 when many companies 
made arrangements with the Railway Express Agency to transport 
packages on regularly scheduled flights, it was not until 1945 
that all-freight airlines came into existence. In 1947, the Board 
permitted ten all-cargo carriers to offer scheduled air freight 
transportation on a non-certificated basis. By 1949, six of 
these had declared bankruptcy and the remaining four were issued 
temporary certificates of public convenience and necessity to 
perform scheduled service. 
There are four other types of u.s. air carriers which need 
some explanation. First, there were carriers such as Alaska and 
Hawaiian Airlines which were located in the u.s. overseas ter-
ritories. Since Hawaii and Alaska did not enter the Union until 
1959, and for other reasons of special operating rights with 
respect to other U.s. airlines, these carriers were not classified 
under the category of domestic. Even tOday they are classified 
as Intra-Alaska or Intra-Hawaii carriers and both carriers possess 
the Board's permanent route certificates. Secondly, after the 
War, there was yet another category of carriers called the intra-
state carriers. The operations of these carriers were restricted 
to within state borders and regulated by the state's Public 
utilities Commission. These carriers were exempt from the Board's 
regulations. Third, in 1952, the CAB authorized a group of small 
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irregular carriers to offer service between communities not 
served by scheduled airlines to points receiving scheduled air-
line service. These carriers, called the air-taxi operators or 
commuter carriers in their scheduled form, offering service with 
aircraft weighing less than 12,500 pounds were also exempt from the 
Board's Economic Regulations. 
The fourth category of carriers consisted of the helicopter 
air service operators. The Helicopter Air Service Program started 
in the united States after the War with subsidies to helicopter 
carriers in a few major cities for the carriage of mail. until 
1953, the three United States helicopter carriers carried no 
passengers at all and their sole source of transport revenue was 
from mail. In the early years the subsidy exceeded overall trans~ 
port revenues, but as passenger traffic increased, it passed sub-
sidy levels by 1964. The subsidy was completely cut off by the 
end of 1965 and the major trunk airlines were persuaded to supply 
financial aid to the helicopter carriers. Since most of the heli-
copter passengers were airline connecting passengers, the rationale 
for this action lay in offering better services for the airline 
passengers with the costs to be borne by the profits of the trunk-
line industry. 
In Europe, BEA and Sabena made significant inroads in the 
development of helicopter service. BEA started the scheduled 
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helicopter passenger service in 1950. Over the years, many 
routes were tried on an experimental basis and most of these 
proved to' be unprofitable because of excessive costs. Although 
Sabena was far more successful in its helicopter passenger service, 
the carrier had to curtail the operations for economy and other 
non-market reasons. The year 1958 was a boom year when,due 
largely to the Brussels World Fair,the helicopter services 
carried over 50,000 passengers and an additional 65,000 sight-
6 
seeing passengers over Brussels. 
By October of 1951, ten domestic trunk carriers had gone 
off federal subsidy. For those still receiving subsidy, the CAB 
announced that a separation should be made between service mail 
payments and subsidy mail payments. For the Big Four trunks 
American, Eastern, TWA, and United, the Board established a 
domestic service mail rate of 45 cents per ton-mile. Four years 
later the Board developed a uniform service mail rate structure 
called "multi-element rate formula." This was a two part rate 
structure consisting of a line haul charge per mail ton-mile 
and a terminal charge per pound of mail enplaned, varied according 
to the class of station served. 
In Europe, after the war, the air transport industry grew 
very rapidly. Most of the route network consisted of pairs of 
airlines enjoying third and fourth freedom rights and even today 
6. World Airline Record - Reference 6, page 205. 
" 
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there are usually only two dominant airlines on any given city-
pair. until about 1950. there was heavy competition between 
the two carriers. This was considered wasteful rivalry and was 
gradually eliminated and replaced on many routes by a system of 
commercial agreements between the airlines. generally known as 
pool agreements. pool agreements generally tend to reduce com-
petition and provide the carriers with high equipment and personnel 
utilization as well as high load factors. Economics can result 
through more uniform scheduling instead of "bunching" flights at 
peak demand periods. It is claimed by some that pooling agree-
ments provide the passenger with a more uniform service at a 
lower price. This is debatable. The terms of the agreement can 
include sharing of revenue. capacity. costs. and can also include 
joint marketing studies. promotion and sale. etc. The extent of 
the agreement varies from carrier to carrier and the agreements 
are usually tied to the national agreements between the respective 
7 
countries. According to the Edwards Report. BEA for example. 
earns roughly 60 percent of its total revenue fvom commercial 
agreements. These agreements are not necessarily restricted to 
intra-European operations. For instance. the "Kangaroo" route 
which links England with India and Australia is operated through 
a tripartite agreement between BOAC. Qantas and Air India. The 
7. Edwards Report - Reference 7. Page 95. 
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distribution of revenue is based on a sophisticated formula 
which takes into account traffic on the various segments as 
well as the connecting traffic at various points. 
These pool agreements generally apply only to the third and 
fourth freedom traffic. Within Europe ~ifth freedom traffic is 
generally limited. There is yet another type of traffic called 
cabotage. This refers to the transportation of passengers by a 
foreign carrier between two cities in the territory of one state 
or its dependencies. For instance, BOAC carrying passengers 
originating at New York to Los Angeles would be referred to as 
cabotage traffic. Another example of this would be for Pan Am 
to carry traffic originating in London to Bermuda. The German 
internal service operated by foreign carriers is sometimes 
confused with cabotage traffic; here however, the peace treaty 
Which followed West Germany regaining its sovereignty prohibited 
Lufthansa from offering service to West Berlin and this service 
was offered by Air France, BEA and Pan Am. This is not cabotage 
traffic. However, there were some other routes within West 
Germany which were operated by the foreign carriers, which was 
cabotage and is now practically non-existent. 
A large number of the scheduled airlines, with the exception 
of the United States air carriers, are partially or wholly owned 
by their governments. The extent of government ownership can 
range from a small percentage as in the case of Finnair (about 
6 percent) to a complete control as in the case of BOAC, Qantas, 
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Air Canada, Air India, etc. Presently, out of the 107 lATA 
member carriers, 37 are completely privately-owned and forty are 
completely state-owned. Table 1 shows the extent of state owner-
ship for the lATA member carriers. 
The reasons for public ownership vary from political philosophy 
to market related factors. In England, for example, one reason 
for nationalization of the airlines was that these carriers were 
unable to compete with the subsidized foreign carriers. The 
size of the carrier is usually not the reason for public owner-
ship; it is also important to keep in mind that private ownership, 
in the case of an international airline still involves government 
participation for at least two reasons. First, the carrier can 
prove to be a very useful element of national defense, and 
second, the carrier needs the government to negotiate bilateral 
agreements with other nations for landing rights. 
Some analysts have attempted to find the relationship between 
government ownership and profitability. So far there is no 
conclusive evidence that government ownership leads to inefficient 
operations, lower profitability, etc. In fact, several govern-
ment owned airlines have consistently shown profitable operations. 
In most cases, complete or partial public ownership also does not 
imply that these carriers exist solely to provide social services, 
carry the national flag, receive protection from competition and 
pay very little attention to the cost of providing the service. 
Number of Carriers 
37 
9 
13 
8 
40 
TOTAL 107 
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TABLE 1 
Extent of State ownership 
lATA Member Carriers 
Percent State 
0 
1 - 49 
50 - 89 
90 - 99 
100 
Source: lnteravia November 1971 - Reference 8. 
Ownership 
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In many cases the nationalized airlines are eventually expected to 
pay their own way. 
Joint ownerships are quite common in the airline industry. For 
example, in 1946, TWA acquired a 35 percent common stock interest in 
the Greek Company, Technical and Aeronatuical Exploitations. in exchange 
for financial and technical assistance. In the same year, BEA held 
30 percent interest in Alitalia. There are many reasons for holding 
financial interests in other airlines. These can range from pure 
commercial investment reasons to obtaining feeder traffic. developing 
new routes, and establishing an outlet for retired aircraft. 
The establishment of airlines in many of the smaller or less 
developed countries was strongly influenced by non-economic or non-
market factors. In many cases, the airlines were supported by the 
government for reasons such as national prestige and national defense. 
On the economic grounds, these international services are usually 
justified for such reasons as earning foreign exchange and developing 
tourism. In many cases the development of these airlines was enhanced 
significantly by the foreign aid through agencies such as the United 
states Export-Import Bank, I CAD , World Bank, A.I.D., etc. The United 
States, for instance. has provided low interest loans to purchase 
united states manufactured aircraft. Some of 
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the European countries have also provided similar sort of aid in 
the past. Besides financial aid, the airlines of these less 
developed nations have been given support in areas such as pilot 
training, technical services, management consultation, etc. The 
benefits gained by the nations providing aid and the airlines 
providing support have been mentioned previously. 
By the mid-1950's, the airline industry in the united States 
could be considered as established. In 1955, the CAB granted 
permanent certificates of public convenience and necessity to 
the local carriers. TWO years later, the CAB was authorized to 
guarantee loans to assist carriers to purchase flight equipment. 
The amount of loan was limited to 5 million dollars per carrier 
and maximum of 90 percent of the loan could be guaranteed. The 
following year, new legislation was introduced permitting the 
subsidized air carriers to retain profits from the sale of flight 
equipment on the conditions that the profits were reinvested in 
new equipment within a reasonable period of time. 
The Federal Aviation Act of 1958 amended and replaced the 
Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938. The safety rule making function 
was transferred to the newly created Federal Aviation Agency, 
while the regulation of civil aircraft accidents still remained 
the responsibility of the Civil Aeronautics Board. Parallel 
developments in streamlining the regulatory aspects of air 
transportation were taking place in many other countries of the 
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world. For instance, Britain's civil Aviation (Licensing) Act of 
1960 established the Air Transport Licensing Board to approve app-
lications for operating licenses and regulate domestic fares in the 
united Kingdom. 
The type of regulation applied to the airlines in the united 
, 
states should not be taken as typical. For instance, the Austral-
ian civil air transport policy has been quite unique. presently 
the Australian airline industry is basically made up of three air-
lines: Qantas, a public-owned carrier operating international ser-
vices onl~ and two competitive domestic airlines, a private corpor-
ation called Ansett Airlines and a government-owned carrier called 
Trans-Australia Airlines. Under the civil Aviation Agreement of 
1957 and the Airlines Equipment Act of 1958, the government not 
only controls competition, but exercises a tight control on the 
commercial management decisions. For example. neither TAA or An-
sett can purchase a new aircraft without the specific approval of the 
government, while each carrier is also supposed to inform the other 
of its decisions to purchase new equipment. The approval is granted 
if the regulatory authority considers that the new equipment will 
not result in excess capacity or produce a competitive edge for 
one of the carriers. In case of excess capacity, the authority 
can force the carrier(s) to review their fleets. 
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Although, research and development of the jet engine was well 
under way during and even prior to World War II, it was not until 
1952 that the public was offered commercial jet service by BOAC 
(which, unfortunately had to be withdrawn shortly after for technical 
reasons.) In 1956 the Russians introduced the TU-l04. The year 
1958 is, however, referred to as the "jet revolution" year when Pan 
American introduced the Boeing 707 on the North Atlantic, in Octo-
ber 1958, three weeks after BOAC introduced the second version of 
their jet, the DeHavilland Comet 4. For almost a full year there 
were no other competitors on the North Atlantic with jet aircraft 
until September and November of 1959 when QANTAS and TWA introduced 
the Boeing 707's. On the domestic side, National Airlines was the 
first to offer jet service in the united states, on December 1958, 
the carrier offered jet service on the New York-Miami route with 
a B-707 leased from Pan American Airways. A month later American 
put in a 707 on the transcontinental route, TWA entered the market 
in March, and united intrOduced the DC-8 in september of 1959 on 
this route. 
Up to this point, the emphasis has been upon scheduled ser-
vices, domestic and international, however of increasing importance 
has been the development of mass travel on non-scheduled or charter 
services due to the lower fares relative to scheduled services. 
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The scheduled air services have catered to this demand through ex-
cursion fares and other forms of differential pricing, however the 
lower costs obtainable through non-scheduled air travel have resulted 
in a tremendous growth in this form of air transportation. 
The growth of non-scheduled air carriers started after World 
War II on both sides of the Atlantic, dependent largely upon the 
carriage of military cargo and troops for their survival. However 
before long the European carriers began to vigorously promote civil-
ian commercial operations, in particular the inclusive tour charter. 
In an inclusive tour charter, a travel agent produces a "complete 
package" containing air travel, hotel <;l.ccommodations, ground trans-
portation, etc. and by arranging schedules to ensure full plane loads, 
the operators are able to offer packages at a c~nsiderably lower price 
compared to the price of air travel on scheduled carriers. By open-
ing the air travel market to the lower income groups, the charter 
operators were able to achieve tremendous growth rates. 
Prodded by the tremendous demand and realizing the economic 
importance of tourism, the European States formulated a Multilat-
eral Agreement on Commercial Rights of Non-Scheduled Air Services 
in Europe at Paris in 1956. This agreement greatly facilitated the 
growth of inclusive tour travel between the 19 signatories, while 
attempting to protect their scheduled services. 
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The low price of the lTC's allowed the lower income workers in North-
ern Europe to holiday in the sunny South, with air travel to and from 
the resorts making such a vacation possible within the short time 
periods available to them. A number of combining factors meant that 
the united States was much slower in responding to this development 
and lTC's were not permitted until the mid-sixties while military 
charters still represent a significant proportion of the supplemen-
tal carriers' revenue. 
Similar to the scheduled carriers, the United States charter 
carriers are owned privately. In Europe, although the charter op-
erators are not owned directly by the state, many of them are owned 
by the national carrier which in turn is partially or wholly owned 
by the state. This is a critical issue regarding competition not 
only between charter operators and scheduled airlines in Europe, 
but between United States scheduled and European scheduled carriers. 
In the United States, scheduled airlines have not been allowed to 
own subsidiaries which offer charter services, although they may 
do so themselves. 
Interesting agreements such as these were not always set up 
in Europe. A different, but interesting agreement was formed by the 
major airlines in the united States. In 1959, six U.S. carriers, 
American,Capitol, Eastern, Pan American, TWA and united entered 
into an agreement called the Air Carrier Mutual Aid Pact. 
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This agreement provides for financial assistance in case of a strike. 
The arrangement calls for payment to the struck carrier of any in-
creased "windfall" revenues which they receive as a result of handl-
ing the struck carrier's business less the additional expense of 
handling such increased traffic. In addition. more recently the 
CAB has allowed some carriers to cooperatively restrict capacity 
on certain routes. 
In general the united states policy reflected free trade. This 
has been made fairly clear in the various reports on the U.S. inter-
national air transport policy released in 1963 and 1970. The policy 
was essentially non-protectionist. promoting reasonable rates and 
equal opportunities for U.S. carriers in route exchanges with for-
eign nations. and opposing arbitrary capacity restrictions. Other 
significant recommendations were to retain a balance of U.S flag 
competition on the North Atlantic. have more than one U.S. inter-
national air carrier and oppose pooling agreements with foreign 
carriers. 
In Europe. cooperative agreements regarding maintenance and 
spare parts had begun as early as 1958. with the introduction of 
jet aircraft. Initially SAS and Swissair signed an agreement to 
coordinate equipment policy and pool resources in terms of operat-
ing w9rkshops and technical organizations. By 1969. the agreement 
had been extended to include two other carriers. KLM. and UTA. to 
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form the KSSU group. Under the new program, KLM was to provide air-
frame maintenance for the B-747 and SAS was responsible for the engine 
maintenance. This type of cooperation provides the carrier with a 
small fleet with the advantages of a large fleet. 
One other form of cooperative agreement which is significant 
is the concept of "blocked-space" agreement. Under this concept, 
a developing carrier with insufficient funds to invest in a large 
(leet and to minimize the financial risk involved in purchasing 
aircraft, can block space on another line to be sold under its 
corporate identity. For example, in 1969 Austrian Airlines 
entered into a pool agreement with Sabena to offer service on the 
North Atlantic. Under this scheme, Sabena operated a daily B-707 
flight from Vienna to New York via Brussels. Austrian Airlines 
blocked half of the cargo capacity for its use and paid Sabena half 
the operating costs of the flight, and a fee for each passenger 
handled. The flag carrier of Portugal, TAP, had negotiatied a similar 
blocked space agreement with Alitalia in 1966 to offer service be-
tween Lisbon am New York. 
The mid-sixties not only set the pace for jet operations, but 
also began to focus on the supersonic aircraft. Pan American, BOAC, 
and Air France placed firm orders for the Concorde supersonic air-
craft. Besides these three international air carriers, a U.s. dom-
estic carrier, continental Air Lines, also placed an order for three 
Concorde air,,·raft. In the meantime, two airframe manufacturers and 
two engine manufacturers undertook the design studies on the U.S. SST 
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for the Federal Aviation Agency. The major portion of the cost of re-
search and development was to be borne by the united States Federal Gov-
ernment. Boeing and General Electric were selected to design the united 
States SST. This team won the competition but the project was abandoned 
in 1971 for political, environmental, and socio-economic reasons. 
The mid-sixties once again witnessed a further streamlining of 
the transportation planning process in the united States. The Depart-
ment of Transportation was created to provide total transportation 
planning, policy guidance and protection of public interest with the 
aim of achieving an integrated national transportation system based 
on economic criteria and not modal preferences. Prior to this organ-
ization, there were numerous uncoordinated modally oriented transpor-
tation agencies with virtually non-existent common goals. These 
agencies were generally unstructured and without sufficient authority 
to develop a national transportation system effectively. The Depart-
ment was given the responsibility of coordinating transportation pro-
grams, providing transportation leadership, cooperating and coordinat.-
ing transportation projects with federal, state, and local government 
agencies, and identifying prodigious transportation problems. 
Parallel efforts took place in Canada, where the National Trans-
portation Act of 1967 created the present Canadian Transport Commiss-
ion to coordinate the development, regulation and control of the 
total transportation system; and in the united Kingdom where the Civil 
Aviation Authority (CAA) came into being in April of this year (1972) 
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with much the same powers but for aviation only. The functions of 
these Agencies are somewhat similar to those of the united States De-
partment of Transportation as well as the Civil Aeronautics Board. 
In this paper most of the attention has been devoted to the devel-
opment of the air passenger transportation industry. Although the 
growth of air cargo has been very significant in the past, its con-
tribution to the total revenue of the carriers is still fairly small. 
On the average, for all scheduled airlines taken together, approximately 
ten percent of the revenue is derived from air cargo. According to 
8 
one report less than one half of a percent of the total cargo moves 
by air. The same report estimates that if the bulk cargo such as oil, 
coal minerals, etc, is excluded then the share of cargo transported by 
air increases to almost four percent. In the past a large part of the 
air cargo has been emergency cargo. The stable cargo has in the past 
been restricted to goods of high value, fragility and perishability. 
The most crucial factor in air cargo is, of course, the cost. It 
is now a generally accepted fact that roughly half of the cost of 
handling cargo is on the ground: loading, unloading, storing, documen-
tation, etc. Recently, effort has been focused on reducing these ground 
handling costs. 9 For instance, according to one detailed study, a 
typical international shipment requires the preparation and processing 
of an average of 46 documents of which nine involve the carrier directly. 
8. Interavia - Reference 8. 
9. Committee on International Trade Documentation - Reference 9. 
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Efforts to reduce ground handling costs in the past have been in the 
areas of containerization, computerized documentation systems, etc. 
Another critical and unfortunately unsolved problem is in the area of 
rates. So far no carrier or government agency has been able to set 
rates which take into account adequately, the cost, the value and the 
market elements of air cargo. The solutions to these problems will 
expand the air cargo market and its contribution to the total revenue 
of the air transport industry. 
Although direct subsidy is non-existent with major airlines, in-
directly the airlines are still aided a great deal by the governments. 
In most cases, the full cost of navigational and terminal services is 
still not recovered from the air carriers, but supported by national 
and regional governments. Since the Chicago Conference of 1944, much 
work has been done by ICAO to try to coordinate and standardize the 
charges made for airport and their facilities are open to use by any-
one, the governments have had much trouble distinguishing between the 
services offered to different users. As a consequence, it is debat-
able whether the airlines have paid their full way on the ground or 
in the air. 
Recently more accurate allocation of airports and navigational 
costs have become critical issues. In Europe, for example, an organ-
ization called Eurocontrol operates navigational facilities in the 
upper airspace and makes a charge for such services. In the united 
States the Airport and Airways Development Act of 1970 imposed new and in-
creased aviation user charges to be used for expansion and improvement 
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of the airport and airway system. In addition, some airports have 
sought to meet their costs through "head taxes" levied on arriving 
and/or departing passengers. Recently, an agreement .was reached in 
the united States to prohibit such state and local airport head taxes. 
During this relatively short period of roughly sixty years, the 
., 
progress in the commercial air transport industry has been spectacular. 
In 1970, over 300 million passengers were carried by the scheduled 
international and domestic carriers belonging to lATA. Today, the 
operating revenue of the United States airline industry is about ten 
billion dollars. We can expect even greater progress with the forth-
coming supersonic age and the increasing growth of tourism with its 
mass travel implications. 
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Abstract 
A review of the roles of the various federal agencies in 
the regulation, control, and development of the Air System, with 
major emphasis on the Department of Transportation (Office of the 
Secretary, Federal Aviation Administration, and National Trans-
portation Safety Board) and the Civil Aeronautics Board. 
The Federal Government plays a central role in the develop-
ment, finance and operation of the united States Air Transportation 
System. Figure I shows some of the functional relationships be-
tween the Government and the other major institutions that are 
parts of the system. Although local and state governments play 
a minor role (through the imposition of local taxes or participa-
tion in airport ownership and management), the national govern-
ment is the primary source of political influence and legal con-
trol. 
Figure 2 shows the government organizations that impact the 
air system and how they fit into the federal structure. The 
united States constitution is the ultimate source of all author-
ity. It allocates governmental functions between the Courts, the 
Congress and the President. In turn, the legislative and execu-
tive branches create and appoint personnel to the independent 
agencies which are in essence a fourth branch of government -
the administrative branch. Each branch interacts with the others, 
and each plays a particular role. 
THE ROLE OF THE COURTS 
The Courts are not involved in the day-to-day affairs of 
the air system. Their major function is the supervision of 
other governmental bodies through the judicial settlement of 
disputes as they arise. In addition to the resolution of con-
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flicts involving the federal government, the Courts settle liti-
gation between the other institutions that make up the system -
the users, manufacturers, airlines, etc. JUdicial decisions may 
have major impact and long range policy implications, but since 
they only arise when parties bring particular disputes before 
the Courts, one cannot say that these decisions play a decisive 
or prominent role in shaping air transportation. 
THE ROLE OF THE LEGISLATURE 
Under Article I, Section 3 of the Constitution, the Congress 
has the power to regulate commerce among the states. Therefore, 
the legislature is the major source of air system policy. How-
ever, Congress, like the courts, does not participate in the day-
to-day affairs of the system. Rather, through legislation, it 
establishes policy and delegates the implementation of that 
policy to executive or independent agencies. Through Congres-
sional hearings, it periodically reviews the impact of its legis-
lation and will make modifications only when necessary. 
Perhaps the most important function of Congress is the con-
trol of appropriations sought by the operating agencies. In this 
way, the legislature can exert pressure on both the administrative 
and executive bodies that are charged with policy implementation. 
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General Accounting Office (GAO) 
The General Accounting Office 1S an independent agency in 
the legislative branch of the government established to assist 
the Congress in controlling the receipt, disbursement and appli-
cation of public funds. In general, the audit authority of the 
GAO extends to all departments and agencies of the Federal Govern-
ment. Through audits, the GAO monitors the ways in which agencies 
are discharging their financial responsibilities, the efficiency 
of operations and program management, and whether Government 
programs are achieving the purposes intended by Congress. This 
monitoring activity also extends to state and local governments, 
quasi-governmental bodies and private organization~ when they 
receive or administer federal funds. 
By law, federal agencies are required to pay on presentment 
bills for freight and transportation services furnished by car-
riers subject to the Interstate Commerce of Federal Aviation 
Acts. These payments must be made even if not aUdited. The GAO 
monitors these transactions, and is responsible for determining 
the propriety of the rates and classifications billed, recover-
ing overcharges and settling transportation claims brought for 
or against the government. 
THE ROLE OF THE PRESIDENT 
Article II, Section I of the Constitution vests the execu-
# 
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tive power of government in the President. In addition, the 
President has specific authority and responsibility covering a 
large range of topics conferred by statute. In general, he is 
charged with the implementation of federal policy, which he per-
forms both through the Executive Office of the President and the 
Executive Departments. 
The Executive Office 
Many special and general purpose agencies are administra-
tively grouped into the Executive Office. They provide various 
services and functions to assist the President in his administra-
tion and executive duties. Several of these agencies can have 
major impact on the air system. 
council on Environmental Quality -- The Council was estab-
lished by the National Environmental policy Act of 1969 to formu-
late and recommend national policies to promote and improve the 
quality of the environment. Its recommendations on aircraft 
noise and pollution could have great influence on the future of 
air transportation. 
Domestic Council -- Through ad hoc project committees set 
up to deal with both broad program areas and specific problems, 
the Domestic Council formulates and coordinates domestic policy 
recommendations to the President. It assesses national needs and 
coordinates the establishment of national priorities, recommends 
integrated sets of policy choices and provides a rapid response 
~ 
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to Presidential needs for policy advice on pressing domestic 
issues. The Council also maintains a continuous policy review 
of on-going programs. 
National Aeronautics and Space Council (NASC) -- Created 
along with NASA by the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 
1958, the NASC is composed of the Vice president, the Secretaries 
of State, Defense and Transportation, the Administrator of NASA, 
and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. An Executive 
Secretary administers the affairs of the Council assisted by a 
small staff. 
The functions of NASC are to advise and assist the Presi-
dent regarding policies, plans and programs in aeronautics and 
space. The Council develops comprehensive programs for such 
activities and fixes the responsibilities of the agencies involved. 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) -- OMB is the Presi-
dent's financial watchdog. It also provides valuable interagency 
coordination and review. In the financial area, OMB assists the 
President in improving the efficiency and economical conduct of 
GOvernment services, and in the preparation and formulation of 
the budget and fiscal programs. It supervises and controls the 
administration of the budget. OMB also conducts research into 
new modes of administrative management. 
In the area of interagency review, OMB clears and coordinates 
departmental positions on proposed legislation and monitors the 
50 
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progress of activities so that the work programs of all the execu-
tive agencies may be coordinated and so that Congressional appro-
priations can be expended in the most economical manner with the 
least overlap and duplication of effort. 
OMB also promotes and coordinates Federal and other statis-
tical services, and plans and develops information systems to 
monitor program performance. 
Office of Science and Technology (OST) -- OST assists the 
President in the development of technical programs and evaluating 
and coordinating technical activities to assure that science and 
technology are used most effectively in the general welfare. 
Specific tasks include the assessment of selected scientific and 
technical developments and programs and the evaluation of their 
impact on national policies. OST also maintains close relations 
with the Nation's scientific and engineering communities so they 
will continue to participate in the strengthening of the national 
technology base. 
Special Commissions -- Special boards, committees and com-
missions are created from time to time for special purposes and 
administratively report to the Executive Office of the President. 
Some examples are: 
Export Administration Review Board 
Federal Safety Council 
President's Science Advisory Committee 
Aviation Advisory Commission 
5\ 
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These commissions are composed of experts from industry and 
government with full-time staff support. Generally, they under-
take a specific important task, and are dissolved when their work 
is completed. 
The Executive Departments 
The Department of Agriculture -- In addition to its more 
traditional duties, the Department locates, operates and admin-
isters airports in the national forest; contracts for aerial ser-
vices such as seeding, spraying and fire fighting; and through 
participation in CAB proceedings, the Department seeks to secure 
adequate air service for its forests. The Department also oper-
ates inspection and quarantine stations for plants and animals at 
airports of entry and assures the humane treatment of animals 
moving in interstate commerce by air. 
The Department of Commerce -- Through the United states 
Travel Service, the Department encourages foreign travel to the 
United States, and controls the export of aircraft and related 
equipment. It also disseminates technical data abroad and en-
courages U.S. businesses to seek foreign contracts. 
Through the Bureau of the Census and the Coast and Geodedic 
Survey, the Department provides population and geographic data 
essential for airport siting and planning. Through the National 
Weather Service, the Department provides the weather information 
vital to aircraft operations. 
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The Department of Defense (DOD) -- The role of the DOD in 
the development of the air system cannot be minimized. Through 
technology spin-off, DOD projects have provided the scientific 
and technical base for many major developments in civil aviation. 
In addition to the technology spin-offs, it is a prime source of 
trained aviation personnel who have completed military service. 
The DOD is also a customer for air services. It contracts 
with carriers for the movement of its personnel and equipment 
and thus provides a major source of income to them, particularly 
the supplementals. In connection with its purchases of air ser-
vices, the DOD appears before the CAB in matters relating to 
military tariffs. 
Department of Health, Education and Welfare -- The Depart-
ment provides quarantine functions at airports of entry to pro-
tect against the import of contagious human diseases and to en-
force interstate quarantine and health regulations. 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) -- HUD pro-
vides funds for regional and urban planning including research on 
zoning, land-use planning and airport planning. It can finance 
studies of urban access problems, but research on rapid mass 
transit to airports is primarily performed by the Urban Mass 
Transit Administration. 
The Department of the Interior -- The Department controls 
the use of airports in national parks, monuments and recreational 
53 
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areas. Through participation in CAB proceedings, the Department 
attempts to ensure adequate service to these areas as well as 
for the Pacific Trust Territories which it helps administer. 
The Department of Justice The Department has several 
functions that directly relate to the air system. First, through 
the Immigration and Naturalization Service, it maintains offices 
at airports of entry to monitor the transit of aliens and foreign 
nationals. Second, Justice enforces nondiscriminatory practices 
in the air industry by prosecuting violations. Third, Justice 
provides enforcement when needed for the rules of air safety such 
as transport of dangerous items and interference with the pilot. 
Finally, the Justice Department takes an active role in merger 
proceedings before the Civil Aeronautics Board and enforces anti-
trust laws against manufacturers and suppliers. The Civil Aero-
nautics Act of 1938 exempts the air carriers subject to the Act 
from the anti-trust laws and substitutes CAB supervision. How-
ever, the other institutions in the air system are subject to 
prosecutions for anti-trust violations. 
The Department of Labor -- The major role of the Labor De-
partment is in the enforcement of policies on minimum wages, 
limitations on hours of work and the employment of minorities. 
It also provides statistical information on employment and spon-
sors some limited vocational and training programs. 
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Department of State -- The State Department is primarily 
involved in the international aspects of air transportation, par-
ticularly as they affect united States manufacturers and carriers. 
Through the Agency for International Development (AID) it explores 
the potential for air transportation systems in underdeveloped 
countries. State promotes international agreements on air traf-
fic control and airspace standards and facilitates cooperation 
for international weather data collection and dissemination. 
The State Department issues passports and visas for travel 
to and from the United States. Through the Office of the Deputy 
Assistant Secretary for Transportation and Telecommunications, 
the Department formulates policy recommendations and negotiates 
foreign air transportation agreements. 
The Treasury Department -- TWo bureaus of the Treasury af-
fect the air system. The Bureau of the Customs conducts all 
customs operations at airports of entry to the United States. 
The Bureau of Internal Revenue establishes depreciation policies 
that affect the purchase of aircraft, and sets the policy for 
taking deductions for business travel. The latter can affect 
the use of corporate aircraft and the overall volume of travel. 
The Postal Service -- The Postal Service is one of the air-
lines' largest customers. Although mail rates for certified car-
riers are set by the Civil Aeronautics Board, the postal Service 
has a great deal of control over the amount and timing of airmail 
movements. ~-:;5 
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In addition, the Postal Service can negotiate contracts with 
third level carriers to carry mail to small communities not re-
ceiving regular certificated air service. These postal contracts 
are of major importance to the small operator. 
THE ROLE OF THE INDEPENDENT AGENCIES 
The independent agencies are created by Congress to perform 
a particular duty defined in the authorizing statute. Normally, 
members of the agency are appointed by the President with the 
advice and consent of the Senate, and once appointed, remain in 
office either for their specified term or until they resign. 
Although there is removal power, it can only be exercised if the 
agency member is guilty of major misconduct in office. 
So once the agency is established and its members appointed, 
in theory it is independent of the other branches of government. 
However, the President can exert great political pressure, and 
one can assume that members appointed by the President in office 
may favor his ideas and policies. Likewise, Congress exerts 
pressures through financial and budget appropriations and through 
the threat of amending or revoking the statutory authority that 
originally set up the agency. The Courts also exert some control 
over agency action by review of decisions on appeal. 
The distinction between members of an agency and agency 
staff must be made clear. All the independent agencies have 
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staff to perform day-to-day functions and support agency members. 
In many organizations, the staff may perform research and make 
policy recommendations. It may even appear as an independent 
party in agency proceedings. However, recommendations of the 
staff are not binding on the agency members who make the actual 
decisions. For example, it is not uncommon for the Civil Aero-
nautics Board Staff to take positions that are completely con-
trary to the final decision of the Board members. 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) -- To date, the EPA 
has not had major impact on the air system, deferring most en-
vironmental matters involving aviation to the Federal Aviation 
Administration. However, there are indications that this may not 
hold true in the future. EPA has a variety of research, monitor-
ing, standard-setting and enforcement activities related to noise 
and chemical pollution abatement and control. It is logical that 
these activities will in some way be extended to aviation if a 
truly systematic attack is to be made on environmental problems. 
Whether the EPA assumes some of these roles itself, or merely 
serves as an advisor and consultant to the FAA, it will play an 
important role in air system development. 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) -- The Com-
mission has two purposes: (1) to end discrimination based on 
race, color, religion, sex or national origin in the hiring, pro-
motion, firing, wages, testing, training, apprenticeship and all 
S7 
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other conditions of employment; and (2) to promote voluntary ac-
tion programs by employers, unions and community organizations to 
put equal employment opportunity into actual operation. The Com-
mission participates in the investigation and enforcement of 
actions arising from unlawful discrimination. 
Export-Import Bank -- The Bank aids in the financing and 
export of commodities from the united states to foreign countries. 
It supplements rather than competes with private financing and 
plays a major role in the foreign sale of aviation hardware. A 
more complete description of its functions can be found elsewhere 
in these proceedings. 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) -- The FCC is charged 
with the frequency management of telecommunications activities. 
In particular, it licenses and regulates radio broadcasts for 
aviation and emergency purposes. 
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service -- The Service 
assists parties to labor disputes where the industry affects 
interstate commerce, to settle such disputes through mediation 
and conciliation. The Service possesses no law enforcement author-
ity. but depends wholly on~ersuasive techniques. Whenever in its 
judgement, a dispute threatens to cause a substantial interruption 
of interstate commerce, the Service can offer its services either 
on its own incentive or at the request of one or more of the 
parties. The Service is involved with all industries auxiliary 
5~ 
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to the airlines including manufacturers or concessionaries, but 
does not take an active role in disputes involving the airlines, 
since they are covered by the Railway Labor Act. 
General Services Administration (GSA) -- The GSA manages the 
property (and records) of the government, including the construc-
tion and operation of buildings, procurement and distribution of 
supplies, disposal of surplus property, traffic and communica-
tions management, stock piling of strategic and critical materials 
and the creation, preservation and disposal of records. 
In particular, the GSA manages the government's Transporta-
tion and Communications Service (TCS) which performs traffic 
management for civil executive agencies. The TCS represents 
these agencies in negotiations with carriers and in hearings of 
regulatory bodies. It also develops policies, procedures and 
regulations for the procurement and utilization of transportation 
services. 
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) -- The ICC participates 
with the CAB in establishing air cargo pickup and delivery zones. 
It has also developed a policy with the CAB, to limit or prevent 
transmodal transportation systems and intermodal ownership and 
control of transportation companies. 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) NASA's 
primary programs in aeronautics are managed by the Office of 
Aeronautics and Space Technology and the research centers assigned 
5q 
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to it. The efforts include research and advanced technological 
development of aircraft and associated electronics. The primary 
centers are: 
Ames Research Center - Research in the configuration, 
stability, structure and guidance and control of air-
craft (and space vehicles). 
Flight Research Center - Research in extremely high 
performance aircraft and spacecraft, including flight 
operations, flight systems and structural character-
istics of the vehicles. 
Langley Research Center - Research in structures and 
materials for subsonic and supersonic flight. 
Lewis Research Center - Research in power plants and 
propulsion. 
NASA's work and interest in these areas has expanded rapidly 
during the past few years and this trend is expected to continue. 
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) -- Most of the private 
institutions involved in the air system are covered by the various 
provisions of the National Labor Relations Act as amended, with 
the major exception being the airlines themselves which are 
covered by the Railway Labor Act. The two major functions of the 
NLRB are to conduct secret ballot elections among employees to 
determine whether or not they wish to be represented by a labor 
organization, and to prevent and remedy unfair labor practices 
by employers or labor organizations. 
Through its regional offices, the NLRB can issue complaints 
in unfair practice cases, seek settlements of unfair practice 
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charges, obtain compliance with Board orders and court judgements 
and petition for injunctions to prevent or remedy unfair practices. 
National Mediation Board -- The Board was created by a 1934 
amendment to the Railway Labor Act. Its jurisdiction was later 
extended to carriers by alr engaged in interstate commerce or 
under a mail contract. The purposes of the act are to avoid 
interruption to commerce, to ensure the rights of employees to 
organize and to provide for the prompt settlement of disputes. 
The principle duty of the Board is to mediate differences 
between the transportation companies and their employees arising 
from attempts to reach agreements on rates of pay, rules on em-
ployee working conditions and the like. The Board also settles 
disputes among employees concerning what unions should represent 
them. 
National Science Foundation (NSF) -- The major role of NSF 
is to strengthen research and education in the sciences in the 
United States. Many of the projects undertaken are transportation 
oriented. Through the award of grants and contracts to univer-
sities and other nonprofit institutions, NSF encourages research 
in vital areas. 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) -- The SEC guards 
against fraud in the issuance and sale of securities in inter-
state commerce or through the mails. It operates primarily by 
requiring the submission of certain factual data before the stock 
6/ 
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can be registered, and periodical data submissions thereafter. 
It does not guarantee the accuracy of the data filed, but it makes 
those guilty of fraudulent representations liable for civil or 
criminal penalties. The SEC also has the power to obtain court 
orders enjoining acts or practices that could defraud investors 
or otherwise violate the law. 
THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 
There are two federal agencies that merit particular at ten-
tion: the Department of Transportation (DOT), an executive de-
partment of the President; and the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), 
one of the independent agencies. 
The DOT is a major institutional factor In the air system. 
Both through the Office of the Secretary and the Federal Aviation 
Administration, DOT is involved in policy determination, system 
analysis and operational problems associated with air service. 
Through the FAA and the National Transportation Safety Board 
(which is loosely tied to the DOT for administrative purposes), 
the Department plays a major role in air safety. 
Figure 3 shows the organization of DOT as of 1971. The ad-
ministrations listed on the bottom line are the operating adminis-
trations of the Department. All other functions are collectively 
said to be in the Office of the Secretary of Transportation (OST). 
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The Office of the Secretary -- within OST, the Secretary and 
the Under Secretary are responsible for overall planning, direc-
tion and control of the Department. There are several Assistant 
Secretarials who play a major role in air system policy develop-
ment. 
Assistant Secretary for Environment and Urban Systems -
Through its concern for environmental matters, the Assistant 
Secretary's office influences noise and chemical pollution 
policy and airport planning. 
Assistant Secretary for policy and International Af-
fairs -- The Assistant Secretary is responsible for inter-
national and domestic transportation policy, objectives and 
system planning. He directs programs of international tech-
nical cooperation, including technical support to developing 
countries. A comprehensive transportation data information 
retrieval system is also being developed in this section of 
the Department. 
Assistant Secretary for Systems Development and Tech-
nology -- Scientific and technological research and develop-
ment in transportation systems, safety, noise abatement and 
technical policy inspect are under the management of the 
Assistant Secretary. He also provides overall management 
for the Transportation Systems Center in Cambridge, Massa-
chusetts which is charged with performing and managing pro-
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jects in advanced systems and technological research and 
development in all transportation disciplines. 
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) -- The FAA is 
primarily concerned with safety and the operational aspects of 
air transportation, as compared with the Civil Aeronautics Board's 
economic responsibilities. The Administration is more involved 
with the day-to-day aspects of the system than any other govern-
mental body. It is charged with the promotion of safety and 
development of the system; achieving efficient use of the air 
space; and promoting the national airport system. In addition, 
the FAA is responsible for the development and operation of air 
traffic control and air navigation systems for both civilian and 
military usage. 
One of the Administration's most important functions is 
safety regulation. It issues and enforces rules, regulations and 
standards for aircraft manufacture, maintenance and operation; 
for the certification of airmen; and for the certification of 
airports used by carriers under CAB economic control. The FAA 
also installs and maintains air navigation facilities, communica-
tion equipment and electronics needed for control towers and air 
traffic control centers. The safe and efficient management and 
utilization of the navigable airspace is one of the Administra-
tion's primary objectives. 
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The FAA provides a system for the registration and recording 
of the nationality and ownership of aircraft, engines, propellers 
and appliances, and performs research and development tasks needed 
to fulfill its statutory responsibilities. The National Aviation 
Facilities Experimental Center in Atlantic city, New Jersey is 
maintained as a facility necessary for the experimental phases 
of research tests. 
In addition to other tasks too numerous to mention, the FAA 
administers programs to identify the type and costs of airports 
required for a national airport system and provides funds to 
assist in airport systems planning and airport master plan devel-
opment. It also administers the Aviation Trust Fund, making grants 
for runway and taxiway construction on a matching funds basis with 
airport operators. 
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) -- The NTSB, 
although administratively attached to the DOT, is autonomous in 
its functions with its own statutory responsibilities and execu-
tive authority. The DOT Act of 1966 specifically states that 
the Board in the exercise of its functions, powers and duties 
shall be independent of the Secretary and the other officers of 
the Department. It is required to directly report to Congress 
annually on the conduct of its duties and make appropriate recom-
mendations for legislation. The NTSB has responsibility for 
determining the causes of surface accident as well as air. On 
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the air side, it investigates accidents (except where it delegates 
such investigation to the FAA), determines probable cause and 
reports all facts and circumstances. It also conducts special 
studies and makes recommendations for aviation safety and acci-
dent prevention. 
THE CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD 
Figure 4 shows the organizational structure of the CAB. The 
Board itself is composed of the five members shown at the top of 
the chart. All other offices and positions provide staff support 
to the Board and its activities. 
The Board was created by the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 
and continued by the Federal Aviation Act of 1958. It has broad 
responsibility for the encouragement and development of civil 
aviation. Unlike the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), the 
CAB is charged to both regulate the industry and promote its 
development at the same time. This often leaves the Board in a 
dilemma as to which goal should be predominant. For example, when 
a fare increase is requested, the Board must balance the cost to 
the consumer against the carrier's needs for more capital. 
The Board's five members are approved for staggered six-year 
terms, and no more than three may be from the same political 
party. The President annually designates one member as Chairman 
and another as Vice-Chairman. Board activities can be roughly 
- 22 -
grouped as follows: 
Route Authorizations - The Board through the grant of 
certificates of public convenience and necessity, author-
izes domestic carriers to perform domestic and/or fore-
ign air service between designated points. It also is-
sues permits to foreign carriers to provide air trans-
portation between the United states and foreign countries 
and authorizes the navigation of foreign aircraft in the 
United states for other purposes. 
Fares - The Board has authority over the tariffs, rates 
and fares charged for civil air transportation. The 
carriers initiate the rates and the Board oversees and 
approves them. The Board also authorizes and pays sub-
sidies for service to communities where traffic does 
not cover the cost of service. 
Inter-carrier Relationships - The CAB passes on mergers, 
agreements, acquisitions of control and interlocking 
relationships involving air carriers. It also super-
vises unfair competitive practices of carriers or ticket 
agents. 
Reports - The Board requires regular financial and 
operating reports to be filled by the Carriers. It also 
specifies the accounting and bookkeeping practices and 
procedures to be used in preparing the required informa-
tion. 
International - The CAB serves as an advisor to the 
Department of State in foreign negotiations for new or 
revised air routes and services. 
Board decisions in all domestic areas are subject only to 
court review, and not that of any executive department or agency. 
Decisions granting or affecting certificates for overseas and 
foreign air transportation require Presidential approval. 
The Board's Office of Consumer Affairs has recently increased 
in importance. This office is maintained to assist air travelers, 
shippers, and others interested in air transportation. It processes 
61 
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complaints arising from the use of air service and attempts to 
arrange voluntary solutions between members of the industry and 
the public. 
SUMMARY 
There are over 30 federal agencies that can affect the devel-
opment, operation and control of the air transportation system. 
Because of the many complex roles the government plays, it is 
impossible to understand our air system without understanding how 
intimately private and public institutions are related. What 
might appear to be a simple management decision may involve compli-
cated regulatory and policy issues that could have major unfore-
seen impact on the overall operation and efficiency of air trans-
portation. One must understand the complexities of the federal 
role to truly predict the effects of decisions on the system as 
a whole. 
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1.0 Introduction 
Unlike most forms of public transportation, there is a 
good 'body of data describing the costs of providing air trans-
portation services for U.S. domestic airlines. The source of 
this data is monthly and quarterly reports by US carriers to the 
CAB using the Uniform System of Accounts and Reports (Form 41). 
The existence of this data has made it pos.sible for the air 
transport industry to study the costs of providing service and 
to introduce new, lower cost methods and equipment in a 
rational manner. 
Historically, costs have been divided into two main 
categories , Direct· Ope:r·ating Costs .• , those directly. associated 
with a transport aircraft's operation; and Indirect Operating 
costs which are t'hose not directly associated with an aircraft, 
but rather with an airline and its ground operations. 
There are several formula for estimating direct operating 
costs. A common standard for turbine transports is the ATA 67 
formula used bY manufacturers to compare transport aircraft 
(Reference 3). 
There is no standard formula for indirect operating costs 
although they represent roughly one half of the total operating 
cost and cannot be ignored in any study of air transportation 
systems. They ~ust be constructed by the analyst for the airline 
system be is studying using whatever data'is available. For new 
forms of air transportation this is a major difficulty. 
The system of' accounts used by air carriers to submit their 
costs to the CAB does not recognize the existence of direct and 
indirect groupings. It bas its own classification scheme which 
we shall now briefly describe. 
U.S. airlines are required to submit to the CAB on a quarterly 
basis their operating expenses, among other financial statistics, 
in accordance with the economic regulations of the CAB Uniform 
7Jf 
system of Accounts and Reports (Form 41). The accounting provisions 
are different for route vs. supplemental carriers. within the 
route carriers, domestic trunks and locals (Group III) are again 
distinguished from third level carriers (Groups I and II). 
Each cost item in Form 41 is given a four-digit account 
number. The first two digits designate more general class-
ifications. They are referred to as the functional classification. 
The last two digits are more detailed breakdowns. They are 
referred to as the objective classifications. A fifth digit, 
appended as a decimal, has been assigned for internal control 
by the CAB. It subdivides the objective classifications. 
We include in here, for reference purposes, brief excerpts 
of the official definitions of the Functional classifications. 
Full descriptions of the Functional and Objective classifications 
can be found in Reference 4. 
5100 Flying Operations 
This function shall include 
expenses incurred directly in the 
in-flight operation of aircraft 
and expenses attaching to the 
holding of aircraft and aircraft 
operational personnel in readiness 
for assignment to an in-flight 
status. 
5200 Direct Maintenance 
Thi.s function sha.ll include 
the costs of labor, materials and 
outside services consumed directly 
in periodi.c.maintenance operations 
and the maintenance and repair 
of property and equipment. of all 
types and classes, regardless of 
the location at which incurred. 
5300 Maintenance Burden. 
This function shall in-
clude alloverhead or general 
expenses used directly in the 
activities involved in periodic 
maintenance operations and the 
maintenance and repair of 
property and equipment of all 
types. and classes, including 
the cost o.f direct labor, 
materials and outs ide services 
used in the maintenance and 
repair of property and equip-
ment. 
5500 Passenger Service. 
This function shall 
include all expenses 
chargeable directly to ac-
tivities contributing to the 
comfort, safety and convenience 
of passengers while in flight 
and when flights are inter-
rupted. 
6100 Aircraft Servicing. 
This function shall include 
the compensation of ground 
personnel and other expenses 
incurred on the ground incident to 
the protection and control of the 
in-flight .. movement of aircraft; 
scheduLing or .preparing aircraft 
operational crews for flight 
assigr~ent; landing and parking 
aircraft; visual inspection, routine 
checking, servicing and fueling of 
aircraft; and other expenses incurred 
on the ground incident to readying 
for arrival and take-off aircraft. 
6200 Traffic Servicing. 
This function shall .include 
the compensation of ground personnel 
and other expenses incurred on the 
ground incident to handling traffic 
of all types and classed ,on the 
ground subsequent to the issuance of 
documenrs establishing the air 
carrier's responsibility to provide 
a.ir transportation. Expenses at-
tributableto the operation of 
airport traff.ic offices shall also 
be included 1.n this subfunction; 
expe.nses .attr.ibutable . to reservations 
centers sha II be excluded. It shall 
include expenses. incurred in both 
enplaning and deplaning. traffic as 
well as expenses incurred in pre-
paration for enplanement and all 
expens.es subsequent to deplanement. 
6300 Servicing Administration. 
This function shall include 
expenses of a general nature incurred 
in performing supervisory or ad-
ministrative activities relating solely 
and in common .to functions 6100 
Aircraft Servicing and 6200 Traffic 
Servicing. 
6500 Reservations and Sales. 
This functi on shall include 
expenses incident to direct sales 
solicit.ation. documenting sales, 
controlling and arranging or 
confirming aircraft space sold, and 
in developing tarif£.s and schedules 
for publication. It shall.also 
include expenses attributable to the 
operation of city traffic offices. 
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6600 Advertising and publicity. 
This function shall include 
.. expenses .. incurred in creating 
publ.ic preference for the air carrier 
and its s .. ervices; stimulating de-
velopment of the air transport market; 
and promoting the air carrier or 
developing.air transportation generally. 
6800 General and Administrative. 
This function shall include ex-
penses of a general corporate nature 
and expenses incurred in performing 
activities which contribute to more 
than a single operating function such 
as general financial accounting 
activities and other general op-
erational administration which are 
not directly applicable to a par-
ticular function. 
7000 Depreciation and Amortization. 
This function shall include all 
charges to expense to record losses 
~uffered through current exhaustion 
of the serv.iceability of property 
and equipment due to wear and tear 
from use and the action of time and 
the elements, which are not replaced 
by current repairs. as well as losses 
in serviceability occasioned by ob-
solescence, supersession, discoveries. 
change in popular demand or action by 
public authority. It sha.ll also include 
charges for the amortization of capitalized 
developmental and preoperating costs, and 
other intangible assets applicable to the 
performance of air transportation. 
7% 
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The Art of cost Estimation 
Before we describe in greater detail a classification 
system-- for a irline costs, it is necessary to make a few 
observations on the nature of cost estimation. It is very 
much dependent upon the judgement of the cost analyst who 
must correctly apply the available data according to a given 
purpose or objective. To be correct, the cost analyst must 
understand the operations of the airline, and how the activities 
of the airline are measured, as well as how the costs are incurred 
and recorded. 
The data source is usually a cost accounting process. This 
provides data on'the cumulated expenses in various categories 
over a time period like a quarter, or year, and must be correlated 
by the analyst with cumulated measures of airline activity which 
he deems to be causing this expense. Differen t analysts will 
correlate a given cost with different measures of activity. or 
the same analyst may even use different activity measures in 
analyzing costs for different purposes. 
- - -2-.1 Cost Functions 
Here we shall attempt to provide an analytical framework for 
cost estimation to show some of its difficulties. We shall 
introduce the abstract concept of a cost function. 
Cost functions attempt to relate the cost of some operation 
to the various component activities related to the operation. We 
may denote a cost function as C. (x,t) 
1. 
where C, is the cost functiuj1 for operation i, (dollars) 
1. 
t is time variable 
x is a vector of activity variables (Xl' x 2 ' X 3 "'xn ) 
Thus a cost function provides a time history of the cost of 
operation i as a function of the activities which are deemed to 
cause it. We rarely know with any confidence such an analytical 
expression for any cost function. 
Typical measures of activity for airline operations are listed 
below: 
P - passengers oriqinated (or enplaned) 
D - aircraft departures 
RH - revenue aircraft block hours 
RM - revenue aircraft miles 
RPM - revenue passenger miles 
ASM - available seat miles 
RTM - revenue ton miles 
ATM - available ton miles 
R - revenue dollars 
These are cumulative measures for the airline system over some 
time period similar to the cumulated expense and one expects that 
any cost function would be montonic if expressed in terms of these 
measures (i.e. the cumulated cost never decreases as the cumulative 
measures of activity increase.) 
However, analysts commonly use ratios to "average" these 
cumulative measures, as an index of activity levels. Some of the 
common ratios are listed below: 
P 
P = D = 
average passengers per departure 
D = RM = average aircraft stage length, or hop length 
D 
-d = RPM = average passenger trip length (or hop length). 
P 
T = RH 
aircraft block time b = average D 
R = average ticket price per passenger r = P 
= RPM = average passenger load factor LF ASM 
= RTM = Average overall ton-mile load factor LF ATM 
cost functions will generally be "joint" functions of the activity 
variables, i.e. more than one variable is causing the expense in a 
certain category. Analysts generally find it necessary to represent 
the cost as a "separable" function, or to ignore the "jointness" 
and represent the costs as a function of a single activity 
variable. Thus, our general cost function is separated into 
components, 
where commonly only one component is said to exist. 
The art of cost estimation occurs precisely at this point. 
The cost analyst must choose the form of the cost function he 
believes to exist. Having done so, he returns to the "science" 
of econometrics to use linear or non-linear multiple regression 
techniques to determine the coefficients and parameter which give 
a "best fit", or "best correlation" between the observed cost 
data, and the observed activity data. The analyst postulates cause 
and effect, and a circumstance of a good correlation does not 
verify his postulate, although this is often hopefully stated by 
inexperienced analysts. A result of good correlation is necessary, 
but not sufficient to verify this postulate. 
2.2 Marginal and Unit Costs 
If we assume that we have a single component cost function, 
we can plot it against its activity variable as shown by figure 1. 
In this case, we may take the ratio of the cost to its activity 
at any point to form a "unit cost". Its value corresponds to the 
slope of the line from the origin to the cost curve as shown in 
figure 1, and obviously varies as the scale of operations changes, 
i.e. the unit cost is a function of x. 
Unit Cost = c(x) = ~ 
x 
There is another cost corresponding to the actual slope of 
the cost curve at any point. This is called the "marginal cost" 
and is also a function of the activity variable x. 
Marginal cost = c' (x) = ~~(x) ffj 
COST, Ci 
$ 
Figure 1 A SINGLE COMPONENT COST FUNCTION 
COST FUNCTION, Ci(X) 
x, 
SLOPE OF CURVE 
= MARGINAL COST 
AT XI 
SLOPE OF RA Y FROM ORIGIN 
= UNIT COST AT XI 
ACTIVITY, X (UNITS) 
In general marginal costs do not equal unit costs.· 
The marginal costs also exist for a general cost function, and 
if known,would·tell us the rate of change of cost as 'lny activity 
-"'..e.+_ 
variable is·changed. If the general cost function is separable, 
then unit costs can exist for each component of the cost function. 
Notice that the unit costs represent an . "average cost per unit";· 
and· thus are sometimes called average costs. We shall avoid that 
usage here, and refer to them as unit costs. 
In a similar manner, costs may be plotted against time·as 
shown in figure 2. The unit cost becomes the "long term" cost, while 
"short term" rates of expense may be determined by taking the 
slopes over shorter periods of time. Given a time frame for a 
cost analysis, the analyst regards short term costs as "variable" 
costs, and long term costs as "fixed" costs. The distinction of 
variable and fixed costs may also apply to other activity measures 
used in a given cost analysis, where only a certain portion of 
the costs are considered to be variable. yet another cost concept 
is the distinction made between "sunk" and "recoverable" costs , where 
a large expense or investment made at some point in time is class-
ified as to whether or not it could be recovered in some fashion. 
OPERATING 
COST 
Cj 
$ 
Figure 2 VARIATION OF COST OVER TIME 
MONTH. 
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3.0 categorization of Airline Costs 
We shall follow the categories of costs developed in reference 1, 
where: 
a) Direct operating Costs are designated Flight Operating Costs 
b) Indirect Operating costs are divided into two categories; 
1) Ground Operating Costs 
2) System operating Costs 
c) System Non-operating Costs are also identified. 
Table 1 shows the major categories of this new cost structure. 
Instead of just direct and indirect categories, there are now four 
major categories. Table 2 gives a detailed breakdown of the operating 
cost categories showing a percentage of total operating costs for US 
domestic trunk airlines for each category and sub-category. Table 2 
also indicates the time frame for the expense and some arbitrary 
allocations of the cost. A brief explanation of this cost cat-
egorization is given below: 
a) Flight Operating costs 
These are usually known as direct operating costs, and are 
defined here to coincide with the definition used in reference 2, 
so that document can be used as a source of data. There is one 
exception where rental and flight insurance costs listed under 
Direct Flying Operations are transferred to a category called 
Flight Equipment ownership. Flight Operating costs are usually 
allocated against the flying hours of the airline fleet. Note 
that cabin crew expenses and interest costs of debt associated 
with aircraft ownership are not included, even though they are 
major cost items. On the other hand, a maintenance burden is 
included covering general administrative and overhead expenses for 
the airline maintenance shops. 
b) Ground Operating costs 
This is a new group of costs which might be called direct 
ground operating costs. These costs are incurred at the station 
in handling passengers and aircraft, and are directly incurred 
$5 
Table 1 
A Breakdown of Airline Expenses 
A. Flight Operating Costs - (FC) 
A.l Direct Flying Operations 
A.2 Flight Maintenance 
A.3 Flight Equipment Ownership 
B. Ground operating Costs - (GC) 
B.l Reservations and Sales 
B.2 Traffic Servicing 
B.3 Aircraft Servicing 
C. System Operating Costs - (SC) 
C.l System Promotional Costs 
C.2 Svstem Administrative Costs 
C.3 Ground Maintenance 
C.4 Ground Equipment ownership 
D. Total Operating Costs - (TOC) = Sum of A + B + C 
E. System Non-Operating Costs - (SNC) 
E.l Interest and Debt Expense 
E.2 Taxes 
'l'IIIltE 2 - mmllKDOWN OF IIIRLINE OPllHNI'ING COSTS 
----
- ----. 
A110ca- % TOC 'rimf= Frame for r.;xpenditure 11 ~ Al1oca('ion Frame --~- .--
x = Expenditure Fl:'ilme tion (1970) $/ $/ $/ $/ $/ $1 
TrClnsforn i-l~~ ycp"_. Br. Ho. Yr. - Rev. 
------_._-
A. PLIGHT OPimllTING COS'J'S SS.7 
" -
. 
1. Direct Plying Operations 26.5 
" Fit. Crew ; Hrs./Mo. 13.5 A<:-
-x 
Fuel, Oil 13.0 x 
Other 
-
A' 
15.5 . - . 2. Flight Maintenance I A 
Direct Airframe + Other , Hrs./Dep 4.6 x- ~A,x 
Direct Engines Hrs./Dep 4.4 'x- A,x 
DU1~d(?n Hrs ./Yeal 6.5 A x 
3. Flight Equi.pment Ownership 13.6 Il. 
Dep.cecia tion '1.irframe + Othe 8.2 A x 
Depreciat.ion Engines 1.7 A x 
Ob.solescence & Deterioration : llr s • /Yea, 0.4 A x 
FH. Equipment Rental 3.2 A x 
1"1 t. Insurance 0.4 Ai x 
B. GROUND OPE:RATING COSTS 23.8 A A 
1. Reservations [, Sales " ~ A 
Personnel Pax.fMo. 3.2 A x 
Commissions (Rev./ 
_1 3.9 A x 
Other Pax. ) 1.2 A 
2. Traffic Servicing 8 2 A 
Personnel Pax./Mo. 5.5 11<-- x 
Rentals pax./Year 0.7 A<'- .x 
Other 1.1 A 
3. Aircraft Servicing 7 3 A -. 
Personnel Dep./Mo. 4.0 A x 
J.Janc1in'g Fees 2.0 x 
Other 1.2 A . 
C. SYSTEH OPERA'l'ING COSTS 20.3 , A 
l. Promotional Costs 12.6 .. 'A 
Passenger Flight Service Nev. jl;ax., , 10.2 x X A ev. 0 .. 
Advertising & Publicity 2.4 x 
f 
2. Administrative costs Rev./Ho •... . ,.4~ ~. ..... . ..... . .... ~ . x ", . 
. . . . 
3. Ground Mainten.:t.nce 1.5 A 
4. Ground Equipment Ownership Rev./Year 1. q x- I1.A 
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in providing the complete transportation service. They are best 
allocated~against passengers enplaned, and aircraft departures 
although other allocations may be useful. station administative 
costs are not listed here, but included as a system administrative 
expense later. 
c) System operating Costs 
These costs are the old indirect operating costs remaining 
after ground operating costs are removed. They are not directly 
associated wtih supplying the transportation service, and are more 
of the nature of a system overhead expense. For example, Promo-
tional costs are those spent to increase system revenues, and 
includes the onboard passenger service expenses of food and cabin 
crew. Administrative expenses are those of a general management 
of corporate nature for the complete airline system (except 
maintenance administration). The maintenance and ownership 
of ground property and equipment are minor categories included for 
completeness. system operating costs may be allocated in an overhead 
manner against dollars of revenue. 
d) Total operating Costs 
The sum of the above costs is called total operating cost. 
e) System Non-Operating Costs 
This is a new group of costs not normally considered by 
the old DOC-IOC breakdown. They are not associated with the 
operations of the compnay, but rather with its corporate existence. 
The interest expenses associated with corporate debt are sub-
stantial, and since most of the airline debt can be associated with 
new flight equipment, can be related to Flight Equipment OWnership 
for some analysis purposes. The taxation expenses are associated 
with corporate profit declaration, and is difficult to separate from 
the corporation. 
The following sections will describe these cost categories in 
more detail. 
400 Fliqht Clperating costs - FC 
'rhis grouping of costs is more generally known as "Direct Operating 
Costs", we shall use the basic definitions of the CAB source 
document. (reference 2) with some minor rearrangements as described 
previously, These costs are long term, average costs for operating 
an aircraft, For shorter term operations, various categories of the 
costs should be dropped, For example, ownership costs, and maintenance 
burden costs are commonly d8leted since they are long term costs spread 
over several years, 
As indicated by Table 2, Flight Operating Costs are roughly 55% of 
total operating costs. 
4,1 Flight Operating Costs per Block Hour, FCHR 
The basic cost measure for transport aircraft is the flight 
operating cost per block hour, FCHRo It is a constant, independent 
of trip distance foT. a given aircraft and airline, and therefore provides 
a simple, useful description for comparing different aircraft in 
A:r;otber simple measurto' which is not widely used, but which is 
USE'lful for comparing aircraft of different capacity is the flight 
operating cost per seat-hour. FCSHR 
= FCVR 
_._-"-
Sa 
Where Sa = available seats 
A set of typical values of these measures for US transport aircraft 
is given in Table 30 !;;otice that FCSHR varies between 4 to 6 $/seat hour 
for both jet and turboprop transports, and that the helicopter costs are 
much higher. 
A more detailed breakdown of these hourly costs is shown in Table 4 
for the Boeing 727-100 in domestic service in 19690 The total cost 
TABLE 3 
Operating costs Per Hour, Costs Per Seat Hour 1969 
Aircraft Type Fleet Cos t iHr. Seats 1 Cost'::Seat Hr. Average Stage 
A) Domestic Trunks Size ($) ( $ ) (miles) 
B707-100 17 810.59 128 6.33 884 
B707-100B 91 774.87 128 6.05 1156 
B720 45.1 701. 02 120.7 5.85 827 
B720B 65.7 669.98 116 5.76 721 
DC8-20 43.7 728.60 132.8 5.48 1180 
DC8-50 43.3 691. 00 134.5 5.14 936 
DC8-61 35.5 754.76 196.2 3.85 1033 
B727-100 275 564.46 95.6 5.90 508 
B727-200 144.2 684.55 125.3 5.45 517 
DC-9-30 132.4 439.63 89.3 4.93 298 
DC-9-10 67.4 444.59 68.4 6.55 296 
BAC-111-400 25.9 554.70 64 8.65 214 
Electra 40 526.85 82.7 6.37 187 
B-737 86.3 457.56 96.2 4.75 231 
B) Local Service 
DC-9-30 50.7 396.64 96.5 4.10 230 
CV-580 103.3 256.7 50.7 5.07 118 
FH-227 47.1 227.26 44.6 5.09 109 
Qjlel icopters 
S-61 8 340.7 23.5 14.50 18 
V-I07 (1968) 4.3 575.3 24.6 23.60 13 
C) STOL 
DHC-5 Twin Otter (Es t. ) 100.00 19 5.25 
1 Seats are averaged over aircraft miles performed in 1969. 
Table 4 
Flight operating Costs per Block Hour for Boeing 727-100 1 
10 Direct Flying Operations 
-Flt. Crew 
-Fuel Oil 
2. Flight Maintenance 
-Direct Airframe & Other 
-Direct Engine 
-Burden 
- 283.63 
- 158.45 
3. Flight Equipment Ownership - 122.15 
-Depreciation Airframe & Other 
-Depreciation Engines 
-Obsolescence and Deterioration 
-Flight Equipment Rental 
-Flight Insurance 
4. Long-Term Average Costs 
144.91 
138.72 
48.85 
43.00 
66.30 
69.77 
14.46 
1. 78 
26.75 
9.39 
564.46 
5. short-Term Average costs (less Burden, Ownership Costs) 
144.91 
138.72 
48.85 
43.00 
375.48 
1 Yearly average for Domestic Operations, 1969, 274 Aircraft in service 
from CAB Operating Cost and Performance Report, August 1970. 
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of 564 $/hour is distributed roughly equally between crew, fuel, 
maintena!!ce, and ownership, 'tthus, the sub-category, "Direct operatio. 
made up of fuel' ~nd' crew accounts for roughly 50%, while the 
ot.hE,r two sub-cat.Eogories are each 25%. If maintenance burden, and 
ownership' cost.s are dropped, a short term or monthly operating cost 
of 375 $;hour is obtained. A breakdown of hourly costs for the first 
six mo~ths of 1971 is given in Table 5 for various types of current 
transports and ina i';1idua 1 airlines. The costs vary quite wide ly. 
For U,e "Joeing 727, they range from 593 to 856 $/block hour with 
an averag'e of 665 $/block hour for this period. This range is due 
to factors suc!": as wage rates, fuel cost variations, varying main-
te",ance programs, and varying depreciation scheduled. The variation is 
significar.:>t enough to invaiidate the use of any standard formula such 
as the ATA67 DOC formula when studying the operations of a particular 
airlinE:) system, or for ret.urn on investment calculations • 
. 1'n rec<':-J.t YAars t:~er," has beeT! a marked rate of increase of 
Fligr.t Operillti,.,g costs due to infl"tionary factors. Reference 5 is 
a good source of t:::,~ t.renos in operating cost for jet transport 
air'craft i.n aonostic service. Table 6 is extracted from it to 
O9hO',," the cifclets of inflation on the flight operating costs for tn.", 
Boe,ing; 727. With this rate of growth in costs, it is necessary to also 
specify the year in studying the operations of the industry" or a given 
airline'" system. 
The hourly operating cost FC
ER 
for a transport aircraft must be 
related to its hourly productivity, PHR as measured in available seat 
miles per :,our, or available ton miles per hour. A plot of FC
ER 
;against: available "Con miles per hour is shown in figure 3 for aircraft 
in domEo,stic trunk and local airline service for the year 1968. The 
flattening of the trend curve indicates a relative improvement in flight 
operating costs as productivity increases. 
If we divide the hourly operating costs by the productivity 
measured in available ton-miles per hour. we obtain a value of DOC, 
direct operating cost in terms of dollars per available ton mile. A 
TABLE 5 
Fir£1t 51:< Month!'> of' 1971 
DIRECT EXPENSES 
(Dollars per Block lIr.) Total Total Bloek Fly in9 Direct Depree. • Maint . . Aircraft lIours Operations Maint. Rl)ntals Total Burden Expense 
Bc">cing: 727 
United 214,550 356 76 137 56' B2 651 
E<lstcrn 1 186,238 349 •• 120 568 74 642 ArncriC'~n 157,712 34. 9B 134 5B1 106 687 
'l'rancWorld 101,153 353 BO lOS 59B 102 700 
National 61,419 3010 97 130 537 56 593 
Braniff 59,041 32' 103 125 557 40 597 
Northwestern sa,529 340 6B 230 63B 34 672 
Continental 38,523 345 106 101 552 72 624 
Northeast 34,010 347 115 17B 640 B6 726 
Pan American 29.225 3.2 123 1.6 711 131 B42 
Western 9,159 346 '5 203 644 37 6Bl 
Alilska 8,527 428 162 1.6 7B6 42 B'B 
Airlift 5.194 376 154 17. 70. 42 751 
Frontier 5,058 361 168 17. 70B 61 76. 
l\1lc{jhtlny 
--2...J.2.2. 457 -M 1M. 2n --ll B56 
727 Average 971,693 349 .3 144 586 79 665 
QQuglaa Dc-9 
Delta 143.513 235 55 102 392 4.9 441 
:E;nstcrn 132. !i76 270 74 108 452 55 507 
Allegheny 4b,901 271 71 107 44. 43 492 
Ai.r West 31,301 278 100 123 501 27 52B 
continental 30,427 221 8' •• 404 62 466 Southern 24,950 236 '4 111 441 26 .67 
Ozark 24,344 2" 95 132 468 27 495 
Transworld 22,610 291 80 143 514 .1 605 
Texas Int'l. 22,410 236 92 115 443 2' 472 
tlorth Central 21,403 254 75 113 442 44 486 
NorthaaEit 19,O71 263 92 120 475 71 546 
Hawaiian 8,515 305 llG 211 632 59 691 
Caribair 3.529 !1! .liQ. rrL m!l 1§. ill 
DC-9 Average Sl1,616 255 76 113 444 49 493 
Boeing 737 
united 72,953 339 .2 116 517 72 5B9 
Wmitcrn 40,689 264 110 105 479 43 522 
Piedmont 17,820 254 78 '5 4" 39 466 
Frontier 15.558 251 124 148 523 47 570 
Aloha 4,593 300 120 la9 60. 77 6a6 
Wien consl. 3.635 !Q!. ill ill lQi II 1ll.. 
737' Average 155.247 301 86 118 505 58 S63 
OTiC 111 
American 21,069 269 81 216 5 •• 91 657 
t.lohawk 13,632 250 76 94 420 52 472 
Braniff 13,5(lS 1.!!. 2Q. ~ ~97 12 427· 
III Average 48,298 247 82 145 47. 66 540 
r3 ., 
TiJbla 5 (continued) 
DIRECT (.;xf'lmSES 
(Dollars pl'C Block IIr.) 1'otal Total Dlock Flying Direct Deprac. & M<lint. AirC'rolft 
lIours opcratiollS Naint. R('ntals 'l'otal Burdcn • Expense 
Boeing 747 
Pan American 37,862 919 156 647 1621 164 1785 
TranaWorld 29,917 634 239 510 1383 134 1517 
American 21,254 699 29' 695 1667 132 1819 
Uni ted 16,052 838 218 600 1656 180 1836 
Nnrthwest 15,566 724 131 519 1374 71 1445 
Delta 7.312 980 165 493 1536 197 1735 
Continental 6.103 803 421 37.7 1601 72 1673 
Eastern 4,319 768 536 1995 3299 51 3350 
National 3,420 910 256 561 1627 149 1775 
Braniff ...l.c.1§.Q. 1051 ill ~ ~ ~ 1Q2!! 
747 Average 143,565 75B 226 626 1610 137 1747 
Douqlils DC-B 
unitad 177 • .131 462 9B 204 754 96 850 
Delta 77 ,4(,3 420 102 176 698 110 808 
Eastern 54,238 48B 158 230 876 112 988 
National 36,425 410 122 106 638 67 705 
~ Flying Tigor :n,725 536 134 229 901 B2 983 , Seaboard 19.169 477 126 214 817 45 862 
Bra~iff 13,461 490 97 270 6S7 3B 8.5 
Airlift 8,562 551 15' 387 1097 43 1140 
American 1 6.133 517 131 318 966 61 1027 Pan American 3 1 596 ',41 l.!.l ...ll !.Q!Ll .J.i 1Q2l 
DC-8 Average 42a.103 465 112 202 779 91 970 
Rocing: 707 
TransWorld 1 196,514 434 89 170 693 .7 7.0 
f'<Jn Amorican 170,538 490 •• 194 773 12. 897 American 1 167.564 434 B3 184 701 •• BOO Northwest 46,417 450 84 24, 776 51 827 
continental 22,417 463 142 173 77e 10. e87 
Braniff 17,830 44' 137 162 74e 58 B06 
West.ern 10.056 540 121 162 e23 47 870 
Alaska 645 415 144 IS' 7lB ,e 746 
Airlift. 210 260 ill ill ill ...ll 1ll 
707 Average 632,191 451 .. lB5 730 100 B30 
poning 720 
,/ W<!stern 41.147 3" 13. 17' 70. SS 764 urdted 41,331 428 73 153 65. B5 73. 
Continental 13,056 338 136 130 604 10' 70B 
Pan Americun 10,236 420 112 ,'2 724 126 850 
Americiln 9.850 392 12' 387 905 169 1074 
, No)':thwGst 9.011 379 80 3" BOP 47 8.7 
Braniff Be 530 ~ lQ! ..22 §ll. ill 7B9 
720 1werage 139,163 398 U. 187 701 B5 7B6 
, 
I Convair 8BO TransWorld ]l.Bel 413 132 ,.0 735 143 878, 
Dol tft 29 1 361 ill ill ...u lli ill ill 
8Bo Average 61,103 398 134 121 653 143 796 
IDnta tor Trnns caribbean included with American. 
7t1 
plot of this value is shown in figure 4, and clearly demonstratE's 
t'it,," S\lp8x'iority of the mono productive aircraft in terms of unit 
cests, 
402 Flig:;t Cp€crati"9: Costs~r Trip 
The :,ourly cest, FC"'R is a basic and convenient cost measure fur 
iii. 
transport aircrafto A more precise formulation for analytic purposes 
is prc:wid""d J::;y the trip cost measures; FeAT' flight operating cost 
per airroraft tr'ip, and FeST' flight operating cost per seat trip, 
Flig:-,t cost per airc'raft trip, FeAT always turns out to be a 
linear function of distance, do 
FC"" , ' 
,d = c 1 " (.'2' a 
so t:r;"rt, 'in; OW ied 'J€', of t'll€: two cOE"fficients c l and c 2 is sufficiEmt to 
accar<llt: .. ,ly dbSlO:cibE, thE.: cost p<clrformance of any transport aircraft, 
p.bcausu tho, "Jariation ef fuel costs is not proportional to block tim"", 
and si!'::c(, £\:;8: cost" !':lay vary with the particular climb-cruise schea'lle 
used for a gi'V<.,r~ aircraft, it is not possible to simply multiply the 
'hourly costs by tr,e block tim", to obtain a precise measure of trip 
For purposE's of d"'t,ermi~"ing minimum cost flight plans, wher"" 
varying clirr.b-crtiis., profilEJs ar;d schedules may be used, it Is SOJ:I",tl::;" •• ,s 
useful to repr~sent trip costs Ln the following form~ 
FeAT = Time Costs i fl.~el Costs 
wher", tho. time costs are computed using a short term hourly cost 
for cJ:'ew, maintenancEJ, and perhaps ownership, and fuel costs are 
comp:lhJij for a gl'<:'8':l mission profile, 
It is uS8f:ll to IJllso defi!:Ec tho trip costs per available SElat, 
Fe 0 '3ince Sa, the availabllil seats is not constant after d,,'sign. ral,g"" ST 
this cest mH!.SUY,"' will ::av~' a lircear form up to design ral""ge, and a 
r"o:c-,li::,ear variat::.u:c: a:tt.br d""sign range, The traditional DOC c:urV",B 
,-an b'J ClC'£i.vE,d :from FC hy dividins by the trip distance, The variation 
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Table 6 
Trends in Flight Operating cost per Block Hour, B-727 Domestic 
Year Flying Operations Maint.enance OwnershiE Total FeER $ $ $ 
Crew Fuel 
1964 108 121 121 161 512 
1965 121 129 147 139 539 
1966 128 127 171 138 566 
1967 123 130 159 121 535 
1968 133 132 152 121 539 
1969 140 141 143 130 556 
1970 160 146 168 147 622 
of these cost curves with trip distance is shown in Figure 5 for the 
B727 in domestic service in 1969. Notice the strong variation in the 
unit costs measure, DOC, before it flattens out around full design 
range, 
4.3 Average Flight. Costs 
Suppose we have an aircraft operating over a given set of trips 
(or hops, or stages) within an airline system. We want to compute 
measures of average flight operating costs over this set of trips. 
If there are N trips with n(x) trips at a particular distance. x, 
then we may deno·te a probability density function. f(x) = n~x) to 
describe t~e distribution of trip distances within the set of trips. 
The average trip distance. d, is given by 
00 
d = f x • f (xl' dx 
o 00 
where LO= f f(x)'dx 
o 
Now, the flight. operating costs per trip can be expressed as a 
linear fu.nction of trip distance, x 
• x 
The average flight cost per trip. FC • becomes 
AT 
Fe 
AT = + c 2x) • f (x) • dx 
= c + c ., d 1 2 
i.e., ·the average flight. cost per trip is exactly the flight cost 
at the average trip distance. 
Kow, the total flight operating cost over the set of trips. FC 
is given by' 
FC = J), FC 
AT 
and the total mileage of the set of trips, M; 
FifJUre 5 VARIATION OF FLIGHT OPERATING COSTS WITH TRIP DISTANCE 
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so that: the, average flight operating cost per seat mile (if we assume 
that S seats are available on all trips) becomes: 
FC 
M = 
= 
1 
S 
= DOC (d) 
Le., t,he average direct operating cost over the set of trips is 
exatct,ly the direct opera ting cost at the average distance. 
These 't'wo prope:r'ties are a result of the linear form of trip costs 
wit:::: trip distance. 
notice, how€)ver, that if we average DOC values over a set of trips, 
we do not, get the value of DOC
AV 
since DOC (x) is non-linear in x; 
DOC = 1 s /[:' + 0, ] -f(xhlx 
so DOC 
The value DOC is a useless quantity, and it is a mistake to com-
pute it. The useful quantity is DOC (d) , the direct operating cost at 
the average trip distance. 
/0/ 
'50 IJ Ground Operating costs 
'7'his group of operating costs are incurred on the ground in 
prE'!pa.lt':altion and termination of the trip. They are zero-distance, 
or "tt"u:,d.r:iilll" costl'l as opposed to "line-haul" costs, although it may 
be" a.rgul;,d thiillt there is :nore preparation for a longer haul trip. 
As indic!Sltad by Table 2, Grand Operating Costs are roughly 25% 
of tc)'ital opex"ting costs, broken down into roughly equal categories 
of 8>h I"l«!.ch for r"lserv:altions and sales, traffic servicing, and aircraft 
servicing. A particular airline would use its own costs over the 
system, or perhaps for each station in its system. Notice that these 
costs are relatively independent of the type of aircraft 
5.1 MeasunlS of Airline,' Activity: 
statistics on measures of activity for domestic airlines for the 
last quarter of 1970 are given in Table 7. Some selected activity 
irjdiccs ar", a Iso presented. 
W~lle more aetailed cost allocations may often be made using 
v,arious appropria'te mE.,asures of airline activity, here we shall allocate 
gro\.md operating costs against passengers originated, and aircraft 
departures p,,'rforr::ed for the complete domestic industry. There may 
be significa!,t variation from these unit costs for a particular airline 
or Sbllti.O:1 0 
5~2'Ground Operati.ng-C6sts-per-passenger, GC 
p 
For reservations a::ld sales, the unit cost for the last quarter of 
1970 is 4096 $/passenger originated 0 For traffic servicing, it is 
4.80 $/passEmger originated, The total is defined as ground operating 
cost per passenger, 
GC = 9,76 $/passenger 
p 
5.3 Ground Gperating c'sts per Aircraft Departure, GCD 
The costs per aircraft departure cover the arrival of the plane 
(and its landing fees)" i'ts servicing, and its start up and deparm re. 
Dividing the costs reported for the last quarter of 1970 by the number 
departures gives a unit cost value 
GCD = 178,30 $/aircraft departure 
TABLE 7. ACTIVITY MEASURES, DOMESTIC AIRLINE INDUSTRY 
(last quarter, 1970) 
Activity Measures 
RPM = 22076 x 109 revenue passenger miles 
p = 29.0 x 10
6 
revenue passenger originated 
RTM = 2.97 x 10
9 
revenue ton miles 
RB = 0.993 x 10
6 
revenue aircraft block hours 
D = 00720 x 106 :revenue aircraft departures 
R = L50 x 10
9 
revenue dollars 
Indices of Activiti 
-d = 784 (s. miles) - average passenger trip length 
p = 40.3 (passengers) - average passengers per departure 
-
r - 51.7 (dollars) - average ticket price 
Tb = L 37 (hours) - aveJ:'age block hours per departure 
R. = 2083 (dollars) - average aircraft revenue per departure 
/v3 
600 system Operating costs 
This group of costs is a system wide set of costs of an overhead 
r.at"Jre. It is rougly 2076 of total operating costs as may be seen from,' 
Tab].'" 2, Promotional costs arE' roughly one half of this group, with the 
recmainder split equally between general and administrative and the costs 
of owning and maintaining ground equipment. 
While these costs may be allocated against a variety of airline 
activity measures, here we shall simply allocate against the revenue 
dollar as an overhead costs. Again, note that these costs are 
independent of the types of aircraft used in the airline system, 
§_, 1 System Ope)ratinq Costs, SC 
using the. data for the domestic industry for the last quarter of 1970 
once again, we obtain the following costs in terms of dollars per 
dollar of reve~ue, 
Promotio:,a 1 Costs -
Passenger Service 
Adv~'rtis ing 
TOTAL 
- 0,112 
- .9,025 
00137 
General and Admi"istrative - 0,043 
Ground Equipment 
Maintenance - 0,015 
OWnership - 0,019 
TOTAL 00034 
comcining these expenses, we form an overall system cost SC, 
SC - 0.220 $/revenue dollar 
7,0 Trip Costs 
We now combine the Flight Operating Costs and the Ground Costs 
and the Ground Costs per aircraft departure to form a cost per aircraft 
trip, TC AT 
TC = FC + GCD AT AT 
Also, we shall define the trip costs per available seat; 
TC = FCST + 
GC-
ST D 
S 
a 
= FeST GeST + 
where GCST = ground operat ing costs per seat departure. 
These trip cost measures combine the aircraft related costs; Flight 
Operating Costs, and Aircraft Servicing costs. The trip cost per available 
seat, I'e ,is useful for comparison with fares or yields ina later ST 
section, 
For e.xample, if we use the industry averages for 1970 for a Boeing 
727-100; 
FCST '" 2.85 + .DI2ld $/seat trip 
- - - - - -
GC
ST '" 
178 0 30 $/seat departure 
= 1086 96 
Therefore, TeST = 4.71 +.0121d 
Toe variation of trip costs with distance is shown by figure 6. 
Notice that the ground DIE rating costs are small compared to flight 
operating costs, and that the cost levels seem very low, e.g. the cost 
per seat for a 1000 mile trip is only $16.80. 
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800 Fares, Yields, and Net Yields /tJ7 
We shall now turn our attention to the variation of airline trip 
income per passenger with trip distance. 
801 Domestic Airline Fare Structure, E' 
Unlike other forms of common carrier passenger transportation 
(except pernaps taxis) the domestic airline fare structure has a 
zero distance charge as airlines have attempted to recover the cost 
of these ground operations, Over the past twenty years, thus zero 
distance intercept has grown from zero to 9 dollars with a recent 
CAB examiner's recommendation that it be raised still further to 
12 dollars, 
In 1967, a CAB regression of coach fares versus trip distance found 
an extremely good fit for the following formula: 
Coach Fares, F ~ 6,40 + o057d dollars 
c 
In 1969, at the insistence of the CAB on basing fares on airport 
to airport distances, the following formula was adopted for coach 
fares as part of a genera 1 industry fare increase: 
F '" 9000 + , 060 d 1 P 
+ ,056 d 2 
,-~ 
.052 d 3 
+ ,050 dLI 
f· .048 d S 
where 0 <- d 1 ~ 500 B,miles -
501 ~ d 1 + d 2 
$ 1000 
1001 ~ d 1 + d2 + d3 
, 1500 
1501 ~ d 1 + d 2 + d3 + d4 ~ 2000 
2001 ~ d l + d 2 + d 3 + d4 + d S 
As part of this decision, first class fares, Ff were to be 1.25 
times the coach fares. There was an 8% government tax applied, and 
then fares were rounded up to the nearest dollar. 
In 1971, a further general increase of 6% in coach fares was allowed, 
with first class being set at 1.3 times coach fare, and night coach 
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fares at 0.8 times coach fare. The round up rule was retained. Figure 7 
shows the current fare formulae versus distance for the basic fares 
before the 8% tax and rounding up to the nearest dollar. The domestic 
fare investigation nas ended and a further chcnge is expected before the 
end of 197:20 
While the fare structure seems to determine airline revenues very 
explicitly, the actual airline revenue for a given city pair is the 
r<2sult of the traffic Which moves at a mix of regular fares (coach, 
first class, night coach), and a variety of discount fares (I:> fare 
student, military standby, Family Plan, excursion fares, etc). A 
value for yield on a route is obtained by the airline by dividing 
the actual revenues from the route by the numher of tickets sold, 
10 e 0 yie ld is the average ticket pr ice (exc 1 us i ve of tax). 
Thus, the yield values need not fit an explicit distance fo:rrnula 
like ·the fares, and indeed may vary over month of the year for a 
given route o Howevecr, there is generally a good linear variation 
with trip distance. We shall represent this by a yield formula, 
Y 
P 
The value of Y gene,rally has been below the level for standard 
p 
coach fares in recent years, where a great number of travellers have 
bequ~ to use the discount fares. It may be as much as 15% below coach 
in tc~xiBt markets. 
Thus, as well as forecasting the number of travellers in a given 
market, an estimate must be made of the breakdown of traffic moving 
at different fares to forecast the yield, and the future expected airline 
We shall define net yield here by combining the yield with the 
ground operating costs per passenger and the system operating costs per 
dollar of revenue, 
NY .~ (1 ~ Be) 
p 
Y 
P 
GC 
P 
100 
YIELD PER 
PASSENGER 
80 
Yp, NYp 
60 
$ 
40 
20 
Figure 8 YIELDS AND COSTS VERSUS TRIP DISTANCE 
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Si~ce the system costs, se, have been treated as an overhead cost, 
they further decrease the yield values before we subtract off the 
cost per p<l!lssenger {"'1:' reservations and sales, and traffic servicing. 
~'he valLue of ne,t yie Id then represents a net income per passenger to 
be com.pared with the trip cost per seat from the flight and ground 
cper~tion9 of the aircraft, 
For example" if we assume a yield formula for 1970. 
Yp = 9,00 + .055 d 
with se = 0,23 
and GC = 9, 'j'6 $/passenger. 
p 
Then, net: yield pE.,r passenger becomes 
NY = -2.63 + .0423 D 
P 
dollars/passenger 
Notice the negative value of net yield per passenger for distances 
lE!SS than 60 miles: Ground operating costs are higher than the zero 
distance intercept of the assumed yield formula (or the coach fare formula) 
The relationship of yield,and net yield per passenger to trip cost 
~r seat is shown against trip distance in figure 8. Notice that net 
yi<2!ld per passen<,j'er and trip cost per seat cross around 250 miles. and 
that there is a large excess of net yield over trip costs as trip 
distiill!1ce approaches full design range. 
III 
lid.-
9.0 Trip Income and Breakeven Load Factor 
We are now in a position to compare the net yield per passenger 
and trip cost per seat to determine income per aircraft trip, income 
per seat trip, and the breakeven load or load factor for an aircraft 
trip. 
9.1 Income per Aircraft Trip 
If the number of passengers on a given aircraft trip is denoted 
by PAT' then the income per aircraft trip. IAT is given by; 
NY 
P 
If t:'1e number of passengers required to breakeven is denoted 
by PATB , then w",en rAT = 0, 
"''' ~~AT 
-_._---
h"Y 
P 
9.2 Breaks,v£,;;, Load Factor 
If WE', denote the load factor, LF, as the ratio of passenger load to S, 
s",ats aV1lIilable at 
p 
LF = A'r s 
less than design range. 
ThEm the breakeven load factor, LF 
B 
P 
A.TB 
;3 
TC 
81' 
Ny 
P 
Le" tb3 bre""ke~ren lO!ild factor equals the ratio of trip cost per seat, to 
n~t yield per passenger~ 
A plot of lbreiOlkevE>n load factors for the B-727-100 in domestic 
service in 1970 is shown in figure 9. Because of the crossover of net 
yield per pillssenger and trip cost per seat, there usually is a large 
V:!i\lI:'illltion in LF B with trip distance. It is over 1000/0 at distance,s less~ 
'thl1lt1 :i!50 miles, and reduces to 35% or less at long ranges. Notice that 
~incA we have defined load factor based on total seats, it does not 
break. UpllFilllras af·ter design range. 
Figure 9 VARIATION OF BREAK EVEN LOAD FACTOR WITH TRIP DISTANCE 
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Because the v~riation of net yield and trip cost are linear 
with distance, the average breakeven load factor for a set of trips 
ia the breakeven load factor at the average trip distance. Thus, 
for the B-727-100 in domestic service in 1970, the average stage 
distance w~s 500 miles where the breakeven load factor was 58%. 
9.3 Inccme Per Seat Trip 
We can also define the income per seat trip, IST as a very simple 
functio~ of the ~ctual load factor and breakeven load factor; 
JJ: 
AT 
s 
= 
'" 
'" 
1 (J:,Y 
P S 
NY 
P 
lW 
P 
~'Y (LF 
P 
p 
_ TeST AT 
S 
LF - NY . LFB P 
LF
lB
) 
ThereforE'!, the income per seat trip is some fraction of the net 
yi",]'(I pGr piIDaaenger, where the fraction is the difference between <llctual 
1l1nd breake,ren lollld fiIDctor 0 This fraction shows the le,rerage of 
every point in achieved average loac :actor in increasing the airline 
trip incom~~ 
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The ATA-67 Formula for Direct Operating cost 
H.B. Faulkner 
INTRODUCTION 
The ATA formulas for direct operating cost were developed for 
the purpose of comparing different aircraft, existing or not, on the 
same route or the same aircraft on different routes. Such char-
acteristics of the airline as crew pay, amintenance procedures, and 
depreciation schedules are kept constant. The formulas should be 
used for comparison only; they cannot reliably predict the actual 
operating cost of an airplane in service with a specific airline. 
The 1967 ATA Formula is designed for turbine powered transport 
aircraft only. It covers only direct operating costs, which do not 
include such items as stewardesses and interest on investment. The 
formula is based on the characteristics of U.S. ~nternational and 
domestic airlines, and therefore it should not be applied to foreign 
or third level carriers. In particular, third level carriers would 
be likely to have smaller, unpressurized aircraft, shorter routes, 
and different labor rates. 
In air transportation systems analysis the 1967 ATA Formula is 
usually used with appropriate exceptions or modifications. such as: 
different maintenance labor rate, total maintenance multiplied by 
a factor, maintenance burden deleted, different depreciation schedule, 
or different spares percentages. For situations outside the scope of 
the ATA Formula, other formulas are used, such a~ the Lockheed/New York 
Airways Formula (Reference 1) for VTOL or an updated version of the 
1960 ATA formula for reciprocating power. 
//& 
OUTLINE OF OPERATING COSTS 
I , 
DOC roc 
DEPRECb\TION I MAINTENANCE C~ _________ F~_.--_~_IN_S_U_~CE 
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MATE IAL 
The principal direct effect would be on depreciation. The cost 
of the modification would be spread over the remainder of the useful 
life of the aircraft or the depreciation period. 
Other effects could occur through lower cruise speed, higher 
fuel consumption, or increased maintenance. 
//7 
CONVERSIONS 
The formula gives results in $/aircraft mile. Knowing block 
speed, stage length, and the number of passenger seats, any of the 
following conversions can be made. 
$/hour = $/aircraft mile x block speed 
$/seat mile = $/aircraft mile x 100 
number of seats 
$/seat trip = $/aircraft mile x sta9:e len9:th 
number of seats 
$/seat hour = $/aircraft mile x block sEeed 
number of seats 
$/trip = $/aircraft mile x stage length 
//% 
The following data are needed to exercise the ATA Formula. 
The Formula itself is provided in the appendix. 
INPUTS 
S 
D 
F gm 
Fcl 
F 
cr 
F 
am 
Fd 
TOGW 
max 
N 
e 
C 
a 
T 
C 
e 
= number of seats 
= stage length, statute miles 
= time to climb# hr. 
= time to descend, hr. Vb = block speed, mph. 
= distance to climb, mi. or tb = block time, hr. 
= distance to descend, mi. t f = flight time,hr. 
= cruise speed, mph 
= ground maneuver fuel, lbs. 
= climb fuel, lbs or Fb = block fuel, lbs 
= cruise fuel, lbs 
= air maneuver fuel, lbs. 
= descent fuel, Ibs. 
= maximum takeoff gross weight, lbs. 
= number of engines 
= utilization, hours per year 
= total purchase cost of aircraft without spares, $ 
= weight of airframe, lbs. 
= purchase cost of airframe, $ 
= takeoff thrust of one engine, lbs. 
= purchase cost of one engine,$ 
//'7 
EXAMPLE 
We now proceed through an example, the Boeing 737-200 as it was 
used on the average in 1970 (Reference 2). The following table gives 
the inputs to the formula. Notice that the state length is short, 
the block speed is low, and the utilization is low. The formula 
shows how to calculate block speed if that is unknown. Here we 
assume the full payload can be carried so we do not need to calculate 
reserve fuel as shown in the formula. We will show calculations for 
all quantities although some of them can be read from charts included 
with the formula. 
Input 
s 
N 
e 
C 
a 
T 
C 
e 
= number of seats = 93 
= stage length = 262 statute miles 
= block speed = 289 mph 
= block fuel = 5440 Ibs. 
= maximum takeoff gross weight = 114,500 Ibs 
= number of engines = 2 
= utilization = 1865 hr/yr 
= total aircraft cost = 5.20 x 106 $ 
= airframe weight = 53,217 Ibs 
6 
= airframe cost = 4.68 x 10 $ 
= total takeoff thrust of one engine = 14,500 Ibs. 
= cost of one engine = 261,000 $ 
J ,;<0 
Flight Crew 
TWO Man Crew: 
C· = 
am 
= 
= 
TOGW 
,05(1000) + 100.0 
05(114,500 + 100.0 
. 1000 
5.72 + 100.0 1 289 
= 0.366 $/mi 
1 
289 
The cost components of the formula naturally are incurred as 
cost per hour, cost per trip. or cost per year, which are then 
converted to cost per mile. The cost of flight crew is incurred 
as cost per hour and is converted by dividing by block speed. Note 
that the cost depends on gross weight and number of crew. 
Fuel and Oil 
C 1.02 (Fbx Cff + Nex .135 x Co~ ~ = am 
D 
= 1.02 ~5440 x .0149) + ~2 X .135 x .926 x .906) 
262 
= 1.02 81.2 + .27 
262 
= 0.317 $/mi 
The cost of fuel and oil is incurred as cost per trip and converted 
to cost per mile by dividing by stage length. Note that the cost of oil 
is insignificant. 
lOLl 
EXAMPLE 
We now proceed through an example, the Boeing 737-200 as it was 
used on the average in 1970 (Reference 2). The following table gives 
the inputs to the formula. Notice that the state length is short, 
the block speed is low, and the utilization is low. The formula 
shows how to calculate block speed if that is unknown. Here we 
assume the full payload can be carried so we do not need to calculate 
reserve fuel as shown in the formula. We will show calculations for 
all quantities although some of them can be read from charts included 
with the formula. 
Input 
N 
e 
= number of seats = 93 
= stage length = 262 statute miles 
= block speed = 289 mph 
= block fuel = 5440 Ibs. 
= maximum takeoff gross weight = 114,500 Ibs 
= number of engines = 2 
= utilization = 1865 hr/yr 
= total aircraft cost = 5.20 x 106 $ 
= airframe weight = 53,217 Ibs 
6 
= airframe cost = 4.68 x 10 $ 
= total takeoff thrust of one engine = 14,500 Ibs. 
= cost of one engine = 261,000 $ 
Flight crew 
TWo Man Crew: 
C· = 
am 
= 
= 
TOGW 
.05(1000) + 100.0 
05(114.500 + 100.0 
. 1000 
5.72 + 100.0 1 289 
1 
289 
= 0.366 $/mi 
The cost components of the formula naturally are incurred as 
cost per hour, cost per trip. or cost per year, which are then 
converted to cost per mile. The cost of flight crew is incurred 
as cost per hour and is converted by dividing by block speed. Note 
that the cost depends on gross weight and number of crew. 
Fuel and 
C = am 
= 
= 
= 
oil 
1.02 
1.02 
1.02 
0.317 
(FbX Cft + NeX .135 x Cot ~ 
D 
(5440 x .0149) + (2 X .135 x .926 x .906) 
262 
81.2 + .27 
262 
$/mi 
The cost of fuel and oil is incurred as cost per trip and converted 
to cost per mile by dividing by stage length. Note that the cost of oil 
is insignificant. 
Hull Insurance 
= 
= 
6 
.02 x 5.2 x 10 
1865 x 289 
= 0.193 $/mi 
Insurance is an annual expense and is converted to cost per mile 
by dividing by utilization and block speed. 
Maintenance 
Airframe Labor 
KFC = .05 (W + 6 - 630 a 53.217 + 120 a 1000 1000 
= 2.66 + 6 - 3.63 
= 6.97 hr/cycle 
KFH = 0.59 KFC = 0.59 x 6.97 = 4.11 hr/flight hr. 
a 
C 
am 
a 
= (KFH t f + KFC 
a a 
Vb tb 
= 4.11 x .722 + 6.97 
289 x .906 
= 0.152 $/mi. 
(4.00) (1) 
(4.00 ) 
All maintenance expense is incurred as a cost per trip 
and is converted to cost per mile by dividing by stage length 
(block speed times block time). Maintenace labor costs are based on 
the labor man hours per flight hour and the labor man hours per 
flight cycle. Airframe labor is non-linear function of airframe 
weight. 
Maintenance 
Airframe Material: 
C
FC 
a 
C 
am 
= 3.08 C 
a 
= 6.24 C 
a 
106 
.- CFR Tf 
a 
Vb 
= 
+ 
t 
b 
3.08 x 4.68 x 106 
106 
6.24 x 4.68 x 106 
10 
6 
C
FC 
a 
= 14~4 x .722 + 29.2 
289 x .906 
= 0.151 $/mi. 
= 14 .. 4 
= 29.2 
Maintenace material cost is based on material cost per flight 
hour and material cost per flight cycle. These costs are proportional 
to airframe cost. 
Maintenance 
Engine Labor: 
t· 6 + -1 KFH = .027T jN 3 e e 10 
= L· 6 + .027 x l4,50J 103 2 
= (0. 6 + 0.392) 2 
= 1.98 
KFC = rO• 3 + .::~j N e e L 
= e· 3 + .03 x 1~'506) 2 10 
= (0.3 + 0.435) 2 
= 1.47 
C = K t f + K am FH FC (4. 00) 
e e 
Vbtb 
= 1.98 x .722 + 1.47 
289 x .906 
= 0.111 $/mi. 
Note that increasing the number of engines without changing the 
thrust increases the engine labor cost. However this can be partially 
offset by reducing the thrust requirement from the engine out case. 
Maintenance 
Engine Material: 
C 
am 
= 2.5 
= 13 .1 
= 2.0 N fCe 0)) e 
105 
= 2.0 x 2 x t261 , 000 J 
105 
= 10.4 
=13.1 x .722 + 10.4 
289 x .906 
=0.076 $/mi 
Engine ma.terial cost is proportional to the total cost of the engines. 
/;L7 
i 
II 
Maintenance 
Burden: 
C 1.8 (Airframe Labor + Engine Labor) 
am 
1.8 (0.152 + 0.111) 
= 0.474 $/mi 
Maintenance burden is the cost of owning and maintaining the 
ground facilities for aircraft maintenace. 
sum of airframe and engine labor costs. 
It is proportional to the 
Depreciation 
Ct = 5.20 x 10
6 
= total aircraft cost without spares 
.10(C
t 
- N C } = .10C = .10 x 4.68 x 106 = .468 x 106 
e e 
.40 N C 
e e 
C 
am 
= 1 
Vb 
= 1 
289 
= 1 
289 
= 10% airframe spares cost 
= .40 x 2 x 261,000 = .209 x 106 
= 40% engine spares cost [Ct ' .10 (C -N C ) + .40 tG Co J tee e 
D x U 
a 
x 
, .209 x 10
6 ] 
[
' 5.20 x 10 6 
12 
+ .468 x 106 
1865 
I'· 5.88 x 106 
L 12 x 1865 J 
=0.910 $/mi 
Depreciation is an annual expense which is converted to cost 
per mile by dividing by utilization and block speed. 
Summary 737-200 
Umi. Uhr. Us.mi. ~ 
Crew .366 106 .394 13.3 
Fuel and Oil .317 92 .341 11. 5 
Hull Insurance .193 56 .208 7.0 
Total Flying Operations .876 254 .943 31.8 
Airframe Labor .152 44 .164 5.5 
Airframe Material .151 44 ~163 5.5 
Engine Labor .111 32 .119 4.0 
Engine Material .076 22 .082 2.8 
Total Direct Maintenance .490 142 .528 17.8 
Maintenance Burden .474 137 .510 17.2 
Total Maintenance .964 279 1. 038 35.0 
Depreciation .910 263 .980 33.2 
Total 2.750 796 2.961 100.0 
Notice that total flying operations, total maintenance, and 
depreciation are each about a third of the cost. Maintenance 
burden,rather than flight crew or fuel, is the largest single item. 
J3G 
Comparison with the Real World 
737-200 $/hr. 
Actual Figures are for the year 1970. (Reference 2) 
1967 ATA united Western Frontier Piedmont' 
crew 106 183 119 112 107 
Fuel and Oil 92 101 113 101 104 
Insurance 56 12 4 24 18 
Flying operations 254 296 236 237 229 
Airframe 88 51 47 62 46 
Engine 54 25 45 37 36 
Burden 137 70 37 38 43 
Total Maintenance 279 146 129 137 125 
Depreciation 263 99 104 129 89 
Total 796 541 470 503 443 
/21 
The formula predicts flying operations expense fairly well 
except insurance is high. Also United Airlines has a three man 
crew on the 737-200, whereas we asswned two men for .the formula. 
The formula is very high on maintenance. This seems to be 
because the formula is based on long haul aircraft, which may have 
high cycle costs. The example is a short haul aircraft, which has 
been designed to have low cycle costs. The maintenance burden is 
correspondingly high. 
Depreciation is also high because more recent (1971-82) purchase 
costs were used as input to the formula and because the airlines 
are using different depreciation schedules from the one assumed by 
the formula. 
The total figures show that the direct operating cost does vary 
significantly from airline to airline. The total cost from the 
formula is high and indicates the danger of using the formula to 
predict the absolute true cost in airline service. 
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Technology for the Design of Transport Aircraft 
A) Measures of Performance 
The common measures of performance for a transport aircraft 
are listed below: 
1. Cruise Performance - Payload (passengers) versus Range (s. miles) 
2. Cost Performance - I$/block hour, $/available seat mile) 
3. Runway Performance - takeoff and landing distances (feet) 
4. Speed Performance - max. cruise speed (mph) 
5. Noise Performance noise footprint size. or peak noise (PNdb) 
For a long range transport aircraft, the designer maximizes 
cruise and cost performance subject to constraints specified for 
takeoff and landing, speed, and noise performance. If the de-
signer optimizes takeoff and landing performance as for STOL or 
VTOL transport aircraft, then cruise performance will be less than 
optimal, and these aircraft will only perform well over short cruise 
ranges. Introduction of noise constraints into the design of 
transport aircraft requires good knowledge of the noise generation 
characteristics of engines and other propulsive devices as a function 
of size and technology, and like all constraints will cause le~s 
than optimal cruise and takeoff and landing performance. 
The designer's problem is to create an aircraft design which is 
matched to some design mission stated in terms of desired or required 
levels of these measures of performance. 
Here we shall discuss the design parameters which determine 
cruise performance for a conventional subsonic jet transport, and 
fix other design considerations. We shall assume the aircraft burns 
climb ·fuel to reach cruising altitude, and ask ourselves how far 
the aircraft can carry a given payload at cruising altitude. This 
simple analysis brings out the major factors in establishing the 
cruise performance. We shall see how the current state of aero-
na~tical technology determines the current size of transport 
aircraft, (and therefore its operating cost) and how different sizes 
of transport are needed to provide the cost optimal vehicle for different 
-1- /25 
given payload-range objectives. 
B) Technology 
We have three areas of aeronautical technology, aerodynamics, 
structures,and propulsion,which keep improving, and which cause 
newer aircraft to be superior as time goes on. In discussing 
cruise performance, we will use a single measure for the level 
of technology in each area. 
Areas of Technology 
1. Aerodynamics 
2. Structures 
3. Propulsion 
Measure of Technology Level 
V(L/D) = speed x (lift/drag ratio in cruise) 
W /w = empty weight fraction E G 
SFC 
= (operating empty weight/gross 
weight) 
= Cruise specific fuel consumption 
(lbs. of fuel per hour/lbs. of 
thrust) 
S.l Aerodynamics Technology 
The lift/drag ratio, L/D,in cruise for present subsonic aircraft 
is a number like 16-17, i.e. for every 16 lbs of weight, there is a 
requirement for i lb. of thrust. The steady state forces on the air-
craft are shown in Figure 1. The aircraft weight WG equals the lift 
L. Dividing the lift by the L/D ratio gives the drag D, which re-
quires an equal thrust, T. 
While L/D ratios of up to 40 can be obtained for sailplanes at 
low speeds by using large span,high aspect ratio wings and good air-
foil sections, the objective for transport aircraft turns out to be 
the maximization of the product of speed and L/D, i.e. to achieve 
good L/D values at higher speeds. This objective must be comprom~6ed 
by aerodynamic requirements for takeoff and landing performance which 
demand a larger wing area than otherwise would be used for cruise. 
A plot of values of v (L/ll) is given by Figure 2 which shows the 
-2-
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steady improvement for transport aircraft over the past 35 years. 
These improvements have been developments like laminar flow air-
foils, thinner wings, swept wings, higher wing loadings in cruise 
because of better high lift devices, etc. The supercritical wing 
section (SCW) and perhaps laminar flow control (LFC) wing are de-
velopments which have promise 6f continuing impoovement. 
Notice that alghough the SST has L/D values of only 8, its 
speed on the order of 1800 mph gives very high values for V(L/D). 
B.2 Structures Technology 
Here we use the "empty weight fraction" as a measure of struc-
tures technology although it contains other than the weight of the 
aircraft structure. 
We shall use the following, non-standard breakdown of the 
weight of a transport aircraft: 
We define W = takeoff gross weight G 
W = Gi 
initial cruise weight 
WGf = final cruise weight 
The total fuel load is divided into: 
W = total fuel weight 
F 
W = fuel burn in climb FC 
W = fuel burn in cruise 
FB 
WFR = weight of fuel reserve 
Then W, = WG W GJ. FC 
W = WG = WFC - WFB = W - WFB Gf Gi ) ? a 
-5- --) 1 
For simplicity. we shall ignore fuel burn in descent. and range 
during climb. and shall be computing only range in cruise. We shall 
assume that W
FC 
= WFR = 5% of WG. 
We define the operating weight empyy. WE' as made up of: 
where Ws 
W 
FE 
= weight of aircraft structure 
= weight of furnishings and equipment 
• (pilots. seats. galley. toilets. radios. etc.) 
= weight of power plant 
= weight of reserve fuel. 
Notice that for convenience. we include the reserve fuel in 
the "operating weight empty" although that is not standard practice. 
We define the useful load. W u' as the difference between the 
initial cruise weight. WGi and WE 
= W 
G 
W 
FC 
The useful load will consist of some combination of payload. 
~ and fuel burn in cruise WFB We are going to examine the ef-
fects of range requirements on the payload fraction. ~Il&.which can 
• 
be achieved. As range ia increased. more of the useful load must be 
devoted to fuel. thereby decreasing the payload fractmon. 
Typical values of the "empty weight fraction" (without reserve 
fuel) for current aircraft are given by Table 1. Notice that the 
empty weight fraction is roughly 50%. and that lower values are 
obtained for long haul. large size aircraft. where emphasis is 
placed upon achieving a low value. and where some economy of scale 
-h_ 
TABLE 1. Typical -/dj- . h / Values of ~'~c Empty We~g t Max Gross Weight 
Passenger Aircraft Empty Weight Fraction Max.- Gross Weight Range 
747 .491 no. 5,790 
DC-10-10 .474 555. 5,400 
L-1011 .550 426. 2,878 
DC-8-63 .437 350. 4,500 
707-320B .423 327. 6,160 
727-2000 .55! 175. 1,543 
Trident-3B .554 150. 2,430 
Mercure .557 114.6 1,100 
DC-9-40 .488 114.0 1,192 
737-2001l .538 109.0 2,135 
BAC-111-475 .552 97.5 1,682 
F-28-2000 .557 65.0 1,301 
VFW 614 .656 41.0 1,553 
VAK-40 .570 36.4 807 
Falcon 20T .607 29.1 641 
OHC-6 .560 12.5 745 
Concorde SST • 44 i85 • 4,020 
S-61 helicopter .62 19.00 275 
- -
Freighters 
747F .428 775.0 2,880 
CSA .425 764.5 3,500 
707-320C .402 332.0 3,925 
L100-30 (C130) .468 1:25.0 2.800 -
(Source: Jane's 1971-72) -7- x 103 lbs. St Miles 
may occur for fixed equipment like radios, galley, etc. 
The major portion of the empty weight fraction is the structures 
weight, WS ' which is usually 30% of the gross weight. A diagram of 
the value of the "structures weight fraction" is shown by Figure 3. 
S_nce the construction of the DC-3 there has been very few basic 
changes in structural technology. However, there is considerable 
promise currently of new developments which use composite materials, 
and different construction techniques to provide extremely light 
weight and rigid structures. These are expensive now, but future 
development work may reduce their costs. 
B.3 Propulsion 
The specific fuel consUlllption is given in terms of rate' of 
fuel burned per lb. of ,thrust for the engine. Here we want the 
cruise SFC values at cruise altitude and speed. For the early 
jets, SF£ had a value of roughly 1.0 in cruise, which meant that 
a 10,000 lb. thrust engine would consume 10,000 lbs. of fuel in 
one hour. For present fan engines, SFC is roughly 0.6, so that 
only 6,000 lbs of fuel per hour would be consumed by current 
engines. 
Another common measure of propulsion technology is the thrust 
to weight ratio of the engines, but here we have made it a part of 
the operating weight fraction as a measure for structur~technology. 
The most remarkable improvement over the last decade has been 
the improvement in cruise SFC for the engines used by subsonic 
• 
transport aircraft. This is illustrated tn Table 2 and Figure 4 
which show the ~lmost 50% reduction in fuel consumption by current 
-8-
Table 2. Specific Fuel Consumption for Current Transport Engines 
Takeoff Conditions Cruise conditions 
Static 
Engine Bypass Ratio Thllust SFC ~Altitude SEC 
(lbs) 
9 
JT3-C 0 13,506 0.77 .69 35000 0.92 
CONWAY 0.6 20.400 0.62 .83 36000 0.84 
SPEY 1.0 9,850 0.54 .78 32000 0.76 
JTS-D 1.03 14,660 0.57 .SO 35000 0.83 
JT3-D 1.4 18,000 0.52 .90 35000 0.S35 
TFE-731 2.55 3,500 0.49 .SO 40000 0.82 
M-45 2.8 7,760 0.45 .65 20000 0.72 
CF-6-6 6.25 40,000 0.34 .85 35000 0.63 
ASTAFAN 6.5 1.5622 0.38 .53 20000 0.63 
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high bypass ratio fan engines over the initial pure jet engines, 
This improvement is due to better propulsive efficiencies from the fan, 
improved component efficiencies for engine components like compressors, 
turbines, combustors, etc .• and higher cycle temperatures due to improved 
materials and technology in the design and construction of the turbine 
blades. 
C) Determination of Range-payload Performance 
C,l Short Range Aircraft 
Where the fuel burn, WFB is a small fraction of WG, we can assume 
that WG remains constant during cruise, or WGi ~ WGf -::::: WG• 
If we define R = cruising 
m = mileage 
Then R = m 0 WFB 
We can express m in terms 
v 
T(SFC) 
T 
But from Figure 1, 
WG 
= 
D 
L 
. . m = 
V 
SFC 
Substituting m in (1) 
R : 
range (s 0 miles) 
factor, (s. miles 
= 
of V, T, and SFC 
s .miles!hr 
lbs of fue l!hr 
Q or T = (L!D) 
per 
= 
-. r 0 
lb. of fuel) 
s. miles 
lb. fuel 
where r is called "specific range" (s. miles) 
WFB 
and is called "fuel burn fraction" 
WG 
-12-
(1) 
Note: r has the dimens ions of s. miles 
e,g. if LID = 16, SFC = 0.6 Ibs. of fuel/hr. per lb. of thrust 
Then r = 
v = 550 mph 
550 x 16 
0.6 
= 14,700 s. miles· .. ' 
We shall use these assumed values in later examples. 
a) If no payload is carried, then Wp = 0, Wu = WFB = WGi - WE' 
then the maximum cruise range, R 
max 
= r.(l -
(3) 
So, our structures technology parameter is a strong determinant of 
the maRimum range for a fuelled aircraft. If the "empty weight 
fraction" can be reduced, it cencreases the "fuel fraction", or 
"useful libad f;taction", and thereby the lIlaximum range 
b) If payload is carried, then WFB = WGi - WE - Wp 
and for any given payload 
r[:~~ rtlWG - WE - WP1 R = ~ W G 
= R - r 
. [:: J from (3) max 
where is called the "payload fraction". 
We can plot the p~yloa~ fraction against R in Figure 5 
-13-
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where = 
W 
At R = 0, -E 
WG 
r 
= 
(R - R) 
R 
max 
r 
max 
(4 ) 
from equation (3) 
For this short range case the variation of payload fraction is 
linear in R, decreasing to zero at ~ax. As r is improved, the 
payload fraction at any range improves, and Rmax increases. As 
decreased, ~ is increased 
WG 
for all range s. 
which gives higher payload frac-
This simple analysis has been for the short range case where 
W, may be considered as remaining constant over the cruise, or 
'" 
the fuel burn fraction is small for the short range mission. 
C.2 Long Range Aircraft 
For a long range aircraft, the change in Wg during the flight 
cannot be ignored (Wg = instantaneous gross weight) 
e.g. a B-707-300 on a NY to Paris trip 
WGi out of NY 315000 lbs 
at Paris 230000 lbs 
so final weight is 2/3 of initial weight. 
Equation 2 still applies over a small increment of cruise so 
we resort to the calculus which produces a different, more precise 
formula called the "Breguet Range Equation". Equation (2) becomes 
r 
-15-
where dR = increment of range 
d WFB = -d W = increment of fuel burn g 
= deceease in Wg 
. . dR = r 'l~J 
If the value of Wg at start of cruise is Wgi • at end of cruise is 
Wgf • then we have to integrate from Wgi to Wgf to get the ~xact 
formula for R 
R = r 
-dW g (2a) 
If we compare to Equation ~2) we see that the specific range is 
now modified by a logarithmic expression involving the initial 
and final cruise gross weights; 
[W +. ~ W W Gf FB [ WrnJ i.e. FB ~ FB is now replaced by in W = in 1 +-WG W Gf WGf Gf 
a) If no payload is carried. then Wp = O. Wu = WFB = WGi - WE 
then the maximum range becomes. 
R = r.ln [ WGi J= r In[WGllI l 
maE WGf J WE J (3a\ 
As before. if WE/WGi is reduced. Rmax will be increased. However 
since Wg now decreases as fuel is burned. ~ax is greater in (3a) 
than from the sample case (3). 
For exampH!1jl if r = 14.709 as before. 
WFC 
and---- = .05. and 
WG 
-·16- /60 
WE W 0.60 0.60, E 0.632 we assume - . 
'" = W W, 0.95 
G GL 
W WFB 0.35 FB 0.35, 0.370 or = = = 
WG WGi 0.45 
From (3), R = 14,700 x (0.37) = 5450 s. miles in cruise 
max 
I 
From (3a), R = 14,700 In 
max 0.632 = 14,700 In (1.58) = 6770 s. miles 
The correct formula makes a 1320 s. mile difference in Rmax! 
b) If payload is carried, then W = W , - W - Wp ' and the payload FD GL E 
becomes 
If we un log this express~on 
WE Wp 
, 
WGi WG1 
or payload fracti on, 
At R 
At R 
W 
F 
= 0, WGi 
= R maxf/ 
W 
-R 
W • (; .l 
= 1 -
= 
= e 
W 
E 
W Gi 
o 
-R/r 
= e 
-R/r 4(a) 
W 
U 
= 
WGi 
as before for shar·1: range case 
As Shown in Fiy·ure b ,the payload fraction curve is now a shallow 
exponential. Near maxir,.:um ran'ge, the, payload fr'action becomes very 
small, and very sensitive to ."rrors in estimatinq technology measures. 
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D. Weight-Range Diagram 
We can now show the weight breakdown versus design range , 
for a conventional subsonic jet at a given level of aircraft 
technology. From Figure 7, we see that the payload fraction 
is strongly dependent on design range. 
For a long range aircraft, the payload fraction will be 
very small, and aircraft payload-range performance will be very 
sensitive to the values of rand WE/WG which can be achieved. 
For example, if WplWG is 10% for some design range, then every 
lb. saved in empty weight converts directly to payload, and 
saves 10 lbs. in design gross weight. 
However, for a short range aircraft where WplWG may be 
33%, then eve:ty lb. saved in empty weight still converts directly 
to payload, but saves only 3 lbs. in design gross weight. 
Therefore, a critical decision in the design of any trans-
port aircraft is the choice of the full payload-design range 
point. Once this is selected, we have a good idea of the re-
quired aircraft gross weight for a given level of aircraft 
technology, and consequently, as we shall see, its probable 
purchase cost and operating cost. 
For our example technology, we can compute payload fractions 
at design ranges from 6000 to 500 s. miles. Table 3 gives the 
result of applying equation (3a), and quotes typical gross weights 
for a 50,000 lb. and 100,000 lb. payload, or roughly a 250 and 
500 passenger vehicle. 
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TABLE 3. SIZING TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT 
Cruise 
WG/Wp Design Range Payload Fraction Gross Weight 
(s. miles) (WP!WG) (lbs. per 250 pax 500 pax payload) or 50,000 1bs. or 100,000 1b 
6000 .04 25 1.25 x 10 6 2.5 x 106 
5000 .075 13.3 666,000 1.33 x 106 
4000 .122 8.20 410,000 820,000 
3000 .177 5.65 282,000 565,000 
2000 .230 4.35 217,500 435,000 
1000 .284 3.52 176,000 352,000 
500 .317 3.15 158,000 315,000 
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E) payload-Range Diagrams 
Having chosen the design range point for a given payload weight, 
there are two volume decisions which subsequently must be made. First, 
a fuselage volume must be selected to comfortably house a number of 
passengers corresponding to the payload, or a cargo load of a given 
density, or container configuration. Secondly, a fuel tank volume 
must be selected. 
The fuselage volume restriction prevents the addition of pas-
sengers or cargo on trips of shorter than design range where the 
fuel load can be reduced. The fuel volume restriction prevents 
extending the ranges on trips where less than full payload is being 
carried. These volume restrictions are shown iu Figure 8. 
Point A is the design range for full payload. Point B is a 
point where the fuel tanks are completely filled and a reduced pay-
load is carried. Along the lone AB the aircraft operates at full 
gross weight, and trades off payload and fuel load. Point C is 
the zero payload range, and the aircraft takeoff weight is reduced 
from the maximum gross weight as we move along the line BC. Any 
payload-range point inside the shaded area can be handled by the 
aircraft by operating at reduced gross weights. 
By choosing different volumes, the designer establishes pOints 
A and B, and can provide quite different range-payload performance 
for transport aircraft of constant gross weight as exemplified by 
the exponential curve Which is now dimensional on Y-axis. 
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We now have derived one of the two basic diagrams describing 
transport aircraft performance. It is called the "payload-range" 
diagram. payload-range diagrams for various current jet transports 
are shown in Figure 9. Since smaller aircraft are cheaper to own 
and ope,rate, airlines buy several kinds of aircraft even at a given 
level of technology to match their fleet capabilities to their 
traffic loads on routes of varying distances. Traffic load points 
should be kept near the outer boundaries of the ran~e-payload dia-
grams for profitability. This will be shown later using the second 
Hiisic diagram, the direct operating cost-range cu,rve 0 
As technology improves, a smaller gross weight airplane can 
be constructad to provide the same payload-range capability at lower 
costs. For long range aircraft, these technology improvemen'ts can 
provide spectacular changes in gross wti!ight. For example, if the 
present cruise engines of SFC = 0.60 did not exist, a transport 
aircraft of the general size of the B-747 (i.e. the second aircraft 
in Ta~~e 3, Range = 4000 miles, Payload = 100,000 lbs) would in-
crease in gross weight from 820,000 Ibs to 1.67 million Ibs. if the 
cruise SFC were only 0.8. One can safet.y say that the C-i'A, B-'747, 
DC-lO, L-IOll, etc. would not have been built if it, were not for the 
development: oflhis beU~er engine technology 0 The constilt:;c,tion of 
new engines of smaller thrust will similarly cause new smaller 'trans-
ports to be built in future year's to replace t,he present DC,·,g and 
B-727. 
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F) Direct Operatin9 cost 
F.l Effects of Size and Range on Operating Cost 
We shall now discuss the second basic diagram describing transport 
aircraft performance, the direct operating cost curve, or DOC curve. 
The direct operating costs are made up of crew, fuel, maintenance, and 
depreciation costs directly associated with operating the aircraft. 
A fuller discussion of total airline costs is the subject of a separate 
lecture. In this section we shall make some observations on the effects 
of aircraft size and range (as determined by technology) on these oper-
ating costs. 
We shall use a single cost measure, FCHR , the flight operating 
costs per block hour to show the effects of size as measured by the 
gross weight, WG, and range as measured by the full payload-design 
range. Figure 10 shows a typical result of FTL computer design studies 
for CTOL jet transports. For a level of technology described as 1970 
technology, it shows a linear variation of hourly costs with gross 
weight (or payload size) for a given design range. However, there is 
also a variation with design range, so that a set of linear rays far 
out from a zero weight point of 100 $/block hour. The hourly costs 
for current transport aircraft are shown in Figure 10. The rays cor-
respond to a level of technology used in the DC-lO and B-747 aircraft, 
and good agreement is shown for those aircraft. 
The positive intercept at zero gross weight causes an economy of 
scale as aircraft size is increased for a given design range. We will 
show this by introducing another basic cost measure, F~~R' the flight 
operating cost per seat hour. The variation of FCSHR as payload is 
increased (shown for a design range of 1000 s. miles) is given by 
Figure ll(a). Obviously, there is a significant economy of scale 
as payload increases from 50 passengers (5.40 $/seat hour) to 200 
passengers (3.64 $/seat hour). Note that the gains are not signifi-
cant after that size, but there clearly are benefits from introducing 
-26-
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la.r:ger size aircr:aft whenever traffic loads wa:n'ant, their 'usage. 
The variat,ion 
is shnwn by Fig'ure 
of FCS' with design range at constant payload HR 
11(b)" Here as range is increased, there is an 
exporlential growth, :in FCSHR ' so that for a given payload size, 
there are benefits from using the shortest design range vehicle 
which will perform the task. Figure 11 (b) shows the effect of size 
and range sim'U,ltaneously, (a crossplot of the 1000 mile design 
range poinwactually produce Figure 11(a).) Notice that a smaller, 
but lesser design ra~,g'e vehicle can be cheaper than a larger, but 
longer design range vehicle. The cheapest vehicle is the one de-
signed for exactly the payload and range of the transportation 
task to be perfoI'med. Using a larger vehicle is cheaper per seat, 
but not cheaper per' passenger. 
F.2 Derivation of DOC Direct Operating Costs ($/available seat mile) 
For a given aircraft, we can compute the operating cost per 
hour, FCHR • From this basic cost measure, we can derive the DOC 
curve in terms of cents per available seat mile versus range. We 
shall now show this deL'ivation. 
First, we must know the variation of block time with range. 
This is shown in Figure 12 as a linear form, where the slope of 
the curve is inversely proportional to cruise speed, VCR and the 
zero distance intercept accounts for taxi time, takeoff and landing 
times, circling the airport for landing and takeoff, and any de-
lays due to ATC congestion. This curve can be obtained by plotting 
scheduled times versus trip distance, and Figure 12 shows a 
typical result. 
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If we compute block speed, Vb' as trip distance divided by 
block time. we get the asymptotic curve shown in Figure 13 where 
at longer ranges, the blockspeed begins to approach the cruise 
speed. 
If we define PHR = productivity per hour in terms of seat-
miles per hour where S = available seats for a given trip,then 
a 
a curve shown in Figure 14 is obtained. It is proportional to 
the Vb curve up to the full payload design range point where 
the number of available seats begins to be reduced causing the 
aircraft plDoductivity to decrease af'ter that point. 
Now if we divide the hourly cost by the hourly productivity, 
we obtain the second basic diagram for transport aircraft. the 
DOC curve (Direct Operating Cost). 
DOC = 
FCHR 
P 
HR 
= 
$ /hour 
seat miles/hour 
= $/available seat mile 
Since FC is a constant, this curve is the inverse of 
HR 
the P curve and produces the form shown in Figure 15. where 
HR 
DOC is high for short trips. decreases towards the design range 
point, and increases thereafter. 
If we consider different payloads and ranges for the DOC 
cUJ:'ve, life see that a 50 seat vehicle is more expensive than a 
100 seat vehicle. and a vehicle designed for 1000 miles will 
be dheaper than one designed for 2000 miles as stated previously. 
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These curves may cross so that a smaller, shorter range vehicle 
is cheaper at certain ranges than a larger, longer range vehicle. 
Beca·Cl.se of chis hyperbiblic shape, l.t is easier to work with 
trip cost. lIleasures which have a linear form with distance since 
they are p.roportional to block time. We define two trip cost 
measures here: 
wher'e c l and c 2 are know cost coefficients 
FC ~ flight. cost pel:' seat trip = 
ST 
where Sa = available seats 
FC 
AT 
S 
a 
The form of EC and FC with dist.ance is shown in Figures 
AT ST 
16 and 17. After design range, where Sa is decreasing FCST be-
comes non-linear. 
Generally. these t:t'ip cost measures a.re easier to understand 
and more useful than t.he DOC curve with its hyperbolic shape. One 
needs only to COmplJ:te c l and c 2 for a given airplane and cruise 
schedule, and know the variation of available seats with trip 
distances 
It mU.st be emphasized ·that because of the strong variation 
in DOC with trip distance. any value quoted for DOC is meaning-
less unless accompanied by a value for ·trip distance. This point 
is often f·orgott.en by economists, laymen,' and inexperienced sys-
terns analysts. 
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G) Profitable Load Diagrams 
The two basic diagrams, range-payload and DOC, may be 
combined to form a "profitable load" diagram dlf certain major 
assumptions are made: 
1) It is necessary to assume a variation of revenue 
yield with distance. While a fare formula may be known, 
yield for a given route is an average net contribution in 
terms of dollars per passenger compu:ted. by tak~ng into ac-
count the mix of standard and discount fares, sales commis-
sions, taxes, and pe.rhaps short term,. variable indirect 
operating costs per passenger arising from ticketing. reser-
vations, passenger handling, etc. Here we assume Y ~s linear 
with trip distance. 
2) It is necessary to assume a variation of total costs, 
TC with distance, or to ignore allocation of overlhead costs 
and produce a short term profit (or contribution to overhead) 
diagram. Here we shall assume that short term total operating 
seats per seat trip. TCST have the same linear form as the 
flight costs, FC 
ST 
The usual relationship of Y and TCST is shown on Figure 
18 where the linear forms cross at some short range. The 
result is a hyperbolic form for breakeven load decreasing to very 
low values at design range as shown in Figure 19. As with DOC, 
any value quoted for breakeven load factor must be accompanied 
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Figure 18 VARIATION OF TOTAL COSTS AND YIELD WITH TRIP DISTANCE 
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Figure 19 TYPICAL VARIATION QF BREAKEVEN LOAD WITH DISTANCE 
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by a quoted vahle for trip distance. 
The payload·-range and breakeven load curves can now 
be combined to form a "profit;able" load diagram as shown 
in Figure 20. The shaded areas represent points where a 
"profit" can be made using the aircraft to carry a given 
load over this trip distance. If the areas overlap, it 
is preferable to choose an aircraft where the point lies 
close to the upper boundary of payload-range limits since 
it is more profitable. E.g., choose the medium range air-
craft for point PQ in Figure 20. 
Notice that the profitable load diagram cannot be 
uniquely associated with a particular aircraft because of 
its Bssumptions. It must be associated with an airline 
and a set of routes since the indirect costs are specific 
to the airline, and the yield values are specific to a set 
of routes or city pairs. Thus when profitable load dia-
grams are shown, these additional data should be quoted. 
Notice also that the hyperbolic form of the breakeven 
load curve is due to the differing slopes of the yield and 
total cost curves with trip distance. If yields, or fares 
were proportional to cost over distance, then the break-
even load would be constant with trip distance. Recent 
fare changes have moved fares much into line with costs 
by raising the zero distance intercept for coach fares 
-43- j '7~ 
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from $6.00 to $120000 This provides much lower breakeven 
loads for shorter distance trips. 
H) The Price of Transport Aircraft 
As mentioned earlier, the purchase price and therefore 
depreciation costs are proportional to aircraft size. To 
demonstrate this Figure 21 shows a plot of current prices 
against aircraft operating empty weight. A good fit is 
given by the curve, 
6 P
a 
= 1.9 x 10 + 66,WE $ 
where P
a 
= fully equipped market price 
WE = basic operating weight empty 
This correlation does not mean that WE is the causa-
tive factor in determining the price which a manufacturer 
will decide to establish for his new product. Competition 
from existing aircraft, the expected size of the production 
run, etc. are factors Which he considers closely. It is 
merely interesting to note the correlation with empty 
weight. 
Notice also, that the DEC-6, a simple STOL transport 
from canada, and the YAK-40, a new entry in world markets 
from Russia, are well below the minimum price for conven-
tional transport aircraft from the Western world. 
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A set of data on prices for current new and used 
jet transports taken from the weekly editions of Esso's 
"Aviation News Digest" is given by Table 4. There is 
considerable variation in unit prices which may be due 
to various amounts of aircraft spares included with the 
purchase. 
1$0 
-46-
Figure 21 THE PRICE OF CURRENT TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT 
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Table 4,_ ACQUISITION PRICES FOR NE'. LONG-RANGE TRANSPORT AIRCRAF"r 
SERIES Mor.th of Airline Purchaser Number Total Price Price/Aircraft 
Purchase Aircraft Purchased Millions of $) (Millions of $ ) 
r f-"-"';;';';""--+ ~--·-'--------t------t---r==-":,;:"-="~,,,:,:,::,:=::,,:,::,,,:,,,;:......t . April r~ lIerld Airvays B-747C 3 100.00 33.33 NO'J'ernber 197! Japan Airlines Ltd, B-747 7 209.80 29.97 
B-747 OctC=er 1971 D~lt~ Airli~es B-741 1 25.40 25.40 
L' ~u;;o.< 1971 Alitalia B-747 1 26.00 26.00 I J'.lly ~971 ~"m,"s /'ir-",-:rs B-747 1 28.30 28.30 ~,:a:r 1.17: i Sc;;.'t~ Africa..:. .Air'(Qys B-747B 2 4B.00 24.00 '?e:br.:.3.ry 1971 i 3:r":!.tish C ..... el"'$eas Air ... e..y& Corp. B-747 4 lOS.00 27.00 
n '.:0.:," ::"')72 C:c'"J.':i:.cntal Airli~es DC-IO 4 63.00 I ~pril""1;12 Iberi;;, DC-IO 3 72.80 Xi;i..!"cl;. 1972 MB.rti!".a~r DC-lOF 1 23.00' I ~-!a."ch 1972 Laker A!I"1oiays DC-IO 2 47.30 
January 1972 Trans-:nternational Airlines DC-IO (cargo) 3 57.00 
DC-10 
I
I ~ec~~ber 1971 Sc~~dinavian Airlines Syste~ DC-10-30 2 58.00 
October 1971 lfestern Airlines DC-Io-I0 4 85.00 
I ;\ugust 1971 Alitalia DC-IO 4 91.00 
'
I April 1971 World Airways DC-I0 3 72.00 
February 1971 Natio~al Airlines DC-I0 2 35.00 
L-- Feor-.... a.ry 1971 Finr.a.ir DC-IO-30 2 48.00 
t-lfll ~overnber 1971 Court Lin~ Aviatior. ~-10l1 2 48.JO 
January 1971 Pacific Southwest Airlines L-1011 2 30.00 
A30PB ~ove::'lber 1971 Air France A300B-2 6 75.00 
I.70'7'-
-I :.ja.:.- 2971 
[--I :"1)' IS7: 
~C-p II June ~971 I :~arch 1971 Sc~~d!nQvi~~ Air1i~es St3te~ Horld Airwa.ys 
B7e7-320B 
;;c-6-63 
DC-8-63 
DC-5 SUner ~, 
1 6.60 
1 14.50 
1 
~: Weekly editions of Esso's IIAviation New-So Digest". Jan.uary 1, 1971 through May I, 1972. 
20.72 
24.27 
23.00 
23.65 
19.00 
29.00 
21.25 
24.25 
24.00 
17.50 
24.00 
12.5:) 
8.6~ 
11.1-1-t 
1133. 
-I 
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-Table 4 (cont. )ACQmS:;:TIOOl PRICES FOR NL" MEDIUM .11m SHORT-RANGE TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT 
I 
~ 
I I I 
I f 
"--f 
II 
I i 
:'C-9 i 
. I I 1 
_I _I 
3~i"-L·."_ i 
II 
I I 
I 
1972 
1972 
".:..,-,', 197? I" 
t ~·:.:;:r'.~ary :;'97::: 
":~::ot-:O!r ':97:::" 
A;'l-n 1972 
.~C:-'.Jber 1971 
Ap.ril 
i 
I I ':,.'_.:::::.:.st 1071 
I ,', ... ,:;.:.::; 2.971 
1 l;r~':'J. 1971 r 
Airli::e Pv.rcha.ser 
Cnntinental rt:rlines 
J.\.:,set"t 'I'ransport of Australia 
~ans Austra:ia Airlines 
:'::cr.6or ?:"-~j,ienst 
£astern Air:.i'1<:-s 
i"'eE~ern nil': ioes 
'.::'o.1:-,i5 Ai::-
.4nsett -:'r2.:".spor: of At:.stra::'ia 
Unit.ed St.E.:"-e3 ~S.\-y 
Yugoslovenski Aero Transport 
Iberia. 
.!L.i talia 
Au~tr-';'a.rJ ."-.irlir::es 
Sc~~d:navia~ Airlines Syste~ 
-=''-:'':, i Airr:ays 
Va.cific \o,festern Airlines 
M.::.::aysia .. Airlines System 
nc,.cific \';:est.err.. Airlines 
l'<lalays i "I." ":"~rlines 
A:"r A.l;erie 
r::,,:::.at:'l:mS SAFE 
~t.r.we::l": ":"~,rl::.nes 
Aircraft 
B-127-200 
B-727-200 
B-727-200 
E-727-200 
B-727-200 
B-:27-200 
B-727-20J 
B-727-200 
8-727-200 
5-727-200 
3-727-200 
:JC-9 
;)0-9-30 
DC-9 
DC-9 
:;;C-9 
:;C-9 
5AC-111-475 
B-T37-200 
B-737-:?OO 
B-737 
0-737 
:3--37 
B-737-200 
B-737 
B-737 
3-737-200 
~umber Total Price 
Purchased l~Mi11ion' of-$ ) 
15 1l~.00 
4 38.80 
4 40.1; 
16 140.30 
3 30.00 
14 100.00 
2 15·00 
15 115.0D 
3 22.50 
l 9.70 
6 69.75 
5 25·30 
6 30.00 
11 67.50 
1 5.50 
8 38.00 
5 27.3;; 
1 3.60 
2 10 .90 
18 112.20 
1 , •• )1) 
5 37.30 
6 41. 50 
1 T.OO 
1 h.3G 
1 5.00 
1 4.50 
1 4.70 
~~ice/ Ai rC!'l!lf~ 
Millions of ) 
7.93 
9.58 
10.04 
8.77 
10.:10 
7.14 
7.50 
7.67 
7.50 
9·F· 
11.63 
5·06 
5.00 
6.14 
5.50 
4.75 
5.46 
3.60 
5. 45 
6.24 
5·00 
7.46 
6.92 
7,0·) 
4.30 
5.00 
4.50 
4.70 3-737-200 
~~cr~ure 10 30.00 3.00 
Dige3t" , Jam-luy 1, 1971 through Y..a.y 1, 1972 
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Table 4 (cent •. ). ACQUISITION PRICES FOR USED TRANSPOR'l' AIRCRAFI' 
Xontb of' Airline Purchaser Aircraft Seller Aircraft Nu:nber Purchase Purchased 
April 1972 China Airlines Continental Airlines B-107-324c 1 
Decem 1971 Transavla Holland American Airlines B-107-123B 1 
lrovem 1971 Trans American Airways Braniff' Interna~ional B-707-32OC 1 
Oct 197J Ca.thay Pacific Alrvays Northwest Airkir.es B-707-320B 2 
August 1971 'la:::ig Airlines Awerican Air:ines B-707-32~ 1 
July 1971 EEA Airtours Britist O'.-erseas Alrwlqs Cor B-707-436 7 
April 1972 .!G.pe.:'l Airlines Ltd. Ea.stern A1:::,lines DC-S-61 3 
:Jovem 1971 Intersuede Aviation A3 Eastern Ai~l!r:es OC-S-51 2 
oct ~971 ;'i:- :a..l.aica :'fcDonnell ~cui::"as Corp DC-S-51 : 
Oct 1971 Ir:ela..'1.dic Seaooard Airlines tC~S-63F 1 
July 1971 I Air :ie .. Zea.l.and United Airlinas Dc-8-52 < 
Decem 1971 B!'a...iff Internat.ional Boeing B-727 13 
Allegheny 
Fro:ltier 
Grar.t. Aviat ion 
Sept 1971 Aerovias Nacionales(Colombia Boeing Corp B-727-24C 3 
April 1972 Air Car:.a.da Continental Airlines :>C-9 3 
Jan 1971 Flnnair :-~.::Donnell Douglas Corp DC-9 S 
!·;arch 1972 Allegheny Airlin~a Bra~iff International EAC-lll 11 
;'jay 197: National Airways Corp :Uoha Airlines 3-737 :;. 
Decec: 1911 Sterling Airways United Airlines Aerospatia.le 13 
~: we~:iU.y editions of' Esse r ~ IIAviatio~ Xe-oIS ~igest~l, January 1, ~911 thro'olg.'1 May 1, 1972 
Total Priee Price/Aircraft 
(Million. of $ ) (Millions ot $ ) 
6.20 6.20 
3.60 3.60 
4.85 4.85 
10.00 5.00 
2.40 2.40 
10.30 1.47 
20.40 6.80 
6.00 3.00 
2.90 2·90 
1 10.80 10.80 
3.70 1.65 
87.30 6.71 
9.18 3.08 
6.00 2.0C· 
22.30 , 2.79 
14.50 , 1.32 
, 
3.80 , 3.80 
6.80 ! 0.52 
Basic Economic Principles 
T. Nicolaus Tideman 
Economics shares with engineering a concern with solving problems: 
problems like how to produce shoes efficiently or how to control pollu-
tion--or how to design an efficient transportation system. However, the 
economic approach to solving problems differs from the engineering 
approach in one crucial way: In an economic context every problem has a 
solution. Economists achieve this miracle by defining their goals in 
such a way that doing without something is the correct "solution" if it 
is too expensive or impossible to obtain it. Thus if pollution can be 
eliminated only at a prohibitive cost, economists will seek the optimal 
amount of pollution. If Lockheed loses money no matter what it does, 
the economic solution is for Lockheed to go out of business. 
Formally, the economic approach involves maximizing an objective 
function that reflects both goals and costs. This idea is sometimes 
stated incorrectly as, for example, "getting the most pollution control 
for the least amount of money." A correct statement in words is somewhat 
cumbersome: The goal is to control pollution at whatever level in a 
cost-minimizing manner, and to choose the level of pollution control that 
is most worthwhile considering its minimum cost. Similsrly, economists 
look at the behavior of a consumer as solving a problem in the allocation 
of time snd money. The goal for a consumer is to spend whatever money is 
earned in the manner that maximizes his satisfaction, or "utility," and 
to esrn that amount of money that is most satisfying considering the 
disagreeableness of working harder and the satisfaction to be obtained from 
what the earnings from extra work will buy. Considering for the moment a 
;%5 
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choice between just two goods, say wine and cheese, we can associate 
any pair of quantities of the two goods cheese 
with a point in the first quadrant of a 
graph with Cartesian co-ordinates. Thus 41-__ ~ 
point A may represent 2 glasses of wine 
and 4 ounces of cheese. The other 
combinations of wine and cheese that 
2 wine 
would be equally satisfying to a con-
sumer will, under reasonable assumptions, be on a curve through A that 
is convex to the origin. Economists call such a curve an "indifference 
curve." Combinations that are preferred over A lie on indifference 
curves farther from the origin. If the prices of wine and cheese are 
given, the other combinations that can be bought for the same amount of 
money as A will be on a straight line through A (the budget line), the 
slope of which is determined by the relative prices of wine and cheese. 
If A is preferred to all other combinations that can be bought with the 
same amount of money, then the indifference curve through A must be 
tangent to the budget line at A. Thus a graphical depiction of a process 
of consumer maximization involves finding where the boundary of attainable 
points is tangent to an indifference curve. In a more formal formulation 
a continuous variable called "utility" is assumed to depend on the 
quantities of wine and cheese in such a way that each indifference curve 
corresponds to a different level of utility, with higher levels of utility 
associated with indifference curves further from the origin. The consumer's 
problem is then one of maximizing 
(1) 
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subject to the constraint that 
i.e., that expenditure be equal to income. To solve this kind of 
problem economists use Lagrangian constrained maximization techniques. 
Generalization to more than two commodities is straightforward. 
A demand curve can than be derived by finding the quantities of a 
good that solve the maximization problem as one varies the price of that 
commodity, : .. )lding income and the prices of all other goods constant. 
Or, more directly, one can say that a demand curve expresses the quantity 
of a good that a utility-maximizing person will want to buy as a function 
of the price, assuming that income and all other prices are fixed at 
given levels, and assuming that the person has no way of affecting the 
price he pays. For reasons of consistency p 
with historical diagrams, economists always 
put quantity on the horizontal axes of 
their graphs and price on the vertical axes, 
even though they usually think of quantity D 
as the dependent variable. Market demand 
~-----------------q 
at any price is obtained by summing the 
quantities demanded by all persons in the market at that price. Economists 
are often concerned with the "elasticity of demand," by which they mean 
k. l!. 
dp q , the limit of the ratio of percentage changes in quantity to 
percentage changes in price along the demand curve. 
A supply curve is derived by applying the idea of profit maximization 
of firms. Technology determines a relationship between inputs and output. 
)~7 
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Economists call that relationship a "production function," but we won't 
delve into it. Suffice it to say that the production function and the 
prices of inputs determine a "total cost function," C(q) which gives 
the minimum cost at which any quantity of output can be produced. The 
profit, n, that a firm makes can be considered the difference between 
revenues and costs, each of which depend on the quantity of output: 
n = R(q) - C(q) (3) 
If a firm cannot affect the price at which it sells its output (as in 
the economists' model of perfect competition), then revenue is simply 
the product of quantity and that inflexible price: 
n = p • q - C(q) (4) 
The condition for profit maximization can be obtained by differentiating 
with respect to q and setting that derivative equal to 0: 
dn de o. = p = dq dq (5) 
Thus 
dC 
-
p. dq (6) 
Economists refer to the derivative of total cost with respect to quantity 
as "marginal cost," that is, the cost of producing one addition unit. 
Similarly, the derivative of revenue with respect to quantity is called 
marginal revenue. Profit maximization involves equating marginal revenue 
and marginal cost, which, in the cost of a competitive firm means choosing 
that output where marginal cost is equal to the price received. This is 
efficient because it means that the prices by which consumers choose how 
much to buy correspond to the costs of producing what they buy. 
;gg 
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There is a second-order condition of profit maximization: Marginal 
cost must be rising. And one further condition: reVenue must be greater 
than "variable costs," that is the costs that could be avoided by not 
producing. This condition may also be stated as the condition that price 
be greater than average variable cost. All three conditions are summarized 
in the statement that a competitive firm's supply curve is that part of 
its marginal cost curve that is greater than average variable cost and 
rising. 
A market supply curve is obtained by summing the quantities that all 
firms would supply at each price. If all firms have the same cost func-
tions, then in the long run, when all costs are variable, a competitive 
market will supply unlimited quantities at a price that just covers costs. 
Profit, exclusive of an ordinary return to capital and entrepreneurial 
effort, is exactly zero. 
The competitive result may be contrasted with the profit maximizing 
outcome when a firm can affect the price of its output by varying the 
quantity it produces. Then (2) may be written as 
~ a p(q) • q - C(q). 
Differentiating and setting the result to zero, 
d~ ~ q + P dC o. (8) _ D -- = dq dq dq 
Rearranging. 
dC +££. (9) 
- -
q, dq P dq 
or 
-++ ) dC 1 (10) dq .<!q .E. dp q 
Jzq 
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In words, a profit-maximizing producer who can affect the price of his 
product will choose a level of output where marginal cost is equal to 
price multiplied by one plus the reciprocal of the elasticity of demand. 
Since the elasticity of demand is negative, this means that marginal 
cost will be less than price, so that consumers will be economizing on 
this output inefficiently, treating it as if it were more valuable than 
it is in terms of resources used in production. 
A regulated firm might have no control over the price of its product, 
but it could affect both revenues and costs through such variables as 
advertising ana frequency of service. An economic analysis would 
predict that regulated firms would maximize with respect to the variables 
they did control, setting them at levels where their marginal contribu-
tions to revenues equaled their marginal contributions to costs, with 
appropriate second-order conditions. 
For further reading 
R. G. Lipsey and P. O. Steiner, Economics (Harper & Row). 
P. A. Samuelson, Economics (McGraw-Hill) 
Kelvin Lancaster, Introduction to Modern Microeconomics (Rand McNally)--
a more theoretical treatment. 
J. M. Henderson and R. E. Quandt, Microecono~ic Theory (McGraw-Hill)--
a mathematical treatment. 
BASIC TRANSPORTATION ECONOMICS 
Monday, July 10, 1972 
James T. Kneafsey 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
Introduction 
Under the terms of this workshop, the lectures are to be pub-
lished basically in the original form which you heard in the class. 
In the matter of revision, I have made only small adjustments in 
order to preserve the flavor of the original lecture. I mention 
this partly because lectures, like sermons, do not make books. No 
matter how resonant and uplifting they sound, at least to the 
lecturer during presentation, they remain unimpressive in print. 
With this caveat in mind, the reader is introduced to the session 
titled "Basic Transportation Economics." 
The Scope of Transportation 
Transportation economics is the application of economic prin-
ciples to the examination of issues in various modes of transporta-
tion. It is usually not treated as a separate discipline but rather 
as a mix of general transportation and applied micro economic theory. 
The occasion of this lecture seems an appropriate moment to 
evaluate the general state of transportation as a profession, science, 
art, or however one may view it. In making this evaluation, it would 
be helpful to observe the significant areas of transportation and to 
indicate to you where economics fits in. As a starting point, one 
might classify transportation into five general areas: (1) transpor-
tation engineering, (2) transportation planning, (3) transportation 
policy, (4) transportation regulation and law, and (5) transportation 
economics .. 
The first of these areas is transportation engineering, in which 
/13 
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there are the two sub-areas: "hardware" and "software. 1I Hardware 
pertains to analysis in the actual production of transportation 
equipment and invokes the use of traditional engineering principles. 
The software area, which involves the application of analytic tools 
and techniques to transportation problems, would include systems 
analysis, demand modelling, and computer programming applications. 
The second area of transportation is transportation planning, 
which develops a decision-making apparatus to handle the social, 
political, and environmental aspects of a multitude of current and 
future problems at urban, regional, and national levels. The third 
area refers to transportation policy, the "piece de sustenance" of 
all transportation analysts. Issues of transportation policy can 
range widely from the question of labor featherbedding to SST invest-
ment to subsidy for mass transit systems. To this area I have added 
logistics and physical distribution management, that is, the management 
of the movement of physical goods from points of origin to points of 
destination. 
TIle fourth area of transportation regulation and law will comprise 
a substantial portion of this seminar and its activities concerning 
the air sector will be explained accordingly. This brings us to the 
fifth area of transportation economics, the use of economic analysis 
in transportation. 
Transportation Economics 
Economics evolved in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
as an attempt to explain and to justify a market system. The 
-3-
coordinating and controlling mechanisms in those centuries were the 
competitive markets and the systems of prices that emerged from the 
bargains between freely contracting buyers and sellers. The 
rationalization of the competitive market is still in large measure 
relevant to most advanced economies today. For all the great modi-
fications to which market economies have been sUbjected in practice 
during the twentieth century and for all the qualifications that 
must be attached the case for such an economy, the competitive ~arket 
model is still an important measure (in some ways--essential) descriptive 
both of reality and of the aggregate conception of what an ideal 
economic system should be. 
Yet there are at least two large sectors of the U.S. econo~ that 
the competitive market model cannot even purport to describe. These 
are the huge and growing public sector,where the allocation of re-
sources is determined mainly by political decisions, and the regulated 
sector in which the organization and management are mostly private 
but the central economic decisions are subject to direct governmental 
regulation. In general, industries which fall under the aegis of the 
various independent regulatory commissions may be classified into 
communications, banking and finance, energy, public utilities, and 
transportation. In these instances the primary guarantor of acceptable 
activity is conceived to be not competition or self-restraint but direct 
governmental prescription of major aspects of their structure and 
economic performance. Transportation industries are distinguished 
from other sectors of the economy by four principal components of 
this regulation: control of entry, fare and rate fixing, the prescription 
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of quality and conditions of service, and the imposition of an obliga-
tion to -serve all users under reasonable conditions • -Transportation 
economics then is an analysis of the economics of that regulation--
its characteristics and consequences, the principles that govern it, 
and the principles by which it ought to be governed. 
If you read today-the classic treatise of two centuries ago by 
1 Adam Smith on the Wealth of Nations , you would note that he submitted 
three general propositions which have provided the basis of economic 
analysis over the decades. These three propositions in paraphrase form 
are the following: 
First, that the wealth of a nation is the product of its labor; 
Second, that the greatest improvements in the product of labor 
result from the division of labor; and 
Third, that the division of labor is limited by the extent of 
market. 
Now to these three propositions I would add a fourth which many 
economists, especially regional economists, ha,ve argued: the extent 
of the market is controlled by the cost of transportation. If you inter-
pret these four propositions in a syllogistic fashion, you could argue 
the linkage between transportation cost and the wealth of a nation. If 
the nation's wealth can be measured by the national income-accounts, GNP 
statistics reflect quite clearly the importance of the transportation 
sector. 
In terms of economic analysis one must distinguish between the 
different modes of transportation because the institutional arrangement, 
lAdam Smith, 
of Nations, 
1925. 
- An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth 
Edwin Cannan edition, London: Methuen and Co., Ltd., 
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managerial practices, and market structure are very different in the 
air, rail, water, motor and pipeline industries. The analysis must 
indicate the distincUons between passenger and freight traffic, between 
intercity and urban movements, and between domestic and international 
transportation. Even in the case of a single mode, the analyst must 
define the scope of his study very carefully. As an example, the 
analysis for evaluating TACV would be very different from examining 
AMTRAK or previous intercity rail passenger service with conventional 
technology because neither the immediate nor long-run effects of TACV 
are known. 
Especially since each economic analysis requires stringent 
assumptions about the constancy of all variables except the ones under 
focus, it is essential for the analyst to specify each time the 
location, environment, and time period to which' his analysis is 
applicable. In technical terms, this feature is referred to as "ceteris 
paribus "--everything else being equal--and the analys is is known as 
one of partial equilibrium. 
In terms of the above scope of an analysis of transportation 
economics, one also must keep in mind that there are several components 
to the total transportation picture involving the actual users of 
transportation, the firms (carriers) which are providing the services, 
the extent of government agency participation, and the impacts on 
nonusers (or what is often referred to as the public interest elements). 
An economic analysis conducted solely at the user level in urban 
transportation might suggest different policy implications than an 
analysis at the firm or agency level since firms and users often have 
)97 
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different interests and are striving for different objectives. Many 
. riders in the Boston corridor may be interested in free transit but 
the MBTA cannot offer commuter. services at zero fares unless large 
subsidies were involved. The cross-effects on nonusers as a result 
of the income transfers necessary to pay for these subsidies and the 
increasing role of governmental involvement would complicate the analysis. 
Market Structure, Conduct. and Performance 
How are these components best treated simultaneously? In terms 
of most effectively solving the total picture by using the airline 
industry as an example2 first, we look at how the firms or agencies 
are structured in offering the air transportation service to the public, 
namely, how are they. organized, how large are they, how do they compete? 
Why do we have trunk line carriers? Why are there supplementals? 
Why do we have local air carriers? Why cargo carriers? In terms of 
an economic analysis of the air transport industry, market structure 
refers to the degree of competition, the size distribution of firms, 
absolute size, types of competition, and barriers to entry. In general, 
market structure pertains to the ways in which airline firms are 
organized and the resulting structure of firms from such organizations. 
Just as the credibility of a demand or cost analysis depends on the 
specification of a location and time period, so does the merit of a 
market structure analysis require the specification of relevant markets 
(routes) and types of service. 
2 The total picture of transportation can be portrayed in Figure 1. 
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INGREDIENTS AND SCOPE OF 
TRANSPORTATION ECONOMICS 
Passengers: 
- International 
- Domestic 
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Figure 1 
ANALYSIS BY 
MODE 
(1) Air 
(2) Rail 
(3) Motor 
(a) Auto 
(b) Bus 
(c) Truck 
(4) Water 
(a) Inland 
(b) Ocean 
(5) Pipeline 
(6) New Technology 
The Total Picture of Transportation Economics 
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Along the line of the structural elements, a second feature to 
examine relates to what is called in legal terms market conduct or 
simply conduct. ~arket conduct pertains to the ways in which firms or 
agencies in air transportation behave in relation to the statutory or 
other legal requirements within the context of their market structure • 
. Issues of certification, route structure, and fares fall into this 
category. 
Related specifically to the conduct area are the ways in which 
firms and agencies behave with respect to economic yardsticks. This 
third area refers to what is called economic or market performance. 
Measures of economic performance would include rates of return on 
investment, profit rates, number"of innovations, returns on research 
and development, and rates of return on stockholder equity. 
From all of this emerges a really basic question: What is the 
relationship between market structure and market performance? The 
degree of such a relationship has been an often debated and well 
documented topic, with proponents ranging from one extreme to the other. 
Suffice it to say that, if the testimony of many participants in airline 
merger cases is an indicator, it appears that at least in the airline 
industry changes in market structure induce changes in market performance. 
If the C.A.B. in the future regards its adjudicating role in merger cases 
seriously, then substantial research must be undertaken linking the 
forecasts of expected changes in economic performance to changes in market 
structure resulting from merger activities. 
dOQ 
\ 
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Production Func tions, Costs, and Demand 
How does one go about measuring these variables? Say we want tp 
examine profit to the firm as a measure of performance. From an empirical 
pOint of view, we need to have estimates of revenues and costs. In order 
to forecast revenues, we must estimate a demand function; and to estimate 
costs, we need some estimate of the underlying production function. 
What then is a production function? A production function is merely 
a behavioral relationship between the inputs required to provide trans-
portation services and the output which is derived (see Figure 2). A very 
difficult question in terms of transportation, particularly airline 
transportation, is what is output? This is especially difficult when you 
encounter the empirical problems of trying to measure output (whether it 
be seat-miles, departing seats, revenue-seat-miles, number of movement$, 
etc.). For purposes of illustration, let us assume that the input side can 
be classified by three items: capital, labor, and fuel. The production 
function then associates this combination of inputs with producing a certain 
level of output. Again both the location and time period must be care-
fully specified. 
There are numerous types of production functions that can be tested 
empirically but the most frequently applied type is the mUltiplicative 
production function, which could be represented from Figure 3 in the 
following way: output (Z) is derived from a joint combination of 
capital (K), labor (L), and fuel (F). The result is a lograithmic 
production function. Taking natural logs on both sides of the equation 
yields a log linear equation where the exponents become coefficients and 
represent the elasticities of output with respect to each of these inputs. 
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PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS: 
TWO VERSIONS 
(1) Z = F (Xl' X2, ..• Xn) 
inputs 
(2) Z = F(C, L, V, T, E, D) 
charac ter is tics 
Where Z represents output 
Xl' X2 , ... , Xn represent capital, labor, fuel, 
etc. and the characteristics can be depicted by cost, 
level of service, volume, technology, environment, 
etc. 
Figure 2 
Two Hethods of Specifying Production Functions 
Z=F(K,L,F) 
Z = AKa LS FY 
> 
< 
-11-
1 
TC = rK + wL + mF + FC 
OBJECTIVE: 
minimize <p 
Figure 3 
A Multiplicative Production Function 
with Three Inputs 
.~. , 
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For example, in Figure 3, o:represents the elasticity of output with 
respect to capital, S the elasticity of output with respect to labor, 
and y the elasticity of output with respect to fuel. The sum of these 
exponents is a measure of the returns to scale. If the sum equals one, 
constant returrts to scale result, that is, a 10% increase in capital, 
labor and fuel simultaneously would yield a 10% increase in output or 
volUme (Z). If the sum exceeds one, increasing returns to scale 
tesults; if the exponents sum to less than one, then decreasing returns 
to scale occur (for the same 10% increase in inputs, a less than 10% 
increase in output would occur). 
The use of production functions is becoming the most frequently 
used procedure for identifying the growth component attributable to 
ptogr·ess in all industries, including air transportation. In view 
of the producti vities of the phys ical inputs in some base period, we 
can estimate the increase in input that would have occurred since the 
base period if, given the level of technological knowledge of that 
period, the increase of output had been brought about merely by the 
growth of the quantity of physical inputs. The difference between the 
output growth actually observed and the so calculated hypothetical 
growth (i.e., the residual) may be regarded as an excellent measure of 
productivity change. Quite obviously, this measure requires estimates 
of both inputs and outputs and of the behavioral linkage between the 
two in the form of the coefficients of the production function. 
There are at least three principal reasons for suggesting a 
production function approach to the development of improved productivity 
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measures. in air transportation. One is the general desirability 
for accuracy, precision, and clarity to facilitate scientific 
analysis. A second and related reason concerns a particular ob-
jective: if we know a priori why we want to measure performance 
in air transportation, we can then decide what kinds of measures of 
inputs and outputs are appropriate. Statistical testing then. becomes 
the means by which this appropriateness is determined. 
A third reason for being concerned with the production function 
approach relates to the infrastructure of general cost analysis and to 
the estimation of cost functions. The statistical estimate of cost 
functions has been in the strict sense an empirically evasive effort 
despite the literature being replete with different sorts of estimation 
attempts. The chief reason for a paucity of meaningful estimates is that 
rarely are the cost functions related to the behavioral properties of 
the production functions. In the past researchers in their haste to 
relate cost to output forgot that in theory and in practice one cannot 
say anything about the properties of cost functions unless something is 
known about the underlying properties of the productions from which 
cost functions can only be derived. 
On the assumption that the prices of these inputs are known, that 
is, the price of capital, the price of labor, and the price of fuel 
(r, w, and m in Figure 3), one can specify a general cost function which 
can be derived from the production function. Notice that the cost 
function (TC) contains a term for fixed cost (FC) in addition to the 
variable prices above. Another. way of expressing a total cost function 
~05 
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is to relate costs directly to output (see Figure. 4, Equationl). From 
this traditional cost function (a cubic expression) can be derived a 
complete set of relationships involvihg average and marginal costs. These 
relationships are useful in an airline's determination of short run cost 
minimization. From Figure 5, notice that the marginal cost curve 
intersects both the average total cost curve and the average variable 
cost curve at their minimum points. From·the total cost curve, the 
average cost curve which Professor Tideman drew is total cost divided 
by Z and the result is a U-shaped curve. The partial derivative of 
total cost (TC) with respect to Z yields marginal cost. It says neither 
anything about demand, nor anything about revenues, which must be treated 
as separate behavioral analyses in order to test for profit maximization 
condi tions • 
On the demand side, 'single equation estimates usually specify 
a relationship between the quantity demanded of air service and 
variables such as population, income, and fares. Some analysts would 
prefer to combine the population and income variables into a single 
variable called income per capita. A shift in population will cause 
a direct change in the quantity demanded of air service. A change 
in the fares will affect the change in quantity demanded but in a negative 
fashion. When fares increase, by the law of demand, generally the 
volume will go down, assuming again ceteris paribus, 
Several sessions in this workshop will be devoted to issues of 
demand. In these sessions we will observe a variety of techniques 
used for forecasting demand including trend analysis, market research 
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approaches, and econometric methods. 
The specification of demand is crucial since at any particular 
time, average fare multiplied by the number of passengers using the 
services will yield revenues. Keeping in mind that the airline 
company is pursuing some one or more managerial objectives, like 
profit maximization, an accurate assessment of revenues is required 
to offset cost in order to generate profits. Profits are maximized 
when total revenues exceed total costs by the largest amount for some 
Z or, as Professor Tideman has demonstrated, when marginal costs equal 
marginal revenues. These two conditions will occur simultaneously. 
In many situations airline companies will be pursuing objectives 
other than profit maximization yet the foundations for any alternative 
hypothesis still require an accurate assessment of costs and revenues. 
In fact, the need for extremely accurate estimates becomes much more 
compelling as one considers additional alternative objectives. A 
separate analysis of some of these objectives is the topic of a later 
session in this workshop. The importance of cost and demand functions 
will become apparent to you in the topics of other sessions which will 
focus on issues of competition, regulation, fare levels, excess capacity, 
growth, and long run survival. 
SUllUl1ary 
Transportation economics is an integral part of all transportation 
activities. We have observed the scope of transportation and the niche. 
which transportation economics occupies in that scope. To the extent 
ao? 
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(1) z 3 = TFC + TVC TC = aO + al Z - a2Z + a} (total cost) 
(2) TFC = aO ( total fixed cost) 
(3) alZ 2 3 TVC = - aZZ + a3Z (total variable cost) 
(4) ATC = TC a 2 = 
--.L (average total cost) Z Z + al - a2Z + a3Z 
(5) AFC = TFC 
(average fixed cost) Z 
(6) AVC = TVC = ATC - AFC 
(average variable cost) Z 
(7) MC = a (TC) 2 
. (marginal cost) = al - 2 aZZ + 3a3 Z 
-
Z 
Figure 4 
Cost Functions 
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$/Z 
(Unit Cost) 
SHORT RUN OPTIMIZATION: MC = ATC 
MC 
d(ATC) 
dZ 
d(TC) 
dZ 
= 
= 
o 
d(TVC) 
dZ 
MC = ATC 
Figure 5 
J 
Cost Minimiz·ation 
MC 
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AVC 
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that there exists a need for more refined, detailed, and careful 
analyses, we have examined the contributions of the market structure--
conduct-performance methodology and the specification of production, 
cost and demand functions. 
DETERMINATION OF FARES: 
PRICING THEORY AND 
ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY* 
by 
James C. Miller III 
American Enterprise Institute 
for Public Policy Research 
and 
Department of Economics 
Texas A&M University 
The primary purpose of this presentation is to describe the concept of 
economic efficiency, its application to the pricing of air transport se rvices, 
and its relevance as a policy objective, The first two sections discuss economic 
efficiency in general terms, whereas the third applies this norm to several 
airline pricing problems. The final section emphasizes the importance of 
industry behavior as a parameter in policy analysis. 
*Presented at a Summer Workshop on "Air Transportation Systems Analysis 
and Economics, " conducted by the Flight Transportation Laboratory of the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and sponsored by the Office of Aero-
nautics and Space Technology, National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(July 13, 1972). Portions of this presentation are excerpted from a study on 
airline regulation the author and George W. Douglas are preparing for the 
Brookings Institution. The standard disclaimer applies. 
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1. The Nature and Relevance of Economic Efficiency 
A. market is said to be "efficient" (in economic terms) when there is no 
other feasible means of production, no other combinations of qualities and 
quantities of outputs, and no other distribution of outputs which would make 
actual and potential producers and consumers as a group better off. If for 
some reason a market is not efficient. then by definition there exists some 
change which could improve the economic "welfare" of the market's partici-
pants: that is. there are potential modifications in production and/or distri-
bution which could increase the utility (or "enjoyment") of at least one 
consl1Iller (and/or producer) without decreasing the utility of anyone else. 
More specifically, economic efficienc'y in airline service means that, 
given production and cost relationships, the quality and quantity of service 
output is one which satisfies consumers (and furthermore compensates pro-
ducers) as well as any other. If the airline market is not efficient, then on 
balance someone could gain from a change. For example, airline customers 
as a group might prefer less quality and a COInInensurate lower fare (the lower 
quality requiring less cost and thus profits -- or return to carrier investment 
remaining unchanged). Or, carriers might be able to improve the existing 
production process, thus raising profits, increasing service quality. and/or 
lowering fares. 
Of course, economic efficiency may not be the only rational public policy 
objective of an industry such as the airlines. In particular, for over 30 years 
it has been public policy to consider other goals in commercial aviation. 
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including: (al "the promotion, enconragement, and development of civil 
aeronautics," (b) "the promotion of safety in air commerce," and (c) meeting 
"the present and future needs of the foreign and domestic commerce of the 
United States, of the Postal Service, and of the national defense, "I While 
generally these and othe r goals mentioned in the Civil 'I.e ronautics Board's 
"Declaration of Policy" are at least compatible with economic efficiency, 
depending on one's interpretation, in extreme form they can become over-
riding, For example, an efficient service is a reasonably safe one, but to 
" , , , assure the highest degree of safety ... " (emphasis mine) would mean 
no service at all. Moreover, an efficient airline market is one which "promotes 
and encourages" air se rvice to the extent consistent with optimizing resource 
use, but promotion beyond that means a less efficient market. Finally, to 
tailor air service to the special dictates of the Postal Service (PS) and/or the 
Department of Defense (DOD) probably would mean significant efficiency losses. 
However, provided PS and DOD "demands" for air service are weighed like 
those of other users, economic efficiency may obtain. 2 
There are many other public policy goals for the airline industry that 
could be mentioned. For example, the stability of rates and service, As we 
l. Section 102 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958. 
2. Other goals implied by Section 102 of the FA Act likewise, depending on 
interpretation, are at least consistent with economic efficiency. Examples 
include: (a) recognition and preservation of inherent advantages of air 
transport, (b) coordination of se rvices, (c) competition, (d) sound economic 
conditions, (e) adequate, economical and efficient service, (f) reasonable 
charges, (g) absence of price discrimination, and (h) limitations on pre-
dato ry competition. 
~13 
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shall see below. for the 1llarket 1llechanis1ll to function properly. prices 
(and service) will change fro1ll one ti1lle period to the next; thus. to S01lle 
extent, "stability" 1llay conflict with econ01llic efficiency. Another role the 
industry conceivably 1llay take is furthering the econ01llic develop1llent of 
sparsely populated regions of the country. While undoubtedly this was a 
successful role for the railroads in developing the West. there is little hard 
e vidence that C01ll1lle rcial ai r se rvice has a significant impact on com1llunity 
develop1llent, and, even if it did, one could speculate that develop1llent in one 
area is at the sacrifice of another, It would appear therefore that an undue 
e1llphasis on an econ01llic develop1llent role for the airlines can conflict with 
econ01llic efficiency. 
Finally. another, very important public policy goal is "equity." For 
exarrtple. the institution of charging children less than adults is so ingrained 
that to suggest s01llething different ruffles 1ll0st people's sensitivities. Yet, 
fro1ll an econ01llic efficiency standpoint (vis-a.-vis profit or revenue maxi-
1llizing price discri1llination) there is little or no "justification" for children's 
discounts except in extraordinary circu1llstances. Another example, which 
incidentally. shows changing attitudes toward equity, is airline discounts for 
"youth" and the elderly. Because of backlash to student agitation in the late 
1960' s, people gene rally have bec01lle less inclined toward pe r1llitting youth-
fare discounts, whereas discounts for the elderly are 1llore in favor. However, 
a special discount for businessmen, aged 30-40, would doubtless be strongly 
opposed. 
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In sununary, achieving economic efficiency in a market would appear 
to be a worthwhile, if not paramount, objective. There are many other 
public policy goals for the airlines, and for the most part these are at least 
consistent with econoIrlic efficiency, depending, of course, on one IS inte r-
pretation. However, in some cases economic efficiency cannot obtain if 
certain other goals are given too great a weight. In light of this, perhaps 
the most important role of an economist is to indicate something of the 
economic efficiency "costs" of pursuing non-economic objectives. 
II. Optimal P Ticing, Quantity, and Service Quality 
If we can assume that other industries are characterized by economic 
efficiency, then we may perform a "partial analysis" on a single industry 
such as the airlines. If this assumption does not hold, then on" may have 
to resort to that analytical framework called the "economics of the second 
best. ,,1 For the purposes of this presentation we shall assume that economic 
efficiency does obtain elsewhere and further that there are no real (as opposed 
to pecuniary) externalities. In such a setting the prices paid for resources 
attracted into the industry in question reflect the true opportunity costs of their 
use elsewhere. For example, the price paid by the airlines for an aircraft 
reflects the value of those resources used in making the aircraft (labor. 
working capital, metal, etc.) had they been utilized in producing something 
1. Cf., R. G. Lipsey and Kelvin Lancaster, "The General Theory of the 
Second Best," Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 24, No.1 0956-1957). 
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else (e. g., automobiles). By assuming that there are no externalities, we 
rule out changes in air service having any positive or negative impact on the 
rest of the economy not transmitted through the price mechanism. For 
example, increased air travel may lessen auto travel and thus (for a time 
at least) lower the value of General Motors stock, reduce the rate of advance 
in United Auto Workers' incomes, and decrease the pay received by executives 
with special expertise in auto production and sales. This. however. is a 
pecuniary externality. and has no effect on optimal resource allocation. On 
the other hand, increased air travel may augment air pollution over auto 
plants and raise costs of production. This is an example of a real externality, 
but for the moment we presume that these are unimportant. 
Technical Efficiency 
One requirement for economic efficiency in any industry is "technical 
efficiency," and by that we mean achieving any output at lowest cost. 1 Given 
a production function of the form 
( I ) x = f(a,b,c .... ). 
there is a least-cost combination of inputs a, b, c, etc. which for any level 
(and quality) of output X', yields the lowest total cost to the firm. This 
technically efficient combination, of course, depends on the nature of the 
1. This distinction between technical efficiency and "allocati ve efficiency" 
is somewhat arbitrary since the well-known efficiency conditions for 
production are closely akin to the allocative efficiency conditions in 
consumption. Nevertheless, it is a useful distinction and we will adopt 
it in this presentation. 
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production funclion and the prices paid for the inputs. I In a m.anner of 
speaking, then, given resource input costs and given equation (I), there 
is a (total) cost function which gives the lowest feasible cost for any level 
of output: 
(Z) C = g(X). 
This question of technical efficiency and the lowest-cost function m.ay 
be visualized by referring to Figure 1. The average cost (i.e., cost per 
unit) curve labelled AC* is the technically efficient one, since all othe rs 
(e. g., AC' and AC") have a higher average (and total) cost for each rate of 
output (in this case taken to be available seat m.iles per year). 
Of course, an airline produces m.any "outputs" (service between different 
city pairs, different "classes" of service, etc.). so really it is m.ore accurate 
to speak of a production function of m.any outputs as well as m.any inputs. In 
im.plicit form. this can be written as 
(3) h(X I , XZ' "', X n , a, b, c, ... ) = 0, 
where Xl' X2, etc., are the various outputs. The technically efficient cost 
equation then becom.es, 
(4 ) 
This, of course, m.eans that fo r any com.bination of outputs, X I' X2, etc., 
there is a least-cost m.eans of production. 
1. The necessary condition is that the ratio of m.arginal productivity to input 
price be the same for all inputs. Cf., James M. Henderson and Richard E. 
Quandt, Microeconomic Theory: A Mathematical Approach (New York: 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1958), Chapter 3. 
Average 
Cost 
o 
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Figure 1 
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Available Seat Miles 
per Year 
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Allocati ve Efficiency 
So far we have talked about what may be termed the "supply side. " 
Equally important is the "demand side." That is, presumi,;,g that all outputs 
will be produced at lowest total cost, what are the appropriate amounts of 
each output and what is their optimal distribution? This is the basic purview 
of what economists term "allocative efficiency. " 
It should be obvious that we are trying to maximize something. What 
we are trying to maximize is the collective "economic welfare" of producers 
and consumers. Producer welfare is straightforward -- profits. These are 
net revenues exceeding a normal return on investment. The economic welfare 
of consumers is a bit more difficult to define. In essence it is the excess of 
what they would be willing to pay for the service over what they actually do 
pay. Obviously consumers will increase their rate of purchase of any service 
as price is lowered. This is the so-called "law of demand." Stated another 
way, the maximum price consumers would pay for any inc remental increase 
in total output is given by the inverse of the demand relation, or, 
(5 ) p. = p. (X.) 1 1 l' 
where Pi is the demand price for output Xi. Consumers' total utility for 
consumption of any rate of Xi can be approximated by the area under relation (5). 
Subtracting total revenues paid, (net) consume r welfare is given by: 
n X· 
(6) CW = "Lrj 'pi(Xi)dXi - Pi(Xi)·X;]. 
i= 1 0 
In analogous fashion, the welfare of producers (i. e .• profit) is defined as: 
(7 ) 
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n 
PW =~Pi(Xi)'Xi - C(Xl.XZ •.••• Xn ). 
i=l 
We are now in a position to IllaxiITlize total econoITlic welfare. weighting 
the welfare of producers and conSUIllers equally. 1 Adding (6) and (7) and 
siIllplifying. Z we have: 
(8 ) 
n Xl 
TW ='L-J Pi(Xi)dXi - C(Xl.XZ ... ·.Xn )· 
i=l 0 
The first-order conditions for ITlaxiIllizing (8) are:3 
(9) 
i = 1, 2, ~ •• , n. 
This ITle rely states that reSOUrces are allocated efficiently when the price of 
each output [Pi (Xi») equals the ITlarginal cost of producing that rate of output 
We ITlay verbalize this result as follows. Marginal cost reflects the 
additional cost of production associated with increasing output by that unit. 
DeITland price is a ITleasure of the value conSUIlle rs place on the ITlarginal unit. 
Because deITland price decreases with extra units. an output less than where 
price equals ITlarginal cost ITleans that SOITle conSUIller values additional output 
more than the extra cost of production. FroIll a societal point of view. output 
in that (sub)market is thus suboptiITlal. There exists a potential for a buyer 
to cOIllpensate a producer for the extra costs incurred and still be better off. 
1. Other weights. of course. could be used. 
Z. The total revenue te rITl cancels out. 
3. We shall aSSUITle without further COIllITlent that second-order conditions 
obtain. 
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On the other hand, if the rate of any output exceeds that COlUlUensurate 
with a lUarginal price equal to lUarginal cost, then output is "superoptilUal" 
and allocative efficiency does not obtain. In such a case, conSUlUers value 
the lUarginal unit Ie s s than the as s ociated inc relUent of co s t. Alte rnati vel y, 
a reduction in output would lUean a savings in cost in excess of the lost value 
to conSUlUers. Such reasoning thus leads to the conclusion that price lUUSt 
equallUarginal cost in each lUarket for allocative efficiency to obtain. I 
In order to achieve allocative efficiency, it is essential that there be no 
arbitrary lilUitations on conSUlUer "eligibility" for particular lUarkets. That 
is, all conSUlUers lUust have access to each type of output. Arbitrarily 
lUaking one group of conSUlUers ineligible and having to enforce such a 
restraint lUeans that SOlUe conSUlUers in the group discrilUinated against 
would willingly pay more than the marginal cost of output and thus economic 
efficiency does not obtain. A similar case is whe re diffe rent consume r groups 
pay different prices for the same output. To have to enforce such a partition 
means that some in the group discriIninated against would willingly exchange 
money (i. e., a lower price) for the output consumed by the group most favored. 
If the favored group obtains output below marginal cost this still means an 
efficiency loss, for their consumption (at the margin) is valued less than the 
associated (marginal) cost of production. 
1. We note in passing that generally the production of airlil1e services is 
characterized by constant returns to scale for relevant rimges of output. 
[See "Testimony of James C. Miller III," CAB Docket 21866-7, DOT-T-I 
(August 25, 1970) and the references cited therein.] Thus "marginal cost 
pricing" would mean total revenues sufficient to cover total costs. 
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Optimal Quality 
Another allocative efficiency type question relates to the optimal quality 
of service. (Thus far we have assumed that quality is given.) For example, 
as George Douglas has shown, lower average load factors mean that flights 
are more frequent and that the probability of getting a seat on the desired 
flight is greater. But lower load factors, like other service amenities (such 
as speedy baggage claim, more elegant on-board accommodations. and more 
personal attention) can be achieved only at greater cost to the firm and thus to 
the consumer. From the individual consumer's viewpoint, the problem is 
basically one of "trading off" the (marginal) value of inc reased quality with 
the associated increase in cost. The important thing to consider is that 
service·quality does matter. 1 If the "wrong" quality of service is provided, 
then allocative efficiency does not obtain any more than efficiency obtains when 
prices are unequal to marginal costs. 
The (conceptual) determination of optimal service quality is illustrated in 
Figure 2. Quality is measured on the horizontal axis in units and on a scale 
I. The relevance of service quality can be seen with the model sketched out 
as follows. Individual i's utility is defined by UFUi(X, Q, W,), where X= 
quantity of output, Q=quality of output, W=work expended, and where 
aUi/~X>O, ~Ui/dQ>O, and ~ui/dW<O. The perfectly competitive supply 
total cost of output is defined as C=C(X,Q,), where ~c/ax>o and )C/~Q>O. 
Finally, total income (for spending on output) is the wage rate.!:. times work 
expended, W. The maximization problem then resolves into Max: 
Z=Ui(X, Q, W) - ,,[C(X. Q)-rW]. Not counting the budget constraint, the 
first-order conditions (second-order assumed to hold) conle down to: 
(mi/~x)/(ac/,}x) = (;)Ui/()Q)/(bC/~Q) = (lIUi/olW)/(-r). which means that 
the ratios of marginal utilities of output quantity, output quality, and work 
expended to their respective "costs" are equal. 
Cost, 
Value 
o 
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which is commensurate with equal outlays for successive quality increases. 
While higher quality, of course, is desirable, one presumes that after a point 
the (extra) value of increased quality becomes less and less. Thus, for quality 
less than Q', the individual in question values increased quality more than the 
commensurate increase in per-unit cost. Past Q', greater quality is still 
desirable, but of less value than the extra cost. Thus, allocative efficiency 
requires that the quality of service be at Q' and in addition the price of service 
be equal to marginal cost. 
III. Applications to Airline Pricing and Resource Allocation 
Having set out these general rules for efficient resource allocation, it is 
important to understand that their application to transportation industries, 
specifically the airlines, is no easy task. The pricing of airline service is 
complicated by a number of very important characteristics of air transport 
cost and demand. 
On the cost side there are indi visibilities in production, Not only do 
aircraft come in discrete units, but what is probably more important, their 
seat capacity is not subject to instantaneous change. Even if it were possible 
to select the "best" aircraft (in the sense of seating capacity) for a set of 
city-pair markets, because the re are variations in density of travel among 
such cities and because there are economies in reducing the numbe r of diffe rent 
aircraft types employed, one normally would expect that on some routes eithe,' 
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aircraft would fly with some empty seats and/or passengers would be left 
at the gate unless there were sufficient pricing flexibility to ration off excess 
demand and/or fill empty seats. Moreover, as Douglas has described. demand 
is not "certain," but stochastic. Because of this characteristic there will be 
additional instances of excess demand for seats on the one hand, and excess 
capacity (i. e., aircraft not fully loaded) on the other. 
Another characteristic of airline costs is that seat-mile costs for a given 
trip distance fall with larger aircraft size. This accounts for the propensity 
for users of air service to consolidate their demands. While some high-
salaried executives may indeed depart via a personal turbojet airc raft when 
and where they desire, the strong scale economies associated with aircraft 
size make it desirable for most travelers to aggregate their preferred departure 
points (and destinations) and their preferred.departure (and arrival) times to 
common ones. 
On the demand side, users of airline services place some value on the 
reliability and stability of rates and service. Since inforIllation is not perfect 
and costs of coordination are not negligible, the convention of scheduled service 
at assured fares has emerged. If the information and adjustment processes 
were without cost, then the efficient solution would require holding up departures 
until a full load of passengers could be generated (at a price conunensurate 
with 100 percent load factors). Or, as William Vickery has suggested, price 
could be varied instantaneously so as to fill the aircraft by the precise time 
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of departure. 1 Actually, neither schetne is optitnal sitnply because users 
of air service value certainty and wish to save on infortnation costs. 2 
A related characte ristic of detnand is that because of the etnerging 
convention of scheduled service, the presence of excess capacity is highly 
valued. (This was described by George Douglas in the previous presentation. ) 
If average load factors are 50 percent rather than 75 percent, then the proba-
bility of a user's being able to secure passage on the scheduled flight of his 
choice is higher. Also, for given aircraft capacities, a lower average load 
factor tneans a greater frequency of service and thus a higher probability that 
a flight is scheduled reasonably close to the user's tnost desired titne of 
departure. 
As noted before. however, excess capacity has its costs, since users 
tnust pay for it if total costs are to be covered. Thus, the relevant decision 
is not whether to have excess capacity, but rather how tnuch is optitnal. On 
an aggregate level this depends on users' perception of the tnarginal values 
and tnarginal costs of excess capacity. 
There are a nutnber of other econotnic efficiency questions having to do 
with excess capacity, an itnportant one being the argutnent for discritninatory 
discount fares. 3 Essentially, the proposition is as follows: given that the 
1. Williatn Vickery, "Responsive Pricing of Public Utility Services, " The 
Bell Journal of Econotnics and Managetnent Science (Spring 1971), pp. 341-2. 
2. Cotnpare the advantage of having readily-available infortnation on flight 
prices and departure titnes with a need to tnonitor constantly changing 
flight-titne and price alternatives. 
3. These include youth and tnilitary discounts, discounts for children, etc. 
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airlines have excess capacity, why not give a price break to new. previously 
untapped markets; if these consumers pay anything in excess of "marginal" 
costs (presumed to be very low), ,then existing passengers too stand to benefit 
since this means their fare can be lowered. This argument, while intuitively 
appealing, fails to recognize the essential role of excess capacity in the quality 
of service and further ignores relevant opportunity cost concepts. 
If excess capacity is one dimension of service quality. then the addition 
of reserved-seat discount passengers lowers service quality for "regular" 
passengers. In addition to the lower probability of obtaining a seat on the 
desired flight, there is the disadvantage of sharing flight attendants with more 
passengers, plus the extra crowding on-board and greater time taken in aircraft. 
ingress and egress. 
More relevant, however, is the fact that the real (i. e., opportunity) cost 
of adding a discount passenger is the value of the service to the (marginal) 
potential regular passenger who does not fly because the discount is not made 
available generally. And because the real cost of the extra service to the 
(marginal) discount pas senge r exceeds the fare he pays. the re are allocati ve 
efficiency losses. 
The re are two relevant modifications to this analysis that should be 
mentioned. both having to do with the total volume of traffic under the two 
pricing schemes. If under discriminatory discount fares the total volume of 
traffic at any point in time is greater than with a non-discriminatory. lower 
price (or alternatively lowering the regular price won't Ifi11" existing aircraft 
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as effectively as employing discriminatory fares), then this is simply an 
indication that total airline capacity is excessive. On the other hand, as 
George Douglas has shown, in very small markets the increase in service 
quality (via greater frequency, lower seat costs of larger aircraft, etc.) 
arising out of increased total traffic volume with discounts (as opposed to 
lower normal fares) provides some justification for discount fares, at least 
in those markets. However, the optimal fare differential under such circum-
stances is likely to be very small. 1 
Excess capacity is also related to seating density, another obvious 
quality parameter. For a given flight, the greater the seating density the 
greater is quality in terms of seat availability, but the less is seating com-
fort. Of course, passengers differ in their preferences, but it would appear 
likely that after some point the typical user would prefer to convert some 
excess capacity (in the form of extra seats) into less dense seating. More-
over, since for a given rate of travel between city pairs the cost of excess 
capacity is greater for long-haul flights than for short-haul, one would expect 
optimal load factors and seating densities to be higher for long-distance travel. 
Finally, since for a given length of haul the marginal value of excess capacity 
(in terms of reducing delay time) is greater for lower density markets, one 
would expect optirnalload factors and seating densities to be higher the greater 
the total volume of traffic. 2 
1. George W. Douglas. "Price Discrimination and Scale Economies in 
Scheduled Air Transportation" (Chapel Hill: processed, 1971). 
2. Also, see George Douglas I presentation. 
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The institutions surrounding commercial aviation raise several more 
interesting types of efficiency problems. For example, since under current 
arrangements the non-fulfillment of a reservation is costless, for a typical 
flight more reservations are made than passengers show up. This, in turn, 
leads carriers to "ove rbook" flights, relying on "no- shows" to yield enough 
extra seats. Occasionally, however, the number of showing reserved-seat 
passengers exceeds the flight's capacity. The U.S. Civil Aeronautics Board 
(CAB) now fines airlines for this practice, but obviously, given the institution 
of free reservations, some overbooking is optimal. In fact, the optimal fine 
is one which causes airlines to overbook just to the point that the number of 
additional reserved passengers left at the gate just offsets the number of 
extra passengers who could have been accommodated in seats made available 
by no-show reservation passengers. 
The subject of airline safety is much too broad to receive adequate 
attention here. However, it is important to note that safety has. its. "costs. " 
Its benefit, of course, is a reduced probability of a serious or perhaps fatal 
accident. Depending on one's valuation of human life and s uffe ring, the optimal 
expenditure on safety is where the expected value reduction in accident "costs" 
just equals the marginal cost of this (inc reased) safety provision. I 
Another type of allocation problem arises in connection with the efficient 
pricing of diffe rent outputs on the same airc raft flight. As between fi rs t- class 
1. For an interesting discussion see Thomas C. Shelling. "The Life You Save 
May Be Your Own, " in Samuel B. Chase, Jr .• (ed.), Problems in Public 
Expenditure Analysis (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1968). 
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and coach service, it is important to recognize that the opportunity cost of 
first-class space is the eliminated coach space; and vice-versa. I In effect, 
except for the extremely short run, first-class and coach space are common 
costs (i. e., their proportions may be easily varied by moving the bulkhead 
and changing ?~ few seats). Keeping in mind that first-class passengers 
receive extra se rvice amenities in the form of more personalized stewardess 
services (fewer passengers per stewardess), more expensive meals, etc., 
that they exit the aircraft before coach class (and thus considering opportunity 
cost their cost is higher), that the space between ~ of seats is greater 
than in coach class, and that load factors in first class are usually lower than 
in coach, a good rule of thumb is that first-class accommodations should be 
priced at least 50 percent higher than coach, since f.irst class has four seats 
abreast whereas coach class typically has six. 2 
The optimal relationship between passenger and cargo prices is more 
difficult to determine. The problem is that while the ratio of passenger vs. 
cargo space on a "combination" aircraft is variable at the aircraft manufacturing 
1. Aircraft are much more commonly space-constrained as opposed to weight-
constrained. Thus, space is the relevant scarce resource, although ob-
viously weight constrained cases are important. 
2. It is worth noting that in many cases what a first-class passenger buys is 
not so much more luxurious accommodations but simply a confirmed space. 
That is, since load factors average much lower in first class, peak-hour 
accommodations are typically rationed by the first-class fare. Also, 
obviously people pay extra fo r the ability to obtain a reservation "at the 
last minute." Both roles for first class could be handled more efficiently 
by peak-load-pricing and perhaps by reserving a block of standard seats 
for last-minute sales (at a higher price). 
~30 
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stage, once an aircraft has been produced it is most difficult to reallocate 
space. I Thus, in the long run, cargo and passenger space are common 
products; in the strict short run they are joint products. As a forthcoming 
paper by the author suggests, an appropriate pricing rule is to charge "belly 
freight, " a price equal to the cost of carrying such freight (at comparable 
service quality) in all-freight aircraft. Z 
IV. The Relevance of Industry Behavior 
Many pricing problems in the airlines must be considered within the 
context of industry behavior. By "industry behavior, " we mean the response 
pattern that describes industry "competition." Briefly, as DeVany, Douglas, 
Eads, Jordan, Yance, and I have argued, the domestic airline industry can 
be characterized as a non-price competing cartel. 3 Prices are given, being 
regulated by the CAB. Carriers then "compete" (or rival) in non-price (i. e. , 
quality) dimensions, primarily the extent of excess capacity. Our operational 
1. Almost all commonly used pas senge r aircraft have cargo space in excess 
of that required for passenger baggage. 
Z. See "Cargo Pricing and the Configuration of Combination Aircraft, " Journal 
of Transport Economics and Policy (forthcoming). 
3. See Arthur DeVany, "The Economics of Quality Competition: Theory and 
Evidence on Airline Flight Scheduling," unpublished (c. 1969); George W. 
Douglas, CAB Docket 21866-9, DOT-T-3 (May 17, 1971); George Eads, 
"Competition in the Domestic Trunk Airline Industry: Excessive or Insuf-
ficient?" (Washington: The Brookings Institution, forthcoming); William A. 
Jordan, Airline Regulation in America: Effects and Imperfections (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins Press, 1970); Joseph V. Yance, CAB Docket 21866-6, DOT-
RT-l (July 27, 1970); and James C. Miller III, CAB Docket 21866-6, DOT-
T-l (July 6, 1970). 
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hypothesis is that over time schedule frequency will adjust in individual 
(competitive) markets so that actual load factors approximate break-even 
(including a normal return on investment). I 
To see that carriers have incentives which caUSe them to move in the 
direction of break-even load factors, consider first a situation where pre-
vailing load factors are above break-even. In this disequilibrium situation, 
carriers will expand scheduling in hopes of making profits on extra flights. 
Load factors will fall. If on the other hand prevailing load factors are below 
break-even, carriers will be prompted to cut back on scheduling as a means 
of r·educing losses. Load factors will rise. 2 
We may illustrate the importance of policy-makers' understanding 
industry behavior with three examples. 
Cross-Subsidy by Length of Haul 
For many years the CAB has fostered a policy of "cross-subsidizing" 
long-haul and short-haul markets. Essentially the argument is that fares 
1. Recently the CAB has recognized the applicability of this model to airline 
regulation, stating, 
"It is indisputable that eve ry fare level has a built-in load factor 
standard. We find, as DOT has stated, that the higher the fare 
level in relation to cost, the more capacity carriers will offer 
and the lower load factors will be; and. conversely, the lower 
the fare Ie vel, the les s capacity car riers will ope rate and the 
higher load factors will be." (CAB Order 71-4-54, <\pril 9, 1972. 
p. 23.) 
2. This argument is often missed (and perhaps purposely obfuscated) by 
those placing especial emphasis on market share relationships. Douglas 
and I deal with this in our Brookings study (£E.. cit.). 
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cannot be raised to the level of average cost in short-haul markets since 
there would be "undue diversion" to alternative, competitive modes. Fares 
in long-hauls, however, should exceed costs. the long-haul profits thereby 
used to (cross-) subsidize losing short-haul business. The basic price-cost 
relationship by length of haul is illustrated (conceptually) in Figure 3. 
"While this may work in theory, it doesn't work in practice." What happens 
is that because break-even load factors are high in short-haul markets. actual 
load factors also tend to be high. Because break-even load factors are low in 
long-haul markets •. actual load factors also tend to be low. This is seen in 
Table 1. (N. B., load factors for very short-haul markets include many local 
service subsidized routes where because of the subsidy. break-even load 
factor is lower than otherwise.) Note particularly the monotonic decline in 
load factors past 500 miles. 
In short, cross-subsidy is largely a fiction and it will continue to be as 
long as carriers are free to adjust capacity in response to prices and costs. 
Pricing Strategies to Control Pollution 
With increasing public concern over the "environmental impact" of 
economic activities, commercial airports have been singled out (somewhat 
unfairly) as a primary source of air and noise pollution. Much is being done 
by way of "retrofitting" old jet engines and redesign of new ones. However, 
this may be viewed as a longer- range solution and even under technology likely 
to materialize could not be expected to eliminate aircraft pollution entirely. 
Fare, 
Cost 
per 
Mile 
o 
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Table I: 1969 Coach Load Factors by Length of Haul 
Miles Load Factor Miles Load Factor 
100 50.7 1,300 53.B 
200 53. 1 1,600 52.5 
300 53.6 1,900 52.2 
400 54.6 2,200 49.9 
500 55.6 2,500 46.0 
700 55.4 2,BOO 45.9 
1,000 54.B Average 50.0 
Source: CAB Docket 21B66-9, BC-4BOB. 
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Economists have often suggested using the price mechanism to 
"internalize" pollution costs and thus, ceteris paribus, bringing about 
a more efficient level of pollution output. We shall assume that pollution 
is a monotonic, increasing function of the number and size of aircraft 
making take-oHs and landings, and thus, as a proxy, the narrow policy 
objective is to decrease the number of seats scheduled by commercial 
operators. 
The industry behavioral model described in the previous section may 
be sketched out as follows. Quantity of air service demanded (~ante and 
supplied ~~) is a function of both price and the number of seats scheduled: 
D = D(P,X). Average and marginal costs are of two kinds: first, those 
associated with passengers (Cd), and second, those related to seats (Cx )' 1 
Assuming constant returns to scale in both categories, the total cost function 
is given by C = CdD + CxX. Finally, 
where1T' is profit, and any excess profit (or loss) "slack" is taken up by 
variations in X. 
As discussed below, the important policy variables are P, Cd- and Cx' 
We wish to know their individual effects on X. Equation (10) may be differentiated 
to yield, 
(11 ) 
1. This corresponds generally to the conventional distinction between "direct" 
and flindirect" airline costs. 
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(12 ) 
dX 
= 
-D and 
Cx-@D/.}XXP-Cd) 
, 
dCd 
dX 
= 
-x 
dCx Cx-@D/OX~P-Cd)' (13 ) 
where ed is the price elasticity of demand. Also, we note that, 
( 14) 
(15 ) 
dX = D[l+ed(l-CdlP)]dP-DdCd, and 
Cx -0D/oX)(P- Cd) 
Equation (15) simply states a necessary condition for market equilibrium, 
namely that as carriers put on additional capacity, load factors fall (i. e. , 
"marginal load factor" is less than average load factor). (Otherwise scheduling 
would increase without limit. ) 
Public policy to restrain aircraft pollution through market incentives may 
be initiated by two groups. First, the GAB may effectuate a change in the level 
of fares. For example, one presumes that a fare increase would have a depress-
ing effect on aircraft pollution. (But read on!) Second, the local-government 
airport authority may impose some form of "user charges" to curtail total 
pollution output. 1 Let us consider the following alternatives: (1) a fare increase 
imposed by the CAB, (b) an increase in landing fees imposed by local authorities, 
(c) a "head tax" paid by passengers, (d) a head tax paid by the air carriers, and 
1. Most major commercial airports are owned and operated by local govern-
ments. The exceptions include the two Washington, D. C., airports, 
National and Dulles, owned and operated by the Federal Government. (It 
has been proposed that these be sold to the highest bidder.) Some airports 
are privately owned and operated, the largest being Burbank, California. 
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(e) a head tax paid by the carriers where the CAB allows them to pass along 
the cost increase in the form of higher fares. 1 
From equation (11) we may determine that an increase in the price of 
air service will actually increase X if ed > -1. The denominator of the 
right-hand side of (11) [and also of (12), (13), and (14)] is positive by reference 
to (10) and (15). The numerator is negative only when demand is sufficiently 
elastic that ed(l - Cd/P) < -1. 2 This is an important result, inasmuch as the 
CAB, at least, judges air travel demand to be inelastic. 3 If true, then a 
corollary of the above result is that the Board could bring about a reduction 
in pollution by lowering fares. 
An increase in landing fees would be tantamount to an increase in Cx • 4 
From equation (13) we see that the effect would be a reduction in X since the 
right-hand side is negative. 
A head tax on passengers would be similar to an increase in fares, but 
the difference is decisive. Whether demand is elastic or inelastic, carriers' 
total revenue would be reduced (io e. , quantity demanded would fall because 
of the perceived higher price), and thus scheduling would have to contract. 5 
1. Of course, there are other alternatives (e.g., flight quotas, price dis-
c rimination, etc.), but these are not conside red here. 
2. Roughly this would require that ed < -2, since in practice Cd/p .... 5. 
3. The CAB has found demand elasticity to be -.7 (CAB Order 71-4-59, 
71-4-60, April 9, 1971, p. 50.). While many researchers disagree with 
this as sessment, few would maintain that Cd < -2. 
4. Landing fees are typically in proportion to the gross weight of the aircraft. 
5. The application of a head tax would mean an unambiguous dec rease in D. 
Referring to equation (10), since Cd< P and C
x 
is unchanged, X must 
decrease. 
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If the carriers pay the head tax, this would mean an increase in Cd' 
Since the right-hand side of equation (12) is negative, the result would be 
a diminution of X and thus a decrease in pollution. 
Finally, a head tax paid by the carriers which is passed along in the 
form of higher fares would likewise have a depressing effect on X. Note 
that in this case dP = dCd in equation (14) Since ed< 0, the numerator 
is always negative. 
Thus, in one case what would seem like a straightforward policy action 
to control pollution (i. e., higher fares to choke off demand) would be likely 
to have the reverse result, owing to the industry behavior pattern that has 
developed under Federal regulation. 
Pricing and the Demand for Aircraft 
A related issue is the effect of airline pricing on the derived demand for 
aircraft. In other words, how would changes in fare levels (everything else 
equal) affect airlines' requirements for new aircraft? 
First, it is notable that many economists and others have recommended 
that the airlines be "deregulated." Based on the available experience with a 
deregulated airline environment (e. g., the California intra-state market l ), 
the presumption is that fares would fall substantially. Carriers generally 
oppose fare reductions, but with increasing pressure from charte rs and the 
imposition of the Board's higher load factor standards, prospects for signi-
ficant fare reductions must be seriously considered. 
1. On this see Jordan, ibid. 
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Anyway, the nOrrrlal reaction to the fare-aircraft demand issue goes 
something like this: lower fares would mean greater travel and thus a 
greater demand for aircraft. However, it should be recognized that lower 
fares mean an increase in break-even load factor. The question is whether 
the rise in break-even load factor is more or less than sufficient to offset 
the increase in passenger demand. 
The answer is given by equation (it), and this result comes as something 
of a surprise. That is, a decrease in fares (ceteris paribus) would likely 
curtail airlines' requirements for new aircraft. Given this result, I would 
expect Boeing, McDonnell-Douglas, Lockheed and even NASA to be ardent 
supporters of CAB regulation! 
J.B. Gebhardt 
united Air Lines, Inc. 
I have been asked to discuss differential pricing policy in the airline 
industry. I plan to confine my remarks to the passenger pricing although 
there is no question but what cargo is also an important part of this 
Industry. Further, I think the principles that apply to passenger pricing 
also apply to cargo pricing and most of you are more familiar 6nd more 
experienced with passenger pricing practices. 
Differential pricing policy really has its beginnings I suppose In 
monopolistic theory which says that if the monopolist can successfully 
discriminate among markets and not permit revenue dilution to occur in 
his major I'larket as a result of discriminatory priCing in secondary markets, 
he can increase his total profits as long as he does not increase his invest-
ment base or in more pragmatic terms expand his plant size or capacity. 
That same theory holds true with respect to airlines' differential pricing 
policy and the rather tenuous relationship between the theoretical applica-
tion of differential pricing and its actual practice is what I plan to discuss 
today. 
Of our two major methods of differential pricing the first, most difficult 
and some might say the most sophisticated, is that which discriminates 
among markets. The second, simpler, less sophisticated perhaps, but 
at least in practice - frequently the more effective is that of matching peak 
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price with peak demand. Although I've chosen to treat these two practices 
separately they are conceptually the same. In practice one usually 
precedes the other, however. 
Before I begin a discussion of the application of differential pricing policy, 
I would like to make mention of one other factor which is a major considera-
tion in the airline industry and makes us act differently than private industry. 
That is the presence of our regulatory agency - the Civil Aeronautics Board. 
The CAB, as you all know, plays a large role in the pricing policy of air-
lines. It is one of the few regulatory agencies which has the responsibility 
to promote its industry but coupled with that responsibility is an additional 
responsibility for passing judgement on the pricing practices of certificated air 
carriers. The CAB is required to guard against what we might call overly 
zealous price differentiation. Carriers are not able to maintain pricing 
practices which the Board judges to be unjustly discriminatory or unduly 
preferential or that give an unfair advantage to certain customers. Our 
prices are also totally public knowledge as a result of the requirement 
that we publish and maintain tariffs. So, within these constraints, we are 
reasonably free to differentiate our prices and in so doing attempt to 
increase our overall profitability. 
Let's move now to the practice of discrimination among markets. First 
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of all we must identify those markets. There are probabJy hundreds of 
ways to define markets, but as most of you know, in the airline industry 
we tend to break them down into two basic categories. The business 
market and the pleasure market. 
The business market is the simplest of these two to deaJ with. It is the 
market to which we gear our prime product, convenient, reasonably 
frequent schedules between most major cities in the United States. It is 
this market that is considered to be basic, and it is to this market that 
we direct our prime price. It is this market that demands our prime 
product. The business market then really only splits into two pieces -
the first class market and the coach market; and each of these markets 
has a basic, full, non-discounted price. In the case of first class a 
premium is applied because the first class passenger receives a premium 
service in terms of both infl1ght amenities and the amount of space he is 
permitted to consume during the time he is on board. The coach market 
sets the standard for all airline pricing and indeed it is the coach fare 
which is the basic fare in the industry. 
The pleasure market is far more complex than the business market. It is 
a market which has led to the practice of differential pricing and which 
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we like to think at least is the most responsive to differential pricing. 
The pleasure market is as some are fond of saying - - where the action 
is, and it is the market that we generally consider to hold the most 
opportunity for the future growth of this industry. It is a discretionary 
Jnarket. People who are spending their dollars on air transportation are 
spending dollars that they are not required to spend for the basic 
essentials of life ... food • shelter. clothing. education and some form of 
transportation to and from their place of work. In order to compete for 
these dollars, we must compete effectively with many other products 
and services. Automobiles. for example. particularly the second car; 
color television perhaps; vacations which do not require a great deal of 
travel; vacation homes. another growing competitor for discretionary 
dollars. in one respect we have a product disadvantage. Our product 
is an intangible. once it is consumed it is gone. and the pleasures of a 
vacation trip can only be preserved on film and in memories. and on cold 
winter nights a memory may not be nearly as satisfying as sitting in front 
of a tangible, visible and sometimes entertaining color television set. 
These are some of the factors we must contend with and compete with as 
we seek to reach this market. Nevertheless, as I mentioned, this is 
where most of us believe the action is and are trying to use price as a 
means to compete. 
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It is quite easy to characterize our major markets as business and 
pleasure. As I mentioned the business market quickly subdivides into 
the coach and first class markets. But when we consider the pleasure 
market we find that we are dealing with a large. very heterogeneous 
and very complex category. We must deal with each of these submarkets 
and must thoroughly understand them. For example. the bulk of people 
traveling for what we would consider to be basically pleasure purposes 
are traveling to visit their friends and relatives. However. another 
large sector of this market plans to use commercial facilities during the 
entire trip; that is. they will not only use air transportation as a means of 
getting there. but they will be staying at a resort area, eating in 
restaurants, etc. There is a warm weather market; places like Florida, 
California and Hawaii have a great attraction for pleasure travelers. And 
a cold weather market, the ski areas for example. There is a young 
market - we are all familiar With' the youth fares, controversial although 
they may be. And there is an old market which has been demanding equal 
treatment with youth. There is a market for group fares, and this market 
too can be subdivided into at least two categories - some Who travel with 
groups are with the group because they enjoy the security of the group, 
they appreciate the fixed price nature of most group travel, they want 
someone to make the arrangements for them, to handle the administrative 
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details and to ensure that everything goes right. The other part of this 
market, typically a younger part of the market, is very budget conscious. 
They are there because the price is right - they don't care at all about 
the security factors. There is a market for package tours, people who 
want everything planned in advance. Again, this can be either on a group 
or individual basis, but they like the fixed price aspects of a package 
tour. They like knowing in advance what they are going to see and 
where they are going to be, and they may save by buying a package, 
save both in terms of ground arrangements and air transportation. And 
finally there is foreign pleasure travel and domestic pleasure travel. 
And in many cases domestic carriers have an opportunity to participate in 
the pleasure travel with those going to international destinations. 
My reason for discussing these various markets or submarkets is to 
acquaint you with the fact that almost everyone can be categorized into 
one or more of these different pleasure market classifications. In fact, 
most people at any given time, may fit into more than one of these 
categories. And this is where the difficulty begins when we attempt to 
practice differential pricing. 
I suppose the first attempt made to differentiate prices in the airline 
industry was made in the late 1930's with the introduction of the family 
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plan, which I might add is still part of the basic price structure in this 
industry. But the theory was then, and it is now, that offering a price 
difference would fill seats that would be flown and would not otherwise 
have been filled. The execution of this theory is simplicity itself, and 
the theory itself is certainly simple. You don't need a PHD in economics 
to understand that if you can get more revenue than your variable cost, 
without diluting current revenue or increaSing fixed costs, you will 
improve your overall profitability. And to put this into practice in this 
industry, or for that matter, I guess, almost any industry, is quite easy. 
First, you identify the market both demographically and geographically. 
Next, you determine precisely what price that market will pay 
for your product. Too much and you lose the market, too little 
and you lose profits. 
Then, you structure your product offering so that it just fits 
this market and cannot be purchased by anyone that is part 
of a market that would pay more. Because if it could be 
purchased by someone that is wilhng to pay more, once 
again you have eroded your profitability. 
In our case, we Will review our product to be sure that 1t will meet all 
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the regulatory tests, and on the as sumption that it will we will file it 
with the CAB. 30 to 45 days later we can take it to market where we 
will sell our product, sit back and smile benignly and enjoy our profits. 
Oh, and let's not forget that as time passes we will be ever vigilant 
and not increase the size of our plant (investment base) because if we 
do our product then must bear its full share of cost and it hasn't been 
priced at a level which will permit it to do that. 
This then is the underlying theory and hypothetical practice of the most 
common application of differential pricing policy in the airline industry 
today. Now let's look at the "real world" as we are often fond of saying. 
The first example I would like to direct your attention to is the Discover 
America fare. This fare, introduced in 1966, was designed to encourage 
discretionary spending on air travel. It carried a discount from normal 
coach fares of 25%, required round trip, required that the individual not 
depart and return in the same calendar week, he could not be gone more 
than 30 days, could not travel on Fridays or Mondays, generally peak 
business travel days, and could not travel during the peak periods of the 
summer or at peak holidays. All of these restrictions were created to 
differentiate this product from the basiC coach product and to discourage 
discount travel during prime demand periods as well as discourage those 
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who were able ilnd willing to pay the full coach price from shifting to 
this discounted fare. The assumption WilS that no ildditlonal capacity 
would be added and the revenue from this fare would far more than exceed 
the variable cost of carrying the traffic. Yet, in only two short years 
after its introduction, changes were made. The discount was still 25%, 
a round trip was still required, you still had to be gone 7 days ane had 
to return within 30 days, but Fridays and Mondays were no longer 
blacked out. Now the blackout was from Friday noon to Friday midnight, 
and from Sunday noon to Sunday midnight. In other words, 24 hours 
during the week were excluded as opposed to 48 hours at its inception. 
But perhaps the most important difference was that this fare was now 
valid on a year round basis; so, even in the summer when demand peaked 
the discounted price was still available. 
The Discover America fare is still part of our fare structure, it has changed 
again in its characteristics from 1969 but it is still far more liberal in 
terms of periods of applicability than it was at the outset. 
The second example I would like to touch on is a group fare filed originally 
to compete for traffic carried by supplemental carriers who were serving 
Hawaii from the East Coast, offering low cost transportation predlCated on 
high load factors through group travel. At the outset in order to qualify for 
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this group fare you had to be part of a group of 88 to 154 people and as 
the group got larger the price got lower. You could only depart from 
Chicago, Detroit, Cleveland or New York. And from a practical stand-
point most of the business was done from New York. The group had to 
tra vel together during the entire trip, both coming and going. They had 
to buy a tour package so that it was truly an all inclusive tour and they 
had to stay for a minimum of 14 days. Each of these restrictions was 
applied to prevent diversion from higher fares to this lower group fare on 
the part of those who were able and willing to pay a higher fare in order 
to achieve greater personal travel flexibility and more comfortable travel. 
Today, the same group fare is available for groups beginning at 40 
persons. It is national in scope rather than applying to the major 
population centers of the east from where the participating airline was 
virtually guaranteed a long flight where it could achieve maximum efficiency 
of operation. First, passengers were permitted and encouraged to con-
solidate in Chicago by providing a lower price on air transportation from 
their home to Chicago. Next the West Coast was picked as a consolidation 
point, and today passengers can originate any place in the United States, 
travel on an individual basis to or from the West Coast, stopover and spend 
whatever time they wish on the West Coast, then continue on to Hawaii as 
a part of a group. In many instances no tour package is required and the 
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minimum stay is now a short 7 days, which is no problem for anyone 
going to Hawaii for virtually any purpose. 
The point I am trying to make with these two illustrations is that all too 
frequently the best of intentions and the best applications of true 
differential pricing theory soon are completely lost in practice. Wha t 
starts out to be a highly effective, valid attempt to add traffic to existing 
capacity becomes nothing more than a generally available discount price 
available to Virtually anyo "e. 
Let's look back now to the execution of differential pricing policy which 
I have described as Simplicity itself. I mentioned that all you needed to 
do was identify the market, arrive at a price, structure the product 
offering so that it would lust fit the market, make sure you met your 
regulatory requirement8, and be sure that you didn't at some time in the 
future add capacity for this product. It is easy to describe what should 
be done but it is extremely difficult in actual practice to measure the 
precise impact of various price levels and the real effect of the restrictions 
which are frequently applied to promotional or differential pricing. 
I think r can say Without reservation that everyone in the industry attempts 
to make these measurements and find these price levels but I doubt that 
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anyone would be sufficiently bold as to claim that they were able to do so 
with great precision and anything approachinq 100% accuracy. Differential 
pricing is stUI far too much of an art and not enouqh of a science in the 
airline industry. 
Of an even greater concern, there is ample evidence that the industry 
~" .. 
has not been successful in keeping short'lvariable costs from turninq 
into lOng run fully allocated coats. And differential prlcinq will not 
support fully allocated costs. There is considerable evidence that capacity 
has been added for incrementally prlced traffic, and it is this addition of 
capacity and the addition of staff and capital investments required that 
defeats the concept of differential prlcinq, particularly as it appl1es on a 
selective market basis. 
A secondary method of differential pricing and one in which there may be 
more short term promise 1s that of matching peak price with peak demand. 
Again the theory here is so basic that it almost needs no explanation. That 
is, you charge the most when the demand for your product is highest. This 
can be done on a time of day basis and is, it can be done on a day of week 
baSis and. is , and it can be done on a seasonal basis and is. I think the 
best example. of this type prtcinq can be found in the international market 
place, but that doesn't make 1t any less valid for domestic application. 
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This type of pricing also has the virtue that one needn't worry about the 
present price structure, for matching peak price with peak demand is merely 
an attempt to improve the present structure - not to change it. It's wakable 
and we have some good examples of its workability in the Hawaiian market, 
and more recently in the major midwestern and eastern markets to Las Vegas, 
which has some very unique demand characteristics as I am sure you can 
imagine. The only danger in application of this type of pricing is the 
temptation to cut the price in the off-peak as opposed to increasing it 
during the peak period. If one yields to the temptation to cut the price, 
.. ~ 
then we become subject fa the same need for precision and4fallible judgement 
as we find when we differentiate on a selective market basis. It may work, 
but the risks are far h19her. 
Increasing the price during the peak period on the other hand carriers little 
risk except that if your action is too bold a too steep you may discourage 
the market enUrely during those periods. Fortunately, thil il something that 
you wlllieam very quickly and something which is very ealY to correct. 
It is always easier to adjust price on the downside than it is on the upside. 
So, in my Judgement at lealt, the application of differential pricing in a 
fashion which applies peak price to the peak demand period is sound in both 
theory and practice, provided that those of us who are practitionerl do not 
yield to the temptation to put too much faith in our crystal ball. 
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I might odd. too. that this is an area where the CAB has typically given us 
a fair degree of freedom so that we have been able to experiment with price 
differentials and adjust them to some degree of reasonableness. so long as 
we do not get beyond the basic coach level and so long as we do not make 
a change of a radical nature at a time when a substantial number of the 
traveling public are affected. So with a certain amount of gUi'lrded optimism 
I think there is an opportunity for some successful practice of differential 
pricing as it relates to matching peak demand and peak price. 
Let's go back now and talk for a few more minutes about the more difficult 
problem of selective or differential pricing on an individual market basis. 
There is no question but what this too is a valid pricing technique - if it is 
properly applied. The difficulty is how to bring theory and practice tOgether. 
And I think that that becomes the mutual responsibility of the carriers and 
their regulators. First of all. the carriers must use caution and restraint 
both in the development of promotional or differential price offerings and 
the application of those offerings in the marketplace. 
Carriers must stop and realize that long term planning means more than a 
week from today and that some of the actions that are taken for short term 
expediency can have some serious long term effects. Experiments must be 
treated as experiments by both the carriers and the CAB. and when a filing 
8Gb 
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is described as an experiment, the results of thet experiment must be 
evaluated and its success or failure Judged so that only the successful 
experiments can be allowed to continue. 
Differential pricing can be a valid means of improving profits, keeping __ 
the total cost of air transportation down. and llIaking it poaaible for more 
people to use air transportation. However. until we can truly put theory 
into practice we must be very critical of differential pricing proposals. 
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Abstract 
The air transportation ind'jstry has been described as a highly-competitive, 
regulated oligopoly or as a price-re;Julated cartel with blocked entry, result-
ing in excessive service; and 10"1 load factors. The current structure of the 
industry has been strongly influenced by the hypotheses that increased levels 
of competition are desirable per se, and that more competing carri.ers can be 
economically supported in larger markets, in longer-haul markets, with lower 
unit costs, and with higher fare levels. An·elementary application of 
competition/game theory casts doubt on the validity of these hypotheses, but 
rather emphasizes the critical importance of the short-term non-variable costs 
in determining economic levels of competition. 
In trod uction 
THE ECONOMIC EFFECT OF COMPETITION 
IN THE AIR TRANSPORTATION INDUSTRY 
by Herbert B. Hubbard, United Air Lines 
Airlines are regulated and controlled by the government as public utilities 
because their services are deemed essential from the public standpoint and, 
accordingly, must be rendered efficiently. Furthermore, the economies of 
large-scale production and decreasing unit costs tend to increase the size 
of the business unit, and government regulation is designed to prevent the 
potential attendant unreasonable or unfair rates or inferior or inadequate serv-
ice. However, unlike most other public utilities, few airlines enjoy monopoly 
situations with exclusive franchises for a number of years. Airlines are 
highly-regulated public utilities, but are also highly competitive. 
Economists have defined airlines as "a blocked-entry, price-controlled, non-
price-competing cartel," or as highly competitive but regulated ol1gopc)lies, 
with their products essentially undifferentiated, with entry of new comretitors 
into a market difficult because of the entrance fee in terms of government regu-
lation and capital costs, and in which the actions of each competitor (who 
supplies significant portions of the total product) can have a marked effect on 
the plans and actions of the other competitors. The classical economic theories 
for monopolies and pure competition do not apply to the air transportation indus-
try, because there are generally more than one competitor in a market, but 
there are only a limited number of competitors. However, the economic situa-
tion of the airlines (that is, the imperfect competition of oligopolies) lends 
itself less easily to theoretical analyses than do monopolies a.nd pure 
competition. 
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It is the purpose of this paper to investigate the economic effect of competition 
in the air transportation industry in terms of the efficient allocation of resources. 
The paper will include a discussion of competition, certain basic economic 
factors in the industry, the types of scheduling decisions made, the importance 
of flight share in determir.ing market share, an illustration of the application of 
competition/game theory by means of a simplified example, and a summary of 
the apparent results of competition with conclusions. The derivation of the 
various mathematical relationships are included in the appendices. 
COMPETITION 
Competition is considered to be healthy and desirable in the American economy. 
There is competition in the transportation industry (1) between the various seg-
ments or modes of the industry and (2) within the various segments as certifi-
cated by governmental agencies. In the first case, we have a "natural" variety 
of competition in which technological improvements are paramount and which 
often results in substantial benefits to the public in the form of improved service 
and/or lower rates. On the other hand, the second type of competition, with 
multiple (more than 2 or 3) competitors, has tended to depress the economic via-
bility of the carriers with negligible benefits to the public. 
The expansion of route awards in the air transportation industry has made the govern-
ment policy in this area well known. The amount of competition among the airlines 
has been increased substantially during recent years. In most cases, the Civil 
Aeronautics Board has not recognized nor fully considered the probable impact of 
such awards on the economic viability of the established carriers. 
There is a fundamental question as to the amount of competition within the air 
transportation industry that is desirable and supportable from an economic 
efficiency pOint of view! 
Federal Aviation Act, Section 102 - Declaration of Policy 
" •••• the Board shall consider •••• as being in the public inter05t •••• , 
Competition to the extent necessary to assure the sound develUj'lm~nt 
of an air transportation' system •••• without •••• unfair or destructive 
competitive practices." 
Bermuda Capacity Principles 
" •••• strong adherence of the United States •••• authorizing designated 
carriers to conduct their operations without predetermined limits on 
capacity, but subject to ex post facto review to require elimination of 
unjustified capacity •••• other countries are less enamored of the Ber-
muda capacity principles and wish to follow more restrictive poliCies 
than we in controlling capacity and scheduling." 
d59 
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C.A.B. Statement in the_e.ou~:i8i!1 Service to the West Case (l95U 
." •••• accumulaIna experience strongly suggests that we may have: 
reached, and in some C33es even exceeded, the optimum number 
of certificated services that can be economically supported by the 
available traffic. " 
Honorable Charles S. Murphy, Chairman, C.A.B., November 16,196'1 
'i •••• the American economy is generally a competitive economy. For 
the most part, we depend upon free· competition among private busi-
ness enterprises to achieve the most efficient use of resources •••• 
belief that vigorous competition is a good thing - even in the airline 
. Industry ." 
Honorable Secor D. Brown, Chairman, GoA. Bot August, 1970 
"The cardinal sins of the regulators have been in legislating, in effect, 
wasteful, ruinous over-competition along our routes and then interven-
ing unwisely to forestall the natural adjustments for over-competition 
- merger, statesmanlike agreement, or b'lsiness faHure." 
Critical Hypotheses 
There appear to be several hypotheses that gained rather wide acceptance among 
members within the industry and among observers and analysts of the industry, 
and that have influenced the cun-ent structure of the industry and level of 
competition; 
1. Increased levels of competition are deemed desirable per se. 
2. More competing carriers can be economically supported; 
a. In larger passenger inarkets (in terms of passengers p,oT day), 
b. In longer-haul markets (with gl-eater revenues per passe:lqer), 
c. With lower unit costs (in terms of cents per available seat mile), 
d. With higher fare levels (in terms of cents per revenue passenger 
mile), and, 
e. With newer technology (with resulting economies of scale). 
3. Increases in market share will result in greater profits. 
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BASIC ECONOMIC FACTORS 
An evaluation of the air transportation industry must recognize economies of 
scale, the lumpiness (large incremental step-functions) of various types of 
costs I and marginal analysis for determining the efficient economic allocation 
of resources. 
COSTS 
VARIABLE 
VARIABLE 
CHART I 
VARIABLE I TO I 
no I NON-VARIABLE 
SMAll 
NON-V IABLE 
o~--------------~----------~-----
SCALE OF OPERATIONS 
Economies of Scale 
Chart 1 shows a theoretical variation in total costs as a function of the scale 
of operations. A small firm might have essentially no fixed costs but relatively 
high variable costs. A medium-sized firm may have some non-variable fixed 
costs and, as a result, somewhat lower variable costs, in which the total vari-
able costs might be three times the non-variable costs, or, in other words, the 
total costs might be four times the total non-variable fixed costs. An even 
larger firm might have significantly higher non-variable fixed costs, with even 
lower unit variable costs such that the total costs might be only two times the 
non-variable fixed costs. These relationships show a decreasing total unit cost 
with increasing scale of operation. 
Because various costing methodologies tend to be rather subjective, it is diffi-
cult to categorize certain costs as totally variable ,HId others as completely 
fixed or non-variable in the short term of six months to one year. (Over the 
di.o/ 
, 
longer term, all costs must be considered as variable.) However, in contrast 
to some economists' contentions, our analyses and detailed costing models have 
shown the above economies of scale (decreasing unit costs) with great accuracy 
for United and other carriers, with total costs ranging from 2 to 3 times the non-
variable fixed costs. (Such economies of scale have led to the establishment 
of "natural" monopolies in other industries.) 
Lumpiness of COsts 
There are four different levels of costs which must be recognized: costs per 
unit, costs per production lot, costs for capital eqUipment, and overhead costs. 
Certain airline costs tend to vary directly with the volume of passengers served 
(i.e., tickets, meals, insurance, reservations costs, etc.) and can be handled 
as a deduction to obtain the net fare yield per passenger. Other costs are quite 
lumpy, such as the marginal operating costs for a given flight (prinCipally fuel, 
crew, and direct maintenance costs) which are essentially independent of 
the passenger loads. The capital costs of the equipment vary with the number 
of airplanes, each of which is used on one or more trips per day. Other airline 
costs are established on the basis of the plaJ;\l1ed scale of operations and do not 
vary with individual scheduling decisions. 
Marginal Analysis 
For economiC efficiency, a. firm should expand its volume of operations until 
the marginal revenues just equal marginal cost, in order to maximize its profits 
or minimize its losses, as shown in Chart 2. 
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CHART 2 
Although a certain minimum volume of operations might be required to realize 
the marginal revenue curve shown, the area between the marginal revenue line 
and the marginal cost line represents ':he total contribution to non-variable 
costs. It should be noted that the marginal cost curve has not been assumed 
to turn up with increasing volumes in accordance with the classical economists' 
theory, but rather shows no dis-economies of scale. 
SCHEDULING DECISIONS 
Analyses have shown that the basic schedule pattern for an airline determines 
80-90% of its revenues, determines 70-90% of its costs, and also establishes 
85-95% of its total capital investment. The basiC schedule pattern is estab-
lished on the basis of a series of scheduling decisions for all of the various 
airport-pair time markets, together with their interrelationships. For the pur-
pose of Simplification, but without distorting the basiC factors, there are really 
only three types of scheduling decisions for an ail'port-pair time market: 
1. DeCision to add or subtract a flight, which is an integer number 0 
(It is relatively easy to add a flight in a market, but quite difficult 
to reduce service, in view of various community pressures.) 
2, DeCision to change the type of airplane providing the service. 
3. Decision to move a flight earlier or later during the day. 
MARKET SHARE 
Accurate forecasts of market share are essential for the schedule planning and 
equipment purchase decisions, and for the resulting workforce planning, facUi-' 
ties planning, etc. Experience has shown that an increase in frequency in a 
major competitive market is generally accompanied by an increase in market 
share and an· attendant increase in revenue. In fact, frequency of service is 
probably the strongest competitive tool in the airlines' "bag of tricks.' 
A carrier in search of an increased part of the total industry revenues may act in 
a rational manner by adding one flight on a segment. His competitors, seeing 
their share of the market slip and their revenues decline, may act in an equally 
rational manner by adding one flight in an attempt to retain their market share 
and profits, After some" settling" time, each carrier could be back to its origi- .. 
nal market share, so that its operating revenues would be unchanged. However, 
each carrier would have increased its operating costs by the expense of the addi-
tional flight. It can been seen that by.changing a relatively stable two-carrier 
market into a three, four # and sometimes five-carrier market,: it becomes ·more 
volatile # with the possibility that one carrier will set off a chain-like reaction. 
- 6 -
The increase in frequency (capacity and costs), with a resulting reduction in 
load factor, due to the competitive nature of the industry has been explained 
by Mr. Joseph V. Yance, consultant to the Office of the Secretary of Transpor-
tation (CAB Docket 21866-6, Exhibit DOT-RT-l, pages 6 and 7): 
"As we noted earli'lf, Arneric<l.n, United, and TWA argue that the number of 
competitors in a market has an impact on load factors. In general, the 
more competitors in a market, the lower the load factors of carriers serv-
ing that market. Our theoretical analysis of carrier behavior supports 
this view. 
"The reasoning is as follows. What is critical to an airline in making its 
schedule deCision is the number of "new passengers" attracted by an addi-
tional flight. (By" new passengers," we mean passengers the airline is 
not already carrying on its existing flights.) In either a monopoly or a 
competitive market, the number of new passengers required to sustain a 
flight is the same. But the relation between new passengers and average 
load on board varies significantly between the two types of markets. In a 
monopoly market, apart from passengers who are flying because of the 
additional service and who would not fly absent such new service, all of 
the passengers on board a new flight are drawn from other flights of the 
(same) airline; hence unless the number of persons who would first fly 
because of the new service is large enough to cover the costs of a new 
flight, the flight will not be added. 
"The situation is very different in a competitive market. There, new pas-
sengers will consist of (1) those persons first traveling because of the 
additional service (as in the case of a monopoly market), and (2) passengers 
diverted from existing flights of other airlines. It may thus be profitable 
for a carrier to add a flight, even though overall load factors in the market 
decline. On the basis of this analysis, one cause for the decrease in load 
factors one observes over time is the increasing competitiveness of markets." 
"S" Curve Rela tionships 
Many analyses have been made to relate the market share (or percentao;,.~ parti-
cipation in the total passenger market) to the flight share (or relative number of 
flights per day), as shown in Chart 3. The relationship line will obviously pass 
through the origin and the (100,100) end point, and in a two-carrier market, will 
generally pass through the (50,50) pOint. Some analysts have concluded that there 
is an "S" -shaped curve effect, since a majority of the points in the 15-35% range 
are below the diagonal regression line, while a majority of the pOints in the 65-
90% range are above it. Such an "S"-shaped curve would imply that the carrier 
with the highest frequency share would get a disproportionate market share, and 
that therefore the way to make greater profits is to be the schedule leader. Such 
reasoning might lead a carrier to emphasize market share and growth to the 
neglect of the profit objective. 
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The Civil Aeronautics Board released on July 21, 1970 (CAB 70-96, 382-6031), 
the first of a projected series of staff studies evaluating route awards made by 
the Board in recent years. It was their first attempt to determine whether the 
carriers have actually performed in accordance with the anticipation and intent 
of the Board. Some of the conclusions reached in the pilot study included: 
" 2 • The total number of flights and the proportionate share of non-stop 
flights were greater under competition. 
"4. There appears to be generally a close relationship between the share 
of flights provided by each carrier and the share in traffic." 
In order to analyze the effect of competition, it is not necessary to a~"'ume an 
"S"-shaped curve but to merely recognize that a change in the frequene-y share 
by one carrier will effect its market share. High correlation coefficients in the 
regressions of market share against flight share have been interpreted as prov-
ing the validity of the "S" shape. However, in most analyses, the regression 
hypothesis is actually whether greater frequency means greater market share, 
not whether greater frequency means a disproportionate market share. 
Linear Regression Analysis 
As part of United's rebuttal testimony in Phase 6 of the General Domestic 
Passenger Fare Investigation (Docket 21866-6, Exhibits UR-T-1, pages 12 
and 13, and Exhibits UR-8 and 9), the results of a linear regression analysis 
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of all of the basic data contained in the C.A.B. Bureau of Economics Exhibits 
BE 6502 (Columns 8 and 10) for all competitive sample markets were summarized: 
Market Share 
(in %) 
= 1. 09 x Flight Share - 3.7 
(in %) 
280 Observations* 
Coefficient of Determination (R2) = 91. 4% of Total Variance 
Standard Error of Estimate = 6.48 percentage points 
F level = 30.05 
* In order to avoid the inherent auto-correlation among 
the data for all carriers in a market, only one data 
point was used for a two-carrier market, two data 
points for a three-carrier market, etc. 
These results show the extremely high correlation which actually exists between 
market share and flight share, based on the extensive basic data assembled by 
the C.A.B. Bureau of Economics. Furthermore, an analysis made of the excep-
tional variances, between the actual and the predicted values for the various 
city-pair markets included in the regression analYSiS, highlighted the practical 
aspects of on-line, through, and connecting service and the factor of market 
identity. By recognizing these differences, the relationship between market 
share and flight share would have become even greater than that indicated in 
the correlation analysis. It would be very difficult to improve these simple 
linear regression results (with a nominal threshold value) by more complicated 
and sophisticated curvilinear relationships to approximate the "s" curve. Accord-
ingly, the following analysis is based initially on the simple diagonal relation-
ship (that is, market share = flight share), and later extended to cover a linear 
regression with a threshold value and a possible curvilinear relationship. 
BASIC ASSUMPTIONS 
The following competition/game theory analysis is based on two basic assumptions: 
1. There is no collusion. overt or tacit, among competitors. 
2. Each carrier purchases and schedules equipment in its own self-
interest, i.e.: 
a. Each carrier expands its production (schedules) up to the 
limit of capacity whenever marginal revenues exceed 
marginal costs, and, 
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b. Each carrier purchases additional equipment if the marginal 
contribution exceeds marginal capital costs. 
The second assumption would preclude an airline from seeking growth or 
increased market share at the expense of profit. 
EXAMPLE OF COMPETITION 
The following simplified example is based on a reasonably typical airport-pair 
time market: 
Potential Market (If 3 or More Flights) 200 passengers per day 
Net Fare Yield $67.20 per passenger 
Airplane Seating Capacity 100 seats 
Variable Costs $1,400 per flight 
By Simple arithmetic, it can be seen that if this were a monopoly market with 
only Airline" A" certificated, that carrier would probably operate three (or pos-
sibly four) flights. 
Revenues Per Day 
Variable Costs Per Day 
Net Contribution Per Day 
Passenger Load Factor 
Two Carriers 
3 Flights 
$13,440 
4,200 
$ 9,240 
67% 
4 Flights 
$13,440 
5,600 
$ 7,840 
50% 
If Airline" B" were to be certificated as a new competitor in this market, with 
three flights already operated by Airline "A" , it would be faced with the mar-
ginal economic analysis shown in Chart 4, based on the direct diagont..~ 
relationship of market share against flight share. For example, if Airli;':' "B" 
operates one flight out of a total of four flights, the marginal revenue for that 
flight would be one-fourth x $13,440, or $3,360. Airline "B", accordingly, 
would probably operate two flights in the market, because the total contribution 
for these two flights would be $2,580 per day, $60 greater than if it operated 
three flights. 
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$3.000-
2.000-
1.000 
53.360 
5Z.SIIO 
MARC-I NAL REVENUE 
PER FLlGKI' 
52.020 
3 FUGKI'S BY COMPETITORS 
COST PER Fli GHf Sl,'" 1------------ -------------,.--------- -$1, 340 1 . 
- I L-__ ""I $720 
55010 
o~--~---~---~----~--~--+-----~ I zTll. 5 6. 
NUMlElt Of OUR Fli GHfS 
CHART 4 
However, Airline" A" would now find that its contribution from the market could 
be increased by $60 if it cut back to two flights per day. The net result would 
be four flights in the market (two by "An and two by n Bn), with an average pas-
senger load factor ·of 50%. However, if each airline hoped to increase its share 
of the market from 50% to 60% at a daily cost of $60, the net result might be six 
flights in the market (three by "A" and three by'; Bn), with an average passenger 
load factor of 33% and with each airline realizing $1,400 per day less contribu-
tion than if each airline operated only two flights in the market. Chart 4 also 
demonstrates graphically the potential impact of attempting to increase market 
share at the expense of profit. 
Three Carriers 
If a third carrier, Airline n C n, were to be authorized, with four flights CI :ready 
serving the market (two by n A" and two by "B"), ·Airline "e" would opera,e at 
least one flight with a contribution of $1,290 per day, but probably two flights 
with a total contribution of $1,680 per day. A third flight by "c" would have 
a negative contribution. Neither" An nor n B" could improve its own contribu-
tion by either increasing or decreasing its frequency. The net result would be 
six flights in the market (two each by "A", "8n , and "C"), with an average pas-
senger load factor of 33%. 
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Four Carriers 
In a similar manner, the authorization of a fourth airline, "D" I would tend to 
result in eight flights in the market, with an average load factor of 25% and a 
contribution of only $560 per airline, which probably would be inadequate to 
cover the allocated capital costs and those cost factors not directly related to 
this market. 
Scheduling Strategy 
Chart 5 illustrates the results of various scheduling strategies for the example 
case, based on the simplified (and most favorable) relationship that market 
share equals flight share. 
Ma_mt Share 
Rewnue MARKET SHARE = FLIGHT SHARE 
Cost NUMBER OF FLIGHTS BY COMPETitoRS COnlri6u11Oii 
I'_L F 0 I 2 3 4 5 6 
100'10 
t ;""010 .3~. $ r"36O .r'MO I~ 1& • 5,040 $ 2,2«1 Sl,m 
• 
, 
I -I,G -1 «XI -I «XI -I «lO -I «lO -I «lO -I «XI 
$~ .T,iii ."f.ii) .T,iO 
• ~290 .-sil ., m 75Iro 6~ •• .3~ 291. 11m 67'£ scm .... :m. 291. m 
$10,Il10 • 1,960 
• 6,no • 5,380 • 4,. • 3,11«1 • 3,360 CHART 5 2 fI -2 .., -2 .., -2 .., -2 .., -2,'" -2 .., NUMBER . , .~uo .-UiI '~5ii · (. $ 1,010 ., OF 75Iro SOl 3~ 2ft m 
OUR lOO'1o 75Iro 6Ofo SOl 431 m :m. 
FLIGHTS m,. tlO,OIII 
• 8,'" • 6,no , 5,760 
, S,OIO *4 •• 
3 -4200 -.200 -CD -4200 -4200 -4200 
.-"; 'j~ij *1.- , ~i!ii '~S20 s!:' ,-"iii m m 
100'10 m 6~ m SOl .. .... 
$13,. $10,730 
• 1,960 $ 7,. t 6,no • 5,970 • 5,. 4 -5 6CII -s 6GO -5 6CII -s 6CII -S 6CII -5100 -s 6CII 
.T,ii .-T,ii .T,ii .T,ii , ~2ii ., .~ 
.. .. m M no. 
,. 
The horizontal rows, for various number of flights that we might operate, show 
the results when faced by various number of flights operated by our competitor(s) • 
The entries in each box show our market share, our resulting revenue based on 
that market share, our variable costs at $1,400 per flight, our contribution from 
the market, and the passenger load factors for our flights and for the industry. 
For example, if we expect our competitors to operate four flights, our greatest 
contribution from the market would be $1,680 by our operating two flights. 
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The results for the industry may be summarized as follows: 
Market Revenues $l3,440 per day 
Variable Costs $ 1,400 per flight 
Number of Carriers (0) 1 2 3 4 
Flights/Carrier 3 2 2 2 
Total Flights 3 4 6 8 
Passenger Load Factor 67% 50% 33% 25% 
Industry Revenues $13,440 $13,440 $13,440 $13,440 
Industry Costs 4,200 5,600 8,400 11,200 
Industry Net $ 9,240 $ 7,840 $ 5,040 $ 2,240 
This summary can be extended to show the industry profits resulting if the vari-
able costs represent only 67% or 50% of the total costs: 
If Variable = 67% Total Costs 
Non-Variable Charge 2,100 2,800 4,200 5,600 
Industry Profit $ 7,140 $ 5,040 $ 840 $-3,360 
If Variable = 50% Total Costs 
Non-Variable Charge 4.200 5.600 8.400 11.200 
Industry Profit $ 5,040 $ 2,240 $-3,360 $-8,960 
For this illustrative airport-pair time market, foW" competitors would incW". sig-
nificant losses and three competitors would have either inadequate returns on 
their investments or losses. 
J. 7(j 
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COMPETITION THEORY ~7/ 
The results of the simplified example can be generalized by the use of micro-
economic analysis combined with an elementary form of competition/game 
theory. However, this application is really not the classical game theory, 
as developed by J. Von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, but rather is derived 
by the simple application of high school partial differential equations. 
Appendix A-I shows that if each carrier adds flights as long as the marginal 
revenues equal or exceed the marginal cost, and if the market share equals 
the flight share: 
of Flights for (opum"m N"ml"") (Industry Market Revenues) X (0;/) = 
Each Carrier (Variable Costs Per Flight) 
For 0 2 , (0 ;21) 1 = = 4 
For 0 3 , (°02 I) 2 = = 9 
For 0 4 , (00-2 1) 3 = = 16 
In this relationship, 0 represents the number of equal competitors in a particu-
lar airport-pair time market, with equal drawing power for each competitor's 
flights. The industry market revenues per day are available to all competitors 
in the market. In the short term, the variable costs per flight might represent 
only the costs for fuel, crew, and direct maintenance, but over the longer term 
would have to include the capital costs for additional equipment. This equa-
tion also assumes that the industry market revenue forecasts made at the time 
of equipment purchase actually materialize when the equipment is placed into 
service. If not, the number of trips scheduled will exceed the optimum number, 
making the resulting contributions and profits lower than this equation would 
suggest. 
Application of the above equation to the illustrative example results in the 
following comparison of the theoretical optimum number of flights for each 
"arrier versus the number determined previously: 
. $13,440 
EquatlOn: $ 1,440 X 
Q - 1 
0 2 
As Determined Previously 
In Example 
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Number of Carriers (0) 
_1_ _2_ _3_ 4 
2.4 2.1 1.8 
3 2 2 2 
Total Industry Relationships 
Appendix A-2 extends the above relationship to the total industry by simple 
algebraic manipulation: 
• Total Flights = 
(Industry Market Revenues) 
(Variable Costs Per Flight) x (0; 1) 
TOTAL 
FLIGHTS 
20 
5 
Total Costs = g x (Industry Market Revenues) 
Where g = 
(Total Costs) 
(Variable Costs) 
Operating Ratio 
• Profit Margin 
• For Breakeven 
g(O~I) 
1-9(001) 
g(O;I)_ 1 
= 
TOTAL NUMBER OF FLIGHTS BY INDUSTRY 
(Airport - Pair Time Markell 
TOTAl • 
"',,"TI 
o~----+-----~----~----~----~----~ 15 
Total Industry Flights 
x (Q 0 1) 
CHART 6 
Chart 6 shows the total number of industry flights as a function of the ratio of 
total market revenues to variable costs per flight for various numbers of carriers 
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in an airport-pair time market. It can be seen that the total number of industry 
flights tends to vary directly with the market size and fare level, and varies 
inversely with the variable costs per flight. It also increases with the number 
of carriers. However, it will tend to follow a stepped function because of the 
requirement of an integer number of flights by each carrier. 
The service to the traveling public may be improved by the increased number 
of flights, but it should be recognized that the costs and capital investments 
vary also with the increased number of flights, resulting in a deterioration of 
the return on investment for each carrier. Similarly, the actual passenger load 
factor realized will be decreased with an increased number of competitors. 
On the other hand, the service to the traveling public may not be improved with 
an increase in the number of competitors. A monopoly carrier could provide 
good service with five flights, spaced at desirable departure times throughout 
the day; whereas three carriers in the same market might operate three flights 
each for a total of nine flights, but with three competing flights peaked at the 
three largest-demand periods of the day, since this can be shown to be the 
"best" strategy for each competing carrier. 
Profit Margin 
Chart 7 shows that the profit margin for the industry is a function of the ratio of 
total costs to variable costs and the number of carriers, covering a representa-
tive range of values. 
I (TOTAL COSTS\{O • I) PROfIT MARCIN - - \VARiABU tOSi~T 
WH(l1E 0 - NUMBER OF CARRIERS CERTIFICATED 
TOTAL COSTX' NUMBER Of CARRIERS 101 
VARIABLE COSTS 2 1 4 S 6 
2.00 0 -ll" -501 ... -67" 
1.50 25 .. 0 -12'10 •• -25ft CHART 7 
1.33 33 .. II .. 0 -6t. -II" 
1.25 37" 17" 6t. 0 -... 
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• 
It is enlightening to see that the profit margin is apparently not sensitive to 
the absolute levels of costs, but is quite sensitive to the ratio of total costs 
to variable costs. The higher this ratio becomes, the lower the air transporta-
tion industry's profits will be. Unfortunately. the trend of this ratio overtime 
has been definitely upward in the air transportation industry as a result of 
greatly increased capital investments for new aircraft. ground equipment. and 
facilities. In addition, the annual charges by local airports have risen sub-
s tanUally during recent yeap3 0 Furthermore, labor contracts are tending in 
various ways toward greater job security in one form or another, which has the 
effect of converting variable costs into more fixed, longer-term commitments 
to the employees. Since the variable cost of flying a Jet a certain distance is 
not substantially greater than that for a piston aircraft over the same distance, 
the end result of the jet technology has been that higher fixed costs must be 
allocated over relatively fewer units of production. 
Chart 7 shows that, regardless of the size of the market and regardless of the 
fare level, a three-competitor market can be little better than a break-even 
operation, and that for healthy profits, only two competitors may be tolerated 
in any market. 
Break-even Operation 
Chart 8 shows that the maximum number of carriers in any market is equal to 
the ratio of total costs to non-variable costs and is independent of market size, 
length of haul, unit cost, and fare level. 
FOR BREAK-EVEN. OPERATING RATIO - lO 
f. TOTAL COSTS )(0-1) • lO 
\VARIABl£ COSTS \0 
MAXIMUM NUMBER OF CARRIERS 10') 
• ( TOTAL COSTS ) . TOlAL COSTS 
o - TOlAL coSts - VARIABl£ coSts - NON-VARiA8l£ costs 
TOTAL COST~ MAXIMUM NUMBER 
NON-VARIABl£ COSTS OF CARRIERS 
2 2 
3 3 
• 4 
5 5 
INDEPENDENT OF MARKET SIZE. l£NGTH OF HAUl, UNIT COSTS. AND FARE L£VD. 
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CHART 8 
This rather simple relationship, easy to understand, might also be applicable 
to other industries and firms which have relatively high fixed costs, such as 
the fertilizer, plastic. steel, and automotive industries, and possibly even 
applicable to the number of filling stations at a busy intersection. 
Further Extensions 
The preceding derivation and results were based on certain simplified assump-
tions, but what would be the result if the various carriers in a market are not 
equal and have different drawing powers (or relative load factors), or what if 
there is a threshold point in the market share versus flight share relationship, 
or what if an airline's competitors operate more or fewer flights than they really 
should for maximum profit? 
The assumption that all competitors in a market were equal may seem to be a 
severely limiting assumption, in that there are few markets where all competi-
tors are truly equal. Upon closer inspection of the equations, however, it is 
clear that we are not bound by this assumption, and that the model can easily 
be made to apply to unequal competitors. Since industry profits in a market 
are determined by the number of flights actually scheduled, the value of -"Q" 
can be adjusted to conform to the actual number of trips scheduled in the 
market. This new "Q" is the number of "equivalent" equal competitors and 
may be a continuous variable. For example, if three airlines operate in a 
given market, but one dominates the market, we may be dealing with an effec-
tive "Q" of 2.2 rather than 3. By adjusting "0" in this way, it is possible 
to use the various equations shown above to describe the actual situation. 
Furthermore, as shown in Appendix A-3, if the drawing power of one carrier's 
flights is 10% greater than those of its competitors, the optimum integer 
number of flights for that carrier and its competitors probably would remain 
unchanged. 
As shown in Appendix A-4, if there were a threshold value in the market share 
versus flight share relationship (e. g., market share equals 1.10 times flight 
share minus 5), the optimum number of flights for each carrier would be increased 
by the slope of the line (10% for the assumed relationship). Unfortunacdy, 
the total number of flights, costs, and investment would be increased tc.. .he 
extent that the airline managements assumed this slope to be greater than 1.0. 
Appendix A- 4 also shows that the optimum number of flights, costs, and invest-
ment would be increased directly by the exponent in an assumed (or empirically 
derived) curvilinear relationship of market share as a function of flight share, 
for example 2 (Market Share) = K (Flight Share) 
As shown in Appendix A-S, the optimum number of flights for a carrier to operate 
is quite insensitive to the actual number of flights operated by its competitors, 
for the basic diagonal linear relationship of market share = flight share. 
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RESULTS OF COMPETITION 
The customer-oriented competitive nature of the air transportation industry has 
resulted in a frequency battle with more carriers providing more non-stop flights 
to more destinations at more times of the day from multiple-airports serving the 
major metropolitan areas. These new flights may have improved the service and 
convenience for the traveling public, but at lower load factors and higher costs. 
Technological developments have resulted in an equipment battle that has further 
compounded the economic impact of the competitive frequency battle. The engi-
neers and manufacturers have designed and developed faster, bigger. and more 
expensive types before the airlines have recouped their capital investments in 
existing fleets. As soon as one airline buys a new design, competitive pres-
sures force the others to follow. with marked increases in total industry 
indebtedness. New technology large jet aircraft have been introduced to both 
replace the smaller first-generation jets and to permit a reduction in seat-mile 
costs in spite of the inflationary cost pressures. However, this growth in seat-
ing capacity has exceeded the normal growth in passengers, also resulting in 
lower load factors. 
Sensitivity Analysis 
Chart 9 summarizes the probable impact on flight frequency, costs, capital invest-
ment, and passenger load factors as the result of changes in passenger volume, 
fare level, variable costs per flight, and number of carriers certificated. It can 
NUMBER OF INDUSTRY FLIGHTS 
(AIRPORT-PAIR TIllIE MARICET) 
PROBABlE P£RCENTAGE CHANGE IN, 
PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN CONDITlPiS 
FRIIHNCY & COSTS P.l.F. 
PASSENGERS +10 +10 0 
-10 0 -10 
FARE +10 +10 -10 
-10 O· +10 
COS f PER FLIGHT +10 0 0 
-10 +10 -10 
. NUMB£R OF CARRIERS CERTIFICATED 
1_2 +50 to +100 -08 
2_3 +33 to +50 
-29 3-. +12 to +33 -18 
4-5 +7 to +25 -14 
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CHART 9 
be seen that under most changes in conditions, the number of flights and costs 
will tend to be increased and the passenger load factor depressed. Only if the 
fare elasticity of demand were -1.0 or more might the passenger load factor 
increase as indicated. Obviously, from a sensitivity standpoint, the number of 
carriers certificated is most critical in determining the increase in flights, costs, 
and capital investment, with a resultant depressant of passenger load factor. 
Case in Point 
This summary has been derived from a rather straightforward analysis, but it 
might be considered theoretical or abl;ltract. One specific example from actual 
operations might be mentioned: in 1969, United's service to and from Hawaii 
produced a pre-tax profit of more than $26 million; the next year, after five 
additional carriers were granted Hawaiian routes, United's Hawaiian service 
had a pre-tax loss of more than $17 million; a change on this one route of more 
than $43 million per year. No carrier is currently earning a reasonable return 
in the Hawaiian service. 
CONCLUSIONS 
From the foregoing analysis, we may conclude that: 
1. The hypotheses which have influenced the current structure of the 
industry and level of competition, as stated earlier, have not led to 
the most efficient alloca.tion of resources for either the traveling 
public or the air transportation industry. 
2. The competitive, economiC, regulatory, and technological environment 
for the air transportation industry has resulted in over-competition 
with resultant: 
a. Excessive numbers of flights, costs, and capital invest-
ments, which must be supported by the fare levels. 
b. Low utilization of productive capacity - low load i.;-:;tors. 
c. Marginal or loss operations. 
3. The maximum number of fully-competitive carriers possible in any 
market can not exceed the ratio of total costs to non-variable 
costs, and is .!!2! a function of the market size, length of haul, unit 
costs, fare level, or aircraft type. With the inherent increases in 
fixed costs which have occurred over time, the ratio of total costs to 
non-variable costs in the air transportation industry appears to range 
from 2 to 3. 
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Let M 
F 
C 
PA 
Nj 
BASIC DERIVATION 
for 
EACH CARRIER 
= Industry Passengers 
= Net Fare per Passenger 
= Variable Costs per Flight 
= Contribution for Carrier A, 
similarly for Band C 
= Optimum Number of Flights 
for Each of j Carriers 
x = Flights by A 
y = Flights by B 
z = Flights by C 
0 '" Number of Carriers 
Total Costs g 
- Variable Costs 
CO,:,DITION A 
(1) 
1. Each carrier schedules for maximum contribution, that is, marginal 
revenues ~ marginal costs. 
2. Market Share = Flight Share. 
For 0 = 2 Competing carriers A and B 
PA = (x:y) MF - xC , Pa = (~)MF - yC 
For maximum contribution, 
"'PA 0 and "'Pa 0 = = 
"'x "'y 
",PA 
= ~x+l1 • 1 - x ] MF 
- C = 0 
"'Pa 
'" 
[(x+Y) • 1- y] 
(x+y)2 , (x+y)7 MF - C 
... x ... y 
Solving simultaneous equations, 
XOPT YOPT N2 
MF 1 MF(~) * = = = x = C 4 C 0 2 
For 0 = 3 Competing carriers A, B, and C 
By similar analysis 
= 
= MF 2 
C x 9 = .MI(Q -1) C 0 2 
For 0 carriers, by extension 
= 
MF(Q-l) 
C 0 2 for each carrier 
* In order for the first derivative of P to result in a .maximum Value for P, the 
second derivative must, of course, be negative. This will be the case when 
o is greater than 1. 
= 0 
COND1TION A (Continued) 
For the total industry, 
BASIC DERIVATIONS 
for 
TOTAL INDUSTRY 
(2) Total Flights = QNO -_ McF (Q Q- 1) 
C X MCF.(Q Q- 1 \ = . Total Variable Costs '" / 
(3) Total Costs = gMF( Q ; 9 
. Operating Ratio = Total Costs Total Revenues 
APPENDIX A-2 
(4) independent of M, F, and C 
(5) 
(6) 
independent of M, F, and C 
For break-even, Operating Ratio = 1.0 
Maximum number of carriers Q* possible 
Q* = 
= 
~ 
g - 1 
Total Costs 
Non-variable Costs 
Again, independent of M, F, and C 
APPENDlX A-3 
FURTHER EXTENSIONS 
CONDITION B 
(7) 
1. Each carrier schedules for maximum contribution, and 
2. Competitors in market are not equal, such that the drawing power of 
A's flights; 110% of competitors' flights. 
For 0 ; 3 Competing carriers A, B, and C 
PA = .( l.Ix )MF - xC 1. Ix+y+z 
= (l.Ix+y+z - 1. Ix) 
(I.Ix+y+z)2 
, 
I.IMF-C 
= 
(I.Ix+y+z - y) 
(1 • Ix+y+z)2 MF - C Similarly for Pc 
Solving for maximum contribution, simultaneously, 
XOPT = 
2.4 MF 1.05 MFr -1) 1.05 = = (3.2)2 C C 0 2 N3 
YOPT = 
2.2 MF 0.97 MF (0 - 1) 0.97 N3 = = (3.2)2 C C 0 2 
ZOPT = 
2.2 MF 0.97 N3 = (3.2) 2 C 
That is, a reasonably Significant difference in drawing power (or relative 
load factor) generally will not affect the optimum integer number of 
flights to be operated. 
APPENDIJ( A-It 
FURTHER EXTENSIONS 
CONDITION C 
(8) 
1. Each cartier schedules for maximum contribution, and 
2. Market Share = 1.10(FlightShare) - 0.05 
= 
similarly for Band C 
",PA = 1. 1 (x+y+z - x) MF - C , similarly for Band C 
... x (x+y+z)2 
Solving for maximum contribution, simultaneously 
XOPT = YOPT = ZOPT = 1.10 NGl , and 
Total Industry Flights = 1. 109No = 1.10 ~ (9; 1) 
That is, the optimum number of flights for each carrier, and the total 
number of flights (and costs) f-or the industry are increased directly 
by the slope of the regression line of market share against flight share. 
CONDITION D 
(9) 
1. Each carrier schedules for maximum contribution, and 
2. Market Share A = K (x+~+z r ' similarly for Band C 
= 
, 
= ~2+y2+Z2)2x - x 2'2x 
(x2 +y2+Z2)2 
, similarly for Band C 
similarly for Band C 
MF - C , Similarly for Band C 
Solving for maximum contribution, simultaneously, 
XOPT = YOPT = ZOPT = 2 NO ' and 
Total Industry Flights = 29 NO = 2 ~F ( 9 ;21 ) 
That is, the optimum number of flights for each carrier, and the total 
number of flights (and costs) for the industry are increased directly by 
the exponent in the curvilinear relationship of market share as a func-
tion of flight share. 
-APPENDIX A-5 
FURTHER EXTENSIONS 
CONDITION E 
(10) 
, 
1. Carrier A schedules for maximum contribution, but 
2. Carrier B actually operates K times N2 flights 
KN K MF(2 - 1) y= 2= c"""'22 = 
3. Market Share = Flight Share 
p = ( x ) MF - xC 
A x+KN2 
= 
(x+KN2 - x) 
(x+KN2 )2 
MF - C 
Solving for maximum contribution, 
X OPT = (KN2 ~)1/2 - KN2 
= (K ~ x ~)'/2 _ K(~) 
= (2K~ - K) N2 
1. ------------:,:;;;0;---:::=:::::::--S---::;.:---::---·--,.-----
.. ;:._--_ ............. _-_ ....... . 
• 
X OPT :;:::·N2 
IF 
0.4 < K < 1.8 
.... 
• I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I o~------~~--------~----------~----~--__ -o .5 1.0 1.5 2.0 
K 
The flatness of this curve means that the optimum number of flights for a 
carrier is quite insensitive to the actual number of flights operated by its 
competitor(s). for the simple linear relatioplilhiP of market share = flight share. 
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Abstract 
A discussion of the basic measures of corporate financial 
strength, and the sources of the information--the Balance Sheet, 
Income Statement, Funds Flow and Cash Flow, Financial Ratios. 
Before an airline can buy new aircraft, it must be able to 
pay for the plane. The carrier can do this by using its own 
funds. However, few have enough cash on hand to purchase one 
aircraft much less a fleet. Therefore, the carrier must rely 
on outside sources for financial support. 
What are the factors that a financial source investigates 
before deciding to invest or not? The basic information on the 
health of a carrier can be found from its balance sheet and 
income statement. If this information is coupled with a know-
ledge ~f the carrier's working capital and cash flow statements, 
an investor can compute some key financial ratios that will 
allow him to determine his potential risks and rewards from 
financing a carrier's operations. 
ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES 
What are the basic indicators of corporate health, and how 
are they constructed? This is the area of the accountant so a 
basic knowledge of his techniques will be helpful. 
Through the years, certain general rules or guides have 
been developed that accountants follow in preparing financial 
documents. These principles do not specify every detail of 
accounting practice, so the accountant has a great deal of 
~ freedom in tailoring his practices and procedures to the par-
ticular industry and company he serves. However, there are 
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some generally accepted standards. 
The Basic Accounting Conventions 
Although the accountant does have a great deal of freedom 
in how he sets up and keeps accounts, there are several widely 
accepted conventions. The most important are: 
1. Consistency - Once the accountant has decided how he 
will set up the accounts and handle particular transactions, the 
Consistency Convention requires him to handle all future events 
of the same type in the same fashion. Thus, similar transactions 
in different accounting periods can be compared, on a consistent 
basis. 
Since circumstances change, accounting procedures may be 
altered to meet new developments. However, this is not done 
often, and when it is, the changes must be throughly described 
and documented. 
2. Conservatism - This convention is often stated as 
"Anticipate no profits and provide for all possible losses." If 
there is an option in how a resource is to be evaluated, the 
accountant will ordinarily select the method that yields the 
lower value. For example, he would show the value of securities 
held by the firm at the lower of cost or market value. Although 
this procedure is often criticized as inconsistent, it is still 
widely in use and is important. 
- 2 -
3. Materiality - often the recording of an event would 
cost considerably more than the information obtained in the 
process. Therefore, accountants will draw a line based on their 
experience and common sense between what is important enough to 
require close attention, and what can be considered immaterial 
and handled in a less detailed way. For example, an accountant 
would not require daily reports on how much fuel remains in the 
tanks of the aircraft in the fleet, but would use some simpli-
fying assumption such as, "fuel is considered used when it is 
pumped from storage". 
The Basic Accounting Concepts 
In addition to the Accounting conventions, there are several 
basic concepts that underlie the keeping of accounts: 
1. Business Entity Concept - Accounts are kept for busi-
nesses, and not for the people associated with them. The 
accounts reflect how transactions affect the business. This is 
true whether the business is a giant corporation or a sole 
proprietorship, totally merged with the personal finances of the 
owner. In the latter case, the law views both the business and 
personal transactions of the individual as his own personal 
property for which he is personally liable. However, the 
accountant treats the two separately. If the owner takes five 
dollars from the cash drawer to buy food, the accounts for the 
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business show a five dollar decrease in cash. 
Since a corporation has a totally separate legal existance, 
corporate activities are easily distinguished from the personal 
actions of the owners or operators. However, there may still be 
areas of confusion. To keep tighter controls of activities, a 
corporation may treat various aspects of its operations as 
separate business entities and keep separate accounts. Or there 
may be several distinct corporations linked by stock interests. 
In this case, a "consolidated" accounting statement could be 
prepared, treating the whole group as one business entity. 
Because of these techniques it is sometimes difficult to separate 
out the information needed about a particular part of the firm. 
2. Going Concern Concept - Under normal circumstances, 
accounting assumes that the business entity will exist for an 
indefinite period into the future. This eliminates the need to 
constantly compute the worth of the company as if it were to be 
liquidated, and instead concentrate on measuring performance by 
estimating the value of production. Market values of machinery 
and resources acquired, but not yet consumed are ignored since 
resale value is not important. Their value to the firm is through 
the creation of future output. 
3. Cost Concept - Since the Going Concern Concept elimi-
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nates the need to value the resources of a company at their 
going market price, the books of the company will record their 
worth at initial cost. This value is never changed to reflect 
market influences, (unless the Conservatism Convention is applied 
when market value is below cost). Therefore, the dollar amounts 
on the books of business should not be confused with the actual 
value of the company's holdings. Some resources such as cash or 
securities that could rapidly be disposed of will have a book 
value very close to market value. However, items such as land or 
equipment may be shown at values considerably below their worth 
in the market place. 
The Cost Concept serves to remove subjective influences in 
evaluating the company. Two people may disagree widely on the 
value of a piece of property. By using original cost, a consis-
tent measure is obtained. 
4. The Money Measurement Concept - Closely allied to the 
Cost Concept is the Money Measurement Concept -- accounting 
records only include factors that can be expressed in monetary 
terms. Thus, a large number of diverse aspects of the firm can 
be reduced to a common denominator and added, subtracted or com-
pared. 
Since accounting records only reflect things that have 
monetary value, they will not disclose factors that cannot be 
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expressed in dollars. The accounts will not show potential 
contracts, the health of a crucial officer or internal manage-
ment conflicts. 
5. The Dual-Aspect Concept - The tangible and intangible 
resources of a business are its "assets". Claims against the 
business and its assets are called "equities", perhaps because 
they are often enforced in courts of Equity. The equities are 
divided into the claims of creditors -- "Liabilities" and the 
claims of the owners -- "Owners' Equity" (called Shareholders' 
Equity in a Corporation). The claims of the creditors have first 
priority, with the owners being entitled to everything that is 
left. Since the creditors' and owners' claim all the assets and 
since claims cannot exceed the assets, the Dual-Aspect Concept 
can be stated as: 
ASSETS = EQUITIES = LIABILITIES + OWNERS' EQUITY 
The true implication of the concept is perhaps more clearly shown 
by rewriting this equation as: 
OWNERS' EQUITY = ASSETS - LIABILITIES 
The owners are entitled to what is left of the assets after 
creditors' claims are satisfied. 
Since any change in assets must be accompanied by a similar 
and offsetting change in the equities, the assets and equities 
are said to "balance." This balance is shown by the "Balance 
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Sheet". 
THE BALANCE SHEET 
The balance sheet is the basic accounting report of a 
business entity showing the financial status of the firm at a 
given point in time. Every accounting transaction can be reported 
as a change of the balance sheet. Figure I shows the form of a 
typical although simplified, balance sheet for a small corpora-
tion. The categories are defined as follows: 
Assets 
Earlier, we defined an asset as being a tangible or intan-
gible resource of a business. For an asset to qualify as a 
balance sheet entity, it must also have value, be owned by the 
business, and have been acquired at some measurable cost. Assets 
are categorized as: 
1. Current Assets - Used to designate cash and other 
resources reasonably expected to be either consumed, sold or 
converted to cash during the normal accounting period -- usually 
one year. The most common items are: 
Cash: Funds available for immediate disbursement without 
restriction. 
Marketable Securities: Investments which can be readily 
sold and will be disposed of during the coming year. They are 
normally the types of short-term investments used to earn 
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FIGURE 1 
TECH AIRWAYS INC. 
Balance Sheet as of June 30, 1972 
ASSETS EQUITIES 
Accounts Receivable 
Inventory 
prepaid Expenses 
Total Current Assets 
Fixed Assets: 
Land, Buildings and 
Equipment 
Total Fixed Assets 
Other Assets: 
Investments 
Intangibles 
Total Assets 
Accrued Expenses 
Deferred Income 
Total Current Liabilities 
Other Liabilities: 
Bonds Payable 
Total Other Liabilities 
Stockholders' Equity: 
Common Stock 
Retained Earnings 
Capi tal Surplus 
Total Equities 
interest on cash not immediately needed for business purposes. 
Accounts Receivable: Money owned to the business and 
expected to be collected. The money is u.suall", owed by customers, 
but it could be o~ed by employees or others. Where a note or 
other writing has been executed in conjunction with the trans-
action, it would appear under a separate category -- Notes 
Receivable. 
Inventory: Inventory items are tangible personal property 
which is either held for sale in the ordinary course of business 
or is somewhere in the production process and will be converted 
into such goods. For example, aircraft awaiting delivery or on 
the production line would be intentory, as would stocks of sheet 
metal or rivets. But if the manufacturer uses one of those planes 
as a corporate aircraft, it is no longer an inventory item, but 
a fixed asset since it is actually used by the business. 
Prepaid Expenses: These are often intangible assests such 
as insurance policies, which have limited life. Once paid, they 
represent value to the company. Normally, the item will be 
totally consumed within three to five years at most, and some-
times sooner. An example of a prepaid expense that is tangible 
would be heating oil purchased for the coming winter. 
2. Fixed Assets - Fixed assets are tangible resources 
with a relatively long life expectancy. These are usually 
resources used in the production process such as land, buildings 
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and equipment. Fixed assets (except land) are gradually reduced 
in value through ware or obsolescence. However, they are still 
shown on the books at their cost with a separate entry made to 
show the depreciation or loss of value since acquisition. This 
concept will be discussed in more detail in a later section. 
Note that an asset which has a potentially long life that 
is held for resale is not a fixed asset but an inventory item and 
would be listed under current assets. 
3. Other Assets - All other assets are placed in this 
section. Two major categories are investments and intangible 
assets. Depending on the policy of the firm, these items could 
be account groupings on the balance sheet, but here we have 
listed them as classes of Other Assets. 
Investments: Long-term holdings of securities, deposits, 
etc. that are not to be coverted back to cash within the year 
(unlike Marketable Securities which will be converted). 
Intangibles: Includes patents, copyrights, licenses or 
goodwill. In keeping with our basic definition of an asset, they 
must have value, be owned and have been acquired at a measurable 
cost. Therefore, goodwill that a company builds up through its 
own operations is not entered on the balance sheet. Only goodwill 
acquired through the purchase of another firm can be listed. 
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Eguities 
The equities of a firm are of two types -- "Liabilities" and 
"Owners' Equity." In a corporation, Owners' Equity is called 
stockholders' Equity. 
1. Current Liabilities - Like Current Assets, Current 
Liabilities refer to short-term transactions. This includes 
long-term liabilities that will mature in the coming year as well 
as obligations arising from the operations of the business. The 
major accounts are: 
Accounts payable: The claims of suppliers, creditors and 
others are recorded in this account. These claims are usually 
unsecured. If there is a note or other written evidence of the 
claim, it would be listed under "Notes payable" or a similarly 
titled account. 
Estimated Taxes: Since taxes can be a relatively large 
account, they are listed separately. It is shown as an estimate 
since the exact amount may not be known at the time the balance 
sheet is prepared. 
Accrued Expenses: This account represents obligations 
incurred by the firm but not yet paid (such as wages owed for 
work performed). If there is an invoice submitted, or other 
tangible evidence of the debt, it would be listed under Accounts 
payable instead of here. 
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Deferred Income: If the company has received payments in 
advance, it is under an obligation to perform its part of the 
bargain or repay the advance. Therefore, such sums are shown as 
a Current Liability until the obligation is fulfilled. 
2. Other Liabilities - These are long-term liabilities of 
the firm (such as bonds) which will not come due in the next 
year. 
3. Stockholders' Equity - All the resources left after the 
liabilities are satisfied equal the Stockholders' Equity. This 
is sometimes called the residual interest, since the owners only 
get what remains after the interests of the creditors have been 
covered. 
Capital stock: In a corporation, the shares of ownership 
have an initial value called the "stated value" that represents 
either the price at which it was sold or a "par value" established 
in advance, or some other value reasonably fixed by the board of 
directors of the firm. The total represents the paid-in interest 
of the owners. (This is not necessarily related to the market 
value of the stock which is determined by owners selling their 
interests to new owners on the open market.) 
Retained Earnings: If the company has profitable operations, 
it has "earnings". These are either paid out to shareholders as 
dividends or retained by the company for corporate uses. The 
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difference between the total earnings of a company from the date 
of incorporation to the date of the balance sheet and all dividends 
ever paid is shown in the retained earnings account. If this 
difference is negative, it is called a "deficit". 
Capital Surplus: Sometimes the Owners' Equity is changed 
by transactions unrelated to the company's operations. Perhaps 
a town interested in attracting new business donates land for a 
site. The value of the land is shown in the Capital Surplus 
Account. 
EXAMPLE 
Andy Aviator has established Tech Airways Inc. to operate an 
air-taxi service. The corporation has authorized the issuance of 
100,000 shares of common stock at a par value of $1 per share. 
Only 10,000 shares have actually been issued, all purchased by 
Andy for $10,000. Figure 2 shows the balance sheet at this time. 
Andy's first step as president and general manager is to buy 
a plane for $60,000. He uses $5,000 of the cash as a down pay-
ment and finances the remaining $55,000 through a $5,000 short-
term note and a long-term $50,000 mortgage on the aircraft. 
Figure 3 shows the balance sheet after these transactions. 
Since the remaining $5,000 cash is not sufficient to start 
operations, Andy decides to issue bonds for $20,000 and issue 
another 10,000 shares of stock. He finds a friend who is will-
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FIGURE 2 
TECH AIRWAYS INC. 
Balance Sheet as of June 30, 1972 
ASSETS EQUITIES 
Current Assets: Current Liabilities: 
Fixed Assets: Other Liabilities: 
Other Assets: Stockholders' Equity: 
(ASSETS ($10,000) = EQUITIES ($10,000)) 
FIGURE 3 
TECH AIRWAYS INC. fe-It, , 
Balance Sheet as of ~ 1972 
ASSETS EQUITIES 
Current Assets: 
-r ')',,"0 In"" 1\4t< 
$' ~ <a -I 'oil, .. 0 /fIfnfil~ ~uu - 'lo, ... ;j"'p(",,(: 
Current Liabilities: 
Cash 
Fixed Assets: 
Other Assets: 
, s; tmJ 
Total Current Assets ~ 
Total Assets 
~'~m> 
(ASSETS ~ = 
Other Liabilities: 
stockholders's Equity: 
Common Stock $10,000 
TcIt./ Slodthole/u': 4"'" ffi", Il1n 
Total Equities ~O,Oe6 
dU;_ 
EQUITIES~ 
ing to pay $1.50 per share for 5,000 shares, and Andy himself 
buys the other 5,000 at the same price. Andy uses $10,000 to 
buy fuel, $5,000 for a two-year insurance policy, and $5,000 to 
purchase a selection of snacks to be sold on board to passengers. 
Andy invests the remainder of the new capital in government 
short-term bonds since it is not presently needed to cover 
operational costs. Figure 4 reflects the effects of these trans-
actions on the balance sheet. 
Tech airways is now ready to start operations. Pete pilot 
is hired as chief pilot, and flys 5 flights carrying 15 passengers 
over the next few weeks. Ten of the passengers pay cash for a 
total of $5,000, and 5 charge their tickets to Diner's Press Cards 
for $250. One of the passengers pays $50 for a return flight he 
has not yet taken. In addition, pete sold $100 worth of snacks 
for $200. 
$300 worth of fuel is used during these operations, and 
Pete's salary for the period is $250 which has not yet been paid. 
(See Figures 5 and 6) 
Tech Airways operates profitably. By June. of the following 
year, its balance sheet looks like Figure 7. 
Since there is a healthy cash balance, Tech Airways pays off 
the $5,000 note. Andy also decides that the company should buy 
out Avonic Airways, its only competitor for $25,000--$10,000 in 
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FIGURE 4 
TECH AIRWAYS INC. 
~.Iy 9 
Balance Sheet as of-J~ly 5~ 1972 
ASSETS EQUITIES 
------------------------------------------- -----------------------------------------------
Current Assets: Current Liabilities: 
Cash $ 5, 000 + '2o,,,"c t- fk,J., 
r Ir", If1If) /t:- S-Iock 
M,,./(ej,Me S~C ur;fies I J, _ - f' 10, olJrJ ,/wl 
Inventory (S.""ks) s; - - $' r,- rt' AMacl{,. 
P.Hf4-I 'd CK/,t-uStS - Q 0;""0 1:' ;,.....~ 
-I~.t /0, (;Vf) - t IS; IJUD ?"i .41!~ 
f"'f"''''~ r; /II1't> - I' 0; 1Jr>~ (]",.~ 
Total Current Assets $5,999 
1f f oJ i!V'" 
-
Fixed Assets: 
1 Airplane $60,000 
Total Fixed Assets $60,000 
Other Assets: 
J> / /JI), we 
Total Assets $65,OQQ-
-; ;-;0, no 
(ASSETs... ($65,croO) = 
Notes Payable $5,000 
Total Current Liabilities 
Other Liabilities: 
Aircraft Mortgage $50,000 
1J",.t. Owt~r.,.J.';'J $ 2." IO()O 
Total Other Liabilities 
stockholders' Equity: 
,f 2.0, (WO 
Common stock $~ 
(!4f,tAI JW/.fJ~ .r:; otJ1) 
Total Stockholder Equity 
Total Equities 
, IOD, !>DD 
EQUITIES (~) 
$5,000 
.f;tS; ODO 
$.JJl.,-6'O"5 
J{J 100. out> 
w)eo~ 
FIGURE 5 
TECH AIRWAYS INC. 
J.Jy)'1 
Balance Sheet as of J~ 1972 
ASSETS EQUITIES 
Current Assets: 
Cash 
AU/ll<Mr; _-"M~f'rketable Securities 
~cei"""/e Inventory (Snacks) 
.fZS'D prepaid Expenses 
fuel 
insurance 
T; 561> -f},.", It;:.",,, 
$ 5, 000 +~a> J~.ds 
15,000 =Cod,d"7.D 
~~ If,.t,,> 
~ 'l,7fJO 
5,000 
Current Liabilities: 
Notes Payable $ 5,000 
~~rM<td [?<J>- (tJ4/4IIJt) 2ro 
])et(M&/ l~d>O<.. (l1dv4-o<~.t.S4k).ro 
Total Current Assets 
, S,3eo 
Total Current Liabilities $ ~O 
Fixed Assets: 
Airplane $60,000 
Total Fixed Assets $60,000 
Other Assets: 
TOtal Assets 
., IDC,SS'D 
(ASSETS ($.lOQ,9e'O) = 
Other Liabilities: 
Aircraft Mortgage $50,000 
Bonds Outstanding 20,000 
Total Other Liabilities 
stockholders' Equity: 
Cormnon Stock 
Capi tal Surplus 
i?eft;.;"e.< {a/lMi"S" 
$20,000 
5,000 
" 1..~ 
Equity Total stockholder's 
Total Equities 
., /QD. S'S'o 
EQUITIES ($a99.BBO)) 
$ 70.000 
if .tS'. 2£~ $ ;;j§,ee~ 
., 100. S'S'o 
$~.-oOB-
ASSETS 
Current Assets: 
Cash 
Marketable Securities 
Accounts Receivable 
Inventory (Snacks) 
prepaid Expenses 
fuel 
insurance 
Total Current Assets 
Fixed Assets: 
Airplane 
Total Fixed Assets 
Other Assets: 
Total Assets 
FIGURE 6 
TECH AIRWAYS INC. 
Balance Sheet as of July 21, 1972 
$ 5,700 
15,000 
250 
4,900 
9,700 
5,000 
$60,000 
$ 40,550 
$ 60,000 
$100,550 
EQUITIES 
Current Liabilities: 
Notes Payable $ 
Accrued Expenses 
Deferred Income 
5,000 
250 
50 
Total Current Liabilities 
Other Liabilities: 
Aircraft Mortgage $50,000 
Bonds Outstanding 20,000 
Total Other Liabilities 
Stockholders' Equity: 
Common Stock 
Retained Earnings 
Capi tal Surplus 
20,000 
250 
5,000 
Total Stockholder's Equity 
TOtal Equity 
(ASSETS ($100,550) = EQUITIES ($100,550)) 
$ 5,300 
$ 70,000 
$ 25,250 
$100,550 
IV 
0 
FIGURE 7 
TECH AIRWAYS INC. 
Balance Sheet as of June I, 1973 
ASSETS EQUITIES 
Current Assets: 
Cash $ 74,500 
Marketable Securities 15,000 
Accounts Receivable 25,000 
Inventory 5,000 
Prepaid Expenses 
fuel 20,000 
insurance 5,000 
Total CurrentAssets $144,500 
Fixed Assets: 
Airplane 60,000 
Total Fixed Assets $ 60,000 
Other Assets: 
Total Assets $204,500 
(ASSETS ($204,500) = 
Current Liabilities: 
Notes payable $5,000 
Accrued Expenses 2,000 
Deferred Income 2,500 
Total Current Assets 
Other Liabilities: 
Aircraft Mortgage $50,000 
Bonds outstanding 20,000 
Total Other Liabilities 
Stockholder~' Equity: 
Common stock $ 20,000 
Retained Earnings 100,000 
Capital Surplus 5,000 
Total stockholders Equity 
Total Equities 
EQUITIES ($204,500) 
$ 9,500 
$ 70,000 
$125,000 
$204,500 
cash and $15,000 in stock at the stated par value of $1.00 per 
share. Avonic has assets of 1 airplane worth $10,000 and a 
$10,000 hanger. The extra $5,000 paid is for the goodwill Avonic 
has gained by its record of service (See Figure 8). 
Tech Airways, Inc. still looks profitable. with the end of 
the year approaching, Andy estimates Tech Airway's tax liability, 
based on projected operations and $6,000 depreciation on the 
first aircraft. The short-term bonds are sold to increase cash. 
Since a year of the prepaid insurance has been used up, its 
value is decreased on the balance sheet. Since prospects for 
the company are still bright, a $1 per share dividend is paid to 
build stockholder confidence. (See Figure 9). 
Because of his huge success, Andy decides he wants to become 
a regularly scheduled interstate carrier and applys and receives 
a Civil Aeronautics Board Certificate of Public Convenience and 
Necessity. If Andy receives the certificate he will have to 
comply with CAB reporting requirements. Figure 10 shows the 
balance sheet accounts used by the Board and published in Title 
14, Part 241 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). The 
details of this document can be found in the CFR where each 
Account Grouping and each Account is described in great detail. 
Figure 11 shows a typical Balance Sheet for an airline, as 
published in its annual report. Although it follows the C.A.B. 
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FIGURE 8 
TECH AIRWAYS INC. 
J"u.t<e IS" 
Balance Sheet as of .:tIme "1. 1973 
ASSETS EQUITIES 
Current Assets: 
Cash 
Marketable Securities 
Accounts Receivable 
Inventory 
Prepaid Expenses 
fuel 
insurance 
Total Current Assets 
Fixed Assets: 
Airplane 
Ih/t/'l .... e 
~au 
Total Fixed Assets 
other Assets: 
Total Assets 
20.000 
5.000 
$60.000 
/0. ~tJ 
'/J~.~oo 
$].41. sea 
/0, no ,f 80. IJr)D 
$ I'jQ,886 
IS, no 
---
~ :; If. S {)'O 
$~O 
Q ;. If, ! tro 
(ASSETS (~) = 
Current Liabilities: 
No1ses payai31e $ §, 000 
Accrued Expense 2.000 
Deferred Income 2.500 
Total Current Assets 
other Liabilities: 
Aircraft Mortgage $50.000 
Bonds outstanding 20.000 
Total Other Liabilities 
Stockholders' Equity:,t]S'.-, 
Common Stock $ 28.000 
Retained Earnings 100.000 
Capital Surplus 5.000 
Total Stockholders Equity 
Total Equities 
Q ~ If, S" ,,0 
EQUITIES (~;smJ1) 
$ 70.000 
~ lifo. ".-0 
$ .. 25.00-0 
.¥' ~11f) S' IJ'O 
$~iSO"O 
FIGURE 9 
TECH AIRWAYS INC. 
10 
Balance Sheet as of June.-J-5'", 1973 
ASSETS 
Current Assets: -;- '11; MD jl!/fIft S~eM.:A.. 
Cash $59,500 -/J$,c"" ()i",'dAA 
~fi~aH~"k~e~te;a:tl"'~lbee-9Seeee'=!lt:l:rl:"ii:'i:t~i:'l!!e~sr--:l~5;-,,.,0&0&0&- = ~ f, S"., c...~ 
Accounts Receivable, 25,000 
Inventory 5,000 
Prepaid Expense 
Fuel 
Insurance 
TOtal Current Assets 
Fixed Assets: 
Airplane(De,wuc,,;r.,;, f,,_) 
Airplane 
Hanger 
Total Fixed Assets 
Other Assets: 
Goodwill 
20,000 
",06012",,0 
"{'f, opr> 
$68,888 
10,000 
10,000 
$ 5,000 
,f 91,(7fTV 
$129,506 
IY '/ f, I"'" 
$80,Oae 
EQUITIES 
Current Liabilities: 
Accrued Expenses 
Deferred Income 
(,ofi ... ",'iu -r /Ioflu 
$ 2,000 
2,500 
" I( C I ttC"f) 
Total Current Liabilities 
Other Liabilities: 
Aircraft Mortgage 
Bonds Outstanding 
$50,000 
20,000 
Total Other Liabilities 
Stockholders' Equity: 
Common Stock $ 35,000 
$ 
$ 70,000 
Retained Earnings ±ef}-;-et)t) IY 1'".:>0 
Total Other Assets 
Total Assets 
$ 5,000 
$' 171, eM 
$ ft4';-500-
, nl, (J#J 
(ASSETS ($214,506) = 
Capital Surplus 5,000 
Total Stockholders' Equity 
Total Equities 
.f'I7I,_ 
EQUITIES ($~14,500») 
II ,6, rc-v 
$1-49,G09-
4' 111, """" $214,50Q. 
FtGURE 10 
-Curren; ~cts: 
Title 14-Chapter iI 
BALANCE SHEET CLASSIFICATIONS 
Section 3-Chart of Balance Sheet Accounts 
NaOle of accoup.t 
C ~811 •• ___ • _ ••••• _ ••• ____ • ___________________ • _______________________ • _____ • ______ -_.-
Sj)('ci:lj d~'posits ___ •• __ ._. ____________________________________________ n_. ___________ _ 
"t' nit ~,d 8t rites Government securltics _________________________________ ••• ------. -_. ---
ulllrr t ..... rupor:1J'y c,'lsh inv('~tmclll5 ____________ • ________________________ ••••••• _____ e. 
.... !; ~OllnlS rcc~ i~3 hl,,-v,S. Government. _______________________ •••• ____ ".-_. _ •. - .• _ •• 
A(,COlllll s reeci vu bl('-forcil:1l {!O vrrnm{mts ______________ .. __ 0_ ."' ________ -------- -- .•• 
.... CC'Ollnt S recei V:l b l{'-S""ncrtl I trll mc_. ___ ._ •.•• __ . ___ •••• _ • __ •••••• _._ ••••• _ .. --.-.• - •• 
X 0; ~s :J.lld .:Icconnts rCelli ... ,\ blc-9.3sociated com pnnles. __ ••• _._. __ •• _ ••••••••••. ______ _ 
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Balance Sheet Oecember 31, 19$8 whh comparatlw IJgureI for 1987 
Assala 
Current 8889IS: 
Cash 
United Slales GOVfIrnment and olher sec:urltles , 
Accounts receivable: 
United Stales Government 
Airline IraHlc , 
Qlnar, net _ 
Total accounts recelvlible • 
Spare parts and supplies, at average cosl. 
Prepaid expenses. .. • • • 
Total current ElS$ets • 
Inve:;tments and special lunda: 
Advance payments on equipment pUrchase contracla (note 5) , 
Investment in subsidiaries and afliUales, at coal. 
Other Investments and deposits. . . . • 
Total imreslments snd spacial wl\ds 
Property and equipment, at cOst (note 1): 
Flight equipment . . • , . • , 
Less accumulated depreciation 
Flight equipment, net . 
Other property and equipment • • 
less accumulated depreciation 
Other property and equipment, nat. 
Cor.slNclion In progress • • , • 
Net property and equipment 
Cere,'red charges: 
C::Ontrlbulion to the development of supersonic 
a:reraft, nel of amortization, $600,000 
OIM, •. ,.",. 
Total deterred ch.arllaa. • , 
1088 1967 
• 17,063,705 $ 12,463,157 
2,019,632 16,766,068 
5,268,613 6,431,548 
14.405,401 11,123,574 
2,564,214 
22,238,228 
11,602,801 8,608,378 
3,014,443 928,766 
55,938,809 58.742.399 
14,439,276 32,899,273 
3,984,760 3,540,310 
2,010,427 1~99,558 
20,434,463 37,839,141 
323,554,928 208,117,681 
58.690,271 37,984,497 
264,864,651 170,753,184 
47,420.872 29,012,781 
13,593,176 10,836,234 
33,827,496 18,176,547 
935,558 5,"5,7'2 
299,627,711 194,045,443 
2,400,000 
'.125,935 504,250 
3,525,935 604,250 
$379,526,918 $291 ,231 ~33 
FIGURE 11 
Uabilitiea and Stockholder.' EquIty 
Current UabUltles: 
Long-term debt, portion due within one year, 
Accounts payable: 
General 
Airline tralfic . 
Transportatlon taxes and payroll deductions 
TOlal accounts payable. 
Accrued liabilities, 
Federal Income tal«lS 
Unearned transportation revenUQ 
Total current liabilities • 
Long-term debt, leB9 portion due within one year (note 2) 
Reserves for overhaul of flight equipment, net . 
Deferred Income taxes, 
Unamortized investment tax crad1ts (note 3). , 
Other deferred credits and non-current lIabillUea • 
Stockholders' equity: 
Common stock of $0.50 par value per share, 
Authorized 15,000,000 shares: issued 10,050,867 
shares, 1968; 10,015,901 shares, 1967 (noles 2 and 4) 
Capital In excess of par value, • , 
Retained earnings (note 2). . . . 
Total slockholders' eqUity • 
1968 
$ 22,694,131 
10,532,205 
8,384,589 
2,831.582 
21.748.376 
5,259,556 
690,635 
1,385,399 
51,778,097 
219,832,298 
8,607,338 
10,340,723 
9,737,975 
1,400,862 
5,025,434 
19,2<12,794 
53,401,397 
",629,625 
$379,526,918 
1967 
S 9,131,722 
11,584.054 
7,491,016 
1.499.621 
20.574.691 
4,278,505 
486,549 
785,320 
35258,767 
151,285,390 
7,395.223 
6,639,408 
",061,076 
1,467,793 
5,007,953 
18.848,260 
~137,353 
78,143,566 
5291.231 ,233 
classifications, the accounts have been condensed for ease of 
reading by the stockholders. 
THE INCOME STATEMENT 
Before the Income Statement can be explained, a few more 
accounting concepts must be mentioned. 
The Accounting Period 
The Balance Sheet reflects the status of a business at a 
point in time. Balance Sheets are prepared on a periodic basis, 
usually once per year. This is called the Accounting Period. 
The Income Statement reports flows during the Accounting Period 
rather than status at a point in time. Since management needs 
information updated more frequently than annually, there may be 
"interim" reports prepared at the required time intervals. 
The Accrual Concept 
Income is associated with a change in Stockholders' Equity 
and not necessarily with changes in the cash account of the 
business. In our earlier example, one of the transactions was 
the sale of $100 worth of snacks for $200. Since the business 
did not incur additional liability by the sale, the changes in 
assets must be balanced by changes in the stockholders' Equity. 
When the Cash Account is increased by $200, stockholders' Equity 
is increased by the same amount. Likewise, stockholders' Equity 
- 26 -
is decreased by $100 to offset the removal of $100 worth of goods 
from the Inventory Account. 
Any increase in the Stockholders' Equity from the operation 
of the business is called "revenue." Any decrease is an "expense". 
"Income" is the excess of revenue over expenses. If expenses are 
greater than revenue there is a "loss". The sale of the snacks 
thus represented $200 of revenue, $100 worth of expenses and $100 
income. The cash change and the income are not the same. 
1. Expense vs. Expenditure - An Expenditure occurs when an 
asset is obtained either by the payment of cash, by the exchange 
of another asset or by the assumption of an additional liability. 
An Expense arises when an asset is used up and reflects a corres-
ponging decrease in Stockholders' Equity. When $5,000 cash is 
used to purchase an inventory of snacks, there is an "Expenditure" 
of one asset for another cash for inventory. There is no 
"Expense" since there is no change in equity. When $100 worth of 
snacks are removed from inventory, there is no "Expenditure" 
since no new asset is acquired. However, there is an "Expense" 
since the decrease in assets must be reflected by a decrease in 
Stockholders' Equity Account. 
2. Revenue vs. Receipts - A "Revenue" arises when Stock-
holders' Equity increases. A "Receipt" occurs when one asset is 
received in place of another. When an air ticket is sold on 
- 27 - ~JD 
credit, Accounts Receivable are increased. This is a "Revenue" 
since stockholders' Equity is increased by a corresponding 
amount. When the obligation is paid, there is a "Receipt" but 
no "Revenue" since equity stays the same. The only transaction 
is an increase in Cash offset by a decrease in Accounts payable. 
The Accrual Concept holds that income is measured as the 
difference between revenues and expenses and not between receipts 
and expenditures. 
The Realization Concept 
The Realization Concept is closely connected with the 
Actual Concept. Broadly stated, a revenue is recognized when it 
is realized, that is when the product is delivered or the service 
performed. The revenue and expense accounts are updated, not 
when the contract is signed or the goods manufactured, but when 
the actual transfer of value takes place. 
Since the Accrual Concept requires revenues and expenses to 
be compared, expenses are recognized in the same accounting 
period that the revenue arises. (The Matching principle) Thus, 
the costs of manufacturing an item for inventor~ are not expenses 
until the item is sold. They are then recorded as "Cost of Goods 
Sold. " 
Some expenses cannot be connected to a particular revenue 
transaction. These are entered into the accounts during the 
- 28 -
period when they are incurred--which is not necessarily when 
they are actually paid for. 
Figures 12 and 13 demonstrate these principles. In the 
first transaction, goods manufactured in January are sold on 
credit in February, and actually paid for in March. Following 
the principles outlined, all bookkeeping entries are made in 
February, the month when the goods were transferred. 
In the second case (Figure 13), the goods are paid for in 
advance in January, and manufactured in February. But all 
bookkeeping entries are made in March when actual transfer takes 
place. 
The Income statement 
The Income statement (or Profit and Loss statement or 
statement of Earnings) reports on the revenues and expenses 
~hich have accrued during the accounting period. Normally, the 
preceeding year's information is also given for comparison 
purposes. Figure 14 sho~s a sample of a carrier statement of 
Earnings from an annual report. Like the Balance Sheet sho~ 
in Figure 11, the major categories follow the civil Aeronautics 
Board regulations, but the subaccounts have been condensed and 
show less detail than the statements filed with the Board. 
- 29 - 3JOl 
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ACCRUAL CONCEPT 
JAN. 
GOODS MANUFACTURED 
Figure 12 
FEB. MARCH 
GOODS SOLD ON CREDIT CREDIT PAID 
/ V 
REVENUE ACCOUNTED FOR 
IN FEBRUARY (ACCRUAL 
CONCEPT) 
l~ 
EXPENSES ACCOUNTED FOR 
IN FEBRUARY (MATCHING 
PRINCIPLE) 
Figure 13 
ACCRUAL CONCEPT 
JAN. FEB. MARCH 
CASH PAID IN ADVANCE GOODS MANUFACTURED GOODS DELIVERED 
~ 
~ ~ REVENUE ACCOUNTED FOR IN MARCH (ACCRUAL CONCEPT) ~ 
EXPENSES ACCOUNTED FOR 
IN MARCH (MATCHING 
PRINCIPLE) 
Figure 14 
Continental Air Lines, Inc. 
Statement of Earnings· 
Year ended December 31, 1968 with comparative figures for 1967 
Operating revenues: 
P<'$§enger 
Mail 
Express , 
Freight 
Excess baggage 
Aircraft interchange rentals, net, 
Charter and contract services, , 
Miscellaneous, net . . . . . 
Total operating revenue 
Operating expenses: 
Flying operations, 
Ground operations 
Maintenance and repairs, 
Passenger service 
Reservations and sales. 
Advertising and publicity 
General and administrative 
Depreciation and amortization 
Total operating expenses, 
Operating income 
Non-operating expenses and income: 
Interest expense , , , , , , 
Other, net 
.' 
Total non-operating expenses and income 
Earnings before Federal and State 
income taxes and extraordinary items, 
Federal and State income taxes 
Earnings before extraordinary items • 
Extraordinary items - gains on major dispositions 
of flight equipment, less income taxes, $2,329,407 
Net earnings , , • • • 
Net earnings per share of common stock: 
Before extraordinary items 
Extraordinary items 
Total, , . , , 
.. 
- 32 -
1968 1967 
$138,769,984 $107,101,678 
2,689,949 2,155,930 
713,711 683,806 
6,354,749 5,038,256 
266,140 178,655 
45,200 
57,865,758 71,263,689 
1,534,240 1,700,627 
208,194,591 188,167,841 
54,410,014 44,367,712 
23,174,429 20,083,117 
37,045,607 31,081,921 
21,662,004 17,995,883 
10,922,710 8,204,667 
8,397,102 5,017,587 
9,262,464 8,004,931 
28,367,869 21,028,121 
193,242,199 155,783,939 
14,952,392 32,383,902 
10,129,202 6,208,524 
(275,598) (327,624) 
9,853,604 5,880,900 
5,098,788 26,503,002 
, 966,684 11,572,061 
4,132,104 14,930,941 
2,376,466 
$ 4,132,104 $ 17,307,407 
$0.41 $1.49 
0,24 
$0.41 $1.73 
~J5 
FUNDS FLOW STATEMENTS 
Funds can be defined in general terms as economic values, 
or in specific terms as cash. The latter is a subset of the 
former. The balance sheet shows the financial position of the firm 
at a gross point in time and reflects the firm's investments 
(assets) and the claims against it (equities). In general the 
assets side of the balance sheet shows how funds have been used, 
while the equities side refelcts their source. 
The Funds Flow Concept 
An understanding of the flow of funds through the business 
enterprise is essential to sound financial management and proper 
allocation of available resources. The financial manager must 
,know where he can obtain funds on the best terms and how to 
allocate them within his company to maximize the return on the 
investment. 
The process of funds flow analysis compares two successive 
balance sheets. The differences between individual accounts 
shows the flows of funds resulting from management decisions. 
Analysis will indicate where management has decided to connect 
funds (uses), to liquidate assets (sources), to acquire additional 
funds (sources), and to reduce claims against the firm (uses). 
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Circulating Capital and Working Capital 
Figure 15 shows day to day cycle of funds flow in a company. 
Sales are made from inventory. In return, the company receives 
either a direct cash payment, or extends credit which is shown 
as an addition to Accounts Receivable. In turn, the company 
buys supplies to produce more inventory. It makes cash payments 
or shows its debts in Accounts payable. Eventually, cash trans-
fers occur that close out either Accounts Receivable or payable. 
This process is on a continuous state of flux. For some 
purposes, it is easier to lump current assets and current liabil-
ities and refer to these accounts as the "Circulating Capital" 
of the firm. The difference between the current assets and 
current liabilities of the firm is referred to as "Working Capital" 
and is an important indicator of the firm's ability to meet short 
term obligations. 
Cash Flow Statement 
A Cash Flow Statement is a detailed breakdown of the changes 
in Working Capital. In particular, it concentrates on those 
transactions that affect the Cash Account. Figure 16 shows these 
various transactions grouped as operational transactions that 
arise from the day to day business; financial transactions that 
raise funds and retire debts; and other transactions. The latter 
includes discretionary transactions not necessary to the operation 
or regular finances of the firm. 
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The Funds Flow statement 
The Funds Flow Statement concentrates on the sources and 
uses of capital in a more aggregate sense. Rather than concen-
trating on fluctuations in working capital, it reflects changes 
in long term capital commitments in both the assets and equities 
of the firm. Only the net change in working capital over the 
accounting period is shown. 
Figure 17 shows a typical funds flow statement. Sources 
of funds corne from increase in equities, (e.g., issue of new 
stock) or decreases in assets (e.g., depreciation). The uses of 
funds decrease equities (e.g., retirement of bonds), or increase 
assets (e.g., purchase of aircraft). since the dual aspect 
concept requires assets and equities to balance, sources must 
equal uses, or 
Equity Increases + Asset Decreases = Equity Decreases + Asset 
Increases 
Figure 18 diagrams the Funds Flow concept. 
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FIGURE 17 
ABC INC. 
FUNDS FLOW STATEMENT 
w 
(Xl 
~ 
9.:> 
-
YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 1972 
SOURCES OF FUNDS: 
NET INCOME 
ADD BACK: DEPRECIATION 
FUNDS FROM OPERATIONS 
CAPITAL STOCK ISSUED 
BONDS ISSUED 
TOTAL FUNDS ACQUIRED 
USES OF FUNDS: 
PURCHASE OF HANGER 
PURCHASE OF AIRCRAFT 
RETIREMENT OF BONDS 
CASH DIVIDENDS PAID 
NET ADDITION TO WORKING CAPITAL 
$ 20,000 
6,000 
26,000 
20,000 
10,000 
$56,000 
$10,000 
10,000 
10,000 
10,000 
16,000 
$56,000 
SCHEDULE OF WORKING CAPITAL CHANGES 
1971 1972 INCREASE 
(DECREASE) 
CURRENT ASSETS 100,000 98,000 (2,000) 
CURRENT LIABILITIES 50,000 32,000 18,000* 
WORKING CAPITAL $16,000 
*NOTE: Since a decrease in liabilities is an increase in working capital, 
it is shown as an increase and not a decrease as it would on a comparative 
balance sheet. 
SOURCES AND USES OF FUNDS 
INTERNAL 
I NVESTfV1ENT 
TAX CREDIT 
LEASE 
FlmDS 
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co 
Sources and uses of funds can be divided into "internal" 
and "external" categories. External transactions affect the 
relationships between the firm and other parties. The firm 
incurs debt from lenders, it makes payments to its shareholders, 
etc. In contrast, internal transactions depend solely on 
management decisions and do not affect liability to outside 
parties. For example, management can decide to use cash to 
purchase assets. This does not affect the external debts of 
the firm. 
Most categories of Figure 18 are self-explanatory. However, 
some need further clarification. 
Internal Sources 
1. Depreciation and Amortization. Many assets are used for 
years after they are paid for. It is common practice to spread the 
cost over the entire lifetime rather than show a one-time large 
expense. In fact, tax laws require a :tong term write off in 
many instances. But, in fact, payment has already been made. So 
when depreciation or amortization appears as an expense, it does 
not actually represent a funds outlay. So these amounts which 
lower accounting income (profits) must be added to other sources 
of funds to see how much is actually available for use. 
figure 17). 
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Depreciation refers to the write off of tangible assets 
such as flight or group equipment, while Amortization applies 
to the write off of intangibles such as pilot training or good 
will. Together, depreciation and amortization amount to almost 
40% of the total financial resources of major u.s. carriers in 
1969. 
The straight-line method is used by almost all of the 
major U.S. airlines to depreciate their flight equipment for 
bookkeeping purposes. The residual value and the period of 
depreciation varies within the range of 10-15% and 10-15 years. 
Recently some of the carriers have increased the depreciable 
life of their flight equipment for several reasons: first, certain 
aircraft have longer useful lives than was first assumed; second, 
an increase in the depreciable life improves reported earnings 
in future years since from an accounting point of view, it costs 
the carrier less to provide the same service; and third, the 
resulting short term higher profits can be offset against the 
carrier's accumulated investment tax credits. 
For tax purposes, major airlines use accelerated depreciation 
in their accounting for the Internal Revenue Service. A typical 
accelerated depreciation is the double declining balance method. 
The carriers depreciate their assets over 8 years to a 5% residual 
value. During the early years, a greater proportion of the 
asset is expended on the books kept for tax purposes than in 
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those kept for the general operations the stockholders reports, 
which use a straight line method. This insures that the income, 
as reported to IRS, is lower and hence the taxes actually paid 
are less than those stated in the stockholders reports. Later 
on, the trend reverses, and more taxes have to be paid than 
reported to the stockholders. This eventuality is provided for 
by the liability account "deferred taxes." (See figure 19). 
Under this system, a carrier has the use of the cash credited to 
Deferred Taxes until that cash is actually needed. However, 
since fleet acquisition is a continuous process, deferred taxes 
are a relatively permanent source of funds for the industry. 
In cases where there are no before-tax-profits, or actual 
before tax losses, there would be no expense. Consequently 
there would be no difference between publicly reported tax 
payments and actual IRS tax liability. In this case, therefore, 
no deferred tax "source" of funds. Unless there are profits, 
there will be no deferred tax "source." 
(In the case of an actual loss, there could be a tax loss 
credit that could be used to offset future tax liability but 
only if and when there are positive earnings.) In addition to 
tax and internal depreciation methods, a third scheme is imposed 
by the civil Aeronoutics Board for rate-making purposes. When the 
Board computes the rate of return on investment, it uses a straight 
line method to determine the investment value of the equipment 
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(owned by the carrier. Table 1 shows the service life and 
residual values used by the Board). 
2. Investment Tax Credit - The investment tax credit was 
initiated in 1962 to provide an incentive for the industry to 
modernize its facilities through the purchase of capital equip-
ment. Carriers were allowed to claim a tax deduction of up 
to 7% of their investment in qualifying property. The qualifica-
tions were; first, the property had to be tangible, depreciable 
and have a useful life of at least four years; and second, the 
property had to be placed in service during the year in which the 
tax credit was claimed. The credit is 7% on assets with useful 
lives of at least 8 years, 4.7% for assets having useful lives 
of 6 to 7 years, and 2.3% for assets with a 4 to 5 year useful 
life. 
Up until October 10, 1966, when the ITC was suspended for 
5 months, the tax deduction could be used to offset tax liability 
dollar-for-dollar for the first $25,000, but only at 25¢ to the 
dollar above that level. Unused credits could be carried back 3 
years and forward five. On March 10, 1967, the, ITC was restored 
with expanded provisions. Effective January 1, 1968, the limit 
on the amount of tax liability that could be offset above $25,000 
was raised from 25 ~o 50 ¢ on the dollar and the carry-forward 
period was extended to seven years. 
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TABLE 1 
FLIGHT EQUIPMENT DEPRECIATION AND RESIDUAL VALUES 
AS SET BY THE CAB FOR RATE-MAKING PURPOSES 
SERVICE LIFE 
IN YEARS 
TURBO-FAN EQUIPMENT 
4-ENGINE 14 
3-ENGlNE 14 
2-ENGINE 14 
TURBO-JET EQUIPMENT 
4-ENGlNE 10 
2-ENGINE 10 
TURBO-PROP EQUIPMENT 
4-ENGINE 12 
2-ENGINE 10 
WIDE-BODY EQUIPMENT 
4-ENGINE 14 
3-ENGINE 16 
RESIDUAL VALUE AS 
% OF COST 
2 
2 
2 
5 
5 
5 
15 
10 
10 
SOURCE: CAB, "PART 399 - STATEMENTS OF GENERAL POLICY: TREATMENT OF FLIGHT 
EQUIPMENT DEPRECIATION AND RESIDUAL VALUES FOR RATE PURPOSES," APRIL 9, 1971 
There are two options for handling investment tax credits. 
The first is the "flow-through" method that allows the entire 
amount of the credit to be taken in the year the capital expendi-
tures are made. The second is "service-life flow-through" which 
reduces the tax liability over the service lives of the related 
assets. The first method cencentrates the full effect of the 
credit in one year, while the "service-life" method provides 
for a more even distribution. 
The investment tax credit can only be used if there is tax 
liability. Whereas the 25% limitation prevented full utilization 
of the ITC before 1966, in recent years the downward trend in 
profits has limited its usefulness. 
Table 2 summarizes the major internal sources of funds for 
the major u. S. carriers, and their amounts. 
External Sources 
1. Straight Debt - There are four basic types of straight 
debt financing employed by the airlines: long-term notes, sub-
ordinated debentures, revolving credit and equipment installment 
loans. 
1.1 Long Term Notes 
Senior long term notes are by far the most widely used debt 
instruments in the airline industry. They are typically sold to 
institutional investors (banks and insurance companies) and have 
- 46 -
INTERNAL SOURCES OF FUNDS 
MAJOR U.S. AIR CARRIERS - 1969 
SOURCE 
TABLE 2 
FUNDS 
($MILLIONS) 
EARNINGS AFTER TAXES BUT BEFORE ITC 318 
DEPRECIATION & AMORTIZATION 808 
DEFERRED TAXES 341 
INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT 37 
TOTAL 1504 
PERCENTAGE 
21.1 
53.7 
22.7 
2.5 
100.0 
SOURCE: ATA, "MAJOR U. S. AIRLINES, ECONOMIC REVIEW AND FINANCIAL OUTLOOK", 
JUNE, 1969 
maturities of 20 to 40 years. Some of these notes are secured by 
specific equipment pledged as collateral. Holders of unsecured 
notes have priority against unpledged assets of the carrier in 
case of bankruptcy, but no specific assets are mentioned in the 
terms of the loan agreement. All long term notes have indentures 
specifying the details to the financial agreement, and any 
protective covenants that exist. 
1.2. Subordinated Debentures 
A subordinated debenture is an unsecured debt. In the event 
of liquidation, the holder has a claim on the assets left after 
the unsubordinated or seniar debt is satisfied. Banks and 
insurance companies supplying senior debt often require sub-
ordination of other debts in order to protect their investment. 
In contrast to senior debt subordinated debentures are often 
sold in the securities markets in comparatively small denomina-
tions ($1000). 
1.3. Revolving Credit 
Revolving credit loans are short term credit arrangements 
between the carrier and bank or group of banks. The financial 
source guarantees that it will provide up to some amount of 
dollars to the carrier on demand. In return, the carrier may pay 
a basic service charge, or more often, a premium rate for the 
funds it actually uses. 
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1.4. Equipment Installment Loans 
Equipment installment loans are similar to automobile 
financing arrangements. They provide the smallest contribution 
to the air carriers' debt. These notes represent the willingness 
of the various manufacturers to participate in the financing of 
equipment orders and are usually secured by the equipment purchased. 
2. Equity - In equity financing, the carrier sells additional 
shares in its own ownership through the issuance of preferred or 
common stock. 
2.1. Preferred Stock 
Preferred stockholders usually have the first option on 
dividends when available, and a preference over the common share-
holders if the company is liquidated. The disadvantages of 
holding preferred stocks are first, that the dividend, when paid, 
is usually fixed and not proportional to corporate profits: and 
second, that the preferred stock usually has no voting rights. 
Unlike interest payments on debt, preferred stock dividends 
are not deductable from income before taxes which is one reason 
that it is seldom used by airlines today. 
2.2. Common stock 
Common stock offers many advantages as a source of funds. 
First, there are no fixed charges, interest or dividends that 
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must be paid. Second, there is no maturity date when the 
debt must be retired. Third, common stock provides an "equity 
cushion" against losses for senior creditors since it is sub-
ordinate to their claims. Fourth, common stock may be more 
appealing than bonds to certain investor groups, since it has 
the potential of high dividends and rapid appreciation if the 
company is successful. 
The disadvantages are that a new issue of common stock 
further divides ownership in the airline. Second, the new owners 
expect to share in the profits, which can put pressure on manage-
ment to reduce retained earnings by dividend payments. Third, 
the cost of underwriting and distribution common stock is usually 
higher than for an equal dollar amount of bonds. Finally, like 
preferred stock, dividends paid are not deductible from pre-tax 
income. 
3. Convertible Debt - A convertible debenture is a hybrid 
security having characteristics of both straight debt and common 
equity. It is issued as a subordinate debenture carrying a fixed 
interest provision. In addition, the holder is given the option 
of converting his debenture into a specified number of shares of 
the airline's common stock at a specified price (usually consider-
ably above the present market price of the common stock). Because 
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of the conversion privilege with its potential for capital 
appreciation, the bond carries a lower interest rate than compar-
able straight debt obligations. (see Table 3). On the other 
hand, convertible debentures provide greater present income and 
security than common stock. 
The airlines have found this type of financing very attractive. 
since the debenture is a debt,interest payments are tax deductable 
until the bond is converted. Because of the conversion privilege, 
the airline can get a lower interest rate than if it were forced 
to use straight debt financing. And once conversion takes place, 
the carrier's obligation to pay interest and repay principle is 
over. The book value is shifted to the common equity account, 
reducing the carrier's debt/equity ratio which improves the chances 
of further borrowing on more favorable terms. 
4. Investment Tax Credit Lease - A financial intermediary 
with a high marginal tax rate (usually a large commercial bank or 
a group of wealthy investors) purchases an aircraft and simultane-
ously leases it on a long term basis to an airline. Normally the 
intermediary itself provides only 20% of the aircraft's purchase 
price selling equipment trust certificates to finance the remaining 
80%. In the event of default, the equipment trust certificates are 
secured by the aircraft in question which can be repossessed by 
the certificate holders. They do not have a claim against the 
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TABLE 3 
COST OF EMBEDDED DEBT CAPITAL AS OF 12/31/69 (%) 
AA 
EA 
'IW 
UA 
DL 
NW 
CO 
NA 
CONVERTIBLE 
4.68 
5.07 
4.71 
4.70 
-0-
-0-
3.63 
6.00 
NONCOVERTIBLE 
5.06 
6.04 
6.08 
5.93 
7.99 
6.97 
5.87 
6.90 
TOTAL 
4.90 
5.84 
5.62 
5.61 
7.99 
6.97 
5.48 
6.90 
SOURCE: CAB DOCKET 21866-8, "DOMESTIC PASSENGER-FARE INVESTIGATION-
RATE OF RETURN," APRIL 9, 1971. 
financial intermediary under these circumstances. Generally 
the trust certificates are purchased by a syndicate of life 
insurance companies or in some cases, a bank or a group of 
banks will simply pay the full price of the aircraft without 
creating the equipment trust at all. 
By leasing the aircraft, the air carrier usually pays a 
lower effective interest rate. The rental payments need only 
cover the repayment (interest + principal) of the equipment 
trust certificates, which represent only 80% of the cost of the 
aircraft. (However, the airline has no claim to any residual 
value at the end of the lease). The intermediary, being the 
legal owner of the aircraft, receives the full investment tax 
credit and depreciation tax shield in return for his 20% invest-
ment. In addition, he gets title to the aircraft at the end of 
the lease, although the airline often has the option to purchase 
the airplane for its residual value. 
Table 4 summarizes the major external sources of funds for 
the major U. S. carriers and their amounts, while Table 5 shows 
the capital structure of several specific airlines. 
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EXTERNAL SOURCES OF FUNDS 
MAJOR U.S. AIR CARRIERS - 1969 
SENIOR DEBT 
REVOLVING CREDIT 
AVAIV.BLE 1710.0 
USED 503.2 
STRAIGHT SUBORDINATED DEBT 
EQUIPMENT NOTES 
CONVERTIBLE SUBORDINATED NOTES 
TABLE; 4 
ESTIMATED CAPITAL VALUE OF LEASED AIRCRAFT 
TOTAL IMpUTI.'.:D DI.'.:BT 
~ PERCENTAGE 
2626.6 39.3 
503.2 7.5 
153.3 2.3 
108.7 1.6 
1484.4 22.2 
1806.9 27.0 
6683.;1. 100.0 
U1 
U1 
W 
W 
OQ 
TABLE 5 
COMPONENTS OF CAPITAL STRUCTURE AS OF 12/31/69 
(MILLIONS OF $) 
TOTAL BOOK DEBT 
EQUITY CONVERTIBLE NONCONVERTIBLE 
AA 403.3 282.8 398.4 
EA 225.0 127.4 498.7 
TW 361.8 250.0 507.2 
UA 588.1 230.2 649.9 
DL 241.4 -0- 236.3 
NW 426.8 -0- 112.0 
CO 96.3 35.0 164.8 
NA 130.5 0.5 65.7 
SOURCE: CAB DOCKET 21866-8. "DOMESTIC PASSENGER-FARE 
RATE OF RETURN." APRIL 9. 1971. 
COMPONENTS OF CAPITAL STRUCTURE AS OF 12/31/69 (%) 
TOTAL BOOK DEBT 
EQUITY CONVERTIBLE NONCONVERTIBLE 
AA 37.2 26.1 36.7 
EA 26.4 15.0 58.6 
TW 32.3 22.3 45.7 
UA 40.1 15.7 44.2 
DL 50.5 -0- 49.5 
NW 79.2 -0- 20.8 
CO 32.5 11.8 55.7 
NA 66.3 0.3 33.4 
TOTAL 
TOTAL CAPITAL 
681.2 1084.5 
626.1 851.1 
757.2 1119.0 
880.1 1468.2 
236.3 477.7 
112.0 538.8 
199.8 296.1 
66.2 196.7 
INVESTIGATION-
TOTAL 
62.8 
73.6 
67.7 
59.9 
49.5 
20.8 
67.5 
33.7 
SOURCE: CAB DOCKET 21866-8. "DOMESTIC PASSENGER-FARE INVESTIGATION- RATE OF RETURN". 
APRIL 9. 1971 
FINANCIAL RATIOS 
The various financial statements discussed contain a great 
deal of information. A large amount of additional information 
can be gained by studying the relationships between the items 
in the basic statements. Financial analysts often find that 
these relationships are best expressed as ratios which provide 
additional insight into the operations of the firm. Ratios can 
also provide a method of quick analysis that isolates a problem 
area for further study. 
Any ratio in itself is meaningless. There must be a standard 
of comparison. Often these standards are based on the historical 
trends of the firm. Often the performance of competing firms 
can be used. Other standards can be derived from industry 
performance, or performance of the economy as a whole. Another 
valuable source of comparison comes from the general background 
and experience of the analyst and his feelings for what various 
financial ratios ought to be. 
Although innumerable ratios could be formed from the various 
items on the financial statements, several of particular value have 
been standardized through usage and experience. In general, these 
can be grouped into those that are useful in making short term 
financial decisions, long term financial decision and investment 
decisions. Ratios may also be an aide in evaluating management 
performance or market performance of a firm's stock. 
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Short Term 
Before a financial source makes a short term loan, it must 
determine the liquidity of the firm - its ability to repay on a 
short term basis. The lender is not concerned with the overall 
assets of the firm, but with its ability to pay its bills without 
liquidating long term holdings. Some of the ratios commonly used 
to evaluate debt paying ability to potential creditors are: 
1. Current ratio - The current ratio is a very rough measure 
of the ability to meet short term obligations. It is defined as 
current assets divided by current liabilities. As a rule of thumb 
for industry on the average, a healthy firm should have a current 
ratio of about 2 to 1. However, industries with a large fixed 
investment like utilities or hotels have satisfactory working 
capital at a current ratio of 1. The airlines typically have a 
current ratio of 1.2 to 1.5. 
2. Acid Test Rati. 0 - Since current assets include monitories 
which may be hard to sell in an emergency, the current ratio may 
not really reflect liquidity. The acid test ratio is often used 
as a better measure. It is defined as current assets minus 
monitories, divided by current liabilities. For an airline, it 
would be computed on the basis of current assets minus spare parts 
and supplies, and might run between.S and 1. 
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3. Cash and Eguivalent Ratio - This ratio only compares cash 
on hand and assets quickly convertable to cash (such as government 
securities) to current liabilities. This may be too extreme a 
measure of ability to repay a short term obligation since it is 
doubtful that all current liabilities would fall due at once. For 
an airline. this ratio might typically fall between .3 and .5. 
Long Term 
An investor who considers purchasing a long term obligation 
from an airline is not as concerned with liquidity as he is with 
his overall security. This is typically measured by the Debt 
Ratio. long term debt divided by stockholders equity. Table 6 
shows typical debt ratios for the airlines and for other trans-
portation firms. In general. the lower the ratio. the more secure 
the investment. 
Investment 
Investment in this context is the original purchase of stock-
holder's equity in the firm. contrasted with market transactions 
between stockholders. It applies to original issues only. In 
deciding whether or not to buy a new stock. the investor is 
concerned with the potential rate of return. and the risk involved. 
Rate of return is a ratio of net income to total equity - that 
is. liabilities plus stockholder's equity. Tables 7 and 8 show 
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TABLE 6 
LONG-TERM DEBT/TOTAL STOCKHOLDER'S 
EQUITY FOR 1969 
INDUSTRY 
AIRLINES: 
ALL TRUNKLlNES 
B!G 4 (AA,EA,TW,UA) 
LITTLE 4 (CO,DL,NA,NW) 
TRUCKING: 
CONSOLIDATED FREIGHTWAYS 
McLEAN TRUCKING COMPANY 
RAILROADS: 
PENN CENTRAL TRANSPORTATION COMPANY 
CHESAPEAKE AND OHIO RAILWAY COMPANY 
BUSSING: 
RATIO 
1.50 
1.B7 
0.69 
1.04 
0.92 
0.59 
0.27 
GREYHOUND 0.B3 
SOURCE: MOODY'S TRANSPORTATION MANUAL (NEW YORK, 1971) CAB 
TABLE 7 
RATES OF RETURN ON INVESTMENT (CAB) 
, 
J 
i i 
I i 
, TOTAL TRUNKS. ! 
I DOMESTIC i 
, 
! BIG 4. 
i 
! DOMESTIC 
I 
i 
i OTHER TRUNKS. I 
DOMESTIC i 
I 
. ! 
I 
, 
1970 1969 
1.07%, 5.28% , 
, 
, 
-1.58 '4.87 
5.72 i 6.05 
1968 
5.67% 
3.84 
9.92 
1967 
i 
" 8.85% 
! 
! 
7.35 
i , 
112.74 
I , 
, 
i 
, 
1966 
10.36% 
7.48 
17.58 
1965 ! 1964 1963 1962 
II " I I ' 
12.04% I' 9.62% \ 4.20%: 4.10% i 
, i 
! II 
9.76 \ 7.79 I 2.97 
i 
118.50 
I 
! 
I 
I i 15.10 \ 7.74 
i i 
i I 
, I 
2.66 
8.48 
1961 I 
, 
1.46% 
i 1. 32 
1 
1. 92 
PASS. /CARGO. 
INT'L & TERR. 2.58 4.42 
i 
:14.21 
i 
!16.28 
! I 
1 I I 
3.14 
1
10.82! 15.02 i13.29 ! 13.11 .8.69 
i' I 
________________ ~, ______________ ~ _______ I~ ____ ~ ______ ~i ______ ~:------~,------~,--____ ~ __ _ 
TABLE 8 
RETURN ON INVESTED CAPITAL FOR THE 
500 LARGEST INDUSTRIAL CORPORATIONS (INDUSTRY MEDIANS) 
1968 
PHARMACEUTICALS ...........•.•..•................. 17.9% 
SOAPS, COSMETICS .............................•.•. 16.9 
MINING .............•..••..........•...........•.. 16.8 
DOMESTIC TRUNKLINES * ............................. 10.0 
TABACCO ...............••.•..•.................•.• 14. 7 
PUBLISHING, PRINTING •......•.•.•...............•. 14.1 
APPAREL •...•................•....•............... 13.0 
MEASURING, SCIENTIFIC, PHOTOGRAPHIC EQUIPMENT .... 13.0 
METAL PRODUCTS •.................•.•.............. 12.4 
AIRCRAFT AND PARTS ......................•..•..... 12.2 
FARM, INDUSTRIAL MACHINERy .............•.•....... 12.2 
FOOD AND BEVERAGE .......................•........ 12.1 
SHIPBUILDING AND RAILROAD EQUIPMENT •.•..•........ 12.0 
PETROLEUM REFINING .............................•. 11.8 
APPLIANCES, ELECTRONICS .........•................ 11.7 
MOTOR VEHICLES AND PARTS •....................•••. 11.6 
OFFICE MACHINERY (INCLUDES COMPUTERS) .......•.... 11.3 
RUBBER ..................•.......................• 11.3 
PAPER AND WOOD PRODUCTS ...•.••..................• 10.0 
METAL MANUFACTURING .............................• 9.9 
CHEMICALS. . • . . . . . . . . . • . . . • • . . . . . . • . • • . • . . . . . . . . . . . 9.7 
GLASS, CEMENT, GYPSUM, CONCRETE ........•.•..•.... 8.7 
TEXTILES •...•...........•.••...........•......... 8.3 
ALL INDUSTRY 11. 7 
* APPROXIMATE VALUES 
1967 
18.0% 
15.9 
16.4 
15.0 
13 .4 
12.5 
12.3 
14.3 
13.0 
12.0 
12.0 
10.0 
10.5 
11. 2 
11.6 
10.4 
14.2 
9.1 
9.0 
8.8 
10.0 
8.3 
7.2 
11. 3 
SOURCE: "THE FORTUNE DIRECTORY OF THE 500 LARGEST INDUSTRIAL CORPORATIONS," 
FORTUNE, 1968, 1969 
1966 
18.4% 
15.7 
16.2 
20.0 
13.2 
14.8 
14.5 
14.7 
13.3 
14.8 
14.5 
11.1 
12.6 
12.3 
13.3 
14.3 
14.0 
11. 2 
10.4 
10.8 
12.6 
11.0 
11.4 
12.7 
rates of return for airlines and for various other industries 
over a several year period. An investor would be interested in 
both the trend and size of returns in the firm he is considering 
as well as what would be available to him from other firms in 
the sarne or other industries. 
The mixture of debt and equity financing is very important 
in deterrning the risk. This is measured by the Debt Ratio 
previously mentioned. The ratio of debt to stockholder's equity 
determines the leverage of the firm. Leverage involves the use 
of borrowed funds in expectation that the earned rate of return 
will be higher than the cost of those funds. 
Table 9 shows the effect of different debt ratios on the 
stockholder's return on investment. In all cases, a total invest-
ment of $1,000,000 and a 1~1o cost of servicing the debt is 
assumed. The higher the debt ratio, the more sensitive 1S the 
stockholder's return to the overall rate of return of the firm. 
Hanagement performance Ratios 
Financial ratios can be used to compare the effectiveness of 
management. The better the management, the more profits it can 
make on the investment and the lower the expenses with respect to 
revenues. Table 10 shows some of the ratios used to evaluate 
management performance and some typical values for the airline 
industry. 
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(l'l 
w 
Il.>v 
~ 
TOTAL 
INVESTMENT 
$1,000,000 
$1,000,000 
$1,000,000 
$1,000,000 
$1,000,000 
$1,000,000 
$1,000,000 
$1,000,000 
$1,000,000 
TABLE 9 
LEVERAGE EXAMPLE 
DEBTl 
, 
I 
jSHAREHOLDERS 
RATIO DEBT I EQUITY 
I 
! 
, 
1 $500,000\ $500,000 
1 $500,000 $500,000 
1 $500,000 $500,000 
I 
I 
I 
I ! I $750,0001 $250,000 3 
I 1 
3 $750,0001 $250,000 
I 
I 
3 $750,000i $250,000 
I I I 
1.5 $600,000 $400,000 
1.5 $600,000· $400,000 
I 1.5 $600,000 $400,000 , 
, 
RATE OF 
RETURN 
12% 
, 
15% i , , 
! 
7.5% 
i 
I 
I 
i 
, 
! 
12% i 
I , 
15% I , , 
i 
7.5% i 
, 
12% 
, 
I 
15% I l 
I 
7.5% 
I 
NET I ! I INCOME INTEREST i NET \RETURN ON 
BEFORE (at 10%) i INCOME i STOCKHOLDERS 
i , INTEREST i I EQUITY 
I I ! 
$120,000: $50,000 , $70,000\ 14% ! I I i i 
$150,000 I $50,000 , I ! $100, 000 I 20% I , 
I $ 75,000 • $50,000 
i 
$25,000 5% 
, 
, ! , 
I , 
! 
i 
$120,000 $75,000 I $45,000 18% 
! I 
$150,000 $75,000 1 $75,000 I 30% I I 
$ 75,000 $75,000 ' ' ; - 0 - \ 0% 
I I , 
I , 
, 
$120,000 $60,000 i I 15% i $60,000\ 
, 
$150,000 :$60,000 $90,000 I 22.5% , 
$ 75,000 1$60,000 $15,000 'I 3.75% ! 
I 
I 
i 
----~. L 
TABLE 10 
MANAGEMENT PERFORMANCE RATIOS (1968) 
INDUSTRY BIG 4 
(AA, EA, TW, UA) 
OPERATING REVENUES 
TURNOVER = 
----------------------
(%) 60.9% 59.5% 
GROSS ASSETS 
OPERATING EXPENSE 
(%) 91. 2"10 94.5% 
OPERATING REVENUE 
SOURCE = AIRLINE INDUSTRY DATA: DOUGLAS AIRCRAFT CO. SEPT. 1968 
LITTLE 4 
(CO,DL,NA,NW) 
63.9% 
82.3% 
Internal Rate of Return 
When management plans a financial investment, it has 
traditionally evaluated the potential rate of return on the 
investment base. This process can be confusing, however, 
particularly where the useful life of the investment and its 
depreciation period are not the same. As an alternative, air-
lines are starting to use the "Internal Rate of Return" method to 
evaluate investment alternatives. This method is based on 
discounted cash flows and not on the investment base, depreciation, 
etc. 
If Ao is the initial investment, and Ai is the expected net 
cash flow, in or out during the ith time period, the equation 
can be formulated as: 
Ao = (l+r) 
Al + A2 + ... + An 
-,---=-:--(l+r) (l+r)n 
r then represents the rate of return on the initial 
investment, Ao, earned from the future total cash flow 
discounted over the appropriate time periods. By comparing the 
various internal rates of return that can be expected from 
different investment strategies, the firm can decide which project 
offers the best return on the money presently available. 
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Market Performance Ratios 
Market performance is important when one purchases stock in 
the market from a prior stockholder, rather than from the company 
itself as part of an initial stock issue. The market investor is 
concerned with the health of the company whose stock he is buying. 
But he is also interested in how the stock compares with other 
stocks he might purchase in the market place. 
1. Earnings Per Share - this is the ratio of the net income 
of the firm to the number of shares outstanding and gives some 
measure of the worth and earning power of the stock. 
2. Price-Earnings Ratio - The market price of the stock is 
divided by the earnings per share as computed above. This relates 
the earning power of the stock to how much it costs. 
3. Yield (Dividend yield) - To determine the return on his 
investment, the stockholder is not only interested in how large a 
dividend is paid on a share, but how much the share costs. Yield 
is defined as dividends per share divided by the price per share 
and represents the percentage return on investment in the stock. 
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CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AIR TRANSPORT INDUSTRY 
by George James 
A. T. A. 
July 20. 1972 
Abstract 
I 1 a ~he U.s scheduled airline industry has 
been involved in the largest re-equipment program in its 
history. This program which is still continuing involves the 
addition of hundreds of new wide-body and other aircraft to 
the airline fleet. Capital expenditures for the twelve major 
airlines alone during the past two years have amounted to 
nearly $4 billion. As of June 1. 1972. the U.s. scheduled 
airlines had orders for 243 aircraft for delivery in 1972 and 
beyond. The requirements for new aircraft and ground support 
equipment have come at a time when the industry has experienced 
very adverse financial conditions. The costs associated with 
the purchase of this new equipment along with the other costs 
involving such matters as the environment and security are 
presenting the carriers with significant financial challenges. 
One of the problems in trying to forecast the capital 
requi~ements for the air transport industry, is that we have to 
make many assumptions. We try to put together the best assumptions 
and even then there can be a number of errors, and as you will 
see as we go through this series of slides, some of the assumptions 
are quite sensitive to the results. I will try to identify those 
and indicate to you how sensitive they may be. 
This is a two part program this morning. I'm going to try 
to show what the needs are in the industry and then Don Lloyd-
Jones will tell you how easy it is to raise the money to meet 
those needs. 
Looking at the first slide. Now, all I'm trying to show here 
is the methodology and then to show you in very gross terms, what 
steps we took, and then some of the data we try to rely on as we 
made the forecast. 
You have to begin with attempting to anticipate what the 
level of traffic growth would be in the period, in this case, be-
tween 1972 to 1980, and then give the traffic growth, as well as 
try to indicate what the present capacity is; and what the future 
capacity is likely to be; and the measurement of that capacity 
against the traffic growth, and some indication of the load factor 
that might be involved in the time period will give you then an 
idea of how much additional capacity you might need. From this 
35.1 
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cost estimate of capacity need you can figure out your capital , 
requirements. 
On the traffic side, there are a number of groups which have 
made forecasts of airline traffic growth, throughout this period 
of 1972 to 1980 or even to 1985, and some even go out to the year 
2000. What we have done, of course, within the industry itself is 
our own forecasts which we have developed in the last three or 
four years and have had one revision in that regard. 
Now, if you just take the passenger growth from 1972 to 1980. 
One group that has forecast in this area is the FAA. They indi-
cated about 10 ~/o per year average annual growth in our domestic 
revenue passenger miles. The aviation Advisory Commission has 
worked with the figure of about 10% per year. Sam Brown from 
the Civil Aeronautics Board is giving a speech in Milwaukee today 
in which he will indicate that the figure for the CAB is approxi-
mately ~/o per year average annual growth over this time period. 
Now you see on this second slide the ATA forecast. The top 
figure that you see for domestic passenger growth average annual 
from 1972 to 1980 is 8.8% per year. The figure that we are using 
falls somewhere in this spectrum but more on the low side perhaps 
with CAB's at ~/o, and to ourselves 8.~/o, and to Aviation Advisory 
commission's at about 10% and the FAA about 10 ~/O. We are using 
our figure because we did it. And we have,through a committee 
composed of as many as a hundred representative personnel from 
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the various carriers working two or three years hammering out 
this particular forecast and carne up with S.S%. So it is not 
the figure that is identified just with the staff of ATA, but 
with the industry as a whole. At the same time, the international 
passenger growth figure they used is 12.4%. The domestic cargo 
at 16.3% and the international cargo at 15.9%. The aggregate of 
this in terms of revenue ton mile growth will actually give you 
a figure of average annual growth of 10.5%. 
Let me try to show you what the S.~/o per year means between 
1970-19S0. We have 95 billion passenger-miles in 1970, 144 by 
1975 and 220 billion by 19S0. So we are talking on the level of 
one and a half fold increase from '70 to '75 and about 2.3 fold 
increase from '70 to 'SO between 95 and 220 billions. If you used 
the S% figure that the CAB was using, they will have 2.2 fold 
increase between '70 and 'SO. So our figure is not too far 
away from this. In terms of enplaning passengers, this S.~/o 
per year domestic passenger growth that we have, would have 149 
million passengers as a base in 1970, 214 by 1975, and 325 million 
by 19S0. 
So the ratio here is slightly less than the 1.5 and 2.3 
from '70 to 'SO which is largely do to forecast the increase in 
length of haul. So we're actually cutting down the number of 
passengers relative to the increase in revenue passenger miles. 
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still though, you have 65 million more passengers in 1975 
than you have in 1970. We have another 175 million more in 1980 
over 1970. In other words, the increment of 175 million is actually 
greater than 149 million that you were carrying in 1970. 
This 325 million is a lot of passengers, and all we are 
working at is an 8.8% growth which is not too far out of line. 
Given some of our growth factors in the latter part of the '60's 
which ranged as high as 1~1o to 20% in certain years and given the 
performance that we have had this year so far which is bordering 
on the level of about 11%, it seems very high compared with 1970. 
In 1971 we alE showing a nearly flat growth, no change over 1970 
however. Now, if we return to the particular methodology that we 
were talking about, we now have the traffic on one side and what 
we attempt to do now, given this traffic growth of 8.8% per year 
or the 10 ~Io revenue ton mile figure when you make the composite 
with passenger and cargo, and domestic and international. We now 
try to measure against what the present fleet is, take out the 
anticipated retirements to get a net figure on that, add the 
planned additions that the carriers' plans show, and determine 
whether or not that is enough to carry that particular traffic 
at a particular load factor. And that if it does not we will 
have to go out to purchase some additional ATMs (available ton 
miles) in order to provide sufficient capacity to carry that 
amount of traffic, as you have just seen, something on the order 
of 325 million passengers by 1980. We get the information on the 
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present fleet and the planned additions from two sources at this 
point. About 6 to 9 months ago, a comprehensive study was ob-
tained by the ATA from the carriers on their present fleet and 
anticipated plane additions up to 19BO, for environmental purposes, 
particularly with regard to anticipating the need for noise retro-
fit. And then each year, we get from the carriers, sometimes 
about twice a year, a survey on their new equipment they plan on 
purchasing over the next two or three years. So when we combine 
these two, we are able to get a figure within this block, if you 
will, to tell us what the capacity the carriers are planning over 
this time period at this time. Normally, a carrier has a more 
finite plan for the next three years than they might have for 
1975 to 1980. 
Let's take a look at the present fleet and the planned ad-
ditions--the aircraft type 707, 727, 737, and so on down to DCIO, 
L 10-11 and the 747; what the inventory was in 1970, what the 
carriers are planning for 1975, what are the plans for 1980. 
Notice that a number of these are being retired. The 707, with 
an inventory of 412 in 1970, dropping to 263 by 1980 is one 
example. The 720's will be phased out by 1980. The DCB's would 
drop from 258 to 172. On the other hand, there are some others 
growing, of course. The 747 from 40 up to 173, and we didn't 
have the 3-engine wide-body in the fleet in 1970, they will grow 
to 555 by 1980. Now, if you put all this together, you end up 
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with an inventory of 2007 in 1970, 2110 in 1975, 2307 in 1980. 
So that you are adding about 300 from '70 to '80. But at the 
same time, you are retiring 458 in this process. These drops 
in 707's, 720's, DC 8's and so forth add up to 458 taken out of 
the fleet, but the addition, in the wide-bodies in particular, 
bring on additional 758. So you have a net growth of 300 in 
that time period. These do not include the new types of air-
craft -- the A300, the Concord, or even the twin-engine DC 10 
STOL. This is only the anticipated addition from the present 
aircraft that are now being manufactured. 707's will retire 149, 
720's will retire 126, DC 8's will retire 76 over the time period 
of 1970 to 1980. In addition, we have in terms of new orders of 
aircraft, 243 are actually on order as of June 1 of this year. 
And you notice that 88 of those were scheduled to delivery in 
1972, 78 next year, 52 in '74. They may have plans of adding 
additional aircraft which have not been decided yet. But as far 
as orders are concerned, as of June I, 243 have been confirmed 
and are valued in today's dollars at $4 billion. 
Now, most of these will be stretched 727 - 200's. On order 
are approximately 180 of the wide-body tri-jets: DC 10, LIOll 
and 6, at this point, 747's on order. 747's reached their peak 
of delivery last year, the DC 10's will reach peak this year, and 
L 1011 will kind of split as far as the peak of delivery is between 
'73 and '74, because of the stretch out of Rolls Royce engines. 
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What we have done then is we've taken a look at the traffic 
growth, the 8.8% passenger and 10 ~Io revenue ton mile growth, 
and taken a look at the present fleet and the planned addition 
now, and how then to consider whether or not they have plans to 
meet this particular growth pattern. 
We have to do it on a load factor assumption. So that we 
need a guideline then. Once more, incidentally, I should mention 
that throughout all of this we are attempting now to stick with 
basic forecasting that may have been done in one of the areas and 
try to remove the element of apparent judgement as much as pos-
sible. So here is the study that has lasted 2 or 3 years to give 
us that particular figure. This information is now coming from 
the surveys that ATA has done with the carriers. And what do you 
do here. Well, the one thing you can do is to assume that we 
will get the load factor standard that was laid down in the recent 
domestic passenger fare investigation by the CAB at 55%. We have 
attempted to see what would happen if this were set at 55%. But, 
on the other hand, we also said that it may be that you will reach 
a point in this growth pattern that you might even go higher than 
55% before you trigger the need for additional ATMs or additional 
capacity for a number of reasons. One of these is that the carriers 
are under severe financial situations in recent years and they 
will look for every wedge they possibly can to minimize the 
additional capital cost and the additional capacity that might 
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result from that. So, consequently, we have a triggered system 
here, that we will start ordering for more capacity at 55%, but 
we will go up to 57 ~h towards the end of the 1970's before we 
actually drew the line and said that we must have new capacity 
beyond that point. What I'm saying is if we move up of that 
55% load factor, we begin to order some, but as we get to 57 ~h, 
we hold at that. We do not allow the load factor to rise beyond 
57.5%. 
What we now have then in this figure is we get here, with 
the assumption I just gave you for a cut-off at 57.5%. We have 
today in 1970 a ton mile load factor of 44.3% and by 1980 we 
would have a ton mile load factor of approximately 55.7%. This 
is almost a 25% increase in load factor alone, in terms of this 
particular model, before you actually go out and place market 
demand for new equipment. 
As far as the principal characteristics are concerned, we 
will break it down to 2 time periods, '71 to '75 and '76 to '80. 
The domestic passenger growth we already indicated at 8.~h per 
year in '71 to '75 and '76 to '80 period, the load factor we are 
raising throughout this period from 48.5 to 55%, and from '76 to 
'80 it continues to grow from 55% to 57.5% cut-ff. The utilization 
we take at an average of 9 hours per day which is the utilization 
we were getting the '70 to '71 period, that is relati.!vely low at 
this point in time, a lot of it due to the fact that we have to 
.35E 
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cut back during the '70 to '71 recession. One can expect us 
to increase utilization as the traffic grows. So we will increase 
it about 10% or about 10 hours per day in '76-'80 period. 
Now for the seating configuration that we are using in the 
'71 to '75 period. The seating configuration that we had in the 
'70 to '71 period, that also is low. You can increase the seating 
capacity through elimination of lounges or reseating the present 
seating configuration in particularly the wide-bodies. So we 
assume that you hold the present base until this traffic grows 
to a point when you need to get additional capacity, hopefully 
without having to purchase. So you expect to expand seating 
configuration about 1974 and the expansion takes you for the 
next 3 years up to 1977, and it grows, gradually increasing from 
10 to 15% depending upon whether you are working with a 727-200 
standard jet or a wide-body 747. We use a different growth figure 
on the seating configuration depending upon the type of aircraft, 
but it runs about 10 to 15% in total. These are the characteristics 
that you are now getting in '71 to '75 and '76 to '80 period. 
You notice the various assumptions that are built in to each 
of these time periods '71 to '75, '76 to '80. Now, when you 
take all of this growth against what the carriers had planned, 
you come up with insufficient amount of capacity. You now have 
to add capacity and there are some capital costs in that and 
then you cost out what they have already planned. You added 
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the two, what they planned, what additional they will need. That 
factors out in the '71 to '75 period to a little under $6 billion 
of flight equipment alone in that 5 year period. Historically, 
we have run a factor of about 17% of our flight equipment that 
comes out in ground equipment. If we continue to use that 17% 
relationship, that's another billion dollars. And, of course, 
we have to assume that we aren't going to be able to purchase 
those in the future at the same dollar values of today. We have 
assumed a 4% per year inflation. That costs us in this time 
period another half billion dollars. So we end up with a little 
under 7 ~ billion dollars in the '71 to '75 time period. So for 
a five year basis, it is averaged at a billion and a half a year 
and that is about our present rate; we are running as high a 2.3 
billion as in the latter part of the '60's and we cut back as you 
well know. So this assumed about a billion and a half rate. 
The surprise then comes in the '76 to '80 period which as 
you see the flight equipment now goes up to $13 billion. A 
17% ground equipment would account for another $2.2 billion and 
the inflation factor accounts for $5 billion on this 4% per year. 
So now you have a total of about $20 billion in this time period. 
And, of course, almost $28 billion in the decade for 1970-1980. 
What is this compared with history? Well, interesting enough, 
the schedules airlines' capital equipment expenditures from '61 
to '65,$4 billion; from '66 to '70, $12 billion; '71 to '75, $7 
billion; '76 to '80, $20 billion. You can see the extreme cycles 
~~O 
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that are going on which is hitting the bottom in the first half' 
of the decade and hitting the peaks in the last half. The '71 to 
'75 figure is $3 B more than that from '61 to '65, and the $20 B 
for '76 to '80 is $8 B more than the $12 B for '66 to '70 period. 
It is interesting to look at this $12 B and increase it for the 
'76 to '80 period at 4% per year inflation. If you do and take 
the $12 B figure and run it up at 4% per year until you go to 
this time period, it comes up to about $19 ~ B. So in one respect 
this $20 B is only buying in constant dollars about $12 B worth 
in the '66 to '70 period. What I want to point out is, of course, 
that we have a lot of inflation to swallow in this '76 to '80 
period. 
Now, let me take the $20 B in the '76 to '80 period and break 
it down into $13 B of flight equipment without inflation; $15 B 
of flight and ground equipment without inflation, and then $20 B 
for flight and ground equipment with inflation. So the flight 
equipment alone in this time period -- $13 B is just slightly 
more than our total expenditures of $12 B in 1966 to 1970 period, 
and the $5 B of inflation between these 2 figures is actually 
greater than all of our expenditures in the period '61 to '65 
which is $4 B. So we will have to pay more for inflation before 
we can get hold of our equipment, than we pay for equipment in 
'61 to '65. 
Just how good is this forecast of capital requirements in 
1960 to 1980 of some $20 B. We have to look more or less at the 
.3"'1 
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validity of assumptions on utilization, seating, load factor 
and traffic and retirement. We can say, as far as utilization 
of seating, since we have expected utilization up about l~h, 
and the seating configuration up between 10 to 15%, this is a 
pretty fair assumption, the rate at which you do it may be subject 
to some question. Some may feel the load factor may not get that 
high before it actually triggers the demand for equipment because 
you have that kind of growth and irregular competition among the 
carriers to get a larger share of market of capacity, before you 
get to 55% or 57 ~h load factor. The traffic may be subject to 
some question. But at this pOint, the spectrum of forecasts 
that have been done may be slightly on the low side, but the 
retirement is probaoly accurate because pressures have been put 
on to make the noise retrofit adjustment. 
To give you some idea the sensitivity of it. If the load 
factor grows from 55 to 60%, that 5% of additional load factor 
in '76 to 'SO period, this $20 B will be reduced by about $1.6 B. 
Or, if you can get another 10% of utilization, this is worth about 
$2 ~ B. If you didn't retire any of you aircraft which have been 
scheduled to retire between '76 to 'SO, that will be worth about 
$1 ~ B. If you took a combination of th~se: another 5% increase 
in load factor, and 10% increase of utilization, may be worth as 
much as $4 B. So you now have some trade-off. But even if you 
took the combination that I just indicated, worth $4 B, you stillj 
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have about $16 B which is a significantly large amount for air 
carriers to finance. 
You have a range in the change of cost of aircraft from 
7 ~/o to about l~/o. Certainly, there is some quality improvement 
in the aircraft itself. You can't say that it is not exactly the 
same aircraft. But still these figures are more markedly above 
the 4% we have put into the assumption; so it is very possible 
that inflation will be greater than what we have indicated. 
I would summarize by saying that it would appear to us and 
we've just now gone through this exercise and we still have some 
other adjustments that we have to make in order to shake it down 
some. I think we can conclude that the capital requirements on 
the industry in the latter half of the '70's with inflation would 
be greater than they were in the '76 to '80 period. This is going 
to put increasing pressure on the carriers to maintain an adequate 
level of earnings in order to finance themselves through this 
time period, hopefully providing an adequate public service with-
out congestion problems, and so forth as in the latter half of 
the '60's. 
FINANCING THE AIR TRANSPORTATION INDUSTRY 
D. J. Lloyd-Jones 
Gent lemen: It is a pleasure to be here today to speak in such a love ly 
location and on a subject close to my heart. It is a particular pleasure to 
be on the same program with Dr. George James with whom I have had a warm 
association for many years. I say this in spite of the fact that Dr. James 
has just made some capital requirement forecasts substantially higher than 
I had anticipated. The $20 billion capital requirement that George is 
forecasting for the second half of the 1970's is final confirmation that the 
aerospace manufacturers have infiltrated the ATA. 
I know you f ve s_pent a lot of time this week, and some of las t week, on 
the basic characteristics of the industry. I want to touch on them briefly 
today to show how they affect the financing requirements and patterns of the 
i.ndustry. (Chart I) First of all, we are highly susceptible to the business 
cycle. This means that we have to choose our financial timing carefully in 
order to get the best possible interest rates available. There are in fact 
times when we cannot finance at all, when things are at the bottom. It also 
means that our investors, our lenders, tend to request higher interest rates 
or expect higher rates of return on their equity from us than they do from more 
stable industries, such as other utility industries whose earnings tend to be 
reasonably stable.percentages. 
Second, we are a. ser~ice industry;therefore we cannot store our product. 
This fact has a fairly major effect on the amount of equipment we buy and 
therefore the. amount of capital investment that we make. 
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Third, we are closely government regulated. We are regulated with 
regard to the routes we can fly and the rates we may charge. Nonetheless 
we are highly competitive and the combination of this fact and our close 
regulation has tended in the past to drive the industry periodically into 
an over- capacity posture. This puts heavy burdens on the financial officers, 
and the financial resources of the airlines. 
Fifth, "e are a high growth industry, so that, if we were normal in 
all other respects, w~ would have a fairly high rate of new equipment 
acquisitions. We are not normal in all other respects, however. We have a 
rapid technological cycle. Since the airlines first became significant 
entities in transportation in the early 1930's, there has been a major 
technological revolution in the equipment we operate on the average of about 
every seven years. Therefore, we are capital hungry and that is what I am 
going to be talki.ng about to a very large degree today. Finally, seasonality 
enters into our economic picture in that we must equip our fleets to satisfy 
a reasonable percenrage of peak demand. In the case of American Airlines, 
our seasonal peak falls in the summertime on the east-west routes. New York-
Los Angeles traffic, for example, may be 50% higher in the month of August 
than it is on an average day in the month of February. 
The l1Four Seasons" of Airline Financing 
Let me turn now to a historical review of airline financing because I 
think some historical perspective is necessary to understand how we got to where 
we are today and how we can, hopefully, finance the requirements of the future. 
Season I in airline financing I will date as including all years up until the 
end of 1954. This date was chosen because this was when the manufacturers 
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first approached the airlines to purchase the new jets, the 707's, DC-S's. 
Now, let's look at the balance sheet just before that happened. (Chart II) 
We had a fairly comfortable working capital level relative to about half a 
billion in operating property. Other assets were insignificant and debt 
was a minor factor, $214 million or 27% of our total capitalization. The 
bulk of our capitalization, 71%, was stockholders' equity. Outside of a few 
really minor debt agreements including some RFC financing back in the 1930's, 
a small amount in the 1940's, and some insignificant insurance company 
financing in the 1950's, we had financed our growth and our new equipment 
throughout this time period by stockholder equity: new equity issues, retained 
earnings and internal cash generation. This period then can be called the 
equity period and it is the first season of airline financing. 
Now let's look at the ratios that come out of the simplified balance sheet 
that we just saw. (Chart III) First of all the current ratio (the current 
assets divided by the current liabilities) was about 1.4. That's a healthy 
ratio. We've learned to live with a lot lower ratio than that since 1954. 
The debt to equity ratio was 0.4, a very insignificant amount of debt and a 
very healthy situation. There were no leases, sO,even if you include 
capitalized leases, the ratio is still 0.4. Finally, we were covering our 
interest charges 13.3 times through internally generated cash flow. Based on 
these healthy financial ratios, I think you can see why the insurance companies 
became interested in financing the jet program for the airlines in the period 
1955 to 1959. We were healthy, we had a lot of cash flow and we were buying 
a product which offered true productivity improvement to the airlines. Financing 
the first jet purchases then was not too difficult a job. 
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The next chart (Chart IV) shows what aircraft commitments were made by 
the major U.S. airlines in the 1955 to 1959 time period. These were virtually 
all 707 and DC-8 aircraft. There were 262 of them committed for in this time 
period. The total commitment turned out to be $1.5 billion for aircraft and 
a grand total, adding in ground and other commitments necessary to support 
this equipment, of $2.2 billion. Comparing that commitment of $2.2 billion 
to the capitilization base at the beginning of the period of $780 million 
results in a ratio of commitment to capital base of 2.B. I will be referring 
to that same ,'atio as we go along through the various periods of financing. 
The 2.8 was as high as any ratio that we have had since the second World War. 
But since '¥;e had started with a very strong balance sheet, it was not a very 
difficlllt c"::!'lllcing problem. How did we do it? 
In the p .":iod 1955 to 1959, there was $2.2 billion of capital expenditures, 
as I just m0ntioned. (Chart V) We also paid out some dividends, about 770 
of our total 'capital usage was dividends, so about $2.3 - $2.4 billion had to 
be raised. 55% came from internal sources, depreciation plus earnings and 
35% came from debt. $841 million of debt was raised in that period on top of 
the $214 million we had had in the 1954 base year. So we quintrupled our debt 
in this four year time period and over 9070 of it came out of the insurance 
companies. In addition there was an insignificant amount of lease financing 
and there was a little bit of equity financing, but less than 8% of the total. 
I have called this time period Season II, the insurance company period, a time 
when almost all external financing was senior long-term debt placed with insurance 
companies. 
" 
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Q. What forms did these loans take? 
A. They took various forms, but generally speaking they were unsecured, senior 
debt. Guaranteed lease obligations, for example, are senior to these 
insurance obligations. 
Q. The interest rates? 
A. " The interest rates during this period were delightful by todays' standards -
in the neighborhood of 4~% or 4t%. A lot of these original loans have been 
re-negotiated since and the interest rates have been re-negotiated upwards. 
We have reviewed how we sourced our funds in the 1955-1959 time period. 
Our year-end 1959 balance sheet is shown on Chart VI. Compared to 1954 our 
working capital had risen to $188 million, not a significant increase. Our 
operating property, on the other hand, had risen by about a billion dollars 
to a billion five hundred and sixty two million dollars and our other assets 
had just about quadrupled. They were $71 million in 1954 and they were $309 
million at year end 1959. The balance sheet then, had changed quite drastically. 
You recall that the stockholder equity was over 70% at the end of 1954; at 
year-end 1959 it was 43% and debt had risen to 51%. In dollar terms we had 
increased to almost $1.1 billion from $214 million in debt, and in equity we had 
gone from $551 million to $880 million. So, for the first time we were beginning 
to see heavy use of debt financing by the airline industry. Of this total of 
$1.1 billion, $706 million was in the hands of the insurance companies at the 
end of 1959, a little better than 2/3 of the ent.ire debt of the industry. 
The ratios that result from that balance sheet are shown on Chart VII. The 
current ratio hasn't changed very much since 1954. The debt-equity ratio, however, 
had gone from 0.4 to 1.2, so we were then over 50% debt. Inclusion of leases 
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doesn't really change these figures very much because we hadn't turned to 
leasing at all heavily at that point in time. One key ratio had worsened 
dramatically. Our times interest coverage had dropped from thirteen fold 
to three fold and it was just about at this point that the insurance companies 
began to get a little nervous about loaning more money to the airline industry. 
There were additional technological developments in the early 1960's, 
however, and efficiency required their purchase. The three-engine jet, the 
727 came along, the two-engine jet., the BAC's and the DC-9's Came along and 
the industry required additional four-engine jets to retire some of its older 
piston equipment and to meet growth. So, in this time period we ordered an 
additional 842 total aircraft (Chart VIII) with a dollar value, including 
necessary ground facilities, of $4.2 billion. Now, that was a lot of money, 
but compared to the year-end 1959 capital base, the commitment was small 
relative to the early jet acquisition program. Our capitalization, debt plus 
equity, at the end of 1959 had been $2.1 billion. Our 1960-1965 commitments 
of $4.3 billion result in a ratio to base capitilization of 2.1. That figure 
compares to the 2.8 ratio in the latter half of the 1950's. 
On Chart IX we see the $4.2 billion in capital expenditures plus another 
$233 million in dividends. This period I have called the third season of 
airline financing because we were able to finance a very high percentage of our 
commitments through internal cash flow, from depreciation and from quite healthy 
profits in the 1963-1965 period. We did have to turn to debt to some degree -
$854 million - but it was only 19% of the total sourcing of capital during 
this time period. There was little insurance money in this period and leasing 
and equity financing were not a major factor. So the key to this entire period 
was the ability we had to finance our commitments from internal sources. 
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Adding the 1960-1965 cash flows to the balance sheet of 1959, you derive 
the picture shown in Chart X. Working capital and operating property had each 
about doubled from 1959 and other assets were up about 50? from the prior total. 
Total debt had risen to $1.9 billion compared from just over one billion at the 
end of 1959, but had declined as a percentage to 45% of our total capitalization. 
Leases still played a nominal role in our balance sheet. Stockholder equity 
had just about doubled rising to $1.6 billion from $880 million at the end 
of 1959. 
We still, however, had more debt than equity as shown in the next slide. 
(Chart XI) The current ratio was still running along at about the same level, 
no problem. The debt-equity ratio had actually improved a little bit between 
1959 and 1965. If you add the nominal leasing- that had been done, we had just 
about held our own. We did improve our times interest coverage: we got it 
back to 6.6 from the level of 3.1 that it had hit in 1959. That was the picture 
at the end of that era as we came into the most difficult financing period that 
the airlines have had since World War II. 
Q. Would you define times interest coverage? 
A. It's the internal generation of cash divided by the interest commitment of 
the carriers. 
We had bought 262 aircraft in the 1955-1959 time period (Chart XII); 842 
aircraft in the 1960-1965 time period; and in ,the 1966-1971 time period we 
committed for 912 aircraft. These were a lot more expensive aircraft, since 
inflation really started to bite into us in the latter 1960's. We ordered 
214 of the old narrow bodied four-engine jets, we ordered 260 more three-engine 
727's,with the 727-200's representing a large proportion of this number. We 
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also ordered some twin engine jets - 143 of them. The bulk of the dollars, 
however, went to order 121 747'5 and 174 of the DC-lO and L-1011 variety. The 
total commitment for aircraft for the period reached just under ten billion 
dollars. Including the ground equipment, facilities, etc., the total commitment 
in this time period was $11.9 billion. Now let's again compare that figure to 
the capital base that we had entering the period. The capital base at the end 
of 1965 was $4.2 billion which results in a commitment to capitalization ratio 
of 2.8. This is the same ratio that we had had in the late 1950's; in between 
it had been 2.1. 
On the face of it then our problem was no more difficult in the late 1960's 
than it had been back in the late 1950's, but that was not really the case. We 
didn't have the same balance sheet in 1965, that we had had before we ordered 
the first jets in 1954. Most financing sources were either drying up, had dried 
up or had become extremely expensive. We were beginning to get into an 
inflationary period, interest rates were rising for everyone, but they were 
rising more rapidly for the kind of credit that the airlines represented than 
for other kinds of corporations because of our relatively poorer balance sheets 
and erratic earnings. Insurance companies were not willing to extend further 
unsecured senior money. (Chart XIII) Prospective equity investors were looking 
for higher dividend yields because of inflation and, after about 1967, were turned 
away by declining airline stock prices. So, we came into this period, not with 
a bigger commitment problem, but with a bigger balance sheet problem, and a much 
more adverse financing environment than we had had previously. I call this 
period the fourth season or the "get it where you can" season • 
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There were three sub-phases to this period. The first phase was use of 
subordinated convertible debenture financing in order to attract the insurance 
companies by giving them a sweetener in the form of an equity kicker. The 
second phase was bank financing and the third phase was lease financing. Those 
last two phases represent the least desirable types of financing that the 
airlines can do. We had to turn to them as an industry because other sources 
were unavailable. They were generally more expensive; nonetheless we had to 
use them. 
Q. Those are sort of the classic money sources. I understand that there are 
other places like oil companies that have money. How do you get money 
out of something like that? 
A. Out of an oil company? It's quite difficult if you're thinking in terms 
of direct investment. Airlines normally don't get direct debt financing 
out of an oil company until they are really in pretty bad shape. Then they 
may give it to you. 
Q. Why shouldn't they care about you being in bad shape? 
A. Because thex want to collect their money. 
Q. Oh, I see. 
A. You'll find that carriers really on the ropes may get Some oil company 
financing, but it's just to keep the carrier going and hopefully to collect 
some back debts. In those cases the oil comp·nj."s are already so far in, 
they've got to go little bit more. If you're ::, ·.king lease financing by 
oil companies, you run into real problems with the Internal Revenue Service, 
when you start to deal with other than financial institutinns. To be sure 
that you have tax credits, you really have to be a financial institution. 
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Let's take a look now at where the insurance companies stood in the 
airline financing picture in 1968, the middle of this last time period. (Chart XIV) 
We've already seen that back in the late 1950's they had financed two-thirds of 
the original jet acquisitions and accounted for 90% of the direct debt. In the 
next ten years they represented only 28.5% of the total debt sourcing done by 
the airlines. Even that financing took a different form, as we will see in just 
a moment. Seven companies that you're all very familiar with, accounted for the 
large majority of the airline loans. The Metropolitan has the heaviest pOSition, 
they have about $600 million in the airlines, the Prudential, $500 million, and 
just a little bit behind them, the Equitable at $220 million and then Hancock, 
Aetna, MONY, Connecticut General and a batch of others make up the remainder. 
That is a very heavy concentration, as Mr. Nader says, but only a handful of 
insurance companies had the assets in this time period to loan the kinds of 
monies that the airlines needed and never in my experience have these companies 
in any way attempted to exert control. 
There was then a small expansion in insurance company lending and it came 
in 1966 and 1967. (Chart XV) As an industry we had trifled with convertible 
subordinated financing prior to this time period, but I really do characterize 
it as trifling. There had been a little bit in 1958, a nominal amount in 1961, 
and one issue in 1964. Just at the end of 1965 the real push on subordinated 
convertible financing began, with a $53 million issue at 4%, which I believe 
was ours. Then there was a batch of them in 1966 and 1967. You could pick up 
the paper practically every day and find that some airline was doing subordinated 
convertible financing. It was cheap and the insurance companies would take 
that kind of a piece of paper whereas they wouldn't take senior debt financing. 
J'73 
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After 1967, however, airline security prices started to fall out of bed. As 
a result, convertible financing decreased s~arply in 1968. Then we had an 
aberration in 1969. As you may recall, when Pan Am's stock price got down 
to a low level and Pan Am's total value in the market place fell slightly 
below $300 million dollars, International Leisure made an attempt to try and 
take control of Pan Am. Pan Am shrewdly used that run-up in their stock 
price to finance. They issued a fairly sizable subordinated convertible 
debenture issue. TWA rode on Pan Am's coat tails, since their stock price 
had risen with Pan Am's, and they also did a subordinated issue. Those two 
issues accounted for the $325 million in 1969. The 1970 financing was Eastern 
Air Line's. It is the only subordinated convertible debenture that I can 
recall that carried an 8% coupon rate. It was issued when Eastern's stock 
was selling at 13, or thereabouts, and'the conversion price was set between 
15 and 16. It was a very, very expensive kind of finanCing, but it was all 
that .was available to Eastern at the time. Excluding these aberrations, this 
phase one of season four ended in the third or fourth quarter of 1967.and 
subordinated convertible markets became closed for airline financing purposes. 
Q. Must airlines have senior lender approval when it's a bond issue? 
A.Not if it's a subordinated issue - unless, of course, the airline has reached 
its limit for such financing contained in its loan covenants. 
Q. Does the zero in the 1970 debt represent conversion or does it represent 
laying off of some airlines? 
A. It represents conversions. The conversion price as I mentioned on Eastern 
was 16 or a little below. Eastern's stock price went right through that 
level in 1971 and they called. Two of American's issues were convertible 
- 12 -
at 31 3/4; we called them late last year, and finished the conversion 
in January. When you get stock prices that permit yoU to convert these 
issues, you try and convert them into equity to improve"'you't' balance 
sheet and give you more flexibility. 
Q. How do these interest rates compare with insurance interest-rates? 
A. It depends on what premium is set on the conversion; If it's a 20% 
premium or a 30% premium above existing market price ,it will effect the 
interest rates that are charged. I would say on balance in 'this time 
period a direct senior debt placement would have cost you one-half to a 
full point higher than these rates. 
Q. I think that the VA rate was 3/4 less and a point higher than these. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you do any borrowing from foreign countries? 
A. American has none, but some of the international carriers have done some. 
For a while in 1970 the Swiss market was a pretty good source.! You could 
deal in Eurodollars in a couple of other markets. That 'was equivalent 
to bank borrowing, short term borrowing. As an industry we did turn 
to bank borrowing ,but we were able by and large to get our domestic banks 
to loan at rates that were pretty close to the Eurodollar rate or even 
below most of the time. 
Q. This may not be appropriate now, but if you were unregulated in terms of 
fare structure would you be better able to cope with your current problem? 
A. Yes, I think there would be no question that, if we were unregulated in 
relation to rate structure, the financial community would feel more secure 
in lending to us and I suspect the equity investors would also feel more 
secure. Regulation in certain other areas, however, does give the senior 
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lenders and the equity investors some security. Regulation as a whole 
is a bit of a mixed bag, but rate regulations, per se, probably does cost 
us some points. 
So the insurance monies were dried up, we had run out of subordinated 
convertible opportunities essentially at the end of 1967 and we had to turn 
to the banks. (Chart XVI) The banks had been only a very minor factor up 
until the end of 1964. Of our total long-term debt at that point, the banks 
only had $291 million or 17%. At the end of this period, in 1971, we had total 
debt of $5.2 billion. Of the new debt placed in this time period, the banks 
took 27%% of it. Bank financing is probably the least attractive kind of 
financing that an airline can do. Your commitments are invariably long-term 
commitments. You're looking at purchases of aircraft which you anticipate 
will have 12 or 14 or 16 year lives. To go to the bank and finance on a five 
year type of financing makes little sense. In effect, you are commiting to 
finance that particular debt two or three times during the course of the life 
of that aircraft. Therefore, whenever possible, you try and do longer term 
financing. It wasn't possible in this period, so we did turn to the banks 
quite heavily. At year end 1971, the 12 carriers had $2.1 billion worth of 
authorized revolving credit at the banks and were using 44% of it, or just over 
$900 million. Most airlines view such credits first as something you're going 
to try to refinance as soon as possible, and second, as an insurance policy. 
It's awfully nice when you're trying to go to sleep at night to know that you 
have a $300 million revolver down at the bank and you're only using $50 million 
and use your insurance policy to tide you over until market', conditions improve. 
It's expensive insurance, however, and it's not something you carry just for 
!,:.':lL'I,.i/J ::' ;1' ,,": .. 1 ,1~:~: :::~.'dt £1"..-: (qL i...I~.j:·i::: .... :I!;\-· B!: .. '·-
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Finally, very late in 1969 the airline industry entered phase three of 
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this era: the use of a lease instrument very similar to a railroad equipment 
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trust certificate. 
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(Chart XVII) This was an instrument that TWA invented. 
. ;,\1 .. ,,:'-:~j '·_~;~.r :(1 Ll".~· . ,\ 
In December, 1969 they did a $70 million 747 guaranteed loan certificate 
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financing at a, 10% coupon rate. We seized upon this and American Airlines lease 
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financed seven 747's in three separate issues during 1970, representirig the 
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majority of this total of $248 million in 1970. We paid interest rates ranging 
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fr,,,!" about 10':'. Qnup-, ,.,1 '}l never for~~t our h,ighest rate, it was 11%. Another 
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was at 10 7/8':'. and I forget what the third issue was. Other carriers issued 
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lease certificates at ll~% and even a little higher. This was the nadir of the 
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airline financial picture during this time period. 
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Q • Who picked tRos'e :ilp'? 
A. Most of the Ones ,thaf lrufierric:iiri'did were sold publicly. It becomes a rather 
:, long term :ii'dnd'S'eta"t:fI.!'Wbl'i'(0).rt'~We>cao.:trpen: rat:es "shown on Chart XVII. You 
then, ofi!6utsi"~ Whe bea "1Tiv.P"€ruB't!elefS' ;o<>e1tC' r ':10()3 ,t 
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llu':A."These,were bJri'il's:'I'~l?l! iNtI!! ~dl§§il! ellujfl'@rwl¥t<!,Lgilaranteed by the corporation. 
In addition to representing a lien on the aircraft as security for the bond, 
we had to give a separate corporate guarantee in order to sell the bonds. 
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Q. You didn't tell us about the highest interest rate I've seen in public 
bonds? 
A. In this kind of financing you are selling 70% to 75% of the value of the 
aircraft in the form of long-term bonds to the public and 25% to 30% is 
being placed at very low interest rates with equity investors, usually 
banks who have unused investment tax credits. When one factors in the 
very low equity rates with the high bond coupon rates, you typically 
reduce them 3% to 3~% points in terms of the effective borrowing rates to 
the airline. The airline, of course, is giving up investment tax credit 
when it finances this way. I'm not taking account of that. 
Q. What was the term? 
A. We did ours on an 18 year term, most were done on a 16 year term. 
Q. Were these callable bonds? 
A. They are not callable, they are actually paid out just like you payout 
a lease every six months. You're paying off 1/36th or 1/32nd of the face 
value of the total bond twice a year. 
Chart XVIII is as good a summary of the difficulties that the airlines 
were in in 1971 as any I can think of. I don't know how many of you are familiar 
with the New York State Insurance Laws and with similar insurance laws in many 
other states. This law says that the airline, or any corporation to whom an 
insurance company makes a loan, must have cash flow equivalent to 1.5 times the 
fixed interest obligations for the year. Any loans to corporations that fail 
to meet that test in one of the last two years or on average in the last five 
years are put into a special pot and the insurance company has to increase its 
reserve against that particular loan. Normally an insurance company will carry 
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a 1% to 2% reserve against a loan. If you fail this test, however, that 
will jump to 10% or 20%, depending upon the state. The insurance company 
just will not loan when they fear that they may have to reserve 10% to 2~~ 
against the loan. If they would, the rate would be so hi~h that no airline 
would be interested in it.' American failed this test for the first time in 
1970 and was still under in 1971 so we're not eligible at the moment to borrow 
on an unsecured basis from insurance companies, except under this very high 
reserve position. Eastern has been·under since 1969, Pan Am has been under 
since, I believe, before 1969, TWA has also been under for three years. 
United passed in 1969 and then fell out of bed, ~raniff has .een under throughout 
the three years, Continental was under for two, they ~id make it in 1971. Western 
has been under for the last two years. There are only three carriers today that 
could go to an insurance company and say I want to borrow some money and the 
insurance man would smile. They are Delta, National and Northwest. This is 
an interesting test to watch since it means it is going to be at least a couple 
of years .efore we as an industry have real acceSs to the insurance company 
market. 
Q. Have the insurance companies lost anything on their airline loans? 
A. They haven't lost anything but when they see figures of this kind their 
insurance examiners talk to them pretty seriously about how secure is this 
debt. I went down with Mr. Spater in 1968 and talked to the Chairman of the 
Board of one of the very large insurance companies and he said we're not 
going to loan you another cent until you get your current obligation to us 
down by 33%. That's about $65 million and it's going to be 1980 before we 
get it that far down on the current repayment schedule. 
- 17 -
Q. You defined the fixed charges there as interest and amortization of debt? 
A. Yes that's correct. Interest and amortization of the debt and scheduled 
debt/repayments. 
Q. Don, this thing includes rentals? 
A. And it does include rentals, yes. 
Q. Moreover the ICC has a less onerous test? 
A. The ICC has a less onerous test. Under the New York State Insurance Law 
airlines must include full lease payments whereas the railroads need only 
inc lude the irnpu ted interest cost portion of lease payments. 
Q. Your answer to a question previously.asked about oil company money would be 
that the insurance companies possibly have something better to do with their 
money? 
A. Loan to other people? 
Q. Yes. 
A. That's what they have been doing to a very large extent. You can sometimes 
intrigue them with Some of the high coupon rates on the guaranteed lease 
certificates. We did ge~ some insurance companies to participate at lO~% 
and 11% kinds of rates. Naturally, they like that, because they have the 
security of the aircraft and they've got the total guarantee of the whole 
corporation. That's a pretty good piece of paper. It's pretty hard to 
tempt them, as yet, with less security or with much lower interest rates. 
Q. Why wouldn't that same rate attract other investors? 
A. It did. For example, a number of pension funds participated in these guaranteed 
lease certificates from allover the country as did banks and private 
individuals. 
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Finally, in the spring of 1971 the airlines got a break. The big 
investment funds began to believe that 1972 and beyond were going to be very 
good airline earnings years and airline stocks shot up to double or a little 
more than double their recession lows. This enabled each of the big five 
carriers to do equity financing in fairly significant quantities, amounting to 
increases in shares outstanding ranging from 11% up to 15%. (Chart XIX) You 
could well see some more such financing. Continental has just completed one in 
July of 1972, a $27 million issue representing a 10% increase in their shares 
outstanding. There are other smaller carriers who could follow suit, but I 
don't think you'll see a lot more of it unless market conditions improve 
substantially from today's levels. 
Q. What's the cost of that? 
A. The cost of equity financing? Generally, you have to figure that equity 
financing in this industry costs you about 15%. It depends, of course, 
on what you think your cost of capital is and you base your calculations 
primarily on the expectations of the guy who invests and your historical growth 
in earnings per share than on anything else. It is expensive, but there comes 
a point after you've borrowed so much where you have to raise equity to get 
your balance sheet back in shape. 
Q. You show that Continental on the previous chart has been eligible for insurance 
borrowing. Why did they let them do this instead? 
A. Well, I'm not really sure. When they bought their DC-lO's they went very 
heavily into a bank loan. This was in the fall of 1970. They had to get 
out of the banks, to whom they were further heavily commited, and find some 
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means of lengthening their terms. Continental has a very high debt equity 
ratio. It may be because of their debt equity ratio that the insurance 
companies just didn't want to loan to them. They may have had to do 
something to their equity side to get their balance sheet looking better. 
In summarizing then, in the 1967-1971 time period, for the first time 
since 1956, the industry failed to generate half of its commitments internally. 
(Chart XX) We only generated 48%. Debt increased by $3.3 billion and as I 
indicated, it was bank debt and subordinated convertible debt in large part. 
Leases for the first time became a major factor in the sourcing of funds, 
accounting for 16% of the total monies raise~ during that time period. In the 
latter years of this period half or more of the aircraft being delivered to the 
carriers were being leased, because that was the most efficient available kind 
of financing. Equity money, raised mainly in 1970, represented just under 10% 
of the money sourced. In all, we spent $11.9 billion. Dividends again dropped 
as a percentage, down to 3.6% of our fund usage, and of course all but a couple 
of carriers had suspended any dividend payments by the conclusion of this time 
period. 
Looking now at the balance sheet at year-end 1971, (Chart XXI) working capital 
was $360 million, actually down in dollar terms from where it had been six years 
earlier. Operating property had quadrupled during the same period and other assets 
rose about two and half times. Debt had risen sharply to $5.2 billion from 
$1.9 billion six years earlier and represented 44% of total capitalization. For 
the first time leases suddenly emerged as a factor at $2.2 billion or 19%. They 
had only been $200 million six years before. Stockholder equity also rose, to 
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$3.3 billion.from $1.7. billion, but you can see on the next chart the ad,verse 
change in the ratio of debt to equity. (Ch~rt XXII) 
The current ratio had fallen sharply to 1.18. You can live weith .. tll.is 
level, bu~ it can't go much lower. The debt-equity ratio which had ri'len from 
0.4 in 1954 to about 1.2 in the 1960's, has now jumped to 1.56 at the end of 
1971. Including leases, the ratio was now up to 2.22. Stated another way, 70% 
6f our total capitalization was debt and capitalized leases. 
Now let's look at the future and oddly enough, George James forecasted 
'. 
capital requirements don't pose much of a problem in the 1972-1975 period. 
Q. Can I interrupt. Your times interest coverage, was it 1.1? 
A. Yes. 
Q. That 10%, is that all you have to cover dividends and repayment of .pri~cip1e? 
A. That's correct. I suspect we .just lost another potential investor.he;-e. 
Q. Your problem is bigger than I can handle. 
On the balance sheet chart for the end of 1971 we saw that our total 
capitalization, excluding leases, was about $9.7 billion. Dr. James has forecasted 
for the 1971-1975 period that the commitments of the airlines will be about 
$7 billion. That produces a commitment to capitalization ratio thatfs totally 
different from anything we've been looking at. You will recall that these ratios 
for the previous time periods were: 1954-1959 - 2.8; 1960-1965 - 2.1; 1966-1971 -
2.8. In contrast commitments now are actually less than the capitalization 
.' 
of the airlines going into this 1972-1975 time period resulting in a ratio of 
only 0.7. There should be relatively no problem in sourcing these funds. 
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The next chart (Chart XXIII) is an American Airlines sources and uses 
of funds schedule. It shows you what a typical.carrier like ourselves went 
through in 1971 and what we've been going through in 1972. In 1971, we spent 
about $250 million for aircraft, another $140 million for facility expenditures, 
a little bit for debt retirement and about $20 million for other uses, including 
dividends. Our sources included depreciation at a little over $100 million 
and deposits with manufacturers,which had been made previously and were applied 
at the time of delivery of the aircraft, of $45 million. That left us with a 
short-fall of some $300 million. To bridge this gap we used leasing heavily, 
principally the equipment trust certificates that I referred to earlier, and 
we began to use our revolving credit in 1971 for the first time. We also did 
an $85 million equity issue. So, we were scrambling, we used leasing; we used 
revolving bank credit; we used equity financing; we used everything we could 
find to lay our hands on in 1971. And we met this total commitment of about 
$450 million. 
In 1972 American Airlines still has very heavy commitments, about $430 
million in all. Some 19 DC-10's are being delivered to us in 1972. That means 
we have aircraft financing requirements alone of $350 million this year. In the 
facilities area we appear to be over the hump, as is the industry generally, I 
think. The big facility expenditures you saw in the 1969-1971 period are a 
thing of the past, at least for this equipment cycle. For American they should 
now run somewhere in the neighborhood of $30 million on a continuing basis for 
several years. Finally, we have debt retirement of about $30 million. On the 
sources side of the ledger, depreciation will provide about $110 million and 
deposits another $140 million because we're taking delivery of so many aircraft. 
This leaves us with a gap to fill which will be met primarily through leasing and, 
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hopefully, some profits. We also, of course, have substantial unused revolving 
credit. We will use that, of course, to fill the portion of this gap that is not 
filled by other means. 
Now, look what happens to our capital requirements in 1973. No aircraft 
are on order for 1973 delivery. The same is true for 1974, and at the moment, 
at least, for 1975. So there are no aircraft commitments to fund. The ground 
facility expenditures should average only about $30 million. Finally, there 
are debt retirements of about $30 million which brings us up to a total of 
about $60 odd million funds required for the year 1973. On the source side, 
our depreciation will be $125 million and normally we have about $30 million 
in other odds and ends. We have then about $150 million of sources, plus an 
opportunity to earn money above that. There should, therefore, be a substantial 
positive cash flow for the airlines in the 1973-1975 time period. This is the 
first time that there has been more than one year of a positive cash flow for the 
airlines in the post-war period. It says we have no new financing problems until 
1975. 
If you add the anticipated cash sources and uses over the next four years 
to the industry's 1971 balance sheet, you derive the 1975 balance sheet for the 
airline industry, shown on Chart XXIV .. For this purpose we have assumed 
working capital will be unchanged. In the area of operating property, we have 
added the aircraft deliveries forcasted by Dr. James. Other assets have been 
increased nominally. On the liability side the industry's positive cash flow 
should reduce debt by $700,000. We have assumed that about 30% of the new 
deliveries will be leased, so lease commitments go up from $2.2 to $2.7 billion. 
Deferred credits also go up, leaving stockholder equity to rise by 50%. 
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This 1975 balsnce sheet looks a lot healthier than the current one. The 
debt-equity ratio, excluding capitalized, leases, is 0.9. In other words, the 
industry should have more equity than debt {or the first time in a long, long 
time. Even if you include capitalized leases, the debt equity ratio is only 
1.4, which is quite a tolerable level. In deriving this 1975 picture we have 
assumed that earnings recover steadily in 1972 and beyond, but that they don't 
recover all the way to the 12% rate of return by any means. We have assumed 
that the industry will resume paying dividends in 1973, with about a 1/3 
payout of earnings after taxes. Finally, we have assumed that those convertible 
issues which are callable reasonably near their current stock market prices 
will be called during this time period. 
Q. What happens to your times interest ratio now? 
A. I didn't calculate it, but we improve markedly from today's levels. 
Q. Back up to the 13 level? 
A. Oh no. We would be back to a point where we qualify for insurance test 
purposes. I think it would get back into the 3-5 range. 
Q. If all the airlines had a moratorium, no new equipment for five or six years, 
and if there was a traffic buildup, could you sort of have a guaranteed 
recovery? 
A. We have the cash position for that to happen, but the earnings would be the 
question mark. We have assumed a fairly good level of earnings in this 
analysis. Realization of those earnings depends on how we meet our growth. 
If it is done through high load factor, yes we ought to have the recovery. 
Let's turn now to my last slide. (Chart XXV) Until yesterday I thought that 
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Dr • James was going to fOICecast commiments of $13 billion in the last half 
of the decade, but he has come up with a figure of $20 billion. '0ne mu&t 
put that $20 billion in perspective to understand the challenge that it c-reate·s 
for the airline industry. At the end of 1975, on the balance sheet we··just 
looked at, the capitalization of the airlines should be about $11 bilHon .. 
The $20 billion commitment versus the $11 billion capitalization results in 
a ratio of 1.8. Remember we have lived with ratios of 2.8, 2.1 snd' 2.·8 in" 
the past. That should indicate that we ought to be able to live with .'something 
less than 2. 
Nonetheless, there are problems. First, it is questionable whether the 
insurance companies will provide a major source of long-term funds. i second, . 
the industry has existing bank credits of about a billion dollars which, I 
doubt, will be expanded very much. Third, I believe we will lease something 
like 30% of our new aircraft, but probably not much more than 30% can be 
leased because of covenant restrictions. Leasing also becomes quite expensive 
unless we continue to have investment tax credits. Convertible debt is a 
possibility, but its availability depends upon the stock market price. We will 
have a flow of $7 billion from depreciation in the 1976-1980 time period, but 
relative to the forecasted $20 billion commitment this would represent a minor 
contribution. We have never fallen significantly short of financing about half 
of our commitments from internal sources, i.e., depreciation plus earnings. 
In order to maintain that record the industry needs to earn about $3 billion in 
this five year time period. That is equal to $600 million per year after tax 
on average. Earnings then are the key to whether or not we can meet this kind 
of a commitment without ruining ourselves in the process. 
\ 
1 
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Q. Will you repeat that last statement? 
A. In the past, I said, we have generated approximately half or more than 
half of our fixed commitments from internally generated funds. In the 
latter half of the 1970's we will have $7 billion in depreciation, compared 
to the $20 billion commitment. So to close the gap, we need another 
$3 billion to total $10 billion or 50%. That $3 billion has to be earnings. 
If you divide that by five, you get $600 million per year after tax. 
Q. What's the total cash flow? 
A. Today, for the industry depreciation is running about $875 million 
per year. Earnings, according to Mr. Secor Browne, should be in the 
neighborhood of $250 million this year for the airlines. 
BASIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY 
1. SUSCEPTIBLE TO EUSIl<"'ESS CYCLE. 
2. SERVICE INDUSTRY. 
3. CLOSELY GOVERNNENT REGULATED. 
(ROUTES, RATES, SAFETY) 
4. HIGHLY COMPETITIVE. 
S. HIGH GRO';lTH. 
6. RAPID TECHNOLOGICAL CHA1~GE. 
7. CAPITAL HUNGRY. 
8. HIGHLY SEASONAL. 
SEASON I 
THE EQUITY PERIOD 
UP TO 12/31/54 
BALANCE SHEET 
MAJOR U. S. AIRLINES 
YEAR END 1954 
($ millions) 
Working Capital $128 
Operating Property 581 
Other Assets 71 
Debt $214 
15 
551 
% of 
Capital!.zation 
27.4% 
Deferred Credits 
Stockholders' Equity 
39{) 
1.9 
70.7 
CHART II 
..... 
KEY FINANCING RATIOS 
MAJOR U. S. AIRLINES 
Current Ratio 
Debt/Equity 
Debt/Equity 
(incl. Leases) 
Times Interest Coverage 
1951, 
1.39 
.39 
.39 
13 .3 
CHART III 
AIRCRAFT CaMr.1ITMENTS 
MAJOR U.S. AIRLINES 
fIILLtONS OF DOLLARS 
10-
8-
6-
4-
2-
0--
1955 - 1959 
CHART IV 
SEASON II 
THE INSURANCE CO. PERIOD 
1955 - 1959 
SOURCES & USES 'OF FUNDS 
MAJOR U. S. AIRLINES 
1955-1959 
($ millions) 
Sources % of Total 
I.nterna'l 
Debt' 
Leases 
Equity 
Capital Expenditures 
Dividends 
$1305 
841 
42 
186 
$2212 
162 
55.07. 
35.4 
1.8 
7.8 
93.270 
6.8 
CHART V 
BALANCE SHEE'r 
HAJOR U. S. AIRLINES 
YEAR END 1959 
($ millions) 
Working Capital 
Operating Property 
Ot~r Assets 
. Debt 
Deferred Credits 
Stockholders' Equity 
$ 188 
1562 
309 
$1055 
124 
880 
% of 
Capitalization 
51.2'7 • 
6.0 
42.8 
CHART VI 
KEY FINANCING RATIOS 
MAJOR U. S. AIRLINES 
1954 
Current Ratio 1.39 
Debt/Equity .39 
Debt/Equity .39 
(incl. Leases) 
Times Interest Coverage 13 .3 
CHART VII 
1959 
'., ',f ' . .:" 
1.33 
" 
1.20 
1.25 
3.1 
AIRCRAFt COMMITMENTS 
MAJOR U.S. AIRLINES 
BILLIONS OF DOLLARS 
10-
6-
4-
2-
1955 . 1959 1960 . 1965 
CHART VIII 
. SEASON III. 
INTERNALLY FINANCED GROWTH 
SOURCES & USES OE' FUNDS 
MAJOR U. S. AIRLINES 
1960-1965 
($ millions) 
Sources i; of Total 
Internal $3174 70.6% 
Debt 854 19.0 
Leases 175 3.9 
.Equity 290 6.5 
Uses 
Capital Expenditures $4260 9/,.R7, 
Dividends 233 5.2 
3q7 
CllART IX 
· il 
BAUNCE SlIEET-
MAJOR U. S. AIRLINES 
YEAR END 1965 
($ millions) 
Working Capital 
Operating Property 
Other Assets 
$ 378 
3352 
488 
Debt 
teases 
$1908 
218 
431 
1661 
% of 
Capital hat ion 
45.2'1. 
De fer red Credit s 
Stockholders' Equity 
5.2 
10.2 
39.4 
11 includes capitalized leases for aircraft 
CHART X 
KEY FINANCING RATIOS 
MAJOR U. S. AIRLINES 
1954 
Current Ratio 1.39 
Debt/Equity .39 
Debt/Equity .39 
(inc1. Leases) 
Times Interest Coverage 13.3 
'- ,.' ) ' 
1959 J965 
1.33 1.39 
1.20 1.15 
1.25 1.28 
3.1 6.6 
. , 
. , 
CHART Xl 
.~~ ~.'l;!,;~,,~.,'''''.' 
. , 
, 
, . 
". 
AtReRAf:t COMMITMENTS 
MAJOR U.S. AIRLINES 
BILLIONS OF DOLLARS 
10'" 
8-
8-
\955 . 1959 
CHART XII 
1960 . 1965 1966 . 1971 
CHART XIII 
SEASON IV 
GET IT WHERE YOU CAN 
THE SECOND HALF OF THE DECADE 
MOST·FINANCING SOURCES DRIED UP OR BECAME VERY EXPENSIVE 
INTEREST RATES RISING 
INSURANCE COMPANIES NOT WILLING TO INCREASE LENDING 
PROSPECTIVE EQUITY INVESTORS SEEKING HIGHER DIVIDEND YIELDS 
AIRLINE EQUITY MARKET ANTICIPATING DECLINING EARNINGS 
BUT CONSIDERABLE EXTERNAL FINANCING WAS NECESSARY TO MEET THE 
COMMITMENTS FOR NEW AIRCRAFT. MORE EXPENSIVE SOURCES OF FINANCING 
HAD TO BE TAPPED 
a. SUBORDINATED CONVERTIBLE DEBENTURES 
b. BANK CREDITS 
c. LEASING 
#()/ 
MAJOR U. S. AIRLINES 
SOURCE OF LONG TER}! DEBT 
INSllRANCE COMPANIE1j 
($ millions) 
Total Long Term Debt at Year End 1959 
Debt Held by Insurance Companies 
Insurance Debt as % of Total 
Total Lohg Term Debt at Year End 1968 
Debt Held by Insurance Companies 
Insurance Debt as % of Total 
% of New Debt Financed 
lly Ins\lrance Companies 
$1,055 
706 
66.9% 
$4,592 
1,713 
37.3% 
28.5% 
CHART XIV 
Repre~ent~tive Companies % of 1968 Insurance Total 
Netropolitan 
Prudential 
Equitable 
John Hancock 
Aetna 
l'1ulu.al Lii~ of ~~~W York 
Connecticut General 
Others 
30.1% 
21.2 
12.7 
5.3 
5.0 
3.5 
3.3 
la.9 
1959 
1961 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
MAJOR U. S. AIRLINES 
CONVERTIBLE DEBT FINANCING 
PUBLICLY ISSUED 
Amount 
$ 47 
10 
60 
53 
382 
508 
80 
325 
80 
($ millions) 
Average 
Interest Rate 
4.9% 
6.0 
4.5 
4.0 
5.0 
4.3 
4.9 
5.1 
8.0 
% Outstanding 
At Year End 1971 
8.5% 
o 
41.7 
o 
77.5 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
o 
CHART XV 
MAJOR U. S. AIRLINES 
SOURCE OF LONG TERM DEBT 
BANKS 
($ millions) 
Total Long Term Debt at Year End· 1964 
Debt Held by Banks 
Bank Debt as % of Total 
Total Long Term Debt at Year End 1971 
Debt Held by Banks 
Bank Debt as % of Total 
:.;. "r NeH Debt Financed by Banks 
Revolving Credit Agreements 
At Year End 1971 
t.vailab1e Credit Authorized 
Amount Ilorro,"ed 
$1,689 
291 
17.2% 
$5,194 
1,256 
24.2% 
27.5% 
$2,120 
908 
CHART XVI 
1969 
1970 . 
1971 
}~JOR U. S. AIRLINES 
GUARANTEED LOAN· CERTIFICATES 
($ millions) 
Amount 
$ 70 
248 
103 
Average Conpon Interest Rate 
10.m; 
11.1 
10.7 
CHART XVII 
NAJOR U. S. AIRLINES 
COVERAGE QF FtXED CHARGES 
American 
Eastern 
Pan Am 
~A 
United 
Braniff 
Continental 
Delta 
National 
Northl1est 
Western 
1969 
-
1.55 
I .9-'" l...lJ! 
[:I~ 
1.88 
lL131 [G1] 
3.87 
3.09 
6.51 
* 
* 3.13 
rn 
1971 
~ ([;]] 
[cij 
ri..@ 
[:-t~l 
1.56 
2.97 
1.77 
* ~ 
CHART XVIII 
~ does not meet requirement of N. Y. State 
Insurance Law for coverage by 1.5 times. 
* not representative because of strike. 
April 1971 
Hay 1971 
June 1971 
July 1971 
Hay 1972 
July 1972 
MAJOR U. S, AIRLINES 
RECENT EQUITY FINANCING 
($ millions) 
CHART XIX 
Company. 
Increase in 
Amount Shares Outstanding 
Pan Am .. $ 67.0 11.2% 
United 88.8 13 .6 
American 89.9 15.7 
TWA 37.9 14 ;2 
Eastern 54.3 11.7 
Continental 27 .0 10.6 
TOTAL $364.9 
SOURCES & USES OF FUNDS 
MAJOR U. S. AIRLINES 
1966-1971 
Sources 
Internal 
Debt 
'Leases 
Equity 
Uses 
($ millions) 
$ 5929 
3322 
2001 
1132 
Capital Expenditures $11934 
Dividends 450 
% 'of Total 
47.9% 
26.8 
16.2 
9.1 
96.4% 
3.6 
CHART XX 
BALANCE SHEETli 
MAJOR U. S. AIRLINES 
YEAR END 1971 
($ millions) 
Working Capital 
Operating Property 
Other Assets 
Debt 
Leases 
Deferred Credits 
Stockholders' Equity 
$ 363 
10147 
1360 
$ 5230 
2219 
1064 
3357 
% of 
Capital i~ati_~'p" 
44.1% 
18.7 
9.0 
28.2 
1/ includes capitalized leases for aircraft 
CHART XXI 
CHART XXII 
KEY FINANCING RATIOS 
MAJOR U,S. AIRLINES 
1954 1959 1965 1971 
Current Ratio 1.39 1.33 1.39 1.18 
Debt/Equity .39 1.20 1.15 1.56 
Debt/Equity .39 1.25 1.28 2.22 
(incl. Leases) 
Times Interest Coverage 13.3 3.1 6.6 1.1 
• 
$ MILLIONS 
500-
SOURCES A"JD USES OF FUNDS 
AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC, 
1971 . 1973 
DIVIDENDS EARSINGS 
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MAJOR U. S. AIRLINES 
COMPARATIVE BALANCE SHEET 
ESTlllATED 1975 v.s. 1971 
($ billions) 
1971 
Working Capital $J; 
Operating Property 10.1 
Other As se ts 1.4 
Debt $ 5.2 
l,eases 2.2 
Deferred Credits 1.1 
Stockholders' Equity 3.4 
Key R~tios 
Current Ratio 1.18 
Debt/Equity 1.56 
Debt/Equity 2.22 
(incl Leases) . 
Basic Assumptions 
1975 
$ .4 
11.6 
1.7 
$ 4.5 
2.7 
1.4 
5.1 
1.15 
.89 
1.41 
• Eflrnings recover, but he I m,l 127" return 
- Dividends resumed at 1/3 payout 
- Convertibles called as equity prices 
improve 
- Capital comm~tments at $6 billion 
CHART XXIV 
THE SECOND HALF OF TilE DECADE 
($ billions) 
Commitments 
1976 - 1980 
Sources of Funds 
Debt 
Insurance Companies 
Banks-Existing Credit 
Leasing 
Convertible Debt 
Depreciation 
Earnings 
Equity 
New Alternatives 
$20 
Nominal 
$1 
Limited & Expensive 
Dilution 
$7 
? 
Dependent Upon 
Earnings 
? 
CHART XXV 
THE ROLE OF THE EXPORT-IMPORT BANK IN 
DEVELOPING THE EXPORT POTENTIAL OF AIRCRAFT SAU3 
by Chosei Kuge 
Export-Import Bank of the U.S. 
July 20, 1972 
Abstract 
A description of the current patterns, terms, and 
conditions of Eximbank commercial jet aircraft export 
financing will be given. As time permits, some discussion 
of the factors affecting export financing will be noted. 
l.et me make a fel; basic observations. NU1!lber one, Eximbank is a 
US Government arrency. lhllllbor tno, its principle objective is to 
facilitate US exports; you cO-n forget about the "lmrort" in our namo. 
Number three, ne are to supplement and not cOIi'peto Hi th priwlto sourco!') 
of financing. NU1!lber four, any loan that 1,0 [;,al:.e must have a reanonabl" 
assurance of repayment; in other ;,ords, "e are SUI',lose d to act 1)." a 
banker and not as an .AID-type acency. '1'0 i:~ive ;:'"OU a:..'1 idv':~ of ...:.Xl.r.i ban}: t 3 
authorized size, ue can have total outst ... nclinc; loans, guarantees and 
insuranoe of up to .:::20 billion. lie have n billion of outstanuin" 
capital stock held by the US Treasury Dc,·,ar·c,;, ":it i.1·,o..:1. 3 billion of 
reserves. Ue could borrow from the 'l'reasury ;::epartnwl1t at any given 
time up to ,,6 billion. As of Juno. 30, 1971 H0 havo total "'''Jets of :,,5.e 
billion. Substract :,;2.3 billion net north from that and our liabilities 
~1Sre about ,.:s} billion. In fiscal year 1971 1·,e earn(Jd clone to . .)12(;· 
million and paid a dividend to the 'l'reasury lJey:rtmer,t of : ..:50 million. 
~'he balance of our earnings go into our resorve account. 
~uestion: Uha.t kind of a return on investmont 10 that'" 
Answer: The net income is about a 5;; return on net north. 
Let me give you an idea of the amount of financing we have be9n 
doing for commeroial ail-cra.ft. In 1957, we financed four e.ircraft 
~/Ortb about $30 million and loaned 16ll- nillion dollars to do that. 
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Over thi::l period H(l have been involved in more and more transactions 
,md the dollar voltlLle has been going up. However, the amount of money 
,Ie actuall,r put up per transaction, on a percentage basis, has gone 
dC;ill. In oth8r liCrds l1e are utilizing more and more private finanoing 
in specifi0 tranna.ctions. 
On a .;10 million transaction, a typical financing pattern would 
call for D. cash p~.yment from the buyer of 10-20)"£. The buyer raises the 
cash paymor"' f'r('m non-U:] sources. The other 8o-90i:; of contract price 
is the fi1'JeLw':lJ. port5.on. ';ximbank puts lIP one-half and the other 
one-half COtl8S from private sources, either in the U.S. or from fore"ib'll 
sourcen, :P)'. re,AYll!(mt tom on the financing would be 10 years for a 
new commercial jet aircraft or anywhere from 5-7 years for used commercial 
jet aircrnft" The amount of cash paymont varies somewhat depending 
on nho the buyor is. If you're talking abcut the major European 
airlines, cash paym'3nt uill be 20% or greater. lf you're talking 
about a 1·,eakor buy~r in Africa, Asia or Latin America, it would probably 
be closer to the 10/: fii:;ure • 
.. ,uQstion: You require a hieher dCl-ill payment from the l~uropeans-ll'hat' s 
the theoFJ behind that. Usually the better the credit is, the lower the 
down payment? 1'hey are the biggest customers of the US. It seems to me 
that \fe should try to fi[,"Uro out some ~Tay to encourage greater sales. 
Ans,oer: ",ximbal'J: has to balance various objoctives of the US Government, 
including the oncouraU,Jmcnt of greater sales through lower oash payments 
versus balance of payment improvement through higher cash payments. 
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We don't require supplier participation any more as a general rule. 
Supplier participation being Boeing, McDonnell-Douglas, or Lockheed 
extending credit to the buyer. We used to, and will continue to in a 
certain number of transactions involving higher risk buyers. Our 
present interest rate is 6% per annum. We charge a commitment fee on 
our loans of 1/2 of 1% per annum. If we guarantee the private financing, 
as we do in many cases, we charge 1/2 of 1% guarantee fee. On loans 
to strong European buyers, we try to get as much of the private portion 
from off-shore as we can. In many cases the buyers are able to raise 
financing equal to 20-25% of total contract price from offshore sources. 
Question: When you say 6% interest charge--is that your current rate? 
Answer: That's our current rate. 
Question: Can you tie that somehow to your own cost of funds? 
Answer: Since 1945, Eximbank's lending rate has been consistently higher 
than its borrowing rate at the U. S. Treasury and has never been lower than 
the average rate on the total public debt. On a cumulative average, 
Eximbank's operations have never entailed a subsidy cost. 
Question: Wouldn't it be difficult for Pan Am and TWA to compete with foreign 
airlines against this kind of loan? 
Answer: What you've got to take into account is the fact this difference 
between 6% and whatever Pan Am has to pay for their borrowing is only 
one element of total cost. There are other national interest reasons 
117 
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why you would want tei keep this rate at 6% and try to sell aircraft 
abroad. One basic reason is if we don't sell these aircraft abroad, 
O'lr bala.nce of payments and balance of trade are going to deteriorate and 
weaken the dollar in the world money markets. This could hurt Pan Am 
and TWA more than any 6% interest rate we charge the foreign airlines. 
Tn addition, this 6% only celates to possibly 4070 of the transaction. 
The foreign buyer ~till has to pay a market rate on the other half of the 
financing. Also what you are talking about is 10 year Exim financing 
in ,o"t,-<'t to P,u: Am and TWA borrowing at 15-20 years. 
':'_cstL,'n: That could still be a huge difference though. If you're 
len.:lit1~ T"o.ley o.t 6%00 KLM and Pan Am has to pay 1070 or 11% and the 
airlines ha,e a huge part of their capital structure on debt, that's 
going to be a significant factor. 
Answer: We have no reason to believe that Pan Am or any other major U. S. 
carrier is ~aying interest rates approaching 10% or 11% for their equip-
ment rue' ~has2s. 
We have other programs to help finance U. S. exports, including 
guaranteeing aircraft leases. Many small aircraft are financed through 
our FCIA insurance and commercial bank guarantee programs described in 
our brochure. We have a cooperative financing facility and a discount 
loan facility through which many of the small to medium size transactions 
Ltlg 
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are handled On terms up to say five years. Follow-on spares and other 
airline equipment are financed through these programs. We also finance 
U. S. goods and services which go into the airport construction and 
facilities. 
Over the ten years I have been working at the Bank, the programs, 
methods of financing and outlook of the bank have changed, and I believe 
that is going to be the case in the future. Thus, if you're interested 
in how Exim is going to change in the next 10 years in financing U. S. 
exports, you have to keep in mind such factors as balance of trade and 
balance of payments. When you see them getting bad, greater efforts will 
have to be made to encourage and increase U. S. exports. If we don't we 
are going to have to cut back on other things that we are doing abroad or 
limit imports. International political and economic d2vclopr 'ents will 
also affect U. S. export financing. Eximbank's life is extended every five 
years. Thus, Congressional support in the following years is essential. 
Money market conditions, availability of funds, [lnd iuterest rates 
are going to affect what Exim does. Some critics say Exim should not 
finance jet aircraft exports today because ample funds are available at 
this time from the U. S. commercial banking sector. They fail to consider 
that U. S. commercial banks have a liquidity situation, resulting in limited 
funds from this source on repayment terms exceeding 5-6 years. Today it 
is very difficult to find commercial financing for new jet commercial 
aircraft on anything like 7- or lO-year terms. On. the other hand, the 
overseas buyer, as well as Boeing, McDonnell Douglas and Lockheed would 
like to see Eximbank start supporting terms up to 12 years •. 
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Another factor is that Bximbank is a US Government agency subject 
to annual review of its operations by the Administration and Congress. 
2ximbank docs not operate on alUlua! appropriations, however, and pays 
all its expem.!Os out of earnings. 
~uestion: 'ihat kind of dobt seouri ty do you take versus commercial banks'l 
).nswer: In tYl'ic(~l tl'ansactions, we L,ret notes i'rolTJ the buyer. The 
commel'cial bank does exactly the Sallie thing. The notes are usually 
(o;uaranteed by financial institutions or governments. Hortgages are 
not required in most instancos. 
';,ucstion: ~,'ho hilS first rights to proceeds from foreclosure li'hen 
Dortgages are taken';' 
Ans>1er: If tho mortr;a.,;cs 110re roquirod to secura all lenders on a 
pro-rata bases, thon the pl'ocoeds 1-1Ould be distributed accordingly. 
I shculd also mention that in a 10 year transaction, Exim is prepared 
to take thc last 5 years maturities and allow a commercial bank to 
tal,e tne earlier f.laturities. In this li'ay, we are able to meet the 
cOlmercial bank's requirerlent for liquidity. 
,.~ucstion: Aro thcse fiGUres tYl)ical of all transactions or do you 
differentiate betl/con ,wrosl,ace and other products':' 
iWS'lrer: 'iihen "e' re tall:ing in tel'llls of large projects and products, 
the typical transaction lIould oe a lQj; cash payment and 90i~ financing 
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of which Eximbank's sha.re >lould be one-half. As an e}:ception, >TO have 
been able to get ~(Jj, cash payments from major European carriers for jet 
aircraft sales beoause of the compotitive advantaGe of the US aircraft 
industry in recent years. In other transactions, tho typical cash 
payment is 1O)~. 
Question: Do you know "hat the Buropeans arc offering in Latin Arr:erica? 
Ana>ler: Basically, it's 10% cash, 10 year repayment tom with a subsi-
dized interest rate. The BAC 111, Caravelle, and A-300l} are all offe:::,od 
on thoss terms. 
Question: Are -che interest rates comparable'l 
Answer: 'I'M British interest rate is about &ir-75i, to the b01'1'01rer on 
the total finanoing. They nill change theirs as time GODS alone. 
Eximbank charges (f~ on one-half the financing, 'Ihile the commercial 
banks usua.lly charge the prime rate plus a. mark-up on a fluctClating 
bases. At this time, the rates are probably reasonably cOL:lleti tive. 
Question: You said you had a &;.; interest rate, plus a 'i/;; tS"Uo.rantee 
fee and another fee. Could you e~plain? 
Answer: Eximbank oharges a .;~. of 1% per rumum comni tr.lCmt fee on the: 
amount of Eximbank's loan from 30 days after authorization unV·J. the 
loan funds are dralm do,m. The bo=o;/er pays a 8,,;) interest rs.to on 
amounts which ore drawn down. If Bximbank euarantees the pri-'ate 
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financing, the Eximba.nl: cuarantee fee of -iJ of 1% per annum is oharged 
on the private financing from dates of dralf dOim until repayments are 
nJade() 
'~uestinn, Coui" you comment on Hussian Y.AL-40 financing rates being 
so 101(: 
lillslTeI', 1-,\ I'oally doesn't wako an;)' difference beoause the llussians can 
Chill1{i9 tho ::>rice of their product and the interest rate in any manner 
th",:.' ,,,,'It, "rofi t isn't their main consideration. 
;i'-'0stioll L_ V 0 '~1Jrope<UI manufacturers offered conoessionary tems? 
,LnmlOr, ,n GOn9 instances in the past, 13ritish and French manufaoturers 
have Gotton soft loan asc:istance for their buyers. US AID funds have 
not belm used to finance commercial jet aircraft sales. 
I think the cxtent of non-4JS content in US commercial jet aircraft 
"'ill require more and moro attention. It's beooming mOJ.'e and more 
difficult to sell aircraft abroad lTithout some non-4JS oontent. Also, 
the 1'roop90t:3 of '" major noli oommercial jet aircraft being manufactured 
"i th 100i- us compc.nios involvod r.:ay be vory difficult. Othor factors 
requirinG' consideration are (1) the iml'ortal1ce of the non-4JS marlcet to-
any nm, "ircr"ft project, (2) exporting US technology, (3) foroign 
competi tion and (4) d'Jvolo)lli,)ni: of foreign aeroopaoe industries. 
./ 
- 9 -
Question: When you have multi-national interest and foreign equipment, 
is the bank precluded from loans on the portion that's foreign? 
Answer: As a basic policy, Eximbank finances goods and services of 
U. S. manufacture and source only. If the amount of foreign content is 
sizeable, it would be deducted from the contract price and all 
percentages applied to the net U. S.content. 
Question: What effect will the proposed Civil Aviation Financing Plan 
have? Can that help finance aircraft for foreign airlines? 
Answer: Dr. James could answer that question better than I, though it is 
my understanding that the intent of the legislation is to provide capital 
to make possible the manufacture of new aircraft and not to provide 
financing for the ultimate purchaser. 
Question: Wouldn't a reduction in cash payments increase sales? 
Answer: Possibly, but the question is whether a reduction in the cash 
payment would increase U. S. exports sufficiently to make an appreciable 
difference and will increased sales be offset by the reduction in 
balance of payments from reduced cash payments. 
Question: How is the policy of the bank established? 
Answer: Basic policy is established by Congress and is set forch in 
our legislation. To carry out that policy, we have a five-man board of 
directors appointed by the President with advice and consent of the 
Senate. 
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Question: "h~ you prepared to say that you look upon your aotivities 
as a oenefit as op~osed to whether you exist or whether you didn't exist. 
In other llords, you stimulate sales by existing and if you didn't exist 
you 11ouldn' t. 
,inswor: I bolieve the G.l1s,rer is affimative. There are many cases 
lIherc US manufaoturers, US oommeroial bankers, and other finanoial 
institutions cannot afford to take the risk that's involved in 
foreign Gules. The only souroe available in the US to take that risk 
is the UCl GovorntJOnt. It is a legitimate objeotive of the US Government 
to taJ:e such poli tioal and eoonolllio risks. All of the other oountries 
around t110 world do the same thing. lie're in a buyer's market today. 
J • 
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Abstract 
Although the presentation will touch upon the areas of market 
for air transportation, the theoretical foundations of the demand 
function, the demand models, and model selection and evaluation, 
the emphasis of the presentation will be on a qualitative descrip-
tion of the factors affecting the demand for air transportation. 
The presentation will rely heavily on the results of market surveys 
carried out by the Port of New York Authority, the University of 
Michigan, and Census of Transportation. 
The purpose of this paper is to present a basic analysis of 
the demand for air transportation. The presentation is divided 
into five areas: the market for air transportation, the factors 
affecting the demand for air transportation, the theoretical 
foundation of the demand function, air travel demand models, and 
model selection and evaluation. 
The Market For Air Transportation 
At the global level approximately 383 million passengers were 
carried on the scheduled domestic and international services of 120 
airlines of the rCAO Contracting States during the year 1970. This 
includes the USSR traffic which accounted for almost 58 million 
passengers in 1970 and most of which was carried on the domestic 
routes. Of the total world traffic, 170 million passengers or 
44.4 percent was carried by the airlines of the United states. 
Reliable statistics are not available for total world non-scheduled 
traffic, a bulk of which is generated in Europe and the United 
States. 
The statistics taken from rCAO in Table 1 show the regional 
distribution of the total world traffic measured in percentage 
ton-km. performed on scheduled services. This table shows that 
almost 86% of the world air traffic was accounted for by North 
America and Europe (including the USSR). 
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Table 1 
Regional Percentage Distribution of Total Ton-km 
Performed on Scheduled Airlines of ICAO States 
1970 
REGION SERVICES 
Domestic In terna ti onal All 
North America 1 62.9 33.2 51.1 
Europe 28.8 44.1 34.9 
East and South Asia 
and the pacific2 5.6 11.2 7.8 
South America 1.7 4.2 2.7 
Africa 0.7 3.8 1.9 
Middle East 0.3 3.5 1.6 
Total ICAO World 3 100 100 100 
1. Includes Panama and all countries to the north as well as 
the Caribbean States and territories. 
2. Including New Zealand, Australia and neghboring islands. 
3. Including USSR statistics for Aeroflot. 
Source: ICAO Bulletin, May 1972 
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These two ureas account for almost 30% of the world's population 
and almost-80% of the world's economic acLivity. If we measure 
economic activity by Gross National Product, then the united States 
accounts for roughly thirty percent of the total world's GNP and 
almost 45% of the world's air passenger traffic. 
The North Atlantic market represents the largest international 
air traffic flow in the world, accounting for almost a quarter of 
the total international passengers. In 1970, approximately ten 
million passengers traveled on this route with roughly three-
quarters of thp.se using scheduled airlines. Roughly a third of 
the passengers using non-scheduled services were transported by 
the charter operations of the scheduled carriers. 
From the statistics collected by the civil Aeronautics Board 
on the passenger traffic carried on United States scheduled air 
system in 1970, 153 million or a little over 90 percent were 
carried in the domestic operations. Table 2 shows the percent-
age distribution of the revenue passenger originations by carrier 
group. Over 70% of the passengers were carried by the eleven 
domestic trunk carriers and over 46% were accounted for by the 
Big Four Carriers. The revenue passenger miles of the United 
States domestic air system represents less than ten percent of 
the total for all modes. 
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Table 2 
U.S. Scheduled Air passenger Traffic & Distribution 
Carrier Group 
Domestic Operations 
Trunks 
Local Service 
Helicopter 
Intra-Alaska 
Intra-Hawaii 
Other * 
International and 
Territorial Operations 
* Alaska, Aspen, Tag. 
Total 
Scheduled Service - 1970 
Revenue passenger Originations 
Passengers 
(000) 
122,866 
26,472 
573 
351 
2,643 
503 
153,408 
16,260 
169,668 
Percent 
72.4% 
15.6 
0.3 
0.2 
1.6 
0.3 
90.4% 
9.6% 
100.0% 
Source: CAB Handbook of Airline Statistics, 1971 Edition, 
Tables 46 and 47. 
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Although private automobile accounts for almost 85 percent of inter-
city passenger traffic in terms of passenger miles, the air carriers 
are the largest form of common carrier transportation. 
For passenger travel on the scheduled domestic air system, the 
1970 CAB data shows that 42.8 percent of the passengers traveled a 
distance less than 499 miles while 99.0 percent of the passengers' 
trip length was 2749 miles or less. The reader is cautioned that 
these statistics do not include traffic data for the intra-state 
carriers. These statistics would change significantly if we were 
including PSA' s traffic on the Los Angeles - San Francisco market, 
the world's largest passenger market. 
The distribution of domestic scheduled air passenger traffic 
is shown in Table 3 for 1970. The top 100 city-pairs account for 
33.4 percent of the total traffic while the top 1000 city-pairs 
accounts for 72.9 percent of the traffic. According to the CAB 
data, New York - Boston ranks as number one city-pair with a little 
over two million passengers in 1970. If we include intra-state op-
1 
erations, then a DOT Study, based on a ten percent sample similiar 
to the CAB data, indicates that a total of 5.3 million passengers 
travelled on the Los Angeles - San Francisco route. 
L 
Statistical Compilation of Airline Passenger Markets. 
Domestic FY 1972. U.S. Department of Transportation. 
November, 1971. Page 10. 
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TABLE 3 
u.s. Scheduled Domestic Air passengers 
cumulative Distribution Among City-pairs 
1970 
Number of TOp city - Pairs 
In Order of Passengers Rank Cumulative Percent 
1 1 9 
10 11 1 
50 24 6 
100 33 4 
200 44 2 
500 60 4 
1000 72 9 
ALL 100.0 
Source: CAB's Handbook of Airline Statistics. 1971 Edition 
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The seasonality of air travel is a very important character-
istic. Figures 1 and 2 show the monthly seasonality of the traffic 
moving through Ne~ York. The months of July and August represent 
peaks for both domestic and overseas travel. The effect of season-
ality is more pronounced if we analyze an individual market. Figure 
3 shows that on the North Atlantic, the eastbound traffic was almost 
four and a half times greater in July than in February. Air travel 
even changes with the day of the week and hour of the day. The 
peaks in the hourly variation can be explained partially by the 
preference of the business traveler. The somewhat heavier demand on 
Thursday and Friday can be partially explained by the preference 
of the traveler on personal business or pleasure to travel at the 
end of the week. These demand patterns are seen in Figures 4 and 
5. 
Part of the seasonality pattern may be artificial. Orginally, 
excursion or discount fares were introduced by the carriers to shift 
demand from the peaks to the slack periods. However, the black out 
periods established to reduce peaking have created their own peak-
ing problems. 
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Figure 1 
Seasonality of Air Travel Demand 
U.S. Domestic at New York 
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Figure 2 
Seasonality of Air Travel Demand 
u.S. Overseas at New York 
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Figure 3 
Seasonality of the North Atlantic Traffic - by Month 
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Figure 4 
Daily Air Travel Demand 
by Hour 
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Figure 5 
Weekly Air Travel Demand 
by Day 
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Factors Influencing The Demand For Air Travel 
Factors affecting the air travel demand can be grouped into 
two broad categories: market related and trip related. The market 
related variables, also called the socio-economic variables, are 
those inherent to the general economic, geographic, social and 
political environment. This group can be further divided into 
characteristics related to the traveler (income, age, occupation, 
etc.) and demographic characteristics (population, industrial act-
ivity, tourism, etc.). The trip related variables, on the other 
hand, are those inherent to the transport mode, that is cost, tra-
vel time, comfort, safety and convenience. The demand for air 
travel is influenced by a complex interaction of one or more of 
these variables. This section contains a qualitative description 
of some of these factors. 
The demand for air travel can be analyzed in two parts: per-
sonal travel and business travel. Table 4 shows the distribution of 
air travel by purpose of trip. In 1967, based on the survey carried 
out by the Census of Transportation, personal and business travel each 
accounted for about 50 percent of the air travel market. 
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Table 4 
Percentage Distribution of Air Travel by Purpose 
of Trip (1967) 
Eerson-triEs Eerson-miles 
business 45.8 40.8 
conventions 5.5 6.5 
visits to friends & relatives 23.9 26.0 
outdoor recreation 2.4 2.5 
entertainment 3.4 3.6 
sightseeing 7.6 7.6 
other pleasure 2.2 2.3 
personal & family 9.1 10.7 
100% 100% 
source: 1967 Census of Transportation 
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Market Related Factors 
Income: Air travel is strongly determined by income,personal 
income in the case of personal travel and national income in the case 
of business travel. The ability to pay however, has to be accom-
panied by the willingness or the desire to spend. The demand for air 
travel is unlikely'to change,if for example, an increase in income 
is accompanied by an exact increase in savings. Table 5, taken from 
Port of New York Authority's survey data for 1967 shows that 94 per-
cent of the passengers surveyed had an annual family income higher 
than $5000. The data implies that the higher the income, the higher 
the percentage of travel. A similar survey carried out by the Uni-
versity of Michigan in 1962 showed that in a sample of 5093 respon-
dents, 28 percent of the respondents had family income less than 
$4000 and accounted for 6 percent of the airtrip~ while 17 percent 
of the respondents with family income of $10,000 and above accounted 
for 60 percent of the air travel. 
There are at least three forms of per capita income that can 
be used to explain the demand for air travel: national income is 
equal to domestic product at factor cost plus net factor income 
from abroad; disposable income is defined as personal income less 
taxes; discretionary income is that portion of disposable income 
in excess of the amount necessary to maintain a defined or historical 
standard of living. 
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Table 5 
Average Family Income of New York's 
Domestic Air Passenger Market 
Percent of the Survey POEulation 
Family Income 1956 1963 1967 
--
Under $5,000 12% 6% 6% 
$5,000 - $9,999 32 19 16 
$10,000 - $14,999 21 25 21 
$15,000 - $19,999 10 16 17 
$20,000 and over 25 34 40 
(Median) $11,400 $15,000 $17,000 
Source: Port of New York Authority Reference 2. 
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This last type of income may be saved or spent with no immediate 
impairment of living standards. Thus, it would appear that discret-
ionary income would be a better and more consistent predictor of air 
travel growth than either disposable or national income. However, 
most studies employ disposable income for the following reasons: 
1. unavailability of consistent data for discretionary 
income. 
2. difficulty of quantification of discretionary income. 
3. subjective definitions as to the size of discretionary 
income. 
Although data on disposable income per c3pita for the United 
States is readily available, similar and consistent data for other 
countries is not available. For international travel, one can use 
the data on national income which is published by the United Nations 
in consistent form for many countries including the United states. 
Various studies have shown that a factor which is even more 
important than the level of personal income is the distribution of 
family income. Some analysts prefer to use the distribution of 
family income above a certain base level to explain the demand for 
air travel. Asher3 uses a base of $7,500 for international travel; 
in other words, the traveler's annual income is greater than or 
equal to $7,500 and the greater the income (above $7,500) the greater 
the chances of his taking the trip. The use of such a districution 
should be viewed with caution since: 
- 18 -
1. The base level is a subjective measure and analysts 
differ in their views of its numerical value. Further-
more, the level would vary by geographic region. 
2. The data is very sketchy on the distribution of income 
in the united States and almost non-existent for some of 
the foreign countries. 
3. The variation in the income distribution is fairly 
difficult to forecast accurately. 
It has been shown previously that the level of income is an 
explanatory variable which partially explains the pleasure demand 
for air travel. While higher income families are more likely to 
travel, it is not income alone that influences them to travel. 
Now, we will introduce other variables related to income which 
also influence the pleasure travel demand. Given the relationship 
between income and the demand for air travel, the relationship be-
tween occupation, education, social status, etc., is fairly easy to 
predict. Travelers in the higher status occupations are usually 
educated to a higher level, belong to a higher social class and 
earn a higher income. 
Table 6 shows the relationship between occupation and air 
travel. In 1967, the survey of the pleasure air travelers in New 
York shows that 19 percent were in the professional and technical 
category. 
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Table 6 
occupation By Broad purpose of Trip 
New York's Domestic Air passenger Market 
1967 
occupation Personal 
Visiting Friends Sightseeing or 
or Relatives Visiting Resort Other Total 
Technical, Professional 21 20 10 19 
Manager, Official 14 17 6 12 
Salesman 3 4 1 3 
Secretary, Clerk 11 12 3 9 
Mecbanic, Craftsman, 
Factory Worker 4 4 2 3 
Armed Forces 2 1 24 7 
Housewife 22 23 19 21 
Student 17 12 32 20 
Retired 5 5 2 4 
Other 1 2 1 2 
Source: Port of New York Authority. Reference 2. 
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Further, the 1967 Travel Survey shows that for 56 percent of the 
trips taken, the occupation of the household head was either pro-
fessional or managerial. The category of factory workers and ser-
vice workers accounted for only 3% of the sample population. 
The level of education attained has a high correlation with 
income, occupation, social status, human wants, buying habits and 
attitudes. The educated generally travel more. Even when income is 
held constant. the better educated population tends to outspend the 
lesser educated for all goods and services. In addition. the better 
educated respond strongly to innovations. Therefore, the amount of 
education is increasingly important in estimating the demand for cer-
tain products. 
Higher education inspires an interest in and a desire to see 
other places, and thus affects demand for air travel. Today, there 
is a phenomenon which is not so much a pressure against heavy spend-
ing as a pressure to spend money as educated men are supposed to 
spend it. This is shown in the National Travel Survey by the fact 
that in 1967, 66 percent of the air travelers had some college educ-
ation and 94 percent had high school training. The·vital role educa-
tion plays in the air travel demand is substantiated by many other surveYE 
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For example, in a 1955 survey of United States Tourists in Europe, 
57% were found to be college and university graduates. Life maga-
zine, in a survey in 1960, found that 72 percent of the respondents 
sampled had some college education (19 October 1960). 
Knowledge of the social class with which a comsumer affiliates 
and/or to which he aspires also provides an indication of the likeli-
hood of his traveling. The middle class considers non-business air 
travel prestigious and a middle class person normally aspires to 
develop purchasing habits and attitudes similar to those of persons 
with higher social status. 
This phenomenon also takes place within the same social class. 
For example, having relatives, friends or business associates who 
traveled and enjoyed their trips appears to be an important deter-
minant of a person's decision to .travel. As a result of social press-
ures such as status-seeking and a desire to conform, the travel de-
cision of the individual may be a reflection of his friends' and 
associates' spending preferences~ 
While rising incomes account for part of the increase in the de-
mand for air travel, changes in taste also account for part Ot the 
growth. For example, a reduction in income may not be accompanied 
by a proportionate reduction in travel and visa versa. Tastes change 
with time and the availability of other goods and services will con-
tinually influence the demand for air travel. 
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It appears that business travel is not sensitive to personal 
income .. Business reasons are not self-selected, and although highly 
paid senior management executives travel more than middle and lower 
level staff, income of the business traveler seldom seems to directly 
influence the frequency or, in some cases, the class of travel. 
Business travel in general appears to depend, among other things, 
on the state of the economy. In individual city-pairs, the demand 
for business travel will depend on the type and extent of the business 
activity in each city. On the other hand, the demand for internat-
ional travel may depend on the level of exports, imports, investment 
abroad, balance of payments, etc. 
Since the economy is correlated to the demand for business 
travel, it stands to reason that during recessions, the amount of 
business travel diminishes. conversely, during an expansion of the 
economy, business travel increases. During recessions when corpor-
ate profits are down and costs are rising, one of the means of re-
ducing corporate costs is to curtail business travel. It can be seen 
from this that a relationship exists between the fluctuations in the 
economy and the travel trend. However, this relationship is very 
general, since fluctuations in the economy do not exactly coincide 
with fluctuations in traffic. The reason for this is twofold. First, 
there is never just one factor at play. Every year's traffic is in-
fluenced by many factors simultaneously. 
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Secondly, there is a time lag between the movement in the economy 
and the influence on traffic. TO attempt to predict this time lag 
accurately would require very sophisticated techniques and numerous 
statistical data. It has been suggested that a variable time lag 
should be considered. The variation implied here is twofold. First, 
the time lag should be different for the pleasure and business mar-
kets. Secondly, it should reflect the economy at any given time as 
being in the state of expansion, recession or normality. Due to the 
sophistication involve~ accuracy is usually sacrificed for simpli-
city and fixed lags are used. 
Population: Although it stands to reason that other things 
being equal, the demand for air travel would increase in some pro-
portion to the population growth, its influence is seen more clearly 
from the analysis of geographic concentrations of populations and its 
distribution by age, income and occupation. The influence of occu-
pation and income has already been shown. Many surveys have shown 
that the average age of the traveler is declining. Table 7 shows 
that between 1960 and 1969, the percentage of the United States pop-
ulation in the age group 15-29 years increased from 19.5 percent to 
23.4 percent. 
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Table 7 
Population by Age: 1960 and 1969 
(Total resident population, excluding Armed Forces abroad) 
AGE Percent Distribution 
(in years) 
* 1960 (Apr. 1) 1969 (July 1) 
Total . . . . . . . . . 100.0 100.0 
Under 5 11.3 8.9 
5-9 10.4 10.3 
,n , . 9.4 10.2 .L V-.L~ 
15-19 7.4 9.1 
20-24 6.0 7.8 
25-29 6.1 6.5 
30-34 6.7 5.6 
35-44 13.4 11.5 
45-54 11.4 11.5 
55-64 8.7 9.0 
65-74 6.1 5.9 
75-84 2.6 3.1 
85 and over 0.5 0.6 
* preliminary 
Source: Statistical Abstracts of the U.S. 1970 
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The influence of varying growth in different sectors of the 
population has different effects on the demand for air travel. For 
5 
example, as pointed out by Wheatcroft in his paper on the elasti-
city of demand for the North Atlantic, the influence of the popu-
lation growth on the demand for air travel, should include an allow-
ance for the growth of the European immigrant population. This sec-
tion of the united States population has grown almost twice as fast 
as the rest of the population. He has also pointed out another demo-
graphic factor which has influenced the traffic over the North Atlan-
tic; the tendency of the united States population to shift towards 
the West Coast and the influence of immigration. Data taken from the 
united States Abstracts shows that from 1790-1960 the centre of grav-
ity of the united states population moved from a point 23 miles east 
of Baltimore"Maryland to a point 4 miles east of Salem, Marion County, 
Illinois, a distance of roughly 700 miles westwards. Besse and De-
mas
6
, in their study reported that from 1940-1960 the centre of grav-
ity of the united States population moved 160 km westwards. This 
might be regarded as an adverse influence for European travel, since 
it would imply that an increasing porportion of the united States 
population lives nearer other competitive areas of pleasure travel 
(Hawaii and the Orient) . 
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Trips Related Factors 
Fares: The Marshallian law of demand is applicable to air tra-
vel: consumers will buy more at lower prices and less at higher 
prices. if other things do not change. 
Both personal and business air travel demand is dependent upon 
total trip cost and varies inversely with the trip cost as compared 
with other prices. Table 8 shows the historical trend of domestic 
and international fares and its relationship to consumer prices. 
The fares are represented by yield which is defined as revenue 
per revenue passenger mile. To compute yield. the accounting procedure 
is to divide the total passenger revenue for a given time in a given 
market by the total revenue passenger miles in that time period. 
Only revenue passengers are counted. The product of one passenger 
traveling one mile constitutes a revenue passenger mile. 
Table 8 shows while consumer prices have increased sharply 
since 1965. the domestic and international yields have declined. It 
should be pointed out that a decline in yield does not always imply 
a change in fare levels. A change in the traffic mix and/or change 
in the average stage length may cause a change in th~ average yield. 
A change in the fare can also be the result of a change in the tax 
levied on air transportation. 
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Table 8 
-
Domestic and International Yields for Scheduled 
OEera tions. Com Eared with Consumer Price Index 
1967 = 100 
Domestic Foreign Domestic Foreign Consumer 
Fare Fare Fare Fare Price 
Year (cents) (cents ) Index Index Index 
1957 5.25 6.49 95.5 129.3 84.3 
1958 5.58 6.46 101.5 128.7 86.6 
1959 5.80 6.31 105.5 125.7 87.3 
1960 6.01 6.39 109.3 127.3 88.7 
1961 6.18 6.08 112.4 121.1 89.6 
1962 6.35 5.87 115.5 116.9 90.6 
1963 6.07 5.82 110.4 115.9 91. 7 
1964 6.01 5.44 109.3 108.4 92.9 
1965 5.94 5.26 108.0 104.8 94.5 
1966 5.69 5.13 103.5 102.2 97.2 
1967 5.50 5.02 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1968 5.45 4.96 99.1 98.8 104.2 
1969 5.70 4.95 103.6 98.6 109.8 
1970 5.80 5.02 105.5 100.0 116.3 
Source: CAB Report - July 1971 
"productivity and Employment Costs in System Operations 
of the Trunk Airlines and Pan American, from 1957 
through 1970" 
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While the transportation cost is a significant determinent of 
the demand for air travel, the total trip cost appears to be a more 
important explanatory variable, especially in the case of internat-
ional travel. Table 9 shows the historical trend of the total aver-
age cost of a transatlantic trip. The declining trend since 1960 is 
due to the decline in fares and the decline in average expenditures 
while traveling in Europe. The downward trend in expenditures abroad 
is explained partially by the growing number of United States citizens 
with limited funds who are now traveling and partially by the fact 
that air travelers have been staying shorter periods in Europe and 
spending less. The average stay declined from about 66 days in 1950 
to 45 days in 1963. Data presented in a recent Boeing publication 
indicates that in 1969 the average stay had further declined to 28 
days. 
Table 10 compares the major components of the cost of a ten day 
trip in Europe and a large city in the united states for the years 
1958 and 1970. In both cases, the air fare represents a smaller 
part of the total cost in 1970 compared to 1958. This was accompani-
ed by an increase in the ground costs. This table a-Iso shows that in 
the case of the European trip, almost half of the total cost repres-
ents the air fare, while for the domestic trip, the hotel bill 
accounts for half of the total cost. 
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Table 9 
Average Cost of a North Atlantic Trip 
Transportation Expenses While in Europe 
Year Cost and Mediterranean Total Cost 
1951 $ 610 $ 759 $ 1369 
1952 630 767 1397 
1953 641 812 1453 
1954 628 858 1467 
1955 640 889 1529 
1956 660 867 1527 
1957 666 867 1533 
1958 655 876 1531 
1959 650 850 1500 
1960 660 840 1500 
1961 630 760 1390 
1962 595 705 1300 
1963 550 605 1200 
1964 520 650 1170 
1965 510 610 1120 
1966 487 5B3 1071 
1967 460 562 1022 
1968 455 510 965 
Source: Ref. 4 and the Annual Reports on Foreign Travel published 
in the Survey of Current Business, u.S. Department of Commerce. 
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Table 10 
components of Cost of Travel 
Distribution of Expenses for a 10-Day Trip 
In Europe In a Large City in U.S. 
Component 1958 1970 1958 1970 
Air Fare 75.8% 48.7% 31.6% 18.7% 
Meals 12.0 25.3 26.2 32.2 
Hotels 12.2 26.0 42.2 49.1 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Source: Air Transport 1971. ATA, washington, D.C. 
\ 
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The cause of declining fares when the price of almost everything 
else has been going up is the continuous reduction in the unit 
operating costs (both direct and indirect) for the scheduled airlines 
due to the higher productivity of the successive generations of civil 
aircraft. The jet aircraft has considerably higher productivity be-
ing both bigger and faster than the piston-engined aircraft. Al-
though the new aircraft also have higher operating costs per hour 
than their predecessors, the gain in productivity per hour was greater 
than their increase in costs per hour. Therefore, the net effect of 
their introduction was to produce a fall in the average unit oper-
ating costs. 
The reduction in the normal air fares has been important in 
attracting new and repeat travelers. They have made it more attrac-
tive for consumers who had never traveled before and others to take 
more frequent trips. There have also been many special areas, adapt-
ed to certain categories of users. The big fare reductions brought 
about by the introduction of a new class are probably those which 
strike the public most, but it would be a mistake to underestimate 
the influence of special fares, which have certainly generated a 
constant and very substantial increase in traffic. Examples of 
such fares are: 
Excursion fares, which presupposes a given length of stay. 
sometim$with departures only on certain days of the week. 
Often they are limited to certain times of the year which 
are staggered arcording to the point of origin of the pass-
engers 
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- out-of-season fares, which also tend to lessen the sea-
sonal nature of traffic while permitting certain cate-
gories of passengers to go on a trip at a lower price. 
- Family fares 
- Group fares granted automatically to parties comprising 
more than a certain number of members. 
In addition to the introduction of special fares, Charter has 
played a very important role in the development of air travel, es-
pecially in the international market. Historically, charter oper-
ations were started by scheduled airlines using spare (unproductive) 
equipment at off-peak periods. However, advanced equipment, with 
higher productivity (increased capacity and speed) and lower unit 
operating costs brought about by high load factors have made charter 
operations profitable. 
In recent years, charter traffic across the North Atlantic has 
been growing very rapidly relative to the traffic on scheduled 
carriers. The supplemental airlines have increased their share of 
traffic very significantly from less than 2 percent of the total 
transatlantic passenger traffic in 1963 to over 15 percent in 1969. 
Charter sales have increased as the price spread between charters and 
scheduled services has increased. This gap in fares (estimated over 
$160 average in 1968) from California to Europe has been largely 
responsible for the growth of supplemental charters in the market. 
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Supplemental charter traffic refers to the carriers offering 
charter service only. In the early sixties, several carriers were 
authorized to supplement the scheduled carriers by concentrating on 
charters for bona fide groups. However, authorization was not for 
these carriers to sell individually ticketed, point-to-point, trans-
portation to the general public. It appears that the main reason for 
the tremendous growth in supplemental carriers traffic is simply 
that these carriers have misinterpreted their authorization and 
have carried traffic other than bona fide groups. 
Charters, although a small percentage of the total transatlantic 
market, are very important in several key markets. They account for 
one-third of the transatlantic traffic originating in California, and 
almost 85% of these charters are on supplemental carriers. The price 
spread between charters and scheduled service depends on the length 
* of travel, the ratio of ferry mileage to live mileage and the load 
factors. In 1968, for example, this spread was about $70 for New 
York-London roundtrip and about $160 for Los Angeles-London roundtrip. 
The impact of lower fares depends among other things on the 
purpose of the trip. The pleasure traveler who uses charter services, 
does so to save money and is, therefore, willing to put up with a 
certain amount of inconvenience. 
* Ferry mileage refers to the aircraft flying without revenue 
load. One reason for the negligible supplemental charter activity 
on the North Atlantic during off-season is due to the high ferry to 
live mileage ratio. 
- 34 -
Many surveys have shown (TWA on-board surveys, PONYA) that the two 
categories most attracted to charter travel are ethnic and religious 
groups and educational and youth organizations. Ethnic groups are 
often attracted to a particular destination with which they feel 
they have emotional ties, often a desire to visit the homeland. 
Their travel is generally for the purpose of visiting friends or 
relatives. Price in this case plays a very important role. The 
cost of the stay after arriving at their destination is small. Sim-
ilarly, students are usually limited by cash, have a specific destin-
ation and the cost of their stay is small relative to the cost of 
transportation. Charters, therefore, are attracted to these groups 
because they can generate full plane-loads through established organ-
izations. 
Charters are also attracted to professional and cultural organ-
izations. These include organizations from the upper income sections 
of the community, for example, the medical, legal, cultural organiz-
ations such as symphony and art societies and political organizations. 
Charitable organizations are also included in this group. 
Trip Time: The decision to go by air is mainly a function of 
trip time. Speed is the primary competitive advantage of air travel 
over other modes, for the air journey has become both shorter and more 
reliable with speed improvements in newer aircraft. 
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Over the years the cruise speed of each generation of new aircraft 
have increased from about 110 miles per hour for the Ford Tri-Motor 
to almost 600 miles per hour for the Boeing 747 introduced in service 
in 1970. The increases in non-stop range of aircraft have also led 
to shorter point-to-point travel times through the elimination of 
intermediate stops. A longer-range capability was not necessarily 
combined with higher cruising speed in newer aircraft. 
Reduction in trip time, basically due to the higher speeds of 
aircraft, has affected both the business traveler as well as the 
pleasure traveler. Higher speeds have meant that the businessman 
can reach his destination in less time. Higher speeds also mean 
that the pleasure traveler can visit more distant places in a given 
time. 
The total demand for air travel (pleasure and business) varies 
inversely with the time required to complete a given trip. The value 
placed upon travel time for both pleasure and business purposes would 
presumbly be related to some measure of the traveler's earning rate. 
One such measure is the wage rate. There are, of course, many reasons 
why the value of time spent in travel might be larger or smaller than 
the traveler's wage rate. To the extent that the business traveler 
works during part of the flight or the pleasure traveler reads or 
watches a movie, travel does not take time away from other activities 
that have value. 
- 36 -
In addition, traveling might be sufficiently relaxing, exciting, or 
prestigious to the extent that travelers would pay for these pleasures 
by placing a lower rate on their value of time. Conversely, those for 
whom travel is boring, fatiguing or frightening would value travel 
time at rates higher than otherwise. Thus, although it is reasonable 
to expect that the higher the traveler's earnings, the higher the 
value he would place upon his time, the exact value he places upon 
his time actually be either greater than or less than his earning 
rate. 3 
Comfort, Safety, Convenience: It is extremely difficult, if not 
impossible, to determine the exact effect of comfort, safety and con-
venience on the volume of traffic. The difficulty lies in the fact 
that these variables are difficult to quantify and that their relative 
numerical value is rather sUbjective. Nevertheless, they do affect 
travel demand even if the contribution may be small. It has been 
suggested that changes in these variables such as comfort and con-
venience tend to occur more or less evenly over time. It is assumed 
that while each of these variables may be quite difficult to measure 
empirically, the net effect of all these factors may be approximated 
by a time trend function. 
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Comfort: Improvements in the quality of air travel tends to 
be of greater importance as a competitive factor rather than in 
creating new travel. Comfort is related to the comfort in the air-
craft as well as comfort at the aiport. With respect to comfort 
in the aircraft, there have been gradual product improvements re-
lated to the air' trip. The newer aircraft have gradually 
improved the quality of the air service. Major innovations which 
have led to greater comfort are the pressurized cabins and the 
reduction in cabin noise and vibration. Other factors contribut-
ing to inflight comfort have been a significant improvement in the 
quality of food service, items such as special meals, vast quanti-
ties and variety of reading material, inflight stereo, multi-channel 
music and movies. The level of inflight comfort has also been in-
creased due to lower values of seating density, the classical ex-
ample being the B-747. The distance between seats and their indiv-
idual width vary with the type of service which the passenger buys. 
The comfort level at the airport has also been steadily im-
proving. Modern facilities at the airports, easy and comfortable 
access to the aircraft (covered ramps, mobile lounges) have increas-
ed the level of comfort. 
Access times to and egress times from the airports have gen-
erally increased, around some larger cities. This is partly due to 
the movement of airports to locations more distant frOm the city 
centers but mostly due to the increasing traffic congestion on the 
roads. 
- 38 -
Safety: It is true that a certain percentage of the traveling 
public will always be diverted to other modes for safety reasons. 
For this group, fear plays a large role in keeping them away from 
the airlines. This remains true even though the relative improve-
ment in the safety of airline service. according to the measures 
usually presented, has been greater than for major surface trans-
port media as shown by Table 11. Of course, the absolute number 
of passenger deaths due to aircraft accidents has been growing 
but the numbe~ of passengers has been increasing more rapidly. 
Table 11 also shows the comparative transport safety record of the 
United States carriers compared to other countries. It is interest-
ing to note that the record of the united States scheduled domestic, 
international and territorial airlines is significantly better com-
pared to all scheduled airlines of the tCAO contracting States. 
The attitude of the traveler towards safety is somewhat re-
lated to his experience as an air traveler. This was substantiated 
by the results by a Michigan university survey on the feelings about 
air safety. The question asked was, "Do you feel that air travel is 
safer now (1962) than it was 10 years ago?" The results show that 
74 percent of the experienced air travelers felt'that air travel 
was safer now, compared to 58 percent of the inexperienced travelers. 
Fourteen percent of the inexperienced travelers indicated that air 
safety had in fact deteriorated. 
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Table 11 
Comparative Transport safety Record 
Passenger Fatality Rate per 100 Million Passenger Miles 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
E = Estimated 
united states 
Motor 
Buses 
0.11 
0.15 
0.11 
0.26 
0.15 
0.16 
0.23 
0.18 
0.24 
0.22 
N.A. 
Rail 
Roads 
0.16 
0.10 
0.14 
0.07 
0.05 
0.07 
0.16 
0.09 
0.10 
0.07 
0.09P 
Autos 
2.2 
2.2 
2.2 
2.3 
2.4 
2.4 
2.5 
2.4 
2.4 
2.3E 
2.2E 
P = preliminary 
Scheduled Airlines 
u.s. All ICAO Members 
0.76 1. 29 
0.30 1.11 
0.26 0.97 
0.23 0.78 
0.26 0.58 
0.31 0.56 
0.07 0.70 
0.22 0.40 
0.27 0.47 
0.11 0.43 
* 0.001 0.27 
* = Includes USSR 
Source: ATA's U.S. Air Transport 1971 and ICAO's Monthly Bulletin, 
May 1972. 
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convenience: Factors contributing to greater conveniences 
have been excess capacity, an increased number of flights in any 
given market, increasing number of origins and destinations, more 
direct flights, city-centre baggage check-in locations etc. Excess 
capacity implies that the passengers are not forced to plan their 
trips well in advance. This is especially important to the bus-
iness traveler whose plans cannot be confirmed too far ahead of 
his departure. 
Increased frequency reduces the waiting time at the terminals 
and provides greater flexibility in making connections. A greater 
number of origins and destinations also implies a reduction in 
connecting time and, hence, a reduction in the total trip time. 
Direct flights also have the same effect. For example, the success 
of non-stop flights from the united States west Coast to Europe have 
shown the convenience of direct flights. Where a traffic market does 
not justify direct flights, the carriers have offered through- plane 
service. For example, Cleveland-New York-London, Los Angeles-Lon-
don-Paris and Detroit-Boston-London are specific instances of 
through-plane service. In these cases, stop-over. times are lower 
than connecting times and passengers are assured of being on the 
plane and not missing a connection. 
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City-centre check-in locations save the passenger carrying his 
baggage to the airport and thus avoid lengthy check-in queues at 
the airport. It also reduces his pre-flight check-in time at the 
origin. The net effect of all these factors is to increase 
passenger convenience and to reduce the total trip time. 
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Theoretical Foundation of the Demand Function 
Although it is not esstential, it is useful for the analyst 
to have some idea of the theoretical background to the formulation 
of the demand function. In this section an attempt is made to out-
linein descriptive form some of the basic concepts relating to the 
theory of demand. Demand is treated as consisting of two parts: 
the demand for business air travel and that for pleasure air travel. 
The foundations of the two components are different. The demand 
for pleasure travel is derived from microeconomic theory, the util-
ity theory to be more precise. The demand for business air travel 
has not been formalized as yet. However, its foundations lie in 
the macroeconomic as well as microeconomic theory. 
The Demand Function For Pleasure Travel 
The theoretical demand function for pleasure travel can be 
derived from an analysis of the traditional cardinal or ordinal 
consumer utility theory. An individual's utility can be thought 
of as satisfaction received from consuming different goods and 
services. The term cardinal utility refers to the explicit mea-
surement of utility on an absolute scale. In contrast, the ordinal 
utility theory assumes that an individual is only capable of stating 
which of the two groups of goods and services he prefers, if either. 
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The important concept in arbitrarily assigning an absoluate scale 
to the utility measurement is not the absolute size of the utility 
derived from each commodity, but rather its size relative to all 
other commodities. 
The cardinal utility function relates an individual's total 
utility to his consumption of a set of goods and services. If we 
know the prices of each of these commodities as well as the avail-
able income of the consumer, then the utility is maximum when the 
marginal utility per dollar is the same for all commodities in the 
set. This results in maximum utility because if the marginal util-
ity per dollar was less from consuming service A than from service 
B. then the individual could increase his total satisfaction. just 
by rearranging his purchases without spending additional money. 
This can be shown mathematically. Assume that Xl denotes the 
th 
quantity of the i commodity consumed in a given time period. 
then the utility function can be written as 
U = F(X , X • 
1 2 
X , ---X ) 
~ n 
(1) 
where U relates the total utility of the individual to his con-
sumption of a set of n different goods and services such as food. 
housing. transportation. etc. 
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If we assume that P represents the price of the 1 
i 
commodity and 
Y denotes the consumer's income, then the total utility of the con-
sumer is limited by his budget constraint 
( 2) 
The utility can be maximized through the use of the Lagrangian 
multiplier method. 
... 
L- F(1C , '1-1. -.-y.--X ... )+I\(Y-~ X~ P~) 
.J ) -"t--t-= , (3) 
The satisfaction of first order conditions will maximize the con-
sumer's utility. The second order conditions or the sign of the 
bordered Hessian determinant will determine whether the utility 
is maximum or minimum. 
dL 
-
dLl~ 
::: -- -
_D 
d x,\ (4) 
and 
-
'(- (5) 
• 
(6 ) 
• • 
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Equation 6 expresses that the marginal utility per dollar 
of each of the n goods and services is equal. This equation states 
that for a given marginal utility, the lower the price the higher 
is the marginal utility per dollar. Thus, as the price of a good 
increases, the marginal utility per dollar decreases and it pays 
the consumer to decrease the quantity he buys. The reverse of 
this argument also holds and this confirms the concept of the 
downward sloping demand curve. 
The solution to Equations 4 and 5 will also provide the 
consumer's demand function for each of the n available commodities. 
I h 'd d f . f h' th d . For examp e, t e consumer seman unctlon or tel commo lty, 
say air travel, can be obtained by solving for X . In general, 
i 
the demand function for the ith commodity will be of the following 
x = X 
i i 
(p , p , 
I 2 
p , 
i 
---p , y) 
n 
(7) 
If we hold the consumer's income constant and the prices of all 
th 
other commodities remain unchanged, then the quantity of the i 
commodity consumed by an individual will depend on the price of 
th 
the i commodity. 
)./70 
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Although the exact shape of the demand function for the i 
commodity depends on the parameters and functional nature of the 
consumer's utility function, we will assume that the Marshallian 
law of demand is applicable to air travel: consumers will buy more 
at lower prices and less at higher prices, all other things being 
equal. 
The Demand Function for Business Travel 
There is no formal derivation for the demand function for 
business travel. However, we can point out the areas of economic 
theory which can contribute to the formulation of the theory. It 
is logical to assume that the air travel demand for business trips 
is related to the economy in general and specifically to the level 
of investment by the business concerns, the interest rates avail-
able, some measure of stock prices, etc. At the same time, it is 
logical to assume that the air travel demand for business trips is 
related to the firm's output of products and services. We are, 
therefore, assuming that an individual firm will treat the business 
travel by its employees as another input factor to the production 
activity. In this case, we are hypothesizing that the demand for 
business air trips can be derived from the demand for the output 
of all major industries producing goods and services. 
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Air Travel Demand Models 
A market demand model explains the demand of all consumers 
for a particular good or service. This model can be used to ex-
plain the behavior of consumers in a particular market, all mar-
kets, a particular class of travel, all classes of travel, the 
market share of a particular mode, the market share of a parti-
cular carrier, or some combination of these. The models used to 
estimate the demand for air travel can be broadly classified into 
four categories: aggregate, gravity, modal split and inter and 
intra modal market share. This section contains a brief descrip-
tion of the models and the basic theoretical assumptions. The 
problems involved with the statistical specification and the em-
pirical significance of the models is dealt with in the next 
section. 
The Aggregate Models 
The most simplistic models used for explaining the demand 
for air travel are single-equation aggregate market demand models. 
The aggregate mOdel assumes that the service, air travel, is a homo-
geneous unit such as revenue passenger miles or revenue ton miles, 
etc. The index revenue passenger miles is determined by summing 
over all routes the product of number of passengers and the distance 
flown by each. 
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These models usually relate the total demand for air travel, to a 
selected number of demographic characteristic of the traveler and 
the market and the trip related factors, that is, factors describ-
ing the level of service offered. 
There are normally four sets of "independent" variable in 
the model: some measure of average price of air travel, a mea-
sure of price of other commodities such as an alternative travel 
mode, a measure of the traveler;' s family income and some form of 
a time trend to account for factors which have not been included 
explicity in the model. 
The aggregate model assumes that the volume of passenger 
traffic is related to the same parameters in all markets. This 
implies that the travel demand in the New York-Bermuda market_can 
be characterized by the same parameters as in the New York-Chicago 
market. This assumption is weak, since the first is a pleasure 
market and the latter is mostly a business market. This being the 
case, although price paid by the traveler may be important in both 
cases, the impact of price is different in the two cases. 
Normally, the single equation aggregate demand models do not 
contain a sppply parameter. This is justified on the grounds that 
the airlines usually operate with considerably less than full cap-
acity and it is unnecessary to include a supply variable. 
J/73 
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Secondly, monopolistic routes are almost nonexistent and insuffic-
ient capacity is unlikely due to the market forces. The standard 
criticisms of excluding the supply factor are, first, that there 
may be some routes with very high load factors and secondly, that 
an increase in supply may increase demand. 
The price variable is usually taken to be the average yield, 
that is, average revenue per revenue passenger mile for a given per-' 
iod. In theory, only one price should exist for a homogeneous 
commodity at any given time in a competitive market. However, 
in the case of air travel we have different prices. The average 
yield is a weighted average revenue and as such is subject to change 
even if the level of fare does not change. A change in the compos-
ition of the passenger mix or average length of haul can change the 
numerical value of yield. Similar arguements can be put forward for , 
the use of an average per capita income. 
The demand for air travel cannot be explained by price and in-
come alone. It is generally recognized that some measure of value 
of time should be included in the model. The increases in aircraft 
speed relative to other competitive modes of transportation have 
been a very significant factor in the growth of the air travel. On 
the other hand, advanced technology has required greater amounts of 
investments which in turn, have affected the cost and in turn, the 
price of air travel. 
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Although there are many reasons for choosing aggregate mar-
ket-demand models, the most important one is the lack of adequate 
published data. It is true that a first class revenue passenger 
mile cannot be added to the one generated by the economy class 
passenger or that average yield is inadequate, since no one pays 
the average fare. HoweveI, since data does not exist by class of 
service (other than first class vs. economy), purpose of trip, true 
origin-destination, by type of fare, etc., the analyst is forced 
to investigate the demand for air travel on an aggregate basis. 
The second major problem related to the data is the inability to 
quantify subjective data such as changes in personal taste. In 
general, the mathematical formulation of the aggregate demand 
model can be expressed as: 
where: 
T (t) = traffic between origin i and destination j during time 
ij period (t) 
K = constant 
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F = some average prlce for air travel 
air 
F = some average price for a competitive mode of transportation. 
competition 
Y = some measure of the traveler's family income. 
S = representative aircraft speeds. 
g(t) = time function 
G = lag or lead for the var iable 
This is a mUltiplicative type of extrinsic model. An extrinsic 
model is one where, although time can enter the relationship as a 
predictor variable, it cannot be the sole predictor variable. The 
left hand side of the demand function contains a small number of 
variables which are presumably more important, and the net effect 
of the excluded variables is represented by a stochastic variable, 
a time trend. This variable accounts for all forces which should 
be included explicity in the behavioral demand function but are 
unquantifiable or subjective. Variation of these forces is, there-
fore, allowed through the use of a time trend function. The basic 
assumption is that the effect of the stochastic variable is simi-
lar to that observed in the past and, furthermore, on the long-
term basis, time function will satisfactorily account for many of 
the secondary variables. The selection of the predictor variables 
is limited due to the availbility of data and the difficulty of 
quantification. 
- 52 -
The exponents in the model represent partial elasticities, 
one elasticity coefficient for each factor which may be regarded 
as an average elasticity over the range of the data. The implicit 
assumption here is that the partial elasticities are constant. 
This aggregate form of the demand model contains one term to 
repr.esent inter-mode cross-elasticity. It does not, however, 
contain intra-mode cross-elasticities. This is to say that first 
class traffic is not separated from the economy or excursion traffic 
and business travel demand is not separated from the pleasure travel 
demand. These limitations of the aggregate model exist due to the 
substantial limitations of the data available to reflect the price 
upon which the traveler makes his decision and the lack of tech-
niques to secure homogeneity so that the price and income effects 
may be isolated. 
The model also includes the flexibility to incorporate the 
delays with which the socia-economic factors exert their influence 
on the volume of traffic. For example, the family income in year t 
may effect the demand for air travel in year t, (t-l) , or (t+l). 
The Gravity Models 
The gravity model for the demand for alr travel is based on 
the gravitational law of physics. The model expresses the relation-
ship between the demand for air travel between two cities as a 
function of the population of the two cities and the distance be-
tween them. The general form of the model can be expressed as: 
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k 
• 
P .(iJ p. (tj It ~ 
where: 
T, ,(tl = traffic between city i and city j during some time period t. 
1J 
K = constant 
p = population of city i. i 
p, 
= population of city j. J 
d, ,= the distance between 
1.J 
city i and city j . 
The general form of the model does not assume that the population 
of each city should have equal travel inducing effects, or that the 
exponent of the distance factor has a numerical value of 2. The 
basic limitations of this model are: 
1. it is difficult to define precisely the population of 
a city; 
2. the model assumes that the population of a city lives 
at a "node" of a city; 
3. city characteristics, such as average income, type of 
city, etc., are excluded from the model; 
4. it is assumed that the same factors characterize the 
demand for all city-pairs. 
178 
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It is possible to generalize the gravity model further by 
including factors such as average income, community of interest, 
availability of alternate modes of transportation, etc. By defini-
tion, then, gravity models are cross-sectional in nature, that is, 
they are generally used to analyze the demand for air travel be-
tween different city-pairs. 
The variable "community interest" is an interesting one to 
7 
analyze. Brown and Watkins represent "community of interest" 
by the number of international air passengers travelling on the 
same route. Although it is difficult to prove the significance 
of these two factors in explaining the community of interest. they 
appear to provide a reasonable "fit" to the empirical data. 
Modal Split Models 
A modal split model determines the functional relationship 
between the share of traffic attracted to a particular mode over a 
route. The most common form of the modal split model assumes that 
total trip time and total cost are the two most significant factors 
which the travelling public will use in determining their choice of 
a mode of travel. 
The mathematical formulation of one form of a modal split 
model is given in Figure 6. The total trip time includes the times 
for access, egress, passenger processing and waiting for the next 
line haul service. 
WHERE 
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Figure 6 
Modal Split Model 
MS .. IJm 
a ~ C.. T .. lJm lJm 
= L C.~ • T.~ IJm um 
m-l,m 
MS.. = IJm SHARE OF TRAFFIC BETWEEN i AND j TRAVELLING ON MODE m 
C .. IJm = TOTAL TRI P COST = ACCESS + EGRESS + TRI P FARE 
T.. = TOTAL TRIP TIME IJm 
= T +T +T +Tb+T a p w e 
Ta' Te = TIME FOR ACCESS. EGRESS 
T 
P 
= TIME TO PROCESS PASSENGER AT STATION 
T • TIME TO WAIT FOR NEXT SERVICE TO/2 = 
w f.. IJm 
Tb = BLOCK TIME ON MODE m 
TO = DAILY HOURS OF OPERATION FOR MODE m 
f.. IJm 
= DAILY FREQUENCY OF SERVICE FOR MODE m 
a = TRIP COST ELASTICITY 
~ = TRIP TIME ELASTICITY 
Source: Concept Studies For Future Intercity Air Transportation 
Systems. MIT - FTL. 1970 
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These factors are taken to account for the "convenience" al'pect of 
the system. The model does not contain factors on comfort safety 
and reliability. In this figure, the time to wait for next ser-
vice, T depends on daily frequency. The total trip cost, again, 
w 
consists of trip fare and the cost of access and egress. 
Market Share Models 
A market share model shows the realtionship between the 
share of the passenger traffic for an airline in a given competi-
tive market and the factors which describe the quality of service 
offered in the market by the carrier. Since, for a typical united 
states airline market, service factors such as fares and the type 
of aircraft are similar for all competitors in the market, the 
market share becomes a function of factors such as frequency of 
service, departure and arrival times, the image of the carrier, 
etc. 
Research in the area of market share estimation in the airline 
industry has indicated that the most significant explanatory vari-
able of market share is frequency share. More precisely, the em-
pirical evidence shows that market share is an S-shaped curve and 
its location is a function of the number of carriers in the market. 
This concept is illustrated in Figure 7. 
M.S. 
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Figure 7 
~arket Share - Frequency Share Relationship 
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Source: N. K. Taneja, Airline Competition Analysis 
MIT, Flight Transportation Laboratory, 1968 
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various studies have indicated that the effects of multi-stop 
service and preference for various types of aircraft can best be 
accounted for by assigning weighted values to the daily frequency. 
Although these numbers have been highly criticized for their numer-
ical and relative value, it should be pointed out that the values 
of these weighting factors are not extremely critical since services 
on competitive markets are normally very similar. 
Another significant variable in the estimation of market 
share is the image factor which is usually built on such factors 
as inflight service, on-time performance, advertising, attitude 
of personnel, etc. 
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Model Selection and Evaluation 
The selection of a particular model depends on the purpose of 
investigation, the validity, the simplicity, the accuracy, the cost 
of operation and maintenance and perhaps personal preference of the 
forecaster. The criteria for model selection and evaluation becomes 
significantly complex when there are a number of conflicting factors 
to consider. Nevertheless, it is necessary for the analyst to sort 
through the many factors and select a model. The following are a 
number of factors which can be used as guidelines for model selection 
and evaluation. It is not claimed that this list is complete or even 
that the criteria listed are more important than the ones left out. 
To begin with, it is necessary for the analyst to be clear of 
the purpose of the investigation. For example, if the main object 
of the investigation is to estimate the true numerical value of de-
mand elasticities upon which to base pricing and marketing strategies, 
then the unbiased estimation of the particular demand elasticity 
should be the criteria for model selection and evaluation. On the 
other hand, if the main object of the study is to forecast the demand 
for air travel, then the criterion for the selection of the model 
should be based on the forecasting ability of the model or the 
accuracy of the forecast. 
- 60 -
The model selected should produce the smallest standard error of 
estimate and standard error of the demand coefficients. Similarly, 
if the purpose of the model is to produce a long-term forcast, then 
the choice of a cross-sectional model may not be the best one since 
the parameters in a cross-sectional model are estimated from a sam-
pIe of observations at a given point in time. 
Having narrowed the choice to a particular category of models, 
the next criterion should pivot on the validity of the model. The 
validity factor should be investigated in four parts: the theoreti-
cal foundations of the model, the underlying assumptions, the 
statistical validation and the empirical calibration data in the case ) 
of econometric models. Again, these factors are only guidelines to 
investigate the validity of the model. The analyst can, however, 
perform very sophicticated and in-depth analysis of each factor. 
Once again, the effort put in evaluation should not be out of pro-
portion to the development and use of the model per se. 
All models should be based on some fundamental theory, may it 
be economics, engineering or otherwise. For instance, the demand for 
air travel can be based on economic theory. The analyst can go one 
step further and relate for example, the demand for pleasure travel 
to consumer's utility theory, or business travel to the theory of the 
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firm. In other cases, the analyst can, for example, relate the gravi-
ty mOdel to the gravitational law of physics. Unless some background 
theory can be put forward, it would be difficult to justify a model 
which, for example, predicts the air travel in the United states 
based on the amount of tea consumed in England. 
Equally important in selecting a model, are the basic assumptions 
incorporated in the model. One can not justify using an aggregate 
demand model with constant price elasticity for forcasting the 
demand on a highly price elastic route. In another case, for example, 
the analyst can not use a model calculated using subsonic aircraft 
data, to forecast the potential on the supersonic aircraft. In each 
case, it is crucial to investigate the fundamental assumptions on 
which the model is based. The analyst who favors trend analysis is 
assuming that in the future the impact of factors influencing the 
market demand to air transportation will be similar to that observed 
in the past. Even an analyst who does not believe in forecasting, 
has a model and a set of assumptions For not forecasting, he is 
implicitly assuming a state of status quo. 
The next area of investigation refers to the statistical val-
idation of models which are known as analytic, regression or econometric. 
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These models may be subject to statistical problems such as multi-
collinearity, autocorrelation, heteroscedasticity identification, 
etc. In each case, if a statistical problem exists, the chances are 
that the estimated parameters would be biased and the predictive 
ability of the model is subject to errors. The existence of more 
than one type of statistical problems complicates the matter further 
and evaluation of the model becomes even more difficult. The 
analyst, however, does have a set of statistics to help him deter-
mine the existence and in some cases, the extent of the problem. 
In the case of an econometric model, the analyst is usually pro-
* vided with statistics such as standard error of coefficient, multi-
pIe correlation coefficient, the F-statistic, the Durbin Watson or 
Von Neuman ratio, the Chow test, etc. A combination of one or more 
of these statistics and tests can be used to determine the stat-
istical validity of an econometric model. 
Closely related to the above is the general validity of the 
calibration data. In selecting and evaluating a particular model, 
one must investigate the calibration data which is used to estimate 
the demand parameters. Again, the data can be analyzed for adequacy, 
consistency and reliability. putting it in another way, one must 
* For a description of these statistical problems, the reader is 
referred to standard texts such as Johnston and Wonnacott. 
References 8 and 9· 
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examine the data to see if the sample size was adequate. each data 
point was measured by the same rules and that the data is relatively 
free of significant errors. 
The next set of selection criteria are somewhat interrelated. 
Simplicity is tied to the ease and cost of operation and mainten-
ance on the one hand. and cost. accuracy and personal preference 
on the other hand. An historical trend analysis may be simple. 
cheap and easy to perform. but how accurate is it to forecast the 
demand for travel in a time period which may have supersonic air-
craft. subsonic mass transportation or hypersonic aircraft or none 
of these? On the other hand. and equally important one has to weigh 
the marginal predictive accuracy against marginal cost of formula-
ting a sophisticated model. Furthermore. a sophisticated model may 
not be necessarily more accurate than a simple one and yet for the 
sophisticated model. the collection and manipulation of the input 
data may be very expensive. 
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A key ingredient in the analysis, planning, implementation 
and operation of any successful transportation system requires 
accurate and realistic forecasts of traffic volume expected to use 
the system. Although the planning process involves much more than 
a forecast of the future traffic statistics, these statistics pro-
vide an essential quantative dimension for the planning process. 
Forecasts of expected traffic are therefore an essential prerequi-
site to both long and short-range planning. 
This paper outlines the basic techniques of forecasting the air 
passenger traffic. The differences between the various forecasting 
methods exist, in part, due to the degree of formalization of the 
forecasting procedure. Each technique has its special use and the 
selection of an appropriate technique depends on a number of factors 
such as particular application available data, projection period 
J 
and desired accuracy. 
Forecasts can be classified according to the time period they 
cover. "Short-term" forecasts are normally used for planning cur-
rent policy, evaluating current developments, and in general are 
concerned with the day-to-day operations. The time framework can 
range from one month to a year. "Budget" forecasts normally refer 
to a fiscal year and are used for establishing basic operating re-
quirements such as determining cashflow and adjusting station em-
ployee requirements in line with seasonal movements in traffic. 
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"Long-term" forecasts normally cover a period of three to fif-
teen years. They are generally used for fleet planning, market 
and route planning, etc. Time frame for the forecast will in-
fluence the selection of the technique. For example, a long-
range forecast of the market potential of a given route requires 
a different forecasting technique than a forecast of the system 
traffic for producing next year's financial budget. 
One of the most crucial trade-offs in the selection of a fore-
casting technique is of accuracy versus cost. Although greater ac-
curacy can be obtained at higher costs, there is usually an op-
timal point beyond which diminishing returns take over. In this 
context, the cost of the forecast is used in the general sense. It 
includes such components as time required to forecast, use of com-
puter facilities, the additional cost of acquiring more suitable 
data, the cost of error in the forecast, etc. 
Techniques for forecasting air passenger traffic can be 
broadly classified into four categories: judgmental, time-series 
analysi& market analysis and analytical. The judgmental or sub-
jective method relies on the analyst to make an educated guess of 
I 
the travel demand for the forecast period hased on his experience 
of the past volume of traffic and his intuition of the future. 
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Although the analyst does not use any specific travel demand model, 
he intuitively takes into account the factors which influence the 
demand for air travel and weighs these factors according to his 
judgment. This method is especially useful in cases where the 
data sample is small or nonexistent as may be the case requiring 
traffic forecast on a new market or a forecast of the market 
acceptance of a new type of aircraft. Although the judgmental method 
has the advantage of low cost and ease of operation, it is limited 
to short-term forecasting. This approach has little merit in long-
term forecasting since it is natural, although perhaps, unintentional, 
for the analyst to place greater weight to more recent developments. 
The judgmental forecast can be produced by a single analyst or 
by a committee as with the delphi technique. In the delphi method, 
a group of experts is consulted through a set of carefully designed 
sequential questionaires. The answers to one set of questionaires 
are used to design the next set and all members in the group have 
access to each other's information. 
The time-series analysis method assumes that the air passenger 
traffic will follow its established pattern of growth. This means 
that the future travel demand is a time function of the past ex-
perience. The time-series analysis, therefore, assumes very little 
causation. The method can be useful for broad long-term projections 
especially in cases where there is very little knowledge on the cause 
for growth. On the other hand, the method has little merit for 
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forecasting detailed long-term patterns. Since the assumption of 
the future being direct function of the past is more likely to be 
true in the case of short-term. the trend method can be very use-
ful for producing detailed forecasts on the short-term basis. 
The application of time-series analysis varies from the simple 
extrapolation of historical trends to the use of complex mathematical 
growth curves. such as the Logistic and Gompertz curves. These are 
known as intrinsic models. that is. time is taken to be the only pre-
dictor variable. reflecting the interplay of economic. industry. and 
governemnt activities. The difficulty lies in determining accurately 
the appropriate trend curve. We can use empirical and theoretical 
considerations to narrow the selection of the growth curve. For 
example. the very long-term forecast of the air passenger traffic in 
the united States may be estimated by an asymptotic trend. such as a 
Gompertz curve, since there are good reasons to place an upper limit 
on the level of traffic. 
The simple extrapolation involves a projection of past observed 
trend through visual inspection. Although such a method will suffice 
for certain applications,direct extrapolation, in general. is not 
considered a satisfactory method of forecasting especially for cases 
involving turning points. The method merely indicates that parameters 
exist which have influenced the demand in the past at a rate which is 
a function of time. It is. therefore. difficult to project the 
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demand based on time alone unless one knows these time-based param-
eters and the extent of their influence. It is also difficult to 
forecast the time at which these influences may cease to operate 
or their effects will change. For example, it is well-known that 
the sea traffic on the North Atlantic has been declining steadily. 
A direct mechanical extrapolation of this trend will produce a total 
disappearance of the sea traffic on this route after a certain time. 
A reasonable forecast, on the other hand, would set a minimum on 
the passenger market patronizing the water mode. 
For annual budget forecast, the analyst is usually interested in 
forecasting monthly traffic which can fluctuate due to trend, cycli-· 
cal and seasonal factors. In addition, the seasonal traffic pattern 
may contain random noises. The long-term trend is usually the result 
of steady and continuous increases in population and technical im-
provement. The cyclical fluctuations are generally the result of 
movements in the economy or business cycles and do not usually con-
form to a set pattern. The seasonal effects occur at a given time 
in the year and are usually the result of season or custom. The ran-
dom noise is the irregular or the residual part of the pattern. The 
time-series forecasting model attempts to project the value of the 
first three components of the series and sum the results to get the 
forecast value of the traffic. 
the random noise component. 
It is usually impossible to forecast 
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Various time-series statistical models are available to analyze 
and forecast values of a fluctuating pattern. Smoothing techniques 
are the most common means of investigating time-series components. 
These techniques attempt to cancel out the random effects by using 
"averages." The normal smoothing schemes are the moving average 
type and the exponential smoothing. The former scheme calculates 
averages over a fixed base time period While the latter scheme cal-
culates an average using all past values of the series. The weight 
given to the individual value of the series is determined by the 
smoothing constant. 
The accuracy of this method depends on the behavior of the traffic 
pattern. A well behaved pattern with small random variation will be 
relatively easy to forecast compared to one containing a significant 
random pattern. Normally the historical raw time-series data is 
adjusted and massaged to eliminate known distortions caused by ad 
hoc factors such as strikes, introduction of new aircraft, bad 
weather and extra ordinary large scale promotion. A forecast of the 
time-series model can then be used on the clean data to produce a 
forecast of the seasonal traffic pattern. The experienced analyst 
would then apply to the predetermined forccast intuitive factors 
such as expected changes in competitor's traffic, introduction of 
excursion fares, and movements in economy to obtain a more realistic 
traffic forecast for budget purposes. 
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The mFrket analysis method relates the travel patterns of a 
given segment of the population to its demographic and economic 
characteristics. The port Authority of New York and New Jersey 
has investigated the use of this method based on a series of nation-
al household surveys conducted over a period of fifteen years. The 
results of these surveys indicate a strong relationship between the 
travel pattern of a group of people and such characteristics as in-
come and occupation. A forecast of the air traffic activity is ob-
tained from a forecast of the demographic and economic character-
istics of each of the population segments. 
The air travel market is usually divided into a large number of 
"cells" each defined by a cross-classification of socio-economic 
characteristics such as age, education, occupation, and income for 
personal travel and industry, occupation and income for business 
travel. Once the cells have been established, a relationship is 
investigated between air trips and these characteristics. This 
relationship is then applied to a forecast of the segment of pop-
ulation expected to fall under similar cells to obtain the projected 
number of air passengers for all cells. Projections of population 
and its distribution with respect to age, labor force, income groups, 
etc., can usually be obtained through sources such as united states 
Census Bureau and united states Department of Labor. 
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There are three critical assumptions regarding the validity 
of this method. First, an assumption has to be made regarding 
the stability of the relationship between travel patterns and 
the socio-economic characteristics. Secondly, a realistic 
assumption is needed on the projected growth of the traffic group 
within an individual cell. Third, the model should take into 
account future expected changes in the socio-economic structure 
of the population and segments of the population which are not in-
cluded in the surveys. 
Market analysis can be an extremely useful tool in identifying 
those segments of the population which generated most of the air 
activity and those which are good future potentials. The weakness 
of the method is that it does not take into account service charact-
eristics such as fare and trip time. The market analysis method, 
for example, will not be able to relate the changes in the demand 
for air travel to changes in the average fare level or introduction 
of new fares introduced to attract a certain market. 
The market surveys can be taken from actual travelers or from 
households with potential travelers. In the later case, consumers 
are asked about their travel intentions and the responses are sub-
ject to many "errors". The most common of these is due to misin-
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terpretation and lack of ability to quantify subjective responses. 
The common limitations of these surveys are that the respondent may 
not be the ultimate decision-maker or that he may be unable to 
state accurately his travel plans. In any case the plans can 
change due to family circumstances and general economic conditions. 
The analytical method attempts to relate the variation in the 
movement of logically relevant economic variables such as income, 
demographic variables such as population, and service variables such 
as fare and trip time. This method explores and analyzes parameters 
which have affected the historical travel demand pattern and those 
para'lleters which may influence the future travel demand. An analy-
tical demand model shows through one or more equations, an economic 
relationship between demand and a nwnber of predictor variables which 
can be classified as exogeneous or endogenous. The endogenous 
variables are determined wi thin the model itself while the exogenous 
variables are predetermined. It should be noted that although time 
can enter the relationship as a predictor variable, it cannot be the 
sole predictor variable. It must also be emphasized, :·lOwever. that 
statistical correlation does not always imply cause and effect. In 
many -:::as,.,s the> r:-nlatinn.ship lS empirical or logical at best. 
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There are basically four steps in building an analytical 
model: specification, data analysis and collection, calibration, 
and evaluation. The specification stage involves the formulation 
of a set of testable hypotheses showing the relationship of volume of 
air passenger traffic with economic and transport-related variables. 
It refers to the task of formulating a set of precise mathematical 
equations. The selection of the variables is based on the consid-
erations of empirical data, economic theory, statistical techni-
ques and computational advantages. Since the relationship cannot 
be an identity, it is usual to include an error or residual term. 
The next step involves the analysis and collection of past 
data on both the dependent and the independent variables. This 
is a very critical step since the unavailability of certain types 
of data can force the analyst to an alternate model specification. 
The data analysis is usually performed with respect to sample 
size, reliability, consistency and availability of projected values. 
The data collection involves not only the gathering of statistics 
but ·the adjustment of the data for ad hoc influences such as 
strikes. 
In the thi.d stage of the model development, the parameters of 
the regression equation are estimated from the past data on both 
kinds of variables. The calibration of the model is carried out by 
deriving the appropriate functional relationship through experi-
mentation with the past data and the use of regression techniques. 
For a base period, various functional relationships are empirically 
manipulated. The object is to find the relationship which gives the 
least variance between the derived demand and the actual demand. 
The final step is an evaluation of the model in terms of its 
effectiveness to explain the volume of traffic. This step may lead 
to an alternative specification of the model and hence, repetition 
of the first three steps. In general, model evaluation can be per-
formed in two steps. First, it is necessary to justify the model 
on theoretical grounds. For example, a travel demand model with 
positive price elasticity should be questioned on logical ground. 
The second stage of evaluation is based on statistical validity. 
The four most common indicators of statistical validity are degrees 
of freedom, the coefficient of determination, standard error of the 
regression coefficient, and the standard error of estimates. For 
greater details on the significance of these tests, a standard text 
on econometrics can be consulted. 
There are three fundamental assumptions underlying the analy-
tical approach. First, it is assumed that most of the variation in 
the dependent variable can be explained by using a few selected 
independent variables. This assumption is necessary due to the 
availability of limited data. Furthermore, in many cases it is 
difficult if not impossible to quantify all the variables even 
though we recognize that these variables have influenced the vol-
ume of traffic in the past and will continue to do so in the future. 
500 
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The second assumption is that it is easier and/or more accurate to 
forecast the independent variables than the dependent variable. Nor-
mally the data for the projected values of the independent variables 
can be obtained directly from external sources, giving the analyst 
two advantages. First of all, certain external specialists in 
various branches of the government, private industry, and/or acad-
emic institutions are probably better equipped to produce the pro-
jections. Secondly, it is important that the assumptions regarding 
the projections of economic activity should be consistent. The 
third assumption is that the functional relationship will remain 
valid throughout the period for which the forecast is required. 
Like any other method. the use of analytic technique has its 
own problems. Again without going into depth, the two most common 
problems associated with this method are multicollinearity and 
autocorrelation. The former is caused by the existance of relation-
ships among some of the independent variables. The term autocorrelation 
is normally used to describe the lag correlation of a particular time-
series with itself. This problem can cause the model to systematically 
"overshoot" or "undershoot" the pattern. 
In the past, most forecasts have relied heavily on the use of 
time-series analysis. In cases where attempts were made to formulate 
.501 
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more sophisticated demand models, the scope was limited due to una-
vailability of statistical data such as volume of traffic by pur-
pose of trip, discretionary personal income and lack of the ability 
to measure certain factors, such as taste and the effect of adver-
tising. Current research is devoted to developing models which 
are analytic, multivariate, behavioral, dynamic and probabilistic. 
The analytic formulation offers the advantage of statistical 
tests of several groups of alternative hypotheses relevant to the 
demand for air travel. The multivariate characteristic allows the 
model to c6ntain more than one independent variable. The behavioral 
model of demand relates the consumer behavior to observable decision-
making processes. This approach focuses on rational consumer be-
havior under insufficient knowledge. The dynamic nature of the 
model will eliminate the assumption that the demand coefficients, 
for example, income and price elasticity, should remain constant 
over time. In the real-world and on "a prior i" grounds, it is expect-
ed that the long-run partial coefficients of the explanatory variables 
in the market demand function will vary with time. The probabilistic 
characteristic allows the analyst to treat the demand for air travel 
as a random variable and obtain an approximation for its probability 
distribution together with an estimate of the expected value and 
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variance. This method is particularly useful when the demand is a 
random process due to lack of data or insufficient knowledge about 
the variables which affect air travel. 
The model can be expressed as a system of simultaneous equations, 
thereby lifting the constraint that all of the explanatory variables 
will be exogenous with virtually zero feedback. For example, there 
is a feedback relationship between the type of aircraft available and 
demand. The demand for air travel should be denoted as an explicit 
function of a small number of systematic variables Which are presumably 
more important and can be quantified fairly easily. The net effect 
of the secondary variables can be represented by a stochastic vari-
able. This variable can account for all forces which should be in-
cluded explicitly in the behavioral demand model but are either 
unquantifiable or SUbjective. On theoretical grounds, some of the 
predictor variables may assume a lead-lag structure. The model can 
also incorporate dummy variables which will relay, for example, the 
existence or non-existence of SST, sonic boom, etc. In the final 
analysis, the sophistication and complexity of the model will de-
pend largely on the availability and the degree of quantification 
of the data. 
$03 
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Introduction to ICAO 
AVIATION FORECASTING IN ICAO 
By J ames McMahon 
Assistant to Director 
Air Transport Bureau 
ICAO, the International Civil Aviation Organization, is a specialized 
agency of the United Nations which carne into existence as a result of the 1944 "Chicago 
Convention". The aims and objectives of lCAO as outlined in the Convention are "to 
develop the principles and techniques of international air navigation and to foster the 
planning and development of international air transport ..• " 
lCAO has a sovereign body, the Assembly, and a governing body, the 
Council. The Assembly normally meets every three years to review the entire work of 
the Organization in the technical, economic, legal and technical assistance fields 
and to plan the work programmme for the ensuing three year period. There are presently 
124 Contracting States and each State has one vote in the Assembly. 
The Council is a permanent body responsible to the Assembly and is 
currently made up of twenty-seven Contracting States elected for a three-year term. 
The Council provides the continuing direction for the Organization and is aided in l,t" 
work by various Committees it has established and by the Air Navigation Commission. 
A number of international organizations participate in the work of the 
Organization through their role as observers at many of the meetings of the rCAO bodies. 
These organizations include the International Air Transport Association (lATA) which is 
an organization of international airlines, and the International Federation of Airline 
Pllots Associations (IFALPA) among others. 
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The work programme of the Organiz~tion is carried out by a Secretariat 
of SOme 500 headquartered in Montreal and some 125 secretariat in the six Regjonal Offices 
in Bangkok, Cairo, Dakar, Lima, Mexico and Paris. 
Air Navigation 
I think it is fair to say that the main thrus t of the work of reAD has 
been in the field which we term "air navigation". In this field lCAO deab ,.~Lil the 
technical standards and practices for all aspects of international civil avi" [j ,)" 
operations - in the operation of aircraft, aircraft airworthiness and the nurner"1l8 
facilities and services required in their support such as airports, telecomml,rications, 
navigational aids, meteorology, air traffic services~ search and rescue, aeT!"n~:lJtiral 
information services and aeronautical charts. 
Recommendations for Standards and Recommended Practices of international 
air navigation are made by the Air Navigation Commission and are adopted by the ICAO 
Council as annexes to the Convention on International Civil Aviation. 
The work of lCAO in air navigation also involves the detailed planning 
of facilities and services and the formulation of procedures to support incycases in 
traffic density, new air routes and the introduction of new types of aircraft. This 
planning function is facilitated by regional air navigation meetings which AT<" held 
periodically in each of the nine n'bi.ons of ICAO. The Air Navigation Plans phich resul t 
from these meetings are reviewed by the Air NavtgaLLon Commission and pres""·",·"d to the 
Council for approval. 
Technical Assistance 
leAf; i'~ lS p..J.rticipated in lL~~ mulL~n:'lLionrll ('"cf()r~' :-c' ·:-.8!·:~':· 
technologically devI';".;'_l;Jing nnt:inn::, of the worlJ pCU'.:,;'"ir; J:;I th:rough .i .. [S roil' t.ilt.: 
Executing Agency for "'~t i!·j,1n., ;;,ro.ji>~t~::; nf the Pflitpri Nations De.velopment Pr" ;;:..~amme 
(UNDP). The degree \':~ rCAdl.s pa"(~.:i.i·'iF,).tion 1:::. d::tiJ;-i:--:HC by the ir.d.i.v.ldu::d -:'"qU€sts 
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s"l'mitted by the Governments of developing countries, which are responsible for deciding 
.-!ut portion of the total assistance made available to them by the UNDP should be used 
for civil aviation. 
lCAO's work in the field of technical assistance covers a number of 
different activities. One of the most important activities is to supply aviation 
experts to developing countries to carry out the avistion component of their country 
programme. Our work in technical assistance also includes operating training courses 
for civil aviation personnel, such as the Civil Aviation Safety Centre in Beruit which 
provides training in air navigation and in air transport economics. lCAO currently 
has a roster of some 165 experts engaged in technical assistance around the world. 
While much of the aid provided by lCAO has been of an advisory nature, some projects 
have called for assistance of an operational nature, involving the actual discharge of 
executive functions within the departments of civil aviation. To give you an idea of 
the scope of our activities in this field, current lCAO projects include among others: 
development of STOL operations for a domestic airline, initial operation of air 
navigation and aeronautical meteorological services at a new airport, design of an 
air terminal complex, and establishment of remote communications s,;"cching centres. 
Legal 
The Legal Committee of lCAO advises the Assembly and Council on the 
interpretation of the Chicago Convention; it studies and makes recommendations on 
other questions of public international law brought to it by the Assembly or the 
Council; and it also considers problems of private law affecting international civil 
aviation. 
Although the Legal Committee has a number of items on its general 
work programme, an item of major concern currently is the problem of unlawful 
interference with civil aviation - including the subject of hijacking. As early 
as 1963 the Aviation Community adopted the Tokyo Convention on offenses and certain 
other acts committed on board aircraft. This Convention contains some limited but 
nevertheless useful provisions on unlawful seizure of aircraft. However, due to the 
sharp increase in the number of incidents of unlawful seizure of aircraft in later years, 
5o'l 
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a detailed convention concerning unlawful seizure was developed at the Hague Conference 
of 1970. This Convention is concerned with acts performed by a person on board an 
aircraft and while it does not contain specific penalties, it does contain an undertaking 
by each Contracting State to make the offence of unlawful seizure of aircrsft punishable 
by severe penalties. The States however, were unwilling to make provision for automatic 
extradition of the suspected hijacker. 
In Montreal in September 1971 States adopted the Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation. The Montreal COllvention 
is intended to supplement the Tokyo and Hague Conventions and is aimed at suppreAsing such 
acts as sabotage, armed attacks, or any act which could endanger the safety of an aircraft 
or damage or destroy an aircraft. 
Work in lCAO on these problems is continuing. For example, on the 19th 
of June the Council directed that a special sub-committee be established to look into 
the ques tion of mul tilateral action to elim,,,ate havens for hijackers. 
Air Transport 
lCAO's work in air transport covers a wide range of subjects including: 
facilitation, the joint financing of air navigation services, airport economics and the 
economics of en route navig;ltional faciliti~s, air transport statistics and ai.r transport 
studies. 
Our work in facilitation is aimed at simplifying the entry an.: departore 
of international civil aviation traffic. Broadly speaking, the facilitation pr"gramme 
aims at 1) eliminating all unessential donUllent,Uj r"quirements, 2) simplifying ""d 
standardizing the remaining forms, 3) providing certain minimum facilitie!; at f." t prnational 
airports and 4) sirupL iying handling and clearance procedures at airportG. 
AlthoufI" "<ldl State normally provJdes air navigation facilities and 
services in its OWn ter~ ilory l.h't,,:re are cases where t~l,1tes cannot afford to pn)Vide 
these services (which .Jft? !'"reqllf'11: . .! y vl2ry co:~ !'.l.v) uf- I;!here these servtces must be 
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I'tuv!ded in regions of undetermined sovereignty and on the high seas. These are cases 
wbere the joint financing of facilities becomes necessary and there are currently several 
;,~ '·,'''ments in effect, adminis tered by lCAO, which provide for this. 
leAO periodically reviews the financial situation of airports and has 
issued studies on significant individual items of airport finance - such as landing 
charges and non-aeronautical revenues. ,leAD also publishes annually a manual of airpor t 
and route facilities charges levied by States. The organization has also become involved 
with on route facility costing and charging and has attempted to establish guidelines 
:In this area. 
Our work in statistics is probably best known to those outside the 
organization through those blue and grey Digests of Statistics we publish. These 
digests cover data on traffic, traffic flows, finances and fleet and personnel of the 
airlines, and also airport traffic and the civil aircraft on register in different 
countries. Recently, we have expanded our programme to begin collecting statistics 
on non-scheduled operations. 
Over the years our air transport studies have covered a wide variety of 
subjects.' This range includes studies on international air mail and those on the 
development of passenger and freigh t transport in various regions &uch as Africa, La tin 
''';terica, the Middle East, Europe and, most recently, South and East Asia and the Pacific. 
We have also published studies on cooperative efforts in air transport and pe'riodic 
reviews of the economic situation of air transport. Recent work in this area includes 
the publishing of a manual on air traffic forecasting which I will describe in some 
detail a little later on, and an examination of the feasibility of undertaking s t'.I;:· ',; 
on fares and rates in international air transport. Our future programme of air 
transport studies includes the continuation of the series of regional studies on the 
development of international air passenger and air freight transport, and the preparation 
every three years of a new Review of the Economic Situation of Air Transport. 
Most of the substantive work described above is carried out by the 
Secretariat of the Air Transport Bureau at Headquarters. However, by the end of the 
year we will have an Air Transport Officer stationed in each of the six Regional Offices 
I listed earlier. The main functions of these officers is to lend general air transport 
aseistance to States in each region and to serve as a liaison between civil aviation 
al; inla trations and leAO Headquar ters in Montreal. 
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In a further effort to give assistance to Member States in air transport 
we have arranged a number of small, informal,workshop meetings on such subjects as 
statistics and airport economics in an effort to bring civil aviation personnel into 
direct contact with the specialized staff at Headquarters. 
lCAD has also lent assistance in the creation of regional civil aviation 
bodies - notably the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) and the African Civil 
Aviation Commission (AFCAC). These organizations ,which are independent of ICAO but 
work closely with it, consider the problems of international air transport from I:h" 
pOint of view of their respective regions. 
Brief Description of leAO Forecasting Activities 
Now that you have a general idea of the work we do, I would like to 
give you a brief description of our forecasting activities to date in the fields of 
air navigation, technical assistance and air transport. 
In preparing for the regional air navigation meetings which I mentioned 
earlier, the Secretariat normally prepares a five year forecast showing the frequency 
of service over each of the routes in the given region. These short term forecasts are 
derived from information provided both by States and by the carriers on their anticipated 
future operations. Two forecasting groups - the EUM Traffic Forecasting Group and the 
NAT Systems Planning Group - have been created by Bowe of the States in the E,;ropean and 
North Atlantic regions, respectively, to prepare long-term forecasts of the peak traffic 
demands. These forecasts are then used in establishing the long-term sys teros requirements 
for air navigation facilities and services in the region. 
In the t.echnical assistance area the forecasting work being dr'm·. is 
really an integral pau: of the work of the terchnical ass is tance expert". \-.,!"p : ','quenlly 
happens is the develcp.!.,ng eduntry requests a technical assistance expert, USll:11.J)' (:lIl 
aerodrome enginee.r. tu ~rlve th~m :-;01T:\;~ gllidanct~ on planning for their future cl .. t"rport facilities. 
Of course, one of tIll' !leCtls>,;"y prerequisites for this type ,)f planning is th., preparation 
of a traffic forecast ror ;:):r' aJ.rrw'!-t in quenr1(,I'i. ::; .. that the requirements for such items 
5/0 
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as passenger and cargo handling facilities, runway length etc., can be developed. 
Alt]JOugh we do have air transport economists among our technical assistance staff, 
there is such a great demand for their services relative to the number we do have, 
that it is frequently the aerodrome engineer who must prepare the forecast. This 
mupled with the factor that the data are frequently faulty, incomplete or even 
non-existent and that the time in which the work must be completed is frequently 
very short, makes this work extremely difficult. There does not seem to be any 
simple solution to these problems in the short-run. at least. 
Prior to producing our Manual on Air Traffic Forecasting (which 
I will describe in a moment) the bulk of the forecasting work of the Air Transport 
Bureau was done in conjunction with our other studies, some of which I mentioned 
earlier. An exception to this was the circular we prepared in 1966 on traffic 
forecasts for the North Atlantic covering the period to 1975. This study, which 
included forecssts for passengers, cargo and mail, was based on trend analysis 
modified by some explicit assumptions we made regarding relevant ecoi1omic parameters 
such as price elasticity, fare changes and the timing of the introduction of new 
aircraft types. 
Our studies of passenger, cargo and mail developtnent in the different 
regions normally contain a discussion of the forecasts made by oU."'" fot the given 
region. For example, in our latest study of the East and South As~a ar.j PaCific region, 
we discuss four recent forecasts made for the area by Boeing, McDG",l.ell Douglas. the 
Economist Intelligence Unit and by Curtis Greensted Associates. In addition, we present 
some information supplied by the States in the region estimating the probable grcutr, of 
airport and airline traffic through 1980. 
Our triennial reviews of the economic situation of air transpor ,'"ave 
presented our own work in forecasting the future volume of passenger. freigh t ;.nd mail 
traffic. These forecasts are based on trend proj ections coupled wi th explici t 
assumptions regarding the development of key economic variables; a procedure we used 
in our North Atlantic forecasts. 
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From this you can see that we are certainly not newcomers to 
the field of air transport forecasting. On the other hand, I think we would 
be the first to admit that, in the past, we have concentrated on extremely 
simple forecasting techniques. 
Currently, as a result of a recent Assembly resolution, we are 
beginning to strengthen our forecasting capabilities. An initial step in this 
direction is the recent publication of our Manual on Air Traffic Forecasting 
which I would now like to describe for you in some detail. 
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I~e 2S.AO Manual on Air Traffic Forecasting 
The Assembly of leAD, at its sixteenth session held in Buenos Aires in 
1968, set up t~o requirements for the Organization's ~ork in forecasting - one was the 
preparation of medium-and long-term forecasts of future trends and developments in civil 
aviation, both on a global and on a regional basis, and the second was the development of 
material on current forecasting methods to be used in the Organization's own forecasting 
work and to be disseminated to member States for guidance in their own forecasting. 
As a partial fulfilment of the second requirement the Secretariat 
developed a Manual on Air Traffic Forecasting, which was published a.1d distributed to 
member States in the spring of this year. 
The manual is primarily addressed to di.ec.tors of 'clJ:ll aviation as well 
as to others in civil aviation administrations nnd to plannerd of ail."porrs and route 
facilities. The purpose of the manual is to provide a survey of the techniques currently 
in use in medium-and long-term forecasting and to gbe practicd c ~clidance on the 
application of these techniques. Discussion of theoretical p,,,ul~, 1'- or of methods 
which are not readily and quantitatively applicable has bee.n avoid';d '.0 the greatest 
possible extent. 
Our objective at this stage is certainLy noc to advance the state of the 
act but rather to make more effective use of what has al~eady been developed and our 
manual is the initial step in this process. 
The manual is divided into two basic parts - the first part deals ·"i.t:h 
forecasting by trend projection, the second part with methods of traffi~ forec"", .,cl 
based on studies of the factors governing traffic development. The second par t ".ludes 
a chapter on the technique of formula ting mathematical reI a tion3hips between to'2 traffic 
vsriable and the underlying factors which we have call"d "Econometric Forecasting". 
Other techniques includ'ed in the second part of the document are based on specific 
studies of individual sectors of the air transport market or on studies of plans and 
expectations of the parties engaged in the air traffic activity. 
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Trend Projection 
In the material dealing with forecasting by trend projection the various 
types of trend curves such as the linear, exponential, modified exponential, Gompertz and 
Logistic are described both mathematically and geometrically and the methods of fitting 
trend curves to ohserved data are described. One appendix describes and illustrates a 
simple method of fitting a Gompertz and a modified exponential curve to observed data. 
The least. square" method for curve fitting is demonstrated in another appendix using, as 
an examp!.e, the passenger traffic development at Geneva airport. While the methoa :mel 
rationale for calculating both regression coefficients and the coefficient of derel'mi-
nation are described in the appendix, readers are referred to standard statistics 
Lex ttooks fur a mor"! complete discussion of significance tests and confidence inwrva},;. 
It was felt that a discussion of probability theory which, of course, is necessary for 
an unders;:anding of these t"Wo topics, went beyond the scope of the manual. 
Econrmetrlc f07.'"cas dng 
lbe bulk of the material in the manual deals with whstwe call the 
econometric technique in forecasting. In addition to describing the different models 
which have been developed in this area, practical guidance is given regarding the 
problems of applying this technique. 
Whether applied to passenger air transport, freight transport, general 
aviation or other aspects of civil aviation, the conduct of an econometric forecast 
comprises, in principle, four phases: first, there is the identification of the 
underlying factors (independent variables) to be taken into account in forecasting 
the air traffic activity (dependent variable); ~~nd. the determination of the type 
of functional relationship existing between the dependent and independent varillbl,,; 
third, there is the empirical testing of the relationship between the dependent awJ 
independen t variables. .i.l,,:luding the evalua tion of coeff ic.ients and el!.ponen ts; .. : :>.d 
fourth, the forecasting of the values for the independent variables and the sub""'iuent 
derivation of the traff 1 c forec"s t:. 
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In an attempt to provide a summary of the independent variables most 
f'rcquently used in econometric forecasts, we developed a tabie which showed, for each 
'·'ype of influence on traffic (eg. size and spending ability of the market). the different 
"'ariables used to represent that influence (eg. population,disposable personal income). 
':'he list was not intended to be exhaustive but rather to indicate the range of variables 
that can be used. 
In determining the type of functional relationship between the dependen L 
traffic variable and the independent variables, emphasis is placed on judgment and 
axperimentation,taking into account the experience gained from earlier forecasting work. 
In order to give the reader an idea of the range of models already in use in forecasting, 
we present a dozen different models under four headings: non-directional pas~enger 
forecasts (i.e. those dealing with the overall volume of traffic generated at a certain 
place or in a certain region). directional passenger forecasts (i.e. those concerned with 
traffic on specified routes or between specified regions), a model for non-directional 
air freight forecasts, and a model for forecasting general a"'.'ltio', a,,-,1.vity. While 
we have nearly 400 documents on forecasting in our files" it cho' ."n be, st: -" sed tha t 
the list of models included in the study is far from exhaust. ',e - s'-m', -[ the couunents 
we have already received on this study amply demonstrate this POil 
Six different models for forecasting non-directiorul pas..;enger traffic 
are presented. The first model, developed by the Air Transport Associd'_ion in 1969, was 
used to forecast domestic passenger traffic in the United States.. I t is a very simple 
n.odel - it makes passenger revenue a multiplicative function of Personal. Consumption 
Expenditure in the United States. Testing the model on U.S, data gave an elasticity of 
passenger revenue to Personal Consumption Expenditure of about 2.0. 
The second model was developed by the Institut du Transport Aer1"" ,ITA) 
in 1971 for predicting future growth rates for a country or a region or between countries 
or regions. The model was intended to be used for three to five year forecasts. This 
ruodel relates the traffic in a given year to the traffic in the initial, year in a 
multiplicative fashion through a series of three coefficients. The first coefficient 
reflects the changing propensity of the market to travel due to exogenous factors; the 
5/5 
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second reflects changes in the air transport services available; and the third reflects 
the changing penetration of air transport into the overall travel market. Although the 
future values of these coefficients are left more or less to a subjective judgment, ITA 
gives some guidan"" 8.8 to how they might be calculated. The first coefficient -
representing the influence of exogenous factors - is presented as a function of the 
growth rate of a general economic indicator (such as Gross Domestic Product) and of 
the growth in the proportion of consumption devoted to travel. The second coefficient -
representing the availability of air services - is presented as a function of the change 
in air fares during the forecast period and the relevant price elaaticity which, for the 
domestic traffic cases studied, was found to be between -0.6 to -1.7. The third 
coefficient - representing the penetration of air transport - could be estimated by 
"stimating the total potential travel market and through a subjective evaluation both 
of the development of surface/air competition and of political factors • 
The third model for forecasting passenger traffic volume was prepared 
by Bo Bjorkman for the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) in 1970. This model 
makes the dependent variable, passenger-kilometres a multiplicative function of 
disposable income, disposable income per capita, and yield (average revenue per 
passenger kilometre). Using data on European air travel Bjorkman obtains a price 
elastic.ity of -1.5 and an income elasticity of 0.6. This model was also test"d against 
U.S. rJomest:'.c and international air travel from 1962 to 1968 and gave elasticities of 
simll ar magnitude to those for European travel. 
The fourth model, intended for for,,"caRts of long-term developments of 
long-distance international air travel demand in the United States, Europe and elsewhere 
was presented by the National Planning Association (NPA) in 1971. This model makes the 
dependent vadable, tOlal aiT passenger miles, a multiplicative function of dJ.scr:"tionary 
income and an index of the cost of air tralTel which is defined by the level of Lees 
plus the value of elapsed a:lr travel time. Th" NPA tried alternative models, whj~h 
included time and a variable rel:1ectin~ the business cycle, but these models """" round 
no better than t.he sim:)le.r IWJdel they adopt.ed. 
The. valilf-H 1.1)]' j 1!l:OUH:~ (~last:t('ity were developed from cross-se(:tionaJ 
data (i.f>.., studies oJ the h'e·.p.w~i.cy ("If air tr"lv~!j In di.fferent income groups at a 
certaill t_1.flle). The il) .. ~(lm(' 1"I.alit!.I'· ;,{t~8 w~~!·e 1";1(11).,.: f'i" be between 1.2 and 1.6. 
S/~ 
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To determine che price (cost) elasticities, the value of time was 'equated 
to a typical hourly wage rate tor air passenger, The resulting price (cost) elasticities 
"enl between -0.8 and -1.8. 
The fifth model was developed by Sam Brown and I'ayne Wathins of the CAB 
in 1968. In this model the dependent variable, the change in annual passenger miles pel' 
capita, is a multiplicative function of the change in the average fare, per mile, the 
~hange in disposeble personal income per capita and a residual term representing tiroe. 
This model differs from the others in that it relates the change ,:,n traffic to the ch"n~es 
in the independent variables while the other models related traffiC lerela to the levels 
of the independent variable. One result of this difference is the f8,ct that the interc~pt 
value in this model repLesents a time influence on travel while this i,a not so for tI.e 
other models. 
The coeffid.ents developed. by applying th:e model to J ,,:; .data for the 
1946-1966 period imply that if fares and income had bel'n cons tant j.n (' ·.stanL money 
value, the traffic would have increased by something less than 5 per C'",t per fear. 
The coefficient on the time variable was negative, implying that th::_3 ""utumatic" growth 
rate tends to decrease over time. 
The final non-directional passenger forecast medel',as developed in 
1968 by Wallace and Moore of the Boeing Company. The dependent vari"Dle in this model. 
is an unusual one - revenue passenger miles per unit of Gross Nauo·Clo. _ ? _oduct .. aud its 
percentage change is given as a function of the percentage change :.n the qual!.ty of 
service plus the percentage change in fare multiplied by the flice elasticity. A not,!.:d,', 
feature of this model is, of course, the use of a quality of service variable in ,'1 .•. 
formulation. The quality of service is defined as a weighted index of a number,. . ''''liS _. 
among them are the mnnber of seat departures, schedule reliability ("on time"), L ':,:'H 
time, cabin noise and ride comfort. In total there are nine quality items. 
There is a peculiarity regarding the price elasticity in this model since 
it is given a different value for price increases than for price J.,crE.ases. For price 
increases the elasticity was given as -1.0 while for price decreases the value was -2.0. 
The measure of "quality" in this model was developed through judgment and speCifically 
51'1 
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related· to U.S. traffic. For this reason, and because data on a number of quality 
elements might be difficult to obtain, we felt the application of the model precisely 
as it was presented might prove difficult. 
The section on directional models of passenger traffic starts off with 
a somewhat detailed description of the classic gravity model where the number of 
travellers between two points is positively related to the product of the populations 
i.n the two cities and inversely related to the distance between the cities. It i~ 
pointed out that while the basic gravity model is not really applicable to medi'lffi-or 
long-term forecasting, modified versions of this model have found rather widespre~il 
use. Since the variety of modifications to this model have been so great it Wag only 
possible to give a general indication of the range of these modifications. 
A model for forecasting air travel between pairs of countries which is 
based on the gravity model, as well as on the non-directional model developed by 
Bjorkman previously described, was presented by the European Civil Aviation Conference 
in 1970. This model includes as independent variables: the popu.lations of the two 
countries, the Gross National Products, a typical fare for aiT travel between the two 
counttie~ and the price elasticity of demand. Coefficients for this model were developed 
using data on intra-European traffic. It was found that the value for price elasticity 
which best explained the distribution of traffic at a certain point in time among 
,]Hfpront European SUltes was 2.0, whereas a representative value for predicting the 
development of traffic 0ver time for one pair of States was 1.6. Regarding the 
appJ ir"bi lily of the model, it was found that this tnr-del, which does not take into 
aCCOUl1t. competition from surface. transport, tends to over-estim2.te the tra.ff:: ,: 0n 
short di.:5tance routeE',. 
A method for fore"ast:Lng the totnl travel by puhlic transpon: bet,,'een 
two cities, as well as th., ;d. tranq,07t "',Cit-,, ,we, developed hy Eric Cuney "-,," "r .",enterl 
by the C;..}nadian Trdnsport CommisGi on in .l.Y j(). This method WAS intended fut' dPpJ H.:.alloll 
in Canada but it can he a~rlie.d wtlet'eVer thel'l,';~ is significant compet.irion h·l'!.:H~n 
surfac:.e and ail' t'n~11.:~f'f'rt. rht~ h~tllOd tak~s intu ~H.'L,)UTl.t the time and CCISt .!.nvoJved 
in urdng the variow:; "llorlE:":.S ,I',; f.i,"-lJ L nG thei,.- j requenc'J of ~;ervice. It also inc.i.udes the 
popuJ A tion~:o of t.tlf': I~.J.. ti es t:'l'~-u '1. \Jed a!ld tI:e dt 1: f,,":- r.'!nt i.ncome levels of tile ci Lie~,. 
FinaJ1'{ !-he mociel t;ll~'~ ·'·{I_I1.1~~! the l:i.nru_;:·'rt: ~;.1(~!i._lari.ties of the two citit2s. 
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Use of this model involves two sepsrate estimating procedures. One is 
to es timate the total traffic between the two cities regardless of the mode used and 
the other to estimate how the total traffic is to be split among the various modes 
(l>us, rail and air in this model). 
The modal split model estimates the share of each mode on the basis of 
what the author calls their "level of service". For a given mode, the level of s~rvlce 
is a multiplicative function of a constant (which differs for each mode with the 10",""t 
value for bus and the highest for air), the average trip timz, the average trip co,n, 
and the daily frequency. 
The model for estimating the total traffic be:ween two cities regardless 
of mode includes seven independent variables: the product of the pC;;1l1ations of the two 
cities, an index of linguistic community of the cities, the percentage of families abov" 
$12,000 income, highway driving time between the cities; both aveiCaiS" t1. ',I' time and 
average tr1p cost by public transport (weighted accordi,ng to the modal "pitt), ehe 
perceived total trip cost by automobile (approximately 1.5 cents per m~ 1..: per person) 
and finally, the level of service (as defined in the model sp~it) for th' e" Li"e public 
transport system. Since the exponents were developed for transport in eastern Canada it 
is likely they would have to be adjusted for application elsewhere. 
Another model, intended for use on routes with effective surfac~ 
competition, was presented by Abraham, Baumgart and Blanchet in 1969. This mode i, 
which originally was applied to French domestic traffic, is more micro-"conomic iI, 
character than the other models presented in the sense that it deals with the me,,', 
on a route as a spectrum of users, each of whom behaves in accordance ' .. Ii th his. nomic 
status • 
The basic assumption is that the traveller's time ~an be assigned a 
valua which is directly related to his income and that the traveller ,,'il', cboose tha't 
mode which minimizes the "generalized" cos t of the trip where cost is defined as the 
fare plus this value of time in transit. The model further assumes that the frequency 
of travel is directly proportional to the individual's income (raised to a certain 
power) and inversely proportional to this "generalized cos t" to the 2nd power. 
5'9 
- 16 -
A further factor determining the number of travellers on a route is the product of the 
populations raised to a certain power. Finally the model assumes that the income 
distribution, and therefore the value of time distribution, in a developed country 
like France can be approximated by Praeto's law. 
As I stated earlier, we presented only one model for forecasting freight 
traffic. This is due to the fact that there have been relatively few econometric models 
developed for forecasting freight perhaps because the factors governing both the c1"mand 
and supply for air freight capacity are so complex. However a model for predicrin,,\ 
the development of domestic air freight in the United States was developed by 
Irving Saginor and David Richards of the CAB which is similar to the other CAB ,c.c,del 
we p[~"enled in that it relates changes in traffic to changes in the independ",nL 
variables. l1lis model makes the change in annual freight-ton-miles a multiplicative 
function of the change in the rilte per ton-mile and the change in the gross national 
product. The results of the application of this model to the 1946-·1969 air freight 
experience in the United States imply that if freight rates and GNP had remained constant 
over the period the volume of air freight would still have grown by about 6.7 per cent 
per ye",' under the influence of factors not accounted for in the model. 
We presented one example of the use of the econometric approach to the 
proble,m of forecasting the number of general aviation operations in a district. This 
appfuach was developed by Baxter and Howrey in 1967 and consisted in testing different 
combina dons of five independent variable. ag'ltns t th~ depend en t variable-the number of 
general aviation operations. Th~ independent variables tested were: the population of 
tt,e d1S trict, the per capita income of this p"p111'1tion, the number of airports in the 
dis Ll'ict, an index of the quality of tlivRe airpc,rrs and the proportion of the employment 
in the dis trict being in agric111 ture. 
Ditferent models were testeJ by cross sect.tonal analysis of the r.e.nr:r<~l 
aViation activities in ':'!lS counV-~es in Eastern United States. In general., t',c 
mu~ tipl i.:..:.a tive ra th~L' LHdn addi LJ 'J\J ,f UlH: tion provl:d Hupe t lor. Genera 11 y, nll.hh? 1 t~ 
inc 1 ud1ng all the inde.nl?'[(del: t. \' tlt"ic=th les l:1en tj oned e Kcep t af(r1. eul tural ernploylTIE'n t 
were found to explain th~ ::.U:.L1rencl-:s between ge.n~',~~fll. BvJation operattons in the 
COunLr~":$ reasonably ~·'~.Ll. 5e10 
- 17 -
I,e point out in the manual that this model could also be used for 
"orecasting the effect of building a new airport in a district or for medium-or 
1 <.>l1g- term forec~s ts of general avia tion at exis ting airpor ts if time series data 
i.n used. 
After presenting these forecasting models we discuss the application 
and testing of econometric models and the forecasting of independent variables. It L 
pointed out that every forecasting problem is to a certain extent, unique, and tb,·.t , 
good deal of care and judgment should be exercised before attempting to apply these 
results to a different set of circumstances. 
Once the model has been selected and the independent variables are 
defined, it is necessary of course to evaluate the constants and coefficients in the 
model. Although the forecaster is not entirely in the dark since he Cdn develop 80me 
expectations regarding the range of values of these c0efficients ba"ed on the ec:ampJ eo 
given, the uniqueness of each forecasting situation requires a new estim'ltion of thes" 
values. We point out that since the relationship between the d2pe'ldent and independ~lll 
variables can frequently be expressed by a linear equation (eg. a ,"ultil'l~cative 
relationship which ia linear in its logarithms) the coefficien'c can h- developed 
through multiple regression. An appendix explains the concepta De,' ld mUlUple 
regression and gives a step-by-step demonstration of the _alculaU one '·olved. 
Because of its complexity, tests of significance are described in very brief ter",,, 
and the reader is referred to standard statistics textbooks for furule,: elaboratLm. 
In discussing the testing of models we covered a number o~ p'robl'."" 
areas including the importance of sample size, time seri~s vs. c;:~ss"sectionill 
al1alysis and the problems created by omitted variables and misspecHication. ,i",]' 
to caution the reader against placing too great a faith in the accuracy of any ,nu(lel 
and point out that, in fact. there is just no adequate substitute ,'or good judgme;ot. 
The final section of our manual describes two appro<}c:,es to forGcas ting 
which do not involve the formulation and testing of mathematical models. 
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The Port of New York Authority in 1957 carried out an air traffic 
forecast of U.S. domestic traffic which was based on a detailed market study. This 
approach was chosen because of the availability of abundant information on the 
characteris tics of atr travellers. For the purpose of the forecas t, all air travel 
was divided into personal and business travel. To analyse personal travel, the entire 
population was divided into 160 different groups, each characterized by a certain 
combination of age, occupation, income and education. To analyse business travel the 
total laLor force was similarily diVided into 130 groups, each characterized by a certain 
combination of occupation, income and type of industry. 
All the 290 groups were so chosen that the travel habits with respen to 
l,er genal travel or bu:oiness travel according to travel surveys were uniform wit;'." {,'u: 
group. Travel sU'veys had further shown how the travel habits tended to develop within 
each group and on this hosis, as well as on the basis of forecas ts of future numbers of 
people in each '>rc~p, the forecas l for the total volume of air travel could be derived 
for the period 1957 to 1975. The actual. traffic development up to 1970 confirmed that 
Lhe forecast was fairly accurate. 
An example of a market anatysis approach to air freight forec.wting was 
outl tned in an leAD study of air fre1gh t in the Europe-Mediterranean region i"sued in 
l~ /0. I t was shown there that in North Atlantic trade, the share of a commodity group 
carried by air was fairly closely related to the average value per unit weight. Above 
a eertuin average value per unit we1ght, the use uf aIr transportation increased rapidly. 
!:sing available information on the distribution of all trade with respect to ,alue per 
unit <"~,eight, and assuming that tbe values above which air transportation tends to be 
c')mreU tive will decrease if the air trallsport rates also decrease, it was po",ible to 
es tima t<: the po tential future cler.mnd flOr air freigh t capac! ty. In the ICAO study, the 
analysts was not aimed at actually preparln,; a forecast but rather at verify:lng 'hal 
otber forecasts were plausible. However t th~ ':'llJpru.:Jdl may serve as an exatlJplt! ul. ~I 
pos,;fble avenue for air freight flll'cc;lutlng through Ili.:!rket studies. 
A secL"" up{Jrvadl to L"recasting Jiscusseu 1" the manual is that bns .. d 
on ~.h;;. opinfon~ or pL:li)5 <.'!:' y'.I:d.J.lil::J· experts ia Lllt! field. 
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ICAO uses this approach for forecasting the future requirements for the 
,1,- navigational facilities and services of international civil avia tion. ICAO periodically 
--. d£(:ts information from States and operators on their anticipated future operations, 
c-'.'so.lidates this information, and forecasts the future level of activity at different 
.1 irports. 
The International Air Transport Association also uses a similar approach 
"'" ;>roviding a forecast service for airport authorities to assist them, at their requ0"'. 
j ~ developing master plana for their airport development. In preparing these forecas ts. 
_,AlA circulates a number of questionnaires to member airlines serving the airport reques ting 
;:1[ormation on their future services and their requirements for airport faCilities and 
s\;.rv!ces. 
This information is consolidated by lATA and used to es tablish forecas ts 
of essential aspects of airport activity required for airport master planning. 
Future Forecasting Work in ICAO 
As the forecasting work-of the Organization in th" pa,l has ~een 
fragmentary and limited, it is the firm intention of the Orga-li zation._o mii;,~ ~ much 
more solid and consistent contribution in this field in the years to come. 
In accordance with the directives given to us by the Assembly, the 
future activities in civil aviation forecas ring will serve three objectives: 
1) a more extensive' and improved treatment of forecasting aspects In 
studies carried out by the OrganIzation; 
2) as a service to our Member States, a systematic collection dnd disse],ination 
of material on aViation forecasting; 
3) a contribution to the science of forecas ting by organizing mee tings where 
forecasting experts can eKchange views on methods and techniques. 
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The first of these objectives will be met primarily by involving our 
forecasting officer in most of the economic and other studies being carried out 
as part of the regular reAO work programme and particularly in our studies of the 
development of international air transport in various regions of the world. A 
special effort wIll also be made to take a close look at the overall prospects 
for international air transport in connection with the general Reviews prepared 
every three years fOl1. the Assembly. 
The second objective will be met partly by periodically updating and 
iJnproving the Mnnual I already described to you. In addition to this, we are 
dlso envisaging a great increase in ad hoc requests for guidance material whicb 
can be used for forecasting work by national administrations in our Member 
COUUll-i;..'.s. 
The third objectl,e we will try to meet by organizing about once every 
year informal meetings where a limited number of people active in aviation forecasting 
wi! j ~"t an opportunity to discuss matters of principle and techniques in forecasting 
,"ur·"-. The Organization has had experience with such informal international meetings 
II oLiI"r fields and we hope that this type of meeting will also prove fruitful in 
f<)~lc'rJ"g a better and wider application of good and sensible forecasting techniques. 
You will see from this that our ambitions for the future are quite high 
CGr"edred with what we have accomplished in the past. We do, however, realize (hnt 
our resources are very modest anJ that our muscle may not be quite compaLible with 
Gur ambltion, but we will do our best. 
July 14 l ,07 :"~ 
ROB RANSONE: ,', .;<" 
"American Airlines' prope.ller STOL Tr~sport" ... ':1, 
Economic Risk Analys7-s" 
I.. :> .. 
When American Airlines evaluated STO~ Transpofts, we 
received 13 proposal~ for our ~tate-of-the-art-tec~Qology 
. , .. 
propelled STOL Transport (PST) that could be available 
';.' ~ " .. \.~ 
by 1975. We evaluated t~e~e, cut the list back to 3 
" . 
. "; 
airplanes on which we did a detailed risk a~alys7-s. lt 
.. 
, 
is this risk analysis l'm goin? to talk about today 1 
. .' . 
'!' . 
The studies that have been made br various people on 
market demand and modal split did not provide the in-
, ~' 
formation that American needed, because they started off 
.. 
" ,. 
.-.' 
with qssumtions that people would pay a certain fave 
" 
premium for STOL, and then calculated the size of the 
market. American had no doubts whatever that there was 
"j. 
a large market. Their question was, "Would passengers 
pay a STOL premium fare?" The real question was com-
.-. 
pletely opposite from the data that was provided. 
,," .; .. ' 
Furthermqre we wanted to look at specific rather than 
, 
hypothetical areas and hypothetical airplanes, because 
we were afraid that you would end up with hypothetical 
,,' . 
people and hypothetical profits that way. We felt that 
.. ~ . 
" 
5~5 
~TOL was necessary in the New york area because the de-
mand was f6r the city center operation rather than for 
an RTOL operation at the suburban airports. Further-
more We had reasoh to believe that you could put a city 
ceritet STOLpbrt in Manhattan, although not in Chelsea. 
The Chelsea reaction was not because it was a city center 
STOLpbrt. but be~ause it was a residential STOLport. 
There is an area at Hunters Point, on the East River 
(Queens) that is not a residential area and could Be 
eXpected to have no community reaction against a S'IOL.port. 
We l60ked at the market share: I'll explain later how We 
got this. Whete we had numbers with a fair amount of 
confidence. we used thOse numbers. Where there was un~ 
certainty we used a probability analysis. For instance. 
we determined a most likely value for the O&D market. a 
pessimistic value and an optimistic value. In the anal-
ysis .Sd% of the da.ta came from the most likely level, 
l~/o from the pessimistic and 10% from the optimistic. 
We looked at tHe spares cost in a similar probablistic 
fash:ilon·. Other uncertain economic ractors were the size 
of the O&D market, the direct operating cost. and the in-
direct operatihg costs. Values of which we were confident 
or' were fixed values were fare levels. the available seat 
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miles, offered, the aircraft cost, the aircraft resale 
value, the investment t~"credit rate and the interest - , " 
rate. We assumed 50% eq~ity, and financing for 50% at 
a 10% interest rate. These were fully allocated costs. 
We developed the internal rate of return on investment:· 
We used internal rate of return because we felt it was 
jRore representative of the actual profit and 10$S 'of 
the operation. 
., 
The usufl measure, return on invest- " .f : 
ment, hC\s to assume a certain depreciation rate of tl)e 
, 
aircraft, but internal rate of return is a function of ' 
discounteq cash flow. It tells you whether you afe mak": 
ing profits this year or next year and is therefore of 
more interest. We ran 3 fiirplanes (the Cal)adair Cr,-~46, 
' .. 
the McDol)ell 188 and the Degavilland DHC-7) through the 
computer 100 times each, qn a MQnte CariQ~i~k analysi~. 
Monte Carlo is a type of gambling procedur~'wher~t~~; 
.. , 1.. 
computer. wi th randoIl)., acce~s selects values that you 
give it. It can select these values with 'certain pro-
babil~ties. In .this case it was directed to select BOr., 
'. •• e··" " •• I'. 
; ,of the O&D share out, of the most likely value and 10% 
., 
'·H .. ·· .,' 
out of each of the pessimisb.c and optimistic. You' 
,'1' 
never know whether it is going to pick a number f~6m;' 
-3-
; 
the topllere and the bottom there or something else, but 
in the. long ~un you end up with a probability distribution 
which· shows that. the probability of making a certain ex-
pectedinternal rate of ret.urn is predictable. The'lO%' 
bound indicated that 90% of the cases were above this 
value and therefore there was a 90% probability of makihg 
this level of internal rate of return, or better. We 
Plotted a ~ean and the 10th and 90th percentile. This 
was plotted versus fare premium over CTOL, and number of 
seats offered. 
Now, I will discuss some of the input functions. 
There was a typical mission profile. You start the en-
gine in Washington. There was a fixed climb and man-
euver td get on the flight path below 1500 feet, then 
climb and cruise, a 5 minute hola at 5000 feet which was 
a delay factor built in, and then landing at New York.' 
There was a ld minute time in New york, no refueling, 
just ch~nge passengers, and takeoff, and climb. And 
return to Washinton, five minutes hold and either de-
scend ana land or divdrt. There was a half hour spent bn 
the' ground he.re to service the. airplane for the round 
trip. The total non-cruise allowances were 10 minutes 
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regardless of where you flew. The i~itial assumption 
wa's that there would be two STOLports ij'l Manl'\attan, one 
downtown STOLport and one in the suburbs. Immediately it 
was discovered that since no one really wanted to gp to the 
suburbs the airplanes would be empty, and thorefore the 
STOL airplane would have to d~adhead over to the suburban 
SroQLport. Even if it is a 10 ~inute flight over there, 
if you have a 10 minute system time, it becomes a 20 ~in-
ute flight to the other STQLport. If the time from WashT 
ington to New York was roughly 40 minutes of ~lyingplus 
10 minutes system time, or a 50 minute total flight, and 
if we add the other 20 minutes deadhead, the total is 70 
minutes of cost time but only 40 minutes of revenue time, 
this is right back where we started now with the 70 min-
.' " .. 
ute block time scale for B-727s between New York and 
Washington. Thus we assumed that there would only be 
one city center STOLport in New York and one in Washi~g-
ton. The range is 180 nautical miles between New York 
•• 
an~ Washing~on. We set up a sChedule with these airplanes 
by chasing tail members back and forth between New York 
and Washington. We assumed that there would be no market 
sensitivity due to ~he frequency because the frequencies 
-5-
were from every half hour, every 20 minutes, every 15 min-
utes and every 10 minutes; and because of this very high 
frequency no one really cared whether they missed one 
airplane or not. 
We calculated realistic block speeds, realistic winds 
and temperatures for takeoff and landing performance. 
The ground distance each way was 180 nautical miles. We 
used the highest speed cruise because fuel cost was of 
no consequence; time was more valuable. The 85% pro-
bability winds for the winter and for the summer were khown. 
Because of the effect of winds on cruise performance ,you 
, 
do not subtract 24 knots if you are going downwind, you 
can only subtract a certain portion of it. There's a 
Boeing analysis that we used for this. We ended up with 
equivalent air distances. These then are reflected in 
the times. For the DHC-7, the block time was 70 
minutes (and this inciudes the 10 minute system time) 
from New York to Washington and 59 minutes fIDm Wash-
ingtbn tci New York. We used the winter winds beoause 
this is conservative, providing the greater cycle time. 
If you lodk at the actual times, then the DHC~7 \0[) uld 
depart from the Washington STOLport and it would arrive 
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~n New york City 59 minutes later. It has to stay on the 
ground a minimum of 10 minutes. It ended up staying.on 
the ground 11 minutes here which was fine. Now, ~f it 
had arrived at 61 minutes instead of 59 minutes, it would 
have had to stay on the ground a whole cycle and,could not 
have left at 70 minutes, for example; it wo~ld have to 
wai t over. Similarly, it ended back at. Washington a,fter 
140 minutes elapsed time, 30 minutes later it cou~d leave 
at 170 minutes. If this happened to turn out to be 9 
o' clock for example, it could leave at 9: 30ancl it would 
'be the 9: 30 flight. If it happened to arrivf;l at 9:05, 
it could not leave at 9:30, it would have to leave at 10 
o'clock, so there wa,s wasted time. This shows the .effect 
that just a small difference in cruise speed cap. have ,on 
the value of an airplane in its productive, time and utili-
zation. This is quite important. 
Looking at the market, we tried to. <;l.etermino;! wh~r;e the 
market was coming from. We did not assume any market 
generation or any market stimulatiop.. we figured that 
from New Jersey, roughly 25% of the people would .fly from 
Newark, perhaps 25% of the people would keep going to 
LaGuardia. No one was going to go out to Kennedy to fly 
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to Washington; but 50% would probably go to the STOLport 
in Manhattan. From Manhattan we figured no one would go 
to Newark) 10% to La Guardia, none to Kennedy, but 90% 
would go to the STOLport in Manhattan B.nd so on across. 
Remember, 90% is the probable value. Looking at the op .... 
timistic value everyone in Manhattan would go to the 
STOLport, and pessimisticaily only 2/3 would go. We did a 
, 
similar thing for the Washington area and when we got 
through) we added these things up. Furthermore, based 
9Il the market data, more people fly frcm New York dOwn 
to Washington then go from Washington up to New York. 
Perhaps, this is ;,ecause in Washington we say if you want 
to talk to us, come in and see us. At any rate, we fig~ 
ured 2/3 of the people were originating from Manhattan 
and only 1/3 from Washington, and so this means that we 
ended up with about 60% of the people who wanted to fly 
using the STOLports, optimistically 70% and pessimist- . 
ically only 43%. 
The Pan Am fare sensitivity assum:/=,tion input into 
the CAB Norhteast cOrridor VTOL investigation says that 
STOL wili capture 83% of the market at a CTOL fare but 
.only 45% Of the market at a C'l'OL fare plus a $'7.00 
premium. We did not necessarily agree with this but we 
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did not have anything better to use, so we used it. ~f 
you extrapolate historical market data you will find that 
in 1975, supposedly 4 million people will be flying be-
tween New York and Washington. American was a little more 
oenservative than that. Th<;ly said inst~ad of using thi~ 
9% growth rate we will use a 4% growt.h rate. We pre-
dicted 2.8 million. Now, at the 83% penetrat:\.on that .would 
move the probable STOL to 2.3 million at a CTOL fare. 
Using the data from above about who would actu~1ly go 
to the STOLports for the mean dropped it down to 60%. 
we have the optimistic case and the pessimisti9 case 
alsoo 
Market assessment is a pretty slippery thing t9 get 
nold of,. but using the fare sensi ti vi ty then we could· 
~etermine the size of the market vs. the people who pay 
the ·fare. There is another factor here which we did not put 
~n. That was the inelasticity because of cqnvenience. 
Plilople may pay a $ ~, $4 or $6 prl'!mium to save .some time. 
We ignored this to be conservative. Also, this is just 
the air fare which does not take into consideration any 
savings which the traveller might have from higher cab 
fares. going to airports further away. 
5.33 
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Looking at the costs, .we used the CAB in 1970 dol-;-
lars. We did not look at 1975 dollars because we felt 
that. if you.:3tart looking at 1975, you have to figure out 
I)ot only the inflation and the cost but also the in-
creased air fares themselves and then what is the dollar_ 
worth then to the t.J;-aveler. We felt that if it could 
be made profi~able in 1970, then it would be similarily 
profitable in 1975. 
We did no·t use American Airlines' usual overhead 
burden. We set this ,up as .either a subsidiary airline Or 
a separate airline entirely. The STOL costs had no 
bearing on the American Airlines costs other than just as 
a point of departure. The pilots' salaries are conserva-
tive in that they are the levels of the BAC-lll pilots, 
which wbuld be high for a DHC-7. We felt that if the 
source ·of the pilots was American Airlines, the pilot 
would have to make at least as much salary as he was 
making already. On direct maintenance, we did not ac-
cept the numbers of the manufacturer. Instead, our main-
tenance people looked at the airplane, system by system, 
and cbmpared it to the Electra on which we had operational 
data and determined the relative complexity. This then 
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gave them a basis on which they Cbulde·si,tlnatethe di-, 
rect maintenance and maintenance labor o'v'erhEj'ad;· 
On depreCfation;we'''did 'not 'u'sethe CAB rate but esti-
mated how 1bnii we cciuld 'use the 'aifp'l'ane" and' "what woul&' 
they be worth whei'nwe sold it.: ::We' felt that ·ifthe'sea,ir-
planes we're'availa1ble in197S,-they wOu1d'have "a useful·' 
l,ife of only" S years, 'becau'sE! we 'would have to 'sell1them 
as soon as 'the jet STOI.' s"came 'in-,Ifor; c6iitp'etitivereas0l'ls. 
We felt thatthe'DHC-7-would "have;a': very hi'gh'resale val-
ue' based 'on' ,the' TwiriOtter, exp'erience and wi th dipCtissions 
with 3rd level operators'and'sb; 'we'J$e!'J!t that a'S :ye'ar 
depreciation to '5"0% was reascinablEi - fot, that, airplane. 
: That approximated' the-CAB 'allowance! for: <1';4 engirie:tur" 
bo prop "of '12' 'yearel"'t6 S%.': On the 'other 'ai':!:cr1l'fti,: how-
ever,because they 'are more"complex" 'the'3:r:'d 'h:lveds',l: '; 
could riot be"counted ·bn 'to buy them.' ''lllie'market'there 
wOlildbe inSotithAmerieanc!duntrlE!s 'where'.'they;need':an" 
aircraft that -has' highperf6rmance fdr"bperaticin'in 'the. 
'l1IOilntaini3 and we felt that: ·arriil'lion and a half was-all,: 
these 'pebple"coula'affdifd;" Those "aircraft were ,tae :-".j 
"IiicDOHeIl le8~'ahd- theCana:dair "CV:' 246:: ,~, 'They were '·dejS"re,,:,: 
:ciii'ted, iri'S:'years' t6;1~ fuilliori dcllhirs,-which:was a" , 
535 
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variable rate depending on their initial cost, but was 
roughly double the CAB rate. 
Now this was not what you normally see for DOC, 
this was ~ash DOC because· this is cash flow accounting. 
The depreciation is added later so the total of $353/ 
block hour is not the total DOC. You have to add the 
depreciation, which varies from 130 to 137 dollars/block 
hour for the DHC-7, depending on its utilization. uti-
li~ation varied because we were flying on different fre-
quencies. YoU could add the cash DOC and depreciation for 
a total DOC of roughly $500/ hour. 
Looking·at the indirect operating costs. this is an 
annual cost, not per hour. There are certain things that 
are a function of just getting started. The stewardess 
ttaining for example, and the advertising and publicity. 
Our marketing people felt that it took quite a bit of 
advertising to let anybody know you are around, so there was 
a big initial effort. For the recurring cost, some 
things were fixed, some things were a function of the round 
trips per day and the number of passengers per aircraft. 
We came up then with an indirect operating cost in dollars 
per year in a formula to which we added a 10')(, contingeI1<.!Y 
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factor. These factors were all figured out based on the 
specific type of operation that was being considered. 
For example, ,with the food, there were savings because we 
w~re only toading one end. The type of service providep. 
was not meal service but rather liquor, which would be' 
sold, and soft drinks and coffee; very austere service. 
~urthermore, a savings was realized because there was no 
\ 
~aggage checking. If you provide baggage checking for one 
then you must have someone there to handle all of the 
baggage and you then have the whole system. There 
~ould be room on the airplane for someone to put his 
bag, but no baggage checking. Landing fees were based 
on an analysis of STOLports which we had made and f~~t 
that a 65¢ per passenger was reasonable. 
What did all of this come up to be? Looking at 
the internal rate of return as a function of the annual 
seats and the flight frequency, it looked like Figure 10. 
The numbers in parentheses are the load factors. We res-
tricted load factors to greater than 45% and less than 80'(0 ,/' 
~O% is a little high, but the American Airlines' Jet 
~ress averuge load factor between New York and Washington 
is 70%. We felt that sinc'e this was running back and 
forth, and since we had tIte option with this high frequel¥=Y 
537 
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of cutting out a flight, or a round trip at off peak 
times, we could maintain a ~igher load factor. 80% was 
the cutoff point. The value of the internal rate of 
rioiturn·(IRR) that you see is ,a little bit higher than 
you see normally for return o~ investment (ROI). ROI 
is not directly relatable and,not really convertible. 
If'you have a 10 to 12% ROI you might say that that is 
:t01ighly equivalent to maybe 24 or 26% IRR, but you hilve 
to be cautious because it is not really the same thing. 
Note that the size of the market varies and that we have 
airplanes of different sizes in here competing in a way. 
This method of analysis was able to handle this. Figure 11 
i~ the internal rate of return vs. the fare premium. 
T~ere is a 10th percentile line probability of making 
at least this return on the investment. The large spread 
was caused by the fact that there was considerable var-
iation in the pessimistic and optimistic values that were 
·put into the analysis .. The little numbers in parentheses 
are thelbad factors, 44% up ,to 74%. This shows that 
even with ,the conservative costs, the DHC-7 had a 90% 
. , "'probabili ty of breaking ~ven at a CTOL fare. This is 
quite interesting. If.you charge a little fare premium 
then you can make more but it starts dropping off at 
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a higher level. The question comes up of course then. 
what happens if you cut fares; does IRR continue to in~ 
crease? This would of course be interesting. Figure 11 
shows the data for the DHC-7. The CL-246 was above this 
and the McDonell 188 was below this. This was mainl¥ 
caused by the input costs for the airplanes. 
Now this is where the economic analysis stops but 
that is not where the decision process stops. because 
other factors enter into it. The McDonnell 188 and CL~246 
could not go into production on the basis of this one mar-
keto These airplanes will not be available because there 
is not enough justification. The DHC-7 is likely to ~o 
into production and therefore could be available. but thts 
is not the size of airplane nor the image that America~ Air-
lines wanted to get involved in. If you put on a very con~ 
servative hat and look at the return on investments and 
the money that is already obligated for DCIOs and the 
B-747s. it just does not make sense to buy a prop ai~-
plane. Therefore. the decision was made to terminate 
further study of the propeller STOL transport and con-
centrate on maintaining the option for jet STOL oper-
ation when it is available in the '80's. If I were a 
5~q 
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regional carrier, or someone who can offer this type of 
airplane, I think that the airplane would work and be 
very good. At American Airlines it did not work for us 
and so I recommended against. 
The next step would be to look at a jet STOL trans-
port and run through this same type of analysis. The 
prop airplanes were small, they were too small xorthe 
market. The jet STOL would be a much better size. 
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TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS EVA:.UATION 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
For a number of years, the Operations Research/~'lanagement Sciences staff 
of Boeing Computer Services, Inc., a ~!holly o\Jned subsidiary of The Boeing 
Company, has been actively engaged in the development of analytical tools 
for analyzing transportation requirements and associated systems. The 
purpose of this paper is to present a framework for analyzing transportation 
systems which accounts for the interaction between demand and system per-
formance. This frameIYork is applicable to systems ranging from intraurban 
Personal ized Rapid Transit System (PRT) networks to trunk airlines. It 
has evolved from and been used in studies of inter and intra urban air, 
ground, and water transportation systems to move both commodities and 
people. 
In order to illustrate the flexibility of this methodology, intra and inter 
problems will be discussed in what follows. In Section 2 the framework is 
presented; Section 3 consists of a lengthy example sho\'dng ho\-! the appr')ach 
was used to study a~ intraurtan commuter air SjSl6m. Finally, irl SectlQn 4 
a proposed study using the arproar:h to investigate P2rsonal ized Rapid 
Transit (PRT) is described. 
2.0 ANAL YTI CAL FRM1EWORK 
The steps· required to analyze a transportation system are shown in Figure 
1. The procedure begins with the calculation of travel demand. Then, 
based upon assumed performance, the demand is split between travel modes. 
Next, the sys tem iss imul ated and performance is cal cu I a ted. Thi s per-
formance level is fed back and a ne~1 modal spl it is calculated. When 
assumed performance and calculated performance are equal, the cost and 
revenues of the system are calculated. Capital costs' and non-revenue 
benefits are also calculated. Finally, the syste~ is evaluated based 
upon accurate estimates of service level, capjtal costs, non-revenue 
benefits and operating costs and revenues. Each of the above functions 
will now be described in more detail. 
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2.1 TOTAL TRAVEL DEMAND ANALYSIS 
The first step of the analysis is to calculate total denjand for travel 
for the region under study. Past "and forecasted demographic and geographi 
characteristics of the study areas together with current travel patterns 
form the basis of the analysis. In particular, land use forecasts may 
enter the analysis at this stage. 
To begin the demand analysis for the intraurban" problem, the study region 
is broken into analysis zones by the analyst. Information describing each 
zon"e is fed to the program. Base year travel information from a travel 
survey (if available) is also given to the model. The model calculates 
total travel (by all modes) between all zone pairs. T".e analyst produces 
time of day and day of week distributions of demand. 
The intraurban demand model consists of t~o parts; Trip Generation and 
Trip Distribution. The former creates a forecast of total trips produced 
in and attracted to each analysis zone. The trip distribution portion 
spreads the trips (calculated in the trip generation phase) over all zone 
pairs. It is this trip table I'lhich is needed by the modal split model. 
Demand forecasts for the airlines are based upon the CAB traffic surveys 
and econometric forecasts of basic economic variables. For the domestic 
trunks, for example, the first step is to calculate total RPM for the de-
sired year from the forecast of GNP and other economic variables. Next, 
the demand is assigned to city pairs. The assignment for a given city 
pair depends upon the share of the total RPH carried by that city pair 
in the past. Different gro'lith rates are forecast for different city pairs 
depending upon ~Ihether the market is new or mature. The result of thE: 
assignment is total origin and destination travel for each city pair. 
2.2 MODAL SPLIT MALYSIS 
The function of the modal spl it module is to apportion the total demand, 
previously calculated, to the various trav"l n:~des availcolr,. Required 
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2.2.1 
2.2.2 
inputs are user costs and times for each mode to be considered. and 
users attitudes tO~lards the competi ng modes. Output of the modul e 
is a market share forecast for each mode. This forecast is based 
upon assumed performance levels and hence is a preliminary estimate 
of market shares. After the system is simulated and true performance 
calculated, a neyl modal split must be performed. 
INTRAURBAN mDAL SPLIT 
A marginal utility approach forms the basis of the intraurban modal 
split model. The utility of a mode to a given user is calculated as 
a function of its time and cost and the income of the user. Attitudes 
toward travel modes can be incorporated into the model. The marginal 
utility of one mode over another is simply the difference between the 
two utilities. The percentage of travellers taking one mode instead of 
another is c.,lculated from this marginal utility. 
To calculate the market share for each mode. the marginal util ity analysis 
is applied to each zone Dair seoarately. Access and egress times and costs, 
~Iaiting ti:11es, ~,arking costs, line haul times and costs are all calculated 
for each zone:: pair. From these, the utilities of each mode and hence the 
market shares Ciln be determined. In addition to market share. the model 
calculates demand for transit by station pair. This is the information 
needed by the simulation model. This approach is used for intraurban 
systems as well as short haul air systems in which auto, bus. and train 
are sig~ificant com"etitors. For long haul air systems a different approach 
is taken. 
INTERURBAN MODAL SPLIT - PASSENGER PREFERENCE ANALYSIS 
For nearly ail interurban rnarkets the total demand for air service can be 
calculat,"d from thO' CAB surveys, as ylaS described in the demand analysis 
section. The nDdal split problem in this case involves assigning dellldnd 
to the competing airlines. Historically this "as done according to number 
of frequcncies off~rGd. With the advent of significant differences be-
I.':~:':i -.. '.!i~' 'r: \-::'," 
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technique involves carrying out surveys to obtain passenger reaction to 
the equipment and then calculating market share from these ratings, air-
line image and frequency. To finish the den~nd calculation, the market 
share must be multiplied by the true 0 & D traffic pl'eviously computed, 
to obtain daily 0 & D traffic for each airline for each city pair. The 
fl na 1 step is to convert the 0 & D into segment flow. 
In order to calculate the type and effects of passengers equipment pre-
ferences, we have carried out several surveys. These include in-flight 
as well as mock-Up surveys on several different airlines. Over 14,000 
people have responded to these surveys. 
The basic tool we have used to quantify peeples' subjective feelings is a 
survey form vlhich asks a respondent to rate certain aspects of his trip 
on a scale from 1 to 9. Descriptors are furnished for each aspect to 
define the scale. For example, when rating seat comfort, a rating of 
is defined to mean narrow, cramped and hard, 5 means moderate width and 
leg room and 9 means ample vlidth and leg room. The resulting ratings al'8 
amenable to statistical analysis. This L,,"colnique has been used in situ-
ations other than travel surveys. For e;:aic.p18 Ule Ai r Force uses it fer 
personnel evaluation, as does BCS, and it has been used in the white 
goods industry. 
Our surveys ha ve covered a wi de range of equ i pment, both wi de and na rrow 
aircraft in many configurations. The mock-up surveys tested reaction to 
characteristics such as seat comfort, spaciousness, and cabin appeal as 
well as many other aspects of an aircraft. The in-flight surveys tested 
these reactions as well as the reaction to flight experience variables 
such as smoothness and service. 
The mock-up and in-flight surveys produced similar results. The relative 
importance of the characteristics common to both sets of surveys were the 
same. In particular, it vias found that seating comfort. spaciousness, 
and cabin appeal ratings were sufficient to predict overill flight ratings 
in the mock-up survey. To these, service '.f.,j flight s!"'')oth~ess ne~d to b8 
added to predict overall ratings for the in-flight survey. 
-5-
In order to rate equipment for ~Jhich no survey has been conducted, 
relationships betl·:een physical characteristics and passengers attitudes 
have been produced from survey data. For example for a given pitch, seat 
comfort ratings corresponding to various seat widths used in the surveys 
are used to produce a curve of rating as a function of width. Such curves 
can be produced for several pitches; When a new airplane is being con-
sidered, its seat comfort rating can be obtained from its seat width and 
pitch by using the curves. 
One of the questions asked on the in-flight surveys requested the time 
interval within which a passenger was willing to re-schedule his flight 
in order to fly on the particular aircraft he chose. From the responses 
to this question we produced curves showing the percent of people willing 
to re-schedule their flights as a function of the deviation from the 
desired departore time. Different curves apply to different aircraft. 
These curves allcw or.e to predict flight loads for different equipment 
given the schedule and the passengers arrival rate curve. 
One rna h, pu rpv,,, of the surveys was to produce data a 11 ow; ng more accura te 
market share calculations. A computer program was written including time 
of day d~nand, variations, equipment preferences, and airline image in the 
market share calculations. This program gives roughly the same answer as 
the simple fOrr1~la shown in Figure 2. In the formula PA is the preference 
for flight A, including the equipment rating and airline image. 
The formula and simulation model were both applied to a market (JFK-LAX) 
for which on bo~rd load data was available. Both the simulation and the 
formula gave ar'\'lers \'Ihich differed from the observed loads insignificantly. 
Using either the ~ormula or the computer simulation one calculates the 
market share for each airline in each market. These percentages are 
multiplied by ths total 0 & D air travel, previously calculated, for each 
city pair. The resulting 0 & D demand can then be converted into segment 
flow (on board loads) using our segment flow model. 
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.3 SYSW1 SIMULATION 
So far we have shown hO~1 demand can be cal cul ated and spl i t between 
competing transport modes for a variety of transportation systems 
including intraurban transit and airlines. The process described 
produces an interim estimate of modal split based upon assumed system 
performance. The system must be simulated to get actual performance. 
This information is then given back to the modal split module. The 
process ends when assumed and actual performance coincide. 
The market share forecast produced by the modal split module. in addition 
to the specifications of the system are the inputs required by the simu-
lation module. For a nevi system, the simulation must be done by actually 
having the computer assign passengers to vehicles. move the vehicles to 
their destination, etc. For existing systems, an analytical approach may 
be satisfactory. The result of the simulation is a set of operaticnal 
data shoviing how the system performed. This includes vehicle require-
ments, loads, and utilization. Another result is the cost and revenue 
information re~uired to ("lculate op~rat;ng profit. The average time 
a passenger was forced to deviate from his desired departure time is 
also calculated. This "average passenger vlaiting time" must be compared 
with that assUi;ied in the modal split calculation. 
Once the simulation has been run, complete information regarding system 
operation is available. This information includes: average vehicle 
utilization, number of vehicles used and vehicle loads,among other oper-
ational statistics. For a transit system, labor requirements are calcu-
lated from the operational data and then labor and non-labor costs are 
calculated. Finally, G & A costs are added to get full system operating 
costs. 
For an airline, the routing and scheduling done by the simulation model 
allows accurate cost calculations. Cash DOC (excluding hUll insurance 
and depreciati(m) is calculated from the ATA or some similar formula for 
each flight. Depreciation and insurance al'c calculated for each aircraft. 
Furt~lcr, having all dr=tails 
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of the system operation (e.g. number of peak hour movements at each 
airport) allows one to base the IOC calculation upon system elements 
which actually cause IOC. 
2.4 CAPITAL INVESH1ENT 
The capital investment module determines the cash required for debt 
service for each year the system operates. The vehicle requirements 
have been determined by the operating simulation. Other capital 
expenses, (e.g., guideway construction, computers, statior. construction) 
are required inputs to the model. 
For a municipally owned transit system, this module ba.lances capital 
requirements against available funds. During the construction phase, 
any capital expense not covered by specified grants is assumed to 
require municipal bonds. The capital investment module "issues" such 
bonds when needed. For the operating period, the module calculates 
yearl y ope rat i ng surpluses necessary to cover debt servi ce. The modui e 
also calculates the present value of t1is str~~m. 
For an airline we have av~il~01~ _ f~~ancial analysis proJram which 
treats taxes, fleet additions and retirements, invest~ant tax crecit 
and all other financial aspects of airline operation. 
2.5 SYSTEt1 WORTH EVALUATION 
The results of the previous four modules together "lith the results of 
the non-fare benefit analysis come together in the system worth evaluation. 
This process is not computerized. It requires an analyst and must be spe-
cially tailored to each application. Usually several different transportatioG 
systems are compared with respect to some criterion, e.g., maximum profit, 
within certain constraints, e.g., adequate service level and sufficient 
transit ridership. The aim is to find a balanced transportation system 
for the study region. Usually many systems need to be processed through 
the model before an adequate syst"m worth evaluation can be made. 
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The economi cs of a transi t system don I t tell the full story. In some 
cases community val ues l'Ii11 be better served by a system l'iith poorer 
economics b~t better non-fare benefits. In some cases the non-fare 
benefits ars: directly n:(~$urabl2 economically, e.g., taxable real estate 
retained rather than lost to parking. In some cases the economic benefits 
are harder to measure. Where possible, these benefits are evaluated eco-
nomically by the non-fare benefits module. 
Figure 3 shows how the results of the capital investment and simulation 
modules int'2t'cct. The capital investment module gives the operating sur-
plus required, ~hereas the simulation module shows the operating surplus 
achieved. If an in5uffici~nt operating surplus is achieved, some aspect 
of the system must be modified, e.g., fare level, number of vehicles, 
size of vehicles, station locations. This modification will effect modal 
split, so that an entire new analysis is required. 
Figure 4 s~~:"s t~? s~r:~:~ur2 of th~ entire ~:d~l. Any transportation 
study must t~ver all th~ elem9nts shown in this chart. The major 
advantage cf TSE!' (Tran"portation System Evaluation nodel) is that all 
the elements ar~ linked together so that interactions between the elements 
is considerd, The fine level of detail treated by TSEl1 allOl-iS accurate 
systems evaluation, which in turn ma~es possible intelligent transportation 
planning. 
A study vjhic~ ~;8',;:n cu~::mf:-=d for ilASA sho,!s clearly hoI" the methodology 
described pl'~vicusly c.n be applied. The ourpose of tho study was to test 
the feasibilLy r.f usir:'l '.'/STQL~ircriJft in commuter service. Al.l aspects 
of the 5Y:,:::'.:·,,·'" Vi ~_:, s':·.:diec!. In addition to thr;, b·r;e case results, 
many s.ensi::'I-ity s~,;~~i~:s ~··(~re to bC? conductQJ. ImpGI'Ldr;t areas for future 
research wer~ to be id~ntified. 
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The study covered the nine county San 
periods, 1975 and 1985 were studied. 
2 VTOL concepts Nere i nves ti gated. 
Francisco Bay area. 
In each time period 
Two time 
2 STOL and 
The scope of the study was quHe broad covering all aspects of an ai r 
transportation system. Aircraft design, travel demand, modal split, 
aircraft operation, and economic evaluation vlere the major tasks of the 
study. 
These are also the basic blocks in the methodology presented earlier. 
Vehicle design wasn't mentioned in the methodology, but in order to 
choose a design the analytical procedure must be applied to each candidate. 
In some respects the intraurban system resembles a domestic trunk airl ine. 
Characteristics of a typical intraurban system are 1 isted bel 0\'1: 
Daily Passengers Carried 
Total Daily Flights 
Average Passenger Trip Distance 
Ai rcraft Requi red 
Average Load Factor 
Number of Terminals 
Number of One Way Segments 
48,551 
2,292 
23.4 
73 
.45 
24 
65 
Both in passengers carried and daily flights the system rivals such an 
airline. Of course, the fleet size is much smaller than that of an air-
line, showing the large number of daily flignts made by each aircraft. 
The largest difference bet,leen the intraurban and trunk airline is, of 
course, the average segment length. 
Figure 5 is a picture of one of the STOL aircraft designed for the study. 
Its mQst interesting feature is the large nurr.ber of doors. The plane is 
configured like a European train without any aisle. Each compartment has 
a door on each side of the aircraft. This design came about as a result 
of simulations showing that sate tim~ 
The weight penalty caused by multiple 
reduced gate time they allowed. 
~,,'-)s a critical vari;;t-'12 in thr:? sy~t':::~1. 
doors ':Ias more than pa i d for in the 
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3.1 MODEL STRUCTURE 
Since little historical data exists for intraurban air systems, a 
detailed simulation of the system was required. A demand/modal 
split model was built to calculate station pair demands. A routing 
and scheduling model \~as produced to simulate the operation of the 
aircraft within the system. An economic module was created to take 
the routes. schedules. and flight loads and calculate revenues and costs. 
This is exactly the process described in the preceding general discussion. 
Figure 6 shows some of the data flow within the model. The traffic 
generator for this study was a set of input demands. The modal split 
will be described later. Note that the vlaiting time assumed in modal 
split (as part of the trip time) is compared with the waiting actually 
achieved by the scheduling module. If they don't match, a new modal 
spl it is performed and a nel-l schedul e produced. Once the two are equal 
the economic evaluation takes place. 
The zoning of the study region and total demand for travel by all W.cc:i2S 
for each zone pair in the Bay area had been forecast by the i'letr'opolitan 
Transportation Commission before our study began. These forecasts of 
total travel Were used in our study. They had al so conducted a home 
survey of transportation. From this survey we developed time of day 
demand curves. 
A plot of demand by time of day was made for each zone pair from data 
collected in the home surveys. However, since there were only abcut 
100,000 trips to distribute in more than 2 1/2 million time slots (using 
1/2 hour intervals for each zone pair). most zone pairs had very sparse 
curves. A pattern emerged. however. One curve ~Ias used f}'om all zone 
pairs to downtown S.F .• a second ~Ias used from dOl'mtol'In S.F. to all other 
zones, a third curve was used bet\'/een all other zone pairs. These 3 
curves adequately represented the survey data. 
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The demand (properly speaking modal split) model calculated demand for 
V/STOL between each port pair. The model works exactly like the intra-
urban modal split model described earlier. Each zone pair is treated 
in order as follows: nearest V/STOL ports to the centroid of origin 
and destination zones are found, costs and times for auto and V/STOL 
trips are calculated and a diversion curve is entered with the cost 
and time differences to calculate the percentage of demand choosing 
V/STOL. This percentage is multiplied by t~e total zone pair demand 
and the result is added to the appropriate V/STOL station pair demand. 
The diversion curve used in this study was a plane, with cost difference 
and time difference as independent variables, percent diverted the de-
pendent variable. Of course, negative diversion and diversions of over 
100% were excluded. 
The demand model calculated travel demand between all V/STOL port pairs. 
Figure 7 shows the length distribution of these trips for the base (ose 
(1975 augmentor wing STOl aircraft with 49 seats). Also shown is the 
demand fed to the simulation medel. This consisted of all port pairs 
with traffic of 250 passengers per day. The demand actually carried 
during the simulation is also plotted. The model only carries demand 
when it makes some sense to do so. The requirement was that all air-
craft achieve at least two hours of utilization per day. 
Because the system ~Jas being simulated, all aspects of the operation 
were calculated. This allowed the IDe to be assigned to variables 
which caused IDe to be incurred such as number of gates. For each 
cost category (e.g .• aircraft servicing, ground facilities) coefficients 
were determined for each independent variable (terminals, departures, 
gates, etc.). The cost for each category Vias the sum of these coeffi-
cients multiplied by the variables. Total IOC is the sum of all cost 
categori es. Cash DOC curves I'/ere produced for each des i gn to be 
eva 1 uated. 
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3.2 RESULTS AND SENSITIVITIES 
The results for the 1975 aircraft are showni n Fi gure 8. The small 
STOL aircraft make an operat i I\g profi t but the debt servi ce requi re-
ments cause substantial losses. The helicopters lose less because of 
the reduced land requirement for ports. 
Figure 9 shows cash flows for the best aircraft. Profits from concessions 
10cated in VI S TOl ports ha ve been inc 1 uded in revenues. In 1920 bo th VTOL 
and STOl aircraft require subsidies, 19 million pe~ year for the helicopter 
and 25 million per year for the STOl. By 1990 the STOl subsidy is 16 mil-
l ion and the VTOL makes a profi t,. 
A number of simulations were run using time of day demand curves with 
different peaking characteristics. The results show that both fleet 
size and profit' are quite sensitive to the peaking characteristics. A 
flat time of day demar.d curve led to a requirerrent for 51 aircraft and 
an operating profit $23,000 par day. The standard case required 76 dir-
craft and produced an operating profit of 52,COO per day. If the peaking 
were three times as severe as in the standard case, 82 aircraft Vlould be 
needed and a $5.000 per day operating loss would be sustained. 
The demand and simulation models vlere run for several different fare 
levels. The demand grows rapidly as fares are reduced and the loss per 
passenger decreases. The total loss increases slightly as the fare is 
reduced. At 70% of the base fare the system carries 173,000 passengers 
,instead of 49,000 and the loss per passenger is 51.53 instead of $4.05. 
The 1975 aircraft were flolm in the 1990 market and the results compared 
with the 1985 aircraft in the market to measure the effect of technolo~y 
change. Both the 1975 and 1985 STOl aircraft experience the same demJnd; 
a slight reduction in loss per passenger is achieved by reduced DOC in 
the 1985 aircraft. The 1985 helicopter has a faster block speed than does 
the 1975 vehicle ~nd hence attracts more demand. This in addition to the 
lOI'ler D"'ur of +-h,,=, lC'i;"!:) \'n!~;cl" r"-,J\~p tl"~r' O.(C~:~i. ~+-,... n' -:,-,1,'::)" ;-1'\~"',.-·lcP r.f-ir'~ "" ..... - '" "" .- ~ I, • ~ "_ , ,_ ~. _, ,I -' - '. I •• ~ , I J '.. ,'" ~" ' .. " _ 1"'" • __ • 
The 1985 helicopter loses almost half of what the 1975 vehicle loses p~r 
passenger. 
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Simulation model runs were made using different gate times (turnaround 
times). The results were quite dramatic: going from 3 to 8 minutes 
of gate time increases the loss per passenger from 4 to 5 dollars. This 
effect is due to the lower peak period utilization of the aircraft which 
requi res 1 arger f1 eets to serve the same demand. The need for short gate 
times led to the multi-door design of the aircraft. 
One run through both demand and simulation models was made including the 
BART system as well as the automobile as a competitor to V/STOL. Because 
of its low fare EART is a tough competitor. The demand for STOL shrinks 
and the loss per passenger climbs from $4.05 to $6.93. 
Many sensitivity studies similar to those just described were carried out. 
Some of the results of the sensitivity studies were: 
Low gate biT,e is critical to the system 
Cruise speed is important up to 250 KN 
Commuter type peaking increases costs substantially 
Downtown Darts contribute most to the system 
System cannot compete over the same segment with BART 
Costs are lOllest at very short fi e 1 d 1 engths 
Lower fares (to a point) reduce the loss per passenger 
Both the base case results and the sensitivity studies required the use 
of the demand and simUlation models. This example shows the need for 
using the methodology described in Section 2, including all the inter-
actions betVieen e~e:nents. Had the analysis for this study been done in 
aggregate form, ~he base case results would have been suspect and the 
sensitivity studies could not· have been performed. 
4.0 APPLICATION OF TSEf·' TO A ~'AJOR CITY 
A proposed study for a major U. S. city shows application of the method-
ology described in Section 2. In this case TSEM (Transportation Systems 
Evaluation model), our integrated intraurban model, will be used. 
-n-
The objectives of the study involve preliminary design. evaluation of 
a PRT system. and a comparison of PRT and non PRT solutions to the 
transportation problem. 
have already been made. 
(total demand) have been 
data. 
Several transportation studies of this city 
Zones have been created and 1985 trip tables 
produced. The study will be based upon this 
The first function of TSEr.! will be to aid in the prel iminary design. 
A base case will be designed and run and then many modifications (dif-
ferent vehicle sizes. station locations. station capacities. headways. 
vehicle speeds) will be tried. The modal split and simulation modules 
will be cycled for each modification until convergence is obtained. 
All these runs will be made at a base fare level. 
Once the system has been adequately refined, several fare structures 
will be tried. The service levels. ridership and operating profits 
will be calculated. The "best" fare will be chosen and the resulting 
system evaluated, including the non-revenue benefits. 
Next. the service level, costs, and benefits of a freeway solution vJil1 
be calculated and compared to the PRT solution. 
The demand module will then predict demand for the future time periods. 
Modal-split and simulation modules will calculate system performance and 
costs in those years. The capital investment module will predict debt 
service requirements. Non fare benefits will be analyzed for each eval-
uation year. Finally, cash flows over the life of the system will be 
determined and this will permit final system evaluation. 
-23-
5.0 SUMMARY 
I 
We have presented a methodology for the analysis of transportatlon 
systems consisting of five major interacting elements. The analysis 
begins with the causes of travel demand: geographic, economic. and 
demographic characteristics as well as attitudes toward travel. Through 
the analysis, the interaction of these factors with the physical and 
economic characteristics of the transportation system is determined. 
The result is an evaluation of the system from the point of view of 
both passenger and operator. Service levels, economic and non-economic 
aspects Qf the system are ascertained. 
The methodology '.~as shO\m to be applicable to the intraurban transit 
systems as well as major airlines. Applications of the technique to 
analysis of a PRT system and a study of intraurban air travel were 
given. In the di scussion several unique models or techniques were 
mentioned: i.e., passenger preference modeling, an integrated intraurban 
tra.nsit mod,:l a~d a series of models to perform airline analysis. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The lockheed Aircraft Corporation, as a manufacturer of coriunercial air 
transports, is vitally interested ill following the development of air travel 
throughout the world. Rear'onable expectations as to the future developments 
are required as planning inputs for IJ.lckheed' s Corrunercial A;i.r Transport 
Programs. lockheed's air travel forecast requ irements range frOm over,,-ll 
projections of . world traft'ic by major areas for broad market planning to more 
detailed forecasts of individual carriers' city-pair peak traffic to determine 
each airline's aircraft needs. Generalized area forecasts, :['01' example, 
U.S. domestic, transatlant.ic, ;lntra-Europe, serve an the basis for specific 
airline and city-pair forecasts, while the city-pair forec,,-s\,s provide feed-
back to the more generalized area forecasts. 
This discussion will cover .total world traffic an distributed over broad 
major flows. We, at lockheed, usually forecast total world scheduled traffic 
as reported by the International Civil Aviation Organization (leAO). While 
lCAO statistics are available on a r:lobal basis, these show domestic and 
international traffic by couutry of airline registration and do not reveal the 
actual traffic flow. For example, t.raffic between Taipei and Hong KDng 
carried by TWA would show up undc'r U.S., wh.lle passengers ce.rried by Japan 
Air Lines over the same route would show up under Japan. 
lockheed has compiled a twenty~year hintory or the actual world's major air 
traffic flows as a basi£ for forecasting the futur" of world air travel. 
In addition to the bas ic data sourCE'S· (ICAO, I'<TA, EARB, OM, airport ".nd 
civil aviation authorities, immigration and I"ouri~t organization~), individual 
a.irline traffic statistics havE' also been used to htelp allocate traffic over 
spec ific .flows. 
Since the environment within which the airline industry operates is verJ 
dynamic, you can see how essential it is to continuously evaluate aod update 
the various forecast results. In this current npdating of Lockheed's lCAO 
world forecast, our goal was to identify and measure all major air traffic 
flows and still be cons istent with leAO report"d traffic data. 
SUMMARY 
Total World 
Total world scheduled air passenger traffic carried by the airlines of the 
International Civil Aviation Organization (IeAO), excluding the USSR, 
increased from 17.4 billion passenger miles in 1950 to 237.4 billion in 1970. 
This represents an average annual growth rate of 11.% during the past two 
decades. The USSR became a member of lCAO in 19TO, and Aeroflot - the only 
Russian airline - reported 49 billion passenger miles for 1970. This traffiC, 
which encompasses both domestic and international travel 8.S well as some non-
scheduled flights, is not included in the lCAO world totals shown in this report. 
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Based on air traffic development over the past two decades and expected changes 
in future air travel service in the many areas of the world, including the 
continUEd expansion of non-scheduled services, world scheduled air traffic will 
grow at a sowewhat .lower rate than in the 1960's. lockheed's forecast of lCAO 
world sched"led revenue passenger miles amounts to 650 billion in 1980; this 
represents' an average annual increase of 10.6% for the 1970 to 1980 period. 
, 
Significant shifts between scheduled and non-scheduled traffic are occurring 
in various traffic categories. While it is difficult to measure non-scheduled 
traffic in many areas of the world, we estimate that it amounted to some 50 
billion passenger miles in 1970,. with about half composed of European inclusive 
tour traffic and transatlantic traffic. Most Of the other traffic is composed 
of U.S. domestic and military charter. 
Assuming the present type of non-scheduled service continues, as well as a 
decrease in militury charter, Lockheed forerasts that non-scheduled passenger 
traffic will grow at an annual rate of 15% durin~ the 1970' s, totalins about 
200 billion passenger miles by 1980. Non-scheduled traffic by scheduled, 
supplemental and charter airlines is expected to increase its share reJative 
to scheduled from 21% in 1970 to 31% by 1980. 
Major Flows 
For the first time, all major world air traffic flows were analyzed, including 
those areas for whjch no systematic traffic statistics are available. 
Actual 1970 traffic has been utilized as a base for those areas regularly 
reporting traffic (lCAO, IATA, EARB, OAA, the U.S. CAB). Estimates have 
been made for all other major traffic flows on the baSis of other available 
data, such as airport and civil aviation authorities, immigration and tourist 
organizations and airlines. 
. 
Lockheed's forecast of world scheduled traffic was developed by preparing 
forecasts for about '48 unique traffic flows; these were then combined into 13 
major flows. Every effort has been made to reflect realistic traffic growth 
patterns for these regions based on their own particular characteristics. 
FORECASTING METHODS AND PHILOSOPHY 
I would like to continue this presentation with a discussion of various 
techniques uSed in forecasting. These techniques are applicable to air 
travel anywhere 'in the world; and, in fact'; most of these techniques are 
applicable to forecasting in general, regardless of whether it is for travel 
or other consumer items. ' 
SlJO 
2 
Philosophy of Forecasting 
Before discussing the alternative methods of forecastinG, I would like to 
discuss the "philosophy" of forecasting. 'rile 'quest.ion I would like to 
introduce is: Can we forecas lo the future? Can we really know in advance what 
will happen tomorrow, next week, next sumrne,' 01' (,Vell ten or twenty years out? 
furthermore, what can we know about the future? In whs.t detail can we know 
about it, and to what degree of certainty can we foresee the future? 
There are several aspects to cover before g"Vlng my views. First, there is 
the role of the forecaster - whether It be an individual, or a group ,(,r som', 
orGanization that wants knowledge of the future. This plays a ve!7 2 i'iniflca~t 
role, especially in analyzing and predictir.g th8 td",'lior of people as ;.,-,di-
vidua.ls 'or in groups. Since the analyst is part of the ?rocess that is ·~;':?ing 
analyzed, he cannot detach himself from the analytical Pl'O"')ss. This io unlike 
the detachment possible in analyzing and t~fing to predict phySical phenomena, 
such as the movement of stars or the moon, or experimenting under' controlled 
conditions in a laboratory. The biases, the self-interests, the motivation 
of the analyst make it almost impossible to be 100% objective. 
Another important consideration is that a forecast can be self-fulfillinc. 
Once a forecast is made, if the decision-making officials in the various 
organizations that are affected plan on the basis of this forecast, it can 
well be that this forecast will be realized. Forecasts are usually bas"d on 
, certa:ln assumptions of the future; and one of thes" has to be the required 
policies that must be undertaken for a forecast to be realizable. 
When it comes to forecasting any event involving human behavior, I have come 
to the conclusion after many years of involveme'lt In thh; endeavor, that 
the best we can do is predict what can potentially happen i" a broad degree 
under a given set of c:Lrcumstances - a. given set of' assumptions. The greater 
the detail that we would like to know, the creater the probability of being 
wrong in the future. 
For example, if we want to forecast the number of tourists or air travelers 
to certain parts of the world, we must first make certain assumptions relatine 
to the general SOCial, political, economic environment, the climate, that is 
required to make these events potentially happen. Secondly, there must also 
be assumptions regarding specific policies that are required for cert,ain eventG 
to 18.ppen. 
The former set of assumptions which deal with the broader social, political 
conditions are usually beyond the control of anyone airline or anyone single 
government agency. The latter, however, are subject to the control of an 
airline or a governmel1.t agency and something can be done about 'them. 
Therefore, what we ought to strive for are not forecasts, but goals. In other 
words, let us establish what we vant to happen in the future and then determine 
what we must do to make these things happen, r'or instance, an airline might 
determine that it wants to have so many pascn,gers "etween two cities in a 
certain time period. PrOjectIons of the total traffic potential between these 
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points would be made on a basis of the most likely economic conditions that 
would prevail in the time period under consideration. And these assumptions 
would als() need to include fare levels at whi~h this potential demand could 
be realized. 
1~les" factors are USUg lly beyond the control of anyone airline, so a very 
realistic approach must b8 takeL. Nevertheless, given this assumed environment 
the ai.,-line can set Llp realistic goals of traffic that it would like t() achieve 
within this environme'1t. It would have to establish the proper schedules, 
service patterns, advertiSing policies, marketing strategies to achieve this 
potentia,_, so that the coal they would like to have could be realized. 
It may seem that I am taking a very negative attitude with regard to our 
ability to forecast accurately. Howe-/er, I would prefer to be positive in 
streSSing that forecasts disguised as goals can be attained with the reali-
zation as to the extent to which we can control our own destiny. 
llireover, to be able to determin" the impact of our actions on the development 
of future air travel is no easy task. It require" not only analytical insight 
into cause and effect, bu.t the ability to measure these e'i'f'eets with some 
precision. 
Regardless of all the hazards 0[' forecasting - and there are many - we must 
forectist the future. In fact, any 'lecision that is made bas an implied 
forecast ansociated 'with it, ev~'" thuugh no expl:i cit forecast is made. 
I believe, however, that setti:lg up goals enables US to go from the present 
to the future in a mor'~ orderly and. efficient manner. 
Forecas tine Techniques 
I would next like to cover some of the fore~asting techniques. There are about 
as many techn; ques as therEe aT'e forecasters. Since everyone in the world is 
a forecaster, there are Irtillions of f()recasting techniques. However, I l>elieve 
these can be put into u·wut four broe,d groups. 
Trend Analys ~.s . The first method of forecasting is trend analyS is, 
or ",xtrapolating :',,"m t>le past into the future. It can be as simple 
as drawing a li!"~r~ (;:1 e_ piece of graph paper, or it can become more 
corr:r.iicated U~cl;g)-, the use 0:' ccmputerized programs using second 
and third degree relat',onsh"ips. 
Regression Analysis. The next method is regression analysis, in 
"hich we try to a~certain the relationships between a dependent 
variable (the one which you are tryillg to explain or forecast) and 
Independent' variables. In this uppruach broad economIc indicators 
a.nd'serv'ice fact,,!"s have been used to fOl'('cast the rut.ure of air 
t.l'3. ..... el'. Again, ~:hj.;3 method call ]'al1gl' from very simple linear 
reL'ltionship.s Of: til" depellllcnt Variables to one ind,'p"ntient variable 
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to a very complex system of multi-correlation t.echniCl.ues using 
non-linear relationships. However, regardless of how complex 
any regression analysis is, any fOl'm of reO'essi('n analysis is 
basically a very sophisticated form of tl'end analysis. Furthermore, 
regression analysis, or correlation analysis as ;t is ('ften called, 
does not determine cauoe anti effect relatio'lShi],>s. It merely says 
that certain things happen tOGether, and 1'1'0111 that we imply that 
there are cause and effect relationships. 
Market Analysis. A third general type or forecast which is a 
little more sophisticated than regression analysis, I lump under 
the category of market analysis approach, in which detailed socio. 
economic characteristics of the population, its ineome, ag~, 
education and occupation are used to det,c;:'''''m.ir~e trle .: .... ',;.<:,ure ~)a~terns 
of travel. This method attempts to deterr:,:'.r.~ to sece.'" degr~e caus', 
and effect' relationships. It also reCl.uires, h:;weve!', a ~ontiEuir,g 
body of detailed survey data. 
Simulation Analysis. Finally, the fourth group, which I call 
simulation analysis, is an attempt to duplieate mathematically the 
various forces affecting tourism - air travel, or whatever you arc 
trying to forecast. This method is also called econometric 
techniCl.ues, and perhaps it may be a better term, because almost any 
method that we now use does use to some extent n~theu~tical fOl~ulas, 
and so almost any techniCl.ue can be called econometric. 
Evaluation of Alternate TechniCl.ues 
An evaluation of these four methods has been made in terms, of data reCl.uirements, 
advantages and disadvantages and ease of computerization. 
Trend analysis is the simplest. You don't have to have much data. All you need 
is five or ten years of data on the item you are trying to forecast. It is 
very fast and very inexpensive, but it is very subjective. In other words, 
the way you feel today will influence your forecast today. You go home and 
have a good night's sleep and feel rested and come in tomorrow and you might 
feel a little cheerier - the sun is shining, the world is well, and' you look 
at it and say, "Gee, why was l so peSSimistic yesterday?" and you change the 
forecast. Also, it can be readily computerized too if you have a long time 
period of events. 
The regression analysis is a little more sophisticated. A little more detailed 
data is required. In addition to historical data on your dependent variables, 
you also need historical data on your independent variables. Also, you need 
forecasts of your independent variables, and this is Cl.uite difficult to achieve 
sometimes. FbI' example, if you have to forecast traffic related to the Gross 
National Product of a particular country and if that forecast is wrong, 
obviously, even though your relationship may be perfect, your forecast is 
not valid. In fact, this was one of our problems in trying to forecast U.S. 
domestiC traffic last year. Most of our forecasts of U.~. domestic traffic 
are tied to the economic conditions of the country, and our own forecasters 
and the government had difficulty in telling uS when the turnaround was going 
to come. So, when the economic upswing lagged, the traffic forecasts asso-
ciated with it lagged. The problem then is that you have to have good 
forecasts of independent variables. 
The regres£ion method is still subjective in that the years you choose to 
analyze can s ignificaCltly affect the results. If you choose ten years which 
happen to be part of an ups >ling, you would have one kind of result. If you 
broadened your base and included fifteen years in which there were several 
early years of lower growth, you would have a different result. Therefore, 
even in these mathematical techniques, there is a considerable bit of judgment 
as to what data to use and how to use it. 
Again, I would have to point out that here there is no explicit cause and 
effect relationship, though we feel that the factors used are likely candidates. 
We only observe in the past that these various variables reacted to each other 
in certain ways. Cause and effect relationships are not certain. They are 
just implied. 
One good thing about this method is that you can perform some sensitivity 
analysis. If I were unsure of what GNP were going to be in the next five 
years, I could· take two or three different growL)l rates and see the impact 
on my forecast. This way, at least, we have a band of what the probabilities 
of reaching the forecast can be. Finally, computer programs for this technique 
are readily available. In fact, if you buy a computer, they will give you the 
programs with it. 
The market analysis method has tremendous data requirements. Travel survey 
data· are required to get the socio-economic characteristics of travelers and 
non-travelers over a period of time. A nation's population distributed among 
the same characteristics must also be available for the survey periods as well 
as for the future. 
These· data are not always available and are expensive and time consuming to 
obtain. Thus, it can take quite a few months to do a forecast for just one 
area. 
This method does have certein advantages in that the data and analyses can be 
'~sed in dCjtermining marJ.:etiClg strategies and advertising policies. 
Tc my knowledge, this method has 
could be done .relat.ively easily. 
it has not been worth the effort 
not been computerized, although I think it 
Because the data problem is so enormous, 
to computerize this method. 
The simulation technique has not been successfully used to forecast traffic. 
The question is not only one of techniques or computers. It is primarily the 
complexity of the real world and the difficulty in attempting to duplicat.e 
all : he dec is ion-making processes that are involved when people take a t.rip: 
Should they take a trip, or spend their income some other way? Where should 
they go? When? With whom? For how long? Which mode? - ad infinitum. 
This process would also have to 11e followed ce<l.uentially by time perlod, with 
all the lead and lag relationships. As you Ca!1 sec, the simulation method is 
at present way beyond us. 
IJ)CKlIEED FORECAST OF WORLD TRAFFIC 
So much for the discussion of alternate techni<l.ues and the problems related 
to their use. How did we arrive at our world forecast? 
As I mentioned earlier, we analyzed·all major traffic flows through~ut the 
world. In fact, some 48 different flows were analyzed. In my discuss~c-" 
today, I will cover our total \wrld forecast and several vf the major area 
forecasts, including U.S. domestic, transatlantic and intra-Europe. 
Factors Affecting the Development of Air Traffic 1950-1970 
Based On the analyses of past air traffic, we feel that the most important 
factors which influence the growth of air travel are economic conditions, 
price of air travel and the quality of air service. Specific variables 
utilized in our forecasts inc.1ude: 
• World's Economy 
• Standard of Living 
• Price of Air Travel 
• Quality of Air Service 
Constant dollar Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) fOr the ma~or 
nations. 
Constant dollE.r GDP per capita for 
the major nations. 
Revenue per passenger mile, in 
constant U.S. dollE.r prices. 
Average speed, aircraft size and 
fatality rates. 
The rate of growth of the world economies, as measured by various indic~s, 
provides the most important factor affecting the rate of growth of air travel. 
The price of a ticket, especially in relation to other goods and other modes 
of travel, is also an important and easily measurable factor. 
For any given route or market, other factors, such as competitive pressures 
from other modes of travel, are important in deciding whether a traveler 
will fly. For predominantly business markets, various factors which reflect 
how well bUSinesses are doing, such as profitability and rate of product lon, 
are reliable for forecasting. 
Although these quantitative factors are important in developing suitable air 
travel forecasting models, it is important to realize that subjective f'aclors, 
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which may bear heavily on the environment within which the industry operates, 
must also be included. 
During the past two decades, the factors which have had a significant impact 
on air traffic growth have developed quite rapidly. The world's economy, in 
~onstant prices, grew at an annual rate of almost 5% and per capita income 
at 3%. At the same time, markedly improved air service was offered at 
considerably lower fares. 
World Gross Domestic .Produ~t grew at an annual rate of 4.9% between 1950 
and 1960. The 1960's showed an identical annual growth rate increase. 
The U.S. economy grew at an average annual rate of 3.3% from 1950 to 1960 
and 4% from 1960 to 1970. GDP of other major industrialized nations grew 
at a faster rate, with Japan showing a remarkable gro,nh of almost 10% per 
year for these two decades. 
Per capita GDP varies greatly among the world's nations. This measure of 
the standard of living varies widely among the major industrialized nations, 
ranging from almost $3900 for the U.S. to about one-third of this amount for 
Japan. The world average is only $680.00. 
The average fare throughout the world decreased by 9% between 1960 and 1970. 
After adjusting for consumer price level increases, the average fare in. 1960 
constant dollars decreased a substantial 31%, or an average annual decrease 
of 3.6%. Some selective fares, such as on the North Atlantic and the PaCific, 
fell even faster. Comparatively, the 1950's showed general fare level 
increases, although fares held generally steady on a constant dollar basis. 
While the price of an airline ticket decreased substantially, the quality of 
service, as me.asured by the speed, size and comfort of the aircraft, has 
increased with the introduction of jet aircraft. lCAO carriers' average 
seats per aircraft have increased 7% in the 1960's, from 59 to 101 seats. 
Speed increased almost, 60% for the average aircraft mile flown. This trans-
lates into shorter' tr.avel times, especially on the longer segments. Together, 
these t>lO factors - speed and size - result in an aircraft productivity some 2.7 
times greater .in 1970 than in 1960. 
Added comforts and conveniences to the passenger cannot be quantified. 
In general, the kind of service which the carriers have prOVided to the 
passer.gers during the first decade of jet aircraft has improved. In addition, 
,-="ger rar:ge ,jet aircraft have opened new markets for non-stop flights, thus 
reducing total trip time even more. 
Safety, a very important psychological factor in air travel, has also shown 
significaut improvement, as measured by the number of fatalities per 100 
million RPM's. 
In 'summary, during the past two decades, people's incomes have increased at 
a fast rate, while fares have gone dom1 substantially (especially in relation 
to other go.ods) making air travel more attractive. At the same time, the 
quality of service has' improved, as shown by significant reductions in flying 
time, added passenger comforts and a significantly greater number of non-stop 
flights. 
Air travel is dominated by Americans and Europeans. From the subsequent 
discussion of the major factors that influence air travel, th~, is under-
standable since the technologically developed areas of the world account 
for about ~ of world air traffic. These developed areas account for over 
80% of the world's economic activity, as measured by the Gross Domestic 
Product, while accounting for only approximately 30% of the world's 
population. These areas are characterized by industrialization, high 
income levels, a high degree of literacy and urbanization, They include 
most of North America, the temperate part of South America, Europe 
(including the USSR), Japan, Australia and New Zealand. 
The relationship between air travel and population and economic activity 
may be easily illustrated. The illustrations show that the rate. of growth 
of the world economies provide the most important factor affecting the 
rate of growth of air travel. Economic activity of a country, measured 
by Gross National Product, correlates highly with that country's generated 
air traffic. On the other hand, a large population alone is not the basic 
requirement in achieving high airline travel. For example, India, the 
second largest country in terms of population, is substantially smaller 
on the basis of both GNP and air travel. 
The United States, substantially smaller in population than India, is by 
far the largest in terms of both GNP and air travel generated. TheGNP 
of the U.S. accounts for almost one-third of the total ~orld's GNP. U.S. 
domestic air traffic plus U.S. citizens traveling outside of the U.S. 
account for about 55% of the world's air passeng~r miles. 
Forecast of World Air Traffic 1970-1980 
Scheduled world traffic is expected to increase 10.6% per year far the 
1970 to 1980 period, from 237.4 billion passenger miles to 650 billion. 
In 1975 it is expected that 390.0 billion passenger mnes will be flown, 
an average increase of 10.4% per year over the 1970 level. The second 
half of the decade is projected to grow at 10.8% per year, 
Scheduled traffic by the world's airlines during 1970'~ is expected to 
continue at a fast pace under the impetus of a growing world econ~ and 
the introduction of wide-bodied jet aircraft. This rate will be lower 
than experienced in the 1960's, reflecting our assumption of the continued 
expansion of non-scheduled air services. 
World Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is expected to reach a.lmost $~ triHion 
(measured in 1964 U.S. dollars) in 1980 compared to th~ 1970 base figure 
of almost $2.5 trillion. Thus, we see that world wide economic growth 
during the 1970's will continue the pattern of th~ 1960's. The major 
change is a partial slowdown in Japan's phenomenal growth; despite this 
slowdown Japan's rate will still be twice the U.S. growth rate. Despite 
growth in other parts of the world U.S. will still be the dOminant econo~ic 
power, as shown in the pie chart comparison. 
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As' a result ef the anticipated expansien ef the Japaneseecenemy, tegether 
with a lew birth rate, Japan's GDP per capita in 1980 will be 40 percent 
greater than that ef W:esternEurepe. Hewever, Japan's GDP per capita will 
exceed,Eurepe's,.equal Australia's but will still be less than 60 percent 
. ef the.U.S.GDP per capita. Averag~ werld GDP will increase 3"/. annually 
frem ¢680 in 1970 to' $912 in 1980 •. 
While service facters will centinue to' impreve, these will be at a lewer 
rate than. during the 1960' s . Pas,senger cemfert will increase; speed will 
net increase sign~ficantly until supersenic aircraft are available fer 
service. The imprevement in technelegy will result in aircraft that are 
better airpert neighbers. The wide-bedy jets will have quieter and cleaner 
e,ngines,.and the increased capacity will amelierate airway andairpert 
ce~estien. 
,Altheugh aircraft preductivity will centinue to' increase, it will net 
·increase at the rate experienced with the initial intreductien ef jet 
aircraft; As ind~rectcests are expected to' increase at a faster rate 
than direct, fares in current prices will net decrease as during the past 
decade. Fares, in censtant prices, hewever, are expected to' decline. The 
fatality rate during the past decade decreased to' an extremely lew level; 
hewever, centinued emphasis will be placed en imprevements in air traffic 
centre.l precedures, airpert landing aids and emergency facilities. 
The biggest unknewn is the future ef nen-scheduled traffic including 
inclusive teur packages. If the scheduled carriers elect to' compete with 
nen-scheduled services by reducing fares en scheduled services, eur 
ferecast will fall shert ef actual future scheduled traffic. If, en the 
ether hand, the scheduled carriers elect to' cempete by substantially 
increasing their charter eperatiens, eur ferecast ef scheduled traffic 
will be teo high as nen-scheduled travel exceeds the ferecast 15% grewth 
rate. 
Censidering these factors, werld airline scheduled traffic will centinue 
to' grow at a semewhat lewer rate than the l3.4"/. experienced during the 
1960's. There'are many pesitive facters that will centribute to' the 
centinued grewth ef air travel threugheut the 1970's. At present, a 
large portien of the adult pepulatien has never flewn. The centinued 
~ncreasein werldwide real inceme per capita, mere leisure time, and 
higher 'leVels of werldwide educatien will spur air travel demand. 
Fleasure travel is expected to' shew the mest rapid grewth in the next 
decade. Increasing GNP and internatienal trade alsO' will previde a 
streng impetus to' air travel among businessmen. In spite ef imprevements 
in' 'c'emmunicatfens, there will continue to' be nO' substitute fer persenal 
meetings and face-te-face' centact in the conduct ef business. Highly 
cemPetitive greund transpertation is net expected in the 1970' s except 
fer Japan. . 
The technalegically underd~veleped areas ef the werld (Africa, Asia 
. (except Japan), Central America and the nen-temperate areas ef Seuth 
America) will increase their share ef the werld' s pepulat.ien during the 
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next decade. Even though economic productivity in the underdeveloped 
areas will be growing at a faster rate than in the developed areas, 
increases on a per capita basis will be smaller. The bulk of the world's 
economic activity, and hence air traffic, will continue to be accounted 
for by North America and Europe, even though air traffic growth rates 
in the less developed areas will be greater. For this reason, only U.S. 
domestic, transatlantic and Intra-European traffic will be discussed in 
detail. 
U.S. Domestic Traffic 
U.S. domestic traffic during the 1960's increased 12.3% with continental 
traffic growing at about 12% and mainland to Alaska and Hawaii growing 
at about 15.5%. This average hides tremendous variations in growth during 
the past two decades. The past 20 years of domestic traffic, may be 
broken up into four distinct periods, each with its unique annual ~verage 
growth rate: 
1950-1957 
1950-1957 
1957-1961 
1961-1968 
1968-1971 
l7.F!Jf. 
5.~ 
16.0% 
4.9% 
The period between 1950 and 1957 was one of uninterrupted growth ~n pas-
senger traffic. Although there was an actual decline in economic activity 
in 1954, the airlines were unaffected. During this period, fares in 
constant dollars (deflated by the Consumer Price Index) fell 17 percent; 
simultaneously, service improved as represented by a 38 percent increase 
in average air speed. Direct operating costs per available seat mile 
declined, and the trunk carriers actually averaged a rate of return equal 
to or greater than the 10.5 percent standard set by the CAB. 
1957-1961 
The rate of economic growth slowed down during the 1956-1957 per~od, and 
in 1958 GNP actually fell. The result was that, for th~ first time since 
1948, air traffic (in 1958) showed no growth. In addition to the slow_ 
down in the nation's economy, air fares began to increase. Between 1957 
and 1961 the airlines increased air fares 11 percent in order to offset 
rising costs. Costs had increased, despite improved productivity of 
aircraft, due to the greater capacity required to serve the many new routes 
awarded CAB. Load factors fell as the airlines continued to increase seat 
miles, even though traffic growth slowed down. During this period, oper-
ating costs were· fairly constant; but, due to the decline .in the rate of 
traffic increase, the return on investment dropped sharply, reaching a 
low point in 1961 with barely more than a 1 percent return, despite a 
¢ontinuing increase in yields. 
11 
" ", ~ . 
" 
WUh.the strong upturn ·ih the nation"s 'econorriy, from 1961 onward" traf'fic ' 
grew rapidl:"" achieving about the same "levels of growth as in ,the early 
and mid~-l950's'.,As 'jets became the dominant aircraft,operating effi· ' 
ciencies', increased" better' serv.ice was: offered, and direct operating costs, ' 
per seat mile, ,dropped ,1'6 percent betweeri'1962 and 1968. Air yield, which ;, 
reached a peak in 1962, started to drop rapidly; the passenger tax was 
reduced from 10 percent to 5 percent in 1962. As a result, real fares 
dropped 28 percent. The rate of inflation was less than 2 percent per 
year during this period of rapid growth. The rate of return started 
'climbing, reaching 10 percent by 1964 and exceeding it in 1965 and 1966. 
As airlines' achieved high ROI' s, the CAB increased competition by putting three 
carriers on'most major routes. Between the increased productivity of the jets 
and increasing competitive .scheduling resulting from the new route awards, 
available .seatmiles' doubled in the four years between 1964 and 1968. To 
fill up the seats, the CAB exerted pressure on the airlines to reduce fares, 
espeCially through special discount and promotional fares. These fare 
discounts were probably greater than they should have been; for, while 
direct operating costs per seat mile were falling, indirect costs began to 
increase as airlines improved ground facilities and offered better in flight 
service (movies, improved meals, etc.), and costs associated with congestion 
began to appear. Airline profits and ROI started falling - the latter 
falling to 5.5 percent by 1968, even though traffic was growing rapidly. 
1968-1971 
:', 
The slowdown in domest:ic air traffic from which we have just emerged began 
during thlO,last half of 1969, even though the year ended up 9.2 percent 
ahead of. 1968'~ Newand often excessive route awards (e.g., nine carriers 
serving the U,S. mainland to Hawaii) continued into 1969. Seat miles increased 
16 percent compared to the 10 percent growth in passenger miles. Economic 
activitysl6wed markedly in 1969, and GNP showed only a 2.8 percent increase 
for the year as a whole. GNP, duririg the 4th Quarter of 1969, actually fell 
below the prior quarter for the first time since the 1961-1962 recession. 
Consumer price increases continued to accelerate during the late 1960's, 
reaching,over 5 percent in 1969. Real passenger fares, ending their six-year 
declinir~' trend, : remained constant as fare'increases granted by the CAB ' 
r<Jughlyeq'lalle'd'the;"rate of inflation, Nonetheless, airline profits decreased 
5 pe,tcent,and the ROI slipped under 5 percent. 
Early in 1970 it 'h~ been'anticipated 'that there would be a moderate economic 
recovery'dUiihg the ,"s'eccind h~lf of the year. In actuality, there was no 
re<;~~eri duri'og1970; GNP actually declined. Inflation continued unabated; 
airline, c'osts continued t:o, escahte; real fares increased slightly, and the 
pass<cng<;f'tax wall irwre€lsed, ftom5 to 8 Percent to pay for airport and airways 
improvements.' Airline profits turned into losses. 
, . ." .~ .. ' '. ~ " , 
Domestic'traff:i:h remained virtually static 
carrier traffic actually declined in 1970. 
by strikes of airline personnel as well as 
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during 1970 and 1971. Trunk 
The industry was also plagued 
air tra1'fic ~ontrollers, which 
cost the industry about 1 billion revenue passenger' miles.' In ,fact, traffic 
got worst' during the second half of ,1970, paraU,elinF, the pattern of economic 
actIvity. 
IronicaHy, the 1970-1971 period resembles the ,1958-1961.'period when the first 
ceneration jets were introduced into, service. A slowdown in the economy 
reduced traffic. Capacity increased, not only due to great compet'it~on from 
new route awards but aloo due to increased aircraftprdductivity,.as :a747's 
were introduced into service. One major difference is the current· high level 
01' inflation, a rate of over, 5%. Airline costs Increa»ed at'aneven greater 
rate. Due to reduced traffic growth, the CAB was slow to award further fare 
increases. The airlines, thus,' were squeezed between fa'lling- revenues' and 
soaring costs, resulting 'in their present poor financial condition; 
Forecast 1972-1980 
The economy finally turned around during the latter half of' 1971; Air' traffic 
during the first half of 1971 fell below 1970. Despite the6~ fare increase 
granted in May 1971, summer traffic was about the same and 'traffic' finally 
began increasing during the last quarter. The domestic tra'ffic recovery has 
continued into 1972. The first half is up about 12%; 'and this rate is expected 
to continue the rest of the year. " 
As may be seen from the foregoing analys is, the two most' impOrtant variables 
influencing air traffic are the condition of the nation's econotDy (as m~asured 
by GNP) and the price for air service - passenger yield - measured in average 
revenue (including tax) per passenger mile. ' 
These two independent factors are relatively simpie to'project on a 16ng;-te:rm 
basis - GNP reflects the general trend of the economy and pas,senger yields 
reflect the long-term cost of providing the service." 
", " ... 
However, projecting short-term values for these factors is e<,tremely difficult, 
as to a great extent they reflect Government policy. It"isnext to illlJlossible 
to predict the exact timing of various governmental actions." . 
Nevertheless, our view is that the economy will coptinue improvitlg t,hrot\:gh 1973 
and 1974. Passenger yields will increase to keep' up wiih'inflati"n" ;ihfch is 
expected to .continue through the end of 1973. Air traffic wi,ll c(jntinu~' a 
strong upward trend through 1973 and 1974.' In the last half' of 'the decade 
it is expected that traffic will increase at about 9.5~ per year. ' ,,,0' 
, .;} . , -
Our current forecast was prepared using regression analyses,. ).fany. ;lndep,endent 
variables were considered, including: GNP (iit both "urrent ap.d constant 
dollars), disposable personal income (both current a;i.d.coruitarit,donars )'i. 
population, unemployment trends, current and cops,tant dolIar yields" corporate 
profits, savings rates, stock prices, retail sa'les and, a:,q\!ality se'rvice, index. 
The variables yielding the best fit of the past were current dollar disposable 
personal income, constant dollar yields, <::qrpc::>rate "p:t:0fits and Ul).~J\lPJ,oywent. 
. ,-... .,'" . .' .,'. , . '" ~ .'1. 
,~ , 
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Our forecast through 1980 is based on a 6.9% annual increase in disposable 
income, a 7.~ annual increase in corporate profits, a steadily decreasing 
unemployment rate (e.g.,·5% in 1974,3.8% by 1980) and a yield that remains 
the .S&mE! in constant· dollars. 
Beyond the analysis of past history, there are positive factors which may 
be expected to contribute to the continued growth of air travel in the 
decade of the 1970's. Paramount among these is the real need for such 
Service. Gross National Product will increase by over 50 percent in 
the next ten years. The volume of business resulting from such an increase 
will provide a strong impetus for air travel among businessmen. In spite 
of improvements in communications, there will continue to be no substitute 
for personal meetings and face-to-face contact in the conduct of business. 
The continued increase in acceptance of air travel by the U.S. population 
will be accelerated by larger numbers of young people who have been 
exposed to air travel, either through military service or by youth discount. 
While about 50 percent of the U. S. population has flown commercially today, 
this percentage will continue to increase over the next few years. 
The influence of increased GNP will be more pronounced when viewed from 
a per capita basis. With population growing at about 1 percent per year, 
and GNP in real terms anticipated at 4 percent, one can visualize the 
increase in disposable income which wi~l result. This increased income, 
coupled with the push for more leisure time, will spur air travel demand. 
It is.in the area of increased pleasure travel that the most rapid growth 
in.air travei demand will result. 
Transatlanti.c Traffic 
Transatlantic scheduled air traffic from the U.S. and Canada to Europe 
has been one of the fastest growing travel markets in the world. During 
the 1950's it grew at an average annual rate of over 19%, virtually 
knocking out sea travel. During the 1960's under the impetus of expanded 
jet service which not only decreased travel time but lowered fares 36% 
in constant prices, transatlantic nfr traffic increased at an average 
rate of allllost l~. 
During the ,latter part of the 1960's, charter traffic by both scheduled 
. and supplemental carriers grew rapidly. During the' 1960's charter traffic 
"averaged 3~ annual growth, reaching 26% of the total transatlantic market. 
The combined szheduled and charter market grew at an annual rate of 18% 
almost as high as the 19% experienced by scheduled traffic in the 1950's, 
When the market was first developing. 
Our transatlantic scheduled traffic forecast for 1980 of little over a 
l~.annual growth rate reflects a continuing switch to charter travel. 
Charter traffic, on the other hand, is expected to grow at an annual rate 
of. allllost l~ with the expectation that charter will account for allllost 
39% of total transatlantic air travel by 1980. 
The forecast is based on current types of scheduled and charter services. 
Continued relaxing of restrictive charter policies would result in an 
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even faster charter growth rate and in a lower growth rate for scheduled 
traffic. The new combined scheduled/charter traffic would be higher than the 
present 12~ forecast. 
This forecast of scheduled traffic is based on a separate analysis of U.S. 
and European originating traffic. U.S. originatinc traffic was found to be 
related to U.S. consumer expenditures (in constant dollars), total trip cost 
(including hotels, meals, tours and transportation) and charter traffic. 
European originating traffic was found to be related to an index of Western 
Europe GNP (OECD countries) in constant Western European currencies, a weighted 
index of trip costs in constant currencies and charter passengers. 
Our analysis indicates that European originating traffic will grow at a 
substantially higher rate than U.S. originating traffic. Thus, European 
originating traffic which represented 36~ of the total in 1970 will clim"o 
to 45~ by 1980. This should go a long way in moderating the directional 
imbalance that has plagued this market for many years. 
Intra-Europe Traffic 
Traffic within Europe is the third largest world market. The geographic 
definition of Europe is that used by the European Air Research Bureau; tllUjS, 
it includes the entire Mediterranean Basin (i.e., Africa north of the Sahara 
and the Middle East countries). European traffic to the USSR is included, 
but the USSR itself is excluded. Also, it includes both domestic as well as 
international passengers. 
Some 28 billion passenger miles were accommodated during 1970, or almost 12~ 
of ICAO total scheduled passenger miles. During the 1950' s, this traffic 
grew at almost 16% per year. During the 1960's, this traffic grew at only 
12.5% per year. This drop reflects competition from lOW-fare inclusive tour 
charters (IT Charter) that developed rapidly in the United Kingdom, West 
Germany and in the Scandinavian countries. This traffic is holiday travel 
destined to the Mediterranean area, primarily to Spain. 
European IT charter traffic grew from virtually nothing in 1960 to almost 12 
billion passenger miles in 1970, or almost 35% per year; it now represents 
about 47% of intra-Europe international traffic by Western European carriers. 
While charter service has generated new traffic, it has also diverted some 
SCheduled traffic in certain markets. Our estimate is that two-thirds of IT 
traffic was generated and about one-third was diverted from scheduled service. 
Charter traffic is forecast to grow at 15.5% during the decade of the 1970's, 
compared to a 10.5~ growth rate for scheduled traffic. On this baSiS, charter 
traffic will exceed scheduled traffic in the near future. 
It is interesting to speculate what the impact of this kind of service o~ U,S. 
domestic traffic would be if it were encouraged within the U.S. 
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other Areas 
Traffic in the three areas - U.S. domestic, intra-Europe and transatlantic -
represents about two-thirds of the world's scheduled traffic and most of the 
werld's charter traffic. 
Other important area markets are the U.S. to the Caribbean, transpacific, 
Europe to the Far East, and within Asia (Japan domestic and intra-Orient) and 
Australia. It would be toe time consuming to go over these in detail at this 
time. If there are any questions relating to traffic in these areas, I will 
be glad to anSWer them. 
ONE IAST THOUGHT 
Let me sum up briefly, giving a few highlights. 
If the future were a simple extension of the past, it would be very easy to 
forecast; if the future were completely different from the past, it would be 
impossible to forecast. Fortunately, the future includes both elements; thus, 
we do have the potential of peering into the future. 
I believe that, in spite of all the hazards involved in forecasting and all 
the negatives that I have given in certain areas of my talk, we can still 
!mow the future in broad terms. However, the future can also be made to our 
liking. I believe We can, by conscious policies, translate goals into 
actuality. We need broad forecasts of the future to give us the framework to 
give us the reference of events that are likely to happen. However, what 
will really happen depends on what we do. We are makers of our own dcotinies. 
I really believe that, and I think that is what planning and forecasting are 
all about. This is to say, you must decide beforehand wlmt you want to do 
and why you want to do it; then use your analysis in order to determine the 
i.mpact 0 l' what you do. 
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(1:100" WORLD NON-SCHEDULED AIR -PAS~E~iG~RTRAVEL 
~ 1960-1980 
(Billions of Passenger Miles) 
AVERAGE ANNUAL 
GROWTH RATE (%) 
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1960-1970 1970-1980 
EUROPEAN IT 0_6 3_2 11_9 27.0 50_0 34.8 15_5 
TRANSATLANTIC 0_8 2_8 10.5 25_0 50.0 29.5 16_9 
(J1 OTHER NA NA 27_6 53_0 100_0 13_7 
-C TOTAL 
~ .NON-SCHEDULED NA NA 50_0 105.0 200_0 14.9 
ICAO* 237_4 395.0 650.0 13.4 10_6 
NON-SCHEDULED AS 21.1% 26_6% 30.8% 
A%OF ICAO 
SCHEDULED 
* EXCLUDES USSR 
(J ~ ICAO WORLD· AIR PASSENGER TRAVEL ~ DISTRIBUTE~;u~~~'!: .. ~.!i~~~AFFIC FLOWS 
AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH 
AIR TRAFFIC FLOWS !I ACTUAL FORECAST Y ACTUAL FORECAST 
1960 1970 1980 1960·1970 1970·1980 
U.S. DOMESTIC 32.6 104.2 255.0 12.3 9.4 
. OTHER NORTH AMERICA DOMESTIC 2.1 6.0 15.5 13.4 10.0 
U.S./CANADA·LATIN AMERICA/CARIBBEAN 4.2 15.9 42.0 14.2 10.2 
NORTH AMERICA - EUROPE 6.9 30.0 80.0 15.8 10.3 
NORTH AMERICA - ASIA/OCEANIA 1.8 10.0 41.0 18.7 15.2 
(n INTRA EUROPE 8.7 28.3 79.0 12.5 10.8 
-0 EUROPE -SOUTH AMERICA 0.8 3.4 9.5 15.7 10.9 
-:J EUROPE - AFRICA 1.2 4.0 8.6 12.8 8.2 
EUROPE - ASIA/OCEANIA 2.8 10.6 32.8 14.2 11.9 
AFRICA 1.2 2.4 6.8 7.2 11.0 
ASIA 2.3 12.5 51.0 17.9 15.1 
OCEANIA 1.8 4.5 13.7 9.6 11.8 
SOUTH AMERICA 2.1 4.8 11.6 8.1 9.2 
OTHER 0.2 0.9 3.5 16.3 14.6 
TOTAL - ABOVE IJS.7 237.5 653.0 10.6 
TOTAL - REPORTED BY ICAO 67.3 237.4 13.4 
* EXCLUDES THE USSR 
!I SEE PREVIOUS PAGE FOR DEFINITION. 
YSEE AI'YE",DiX FOR DETAILED FORECASTS FOR EACH MAJOR FLOW. 
COMPARISON OF ALTERNATIVE TECHNIQUES 
r 
TREND I REGRESSION I MARKET I SIMULATION ANALYSIS ANALYSIS ANALYSIS ANALYSIS 
OATA • HISTORY OF • 7·10 YEARS HISTORICAL OATA • OETAILEO SOCIO ECONOMIC OATA • PRECISE OATA 
NEEDS ITEM TO BE INOEPENOENT & OEPENDENT OF POPULATION & TRAVELERS REQUIREMENTS FOR 
FORECAST VARIABLES 
• DETAILED TRAVEL DATA FOR SPECI FIC TIME PER 100S 
• FORECAST OF INDEPENDENT EACH POPULATION SUB-GROUP 
VARIABLES 
ADVANTAGES 
• FAST • RELATIVELY SIMPLE • ANALYSIS OF WHO DOES AND • "WHAT IF" ANALYSES 
• LITTLE EFFORT MATH CONCEPTS DOES NOT TRAVEL • ONCE COMPUTERIZED 
• QUICK • MARKETING STRATEGY FAIRLY RAPID RESULTS 
• SENSITIVI.TV ANALYSIS 
Dt_MlTAGES • !lOT ANAL.YTICAL • CAUSE & EFFECT • nMECONSIIMING - • TIME CONSUMING TO 
'. 
.·IIIaIE!lTivE UlllCERTAtN • DIFFICULT TO FORECAST FUTURE DEVELOP MODEL 
• YEARS CHOSEN POPULATION CHAIIACTERISTIC • MlALYTICAlLY DIFFICULT 
AFFECTS ANALYSIS IN DETAIL 
• ADVANCED MATHEMATICS 
. 
TERIZATION 
• SIMPlE • MORE COMPLEX BUT • DIFFICULT • EXTERMELY ~ READILY AVAllAIILE • HA.St!IOT BEEN DONE COMP1.EX 
-
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 
(BILLIONS OF 1964 U.S. DOLLARS) 
WESTERN TOTAL 
YEAR U.S. CANADA EUROPE JAPAN AUSTRALIA WORLD 
1950 389.4 24.8 242.9 22.0 12.3 949.4 
1960 537.2 36.4 389.9 50.5 17.8 1,535.5 
1970 796.0 66.3 598.6 140.0 27.3 2,466.3 
{J7 
AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH RATE (%) 
-0 
-0 1950/1960 3.3 3.9 4.8 8.7 3.8 4.9 
1960/1970 4.0 6.2 4.4 10.7 4.4 4.9 
GROSS DOMEsnc PRODUCT PER CAPITA 
t 1964 u;s. OOtlARSl 
WESTERN TOTAL 
YEAR U.S. CANADA EUROPE JAPAN AUSTRALIA WORLD 
1950 2,557 1,810 792 265 1,500 375 
1960 2,973 2,034 1,164 542 1,728 513 
1970 3,879 3,098 1,624 1,353 2,184 680 
~ 
~ AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH RATE (%) 
1950/1960 1.5 1.2 3.9 7.4 1.4 3.2 
1960/1970 2.7 4.3 3.4 9.6 2.4 2.9 
ICAO CARRIERS 11 
YEAR CURRENT $ 
1960 6.34 
~ 1965 5.99 
~ 1970 5.75 
1960 TO ·9% 
1970 CHANGE 
AVERAGE FARE LEVELS 
(U.S. CENTS PER PASSENGER MILE) 
IN CURRENT U.S. DOLLARS 
U.S. 
CONSTANT $"}j DOMESTIC 
6.34 6.06 
5.62 6.03 
4.39 6.00 
·31% ·1% 
jJ EXCLUDES THE USSR 
"}j IN 1960 U.S. DOLLARS 
TRANS. TRANS· 
ATLANTIC PACIFIC 
7.08 7.47 
5.43 6.31 
4.53 5.40 
·36% ·28% 
INTRA· 
EUROPE 
7.96 
8.19 
8.42 
+6% 
ICAO CARRIERS*AIRLINE SERVICE FACTORS AND FARES 
,.,.-ce, .C=~"''''='~;''~:;';:::~~: .~.~c:7: •... ',' ;:1r ,. • .. " "" . '~d;5'tt~:~;<j',tv, .... 7W .':r:}"'~rj;;~;r:~;:!I~t~~?~~:~~~·~'-' '-~7""";T:'~T?? 
,AVERAGE FARES 
, . SIZE' . SPEED .' SAFETY , 'REVENUE (c; ) " 
'. . \ ,-' .. 
SEATS PER MILES PER FATALITIES PER PER PASSENGER MILE 
CURRENT CONSTANT** YEAR AIRCRAFT HOUR ." 100 MILLION RPM'S 
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DETERMINANTS OF MARKET 
STRUCTURE AND THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY 
by William Raduchel 
Harvard University 
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Abstract 
This lecture explores the general economic determinants of 
market structure with special reference to the airline industry. 
Included are the following facets: absolute size of firms: 
distributions of firms by size: concentration: entry barriers: 
product and service differentiation: diversification; degrees 
of competition: vertical integration: market boundaries: and 
economies of scale. Also examined are the static and dyn&mic 
properties of market structure in terms of mergers, government 
policies, and economic growth conditions. 
William Raduchel 
I would like to talk about the classical economic 
tradeoff: efficiency vs. equity. In order to try to say 
something we try to set up models. One of the areas in whiqh 
we do this is industrial organization: the structure, conduct 
and performance of one industry or a group of industries. 
There is quite a'bit of work done here, but I don't think 
it's all quite applicable to the airline industry, 
Now, all these models begin by assuming a) that we'r~ 
dealing with firms, b) that these firms produce a homo-
geneous product that is not really subject to much quality 
variation. As a consequence of that the only attribute of 
this product which the firm controls is the price. Now 
these are sort of zeroth order assumptions, but they beg a 
lot of questions, particularly: What's the f~rm? What's 
the homogeneous product? and What's the price? 
The firm I think is best defined implic~t1y: we 
say that it is the decision making center. Someone makes 
decisions controlling inputs and producing outputs. Some~ 
body takes information (basically assumed to be prices frPm 
particular markets) and makes decisions combining these factors 
by taking in the inputs and produces outputs. We assume this 
decision maker, whoever he is, has some goal and the goal is 
usually that he maximizes profit, defined as the difference (PIa 
between revenue and cost. Now this is obviously a somewhat 
strained definition: between the economic firm and American 
Airlines the~e is obviously quite a bit of difference. The 
firm is related to the modern concept of the profit center • 
.. ~ut you seldom have a particular group of people who make one 
product, control one price. and take the other prices in from 
the market. and produce an output. 
In defense of the economics of a firm it is true that 
we do try to practice profit maximization. The perennial 
argument that the firms don't maximize profits is really 
rather spurious because we don't really have to claim it for 
most of the conclusions that we reach. We don't need the 
fact that the firms have a profit function where they set all 
of the first deLivatives to zero and find a maximum. For most 
of the conclusions all we really need is that the firm strives 
for the maximum in profit. There are some questions as to 
how fast they get there. 
The difference is between analytically maximizing the 
function against numerically maximizing it. The outcome is 
the same. All we really need to postulate is that the firm 
is trying. for this goal; it is not necessary to reach it 
right away. 
As we.set up this kind of world we can distinguish two 
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determinate market structures which Professor Tideman talked 
about earlier; these are competition and monopoly. Now I'm 
certain that nobody here really believes that either of these 
serves as a realistic model. But again. that's not really 
their purpose: their purpose is to provide a standard. to 
provide an ideal. If we had such and such a situation. we 
would have the resulting outcome which would have certain 
properties. We can then compare existing situations to these 
standards and try to infer from that something about the pro-
perties. In competition we end up with a long run equili-
brium situation in which the only sustainable price is equal 
to the long run average cost which in turn is equal to the 
marginal cost. This is because of the requirement. that the 
only sustainable condition occurs when each firm is producing 
at its mimimum long run average cost. This situation appeals 
to the economist as it is the most efficient solution: there's 
no way to make you better off without making somebody else worse 
off. 
The contrast to this is a monopoly situation in which we 
can't say very much about price or quantity but we can say that 
the firm. if it's going to maximize profits. will balance off 
the gains to revenue from any action against the additional 
costs incurred. When these are equal. profits will be at a 
~/7 
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maximum. Again this raises all sorts of questions like the 
term over which the firm is thinking about: short or long 
run profits. Things may be very destructive to.profits in 
the short run and very crucial to profits in the long run. 
Most of these questions, however, are ignored and the 
more realistic models all deal with the world of imperfect 
competition. The reason that we don't talk much about the 
problems I guess is because you really can't say very mUCh. 
You must begin to assume that the firm is really behavorial, 
that, c.fter all, a firm is managed by a group of individuals. 
The individuals have various goals: they have stock in the 
company, or they do not have stock in the company. The stock 
may be a small part of the company's net worth; but it may 
be a very large part of the Chief Executive's net worth, so 
he would be interested in maximizing capital gains. A variety 
of circumstances are going to affect the behavior in the top 
managements: status and prestige, particularly. The results 
of these influences are something that we can call slack. 
This again is particularly important. When we talked 
about the production policies that each firm was following, we 
assumed the firm ended up on the production function, and so 
it was getting the most possible output from any given set of 
inputs. Well, it's doubtful that the firms are always there 
~/K 
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and the question really is how close they are. There has been 
a lot of argument that in fact we have quite a lot of 
slack in the U.S. economy. Big firms do not get the most 
out of their inputs. Workers could produce more, and 
machinery could be used more heavily. This, of course, is 
a very hard thing to talk about because we don't have any 
measures. There's no way of telling how much a firm could 
have produced unless you find a more efficient firm that is 
really identical and find they're producing 10 times as much 
output as you are from the same input. Then you're ineffi-
cient. Unfortunatley you seldom have those comparisons. This 
means is if there is slack and you have a management that's 
composed of people who have a variety of goals, they aren't 
necessarily bound to the market. If demand falls off a little 
bit, they can still keep profits up by becoming a little better 
managers. At the same time, if the demand is really soaring, 
managers may take more leisure time and may not worry so much 
about the office. They take trips to waterville Valley or 
something like that. This type of play in the system is not 
really talked about, and we don't really have a role for it 
in the competitive model at all: we assume it isn't there. 
Managers also have control over quality. In the air-
line industry, as we will talk about a little bit later. there 
is really enormous control over the various other attributes 
in terms of the size of the steak, the size of the salads, 
and things like this. In a big firm you have tremendous 
capacity to alter the quality of the product that you pro-
duce. Related to quality is advertising. Firms compete to 
a large extent by different selling of their wares in the 
media. This helps to distinguish their product. A product 
which is sold only by television advertising is a lot dif-
ferent than a product sold by somebody who never has any 
access to television. It's not surprising that certain 
industries, particularly the drug industry or household 
product industries, prefer to spend 150% of the first 2 
or 3 years' revenues in advertising. A good example is 
Cornet Cleanser. 
Again. this really doesn't effect the economic models 
because in the competitive situation the firm has to be on 
its long-run average. It if isn't, it is going to go out 
of business. 
In a monopoly there's no need to advertise. because you 
are the entire industry so that if anybody wants to buy your 
product, they have to buy it from you. In this area of im-
perfect competition there's one strain of views which is 
associated with Professor Galbraith. who is probably not the 
most popular economist in the profession. He has stressed 
one point, which I think today most people are willing to 
accept: in this area of imperfect competion goals are 
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important. We talked about the group which he calls the 
technostructure, which is just his name for the group at the 
top which runs the company: the management. He stresses 
that they have goals and that probably the foremost goal is 
corporate autonomy (protecting yourself). This mandates 
certain economic criteria: minimum acceptable profit rates 
and minimum growth rates (Exactly What the tradeoff is be-
tween them nobody knows.). There are such situations and 
these kinds of goals are formulated. 
Then we have a variety of other behavioral models, 
satifying models. Firms don't try to maximize profits, they 
try to maximize some other function. In other words, they 
simply try to get at least a 5% increase in profits over 
last year. The problem with all these models is that there 
is very little we can say in terms of determining the outcome. 
In fact, we can't say whether this is going to be efficient 
or inefficient; we don't know. It's possible to have a firm 
in imperfect competition that is producing a very gOOd pro-
duct of high quality, at low cost, doesn't spend much money 
on advertising, and has all the nice economic attributes .. 
Equally so we could have an opposite firm that produced a 
horrible product, bad quality and high prices; it was able 
to maintain a position by very wasteful advertising. 
How do we apply this to the airline :industry? Well, I 
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decided what we really wanted to do was to try to answer five 
questions: 
1. What is the industry? 
2. What is the product? 
3. What is the market? 
4. What is the competition? 
5. wi thin the industry itself, what are the means of competition? 
First, what is the industry? It's a variety of indus-
tries. .There are the trunk carriers. These are the major 
airlines. These were created and designed to provide basic 
city to city transport between major city points, major pop-
ulation centers. The next level is what is called the regional 
carriers. These were created to be feeder airlines to bring 
air service to the rest of America and to provide ways for the 
people in these areas to get to central cities and to major 
population centers to get on trunks and then go back. In 
order to. do this, a subsidy program was set up by the Federal 
Government to glarantee that these airlines would serve small 
cities that otherwise couldn't justify it. 
There have grown up, in addition to these, a variety of 
others. There are supplemental carriers which basically do 
a charter business or freight business. These are very important 
internationally but less so domestically. There are carriers 
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which carry only freight; for· example. Flying Tiger Airlines. 
The regional carriers are North Central. Mohawk. Allegheny. 
and Ozark. etc.; and supplementals are something like World. 
Lately there are the third level carriers. which are the air 
taxis. the small airlines. 
Allegheny Airlines is the regional carrier which has 
been very successful in using third level carriers as a means 
of reducing its obligations to serve small points. Under co~­
tract Allegheny yields its route to a commuter company which 
agrees to call itself Allegheny Commuter Airlines. In turn. 
Allegheny performs certain services for them. What you have 
are third level carriers feeding into the regional carriers. 
which in turn are becoming more and more like trunk carriers. 
Regionals now often serve major cities; they often provide 
service between major population centers as well and are very 
apt to be competing with trunks on cer~ routes. 
Finally. there is the category of intrastate carriers. 
particularly in California. Alaska. and Hawaii. They are hard 
to classify; for some of them are quite large and some are 
quite small. 
The obvious product is transportation. You get o~ an 
airline and move from point A to point B. What matters also 
is how convenient it is to make reservations. what the ground 
arrangements there are when you get to the airport, and was it 
-9-
a convenient trip? You may fly American both ways, even 
though an Eastern flight is more convenient because your car 
is parke'ci at 'an AIDerican' garage, which is a 15 minute walk 
from the Eastern terminal. There are a variety of things on 
the ground which would affect your choice of which plane you 
take such as the time ~'our plane takes off and the type of 
plane you get. If you get a ne9, you'll feel cramped; SO 
you want a 727. Also what inflight service do you get? Do 
you get a snack or do you get a whole meal? 
Again, this complicates the product. All the airlines 
really have to provide is transportation, and they have to 
provide transportation either 6 abreast or 4 abreast. That's 
all they are legally required to ,do; everything else is com-
pletely under their control. At a time of strict economic 
conditions they can cut down on a lot of the extras. Alter-
natively. when traffic is booming. when they're trying to 
get more people on and when they make certain that they don't 
lose you because they thing that you £e going to be travelling 
alot; they provide varieties of frills which really don't 
cost very much. aithough they are not cheap. (The average 
cost of a lunch in coach is something like $4.50 where the 
average cost of a snack is $3.80; there's not a great deal 
'of difference. On the other hand. w~,n United Airlines cut 
out serving Macademia Nuts on their trip from Hawaii. they 
saved a total of several hundred thousand dollars over giving 
you a package of regular nuts.) Since 
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they fly so many. even (p;;.t/ 
minor changes in service can mean major total cOst considera~ 
tions. This is the slack I was talking about before. The 
airlines as an industry are characterized by an enormous 
degree of variability, particularly with respect to passenger 
service. 
In times of economic turndown, a greater share of the 
passengers are people who really have to fly. They are not 
passengers that have alternatives in terms of 
not flying! They are going to fly any way. You may not have 
to give them good service. As you get more marginal customers 
who dan't have to fly, you have to keep them happy and 
at the same time keep everybody else happy. This means that 
you provide unofficial services. 
Next, what is the market? Again, you separate this 
by purpose, (business vs. personal), and city pair (because 
it's clear that there are thousands of markets in the U.S. 
which are basically each city pair: Boston-WashingtQn is 
one market, Boston-New York is another, Washington-qhicago, 
Washington-L.A.--these are all different markets.) It's 
not fair to say that there is only one market for airline 
travel, because again you have different proportions of busi~ 
ness and pleasure travellers on each route and too many dif-
ferent considerations involved. In pleasure travel, again to 
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Washington, .. peop;I.e: arell)uch mo,re likely to take the car be-
... 
cause it's a shorter flight and they can drive it very easily 
- -. , 
in one day. For California, it's a different situation; 
you're likely to have a great proportion of your travellers 
wanting to go by air. You have to distinguish feeder routes, 
which connect rural areas, to the population centers or the 
trunk routes, On international flights, you have questions 
about how long the flights are, whether it is a non-stop 
flight (or 7 stops along the way). Again you can have markets 
in which the airlines can decide to service only business 
customers. If there are some pleasure customers they take 
them, but they direct their appeal to business or vice versa. 
What is the competition? Well, obviously there are the 
other carriers. if there is more than one on a paticular route. 
There are trains in some areas, buses, and passenger cars. 
particularly for personal travel the auto is the greatest 
competitor. For business travel I would suggest that one of 
the biggest competitors is no travel at all. Telephone, tele-
type, telex, or various other things substitute imperfectly 
but work almost as well when air travel is expensive. 
How do the carriers compete? Well, here you have as 
many ways as have been listed so far. There are all those 
things that vary services or quality. They can vary advertising; 
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they can vary their prices. This is a regulated industry where 
prices are all established--technically they are not, but in 
,. 
effect they end up· being the same as if established by the 
Civil Aeronautics Board. However, in certain cases an air~ 
line is able to compete in price when its cost structure is 
different from the cost structure of one of its competitors, 
Some carriers may be able to support a lower fare. The 
marginal profits of certain operations is higher in some air~ 
lines than it is in others. American, for example, claimed 
for years that the youth fare (they were the initiator of it) 
was profitable, where some of the other airlines said this 
wasn't true and that they found it to be expensive. If cost 
structures are different, (you fly a different aircraft on a 
route or the destinations are both intermediate stops on longer 
routes), then you can offer special discount fares which the 
other carriers really can match only at much greater costs. 
There is a problem in competition because there seems to 
be some evidence that the proportion of seats you sellon 
certain routes does not vary directly with proportion of 
seats you offer. If you decide you want to go from a 10% 
to a 15% market share you may have to double your capacity 
from, say, 20% to 40%. There is a nonlinear relationship 
between the capacity you offer and the number of seats you 
sell. This particularly favors the established airline, the 
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dominant airline will tend .to become more dominant. The more 
capaci ty he is able to offer, the more seats he's going to be 
able to sell because people get used to it. People learn 
. that Eastern flie,s every hour on the hour or American flies 
every haif hour on the hour, but the other airlines only 
every two hours. So, if they want to take the next flight, 
they just call that airline first. 
And, of course, airlines compete with various types of 
aircraft. There is a lot of competition in advertising of-
fering nelO's with their lounges, or 747's with their lounges, 
as opposed to some other type of plane. The airlines have 
a variety of ways to compete but none of them are really 
directly price related, though they cost the airlines various 
amounts of money. It is very hard to say anything about 
.which type provides which benefits for such and such a cost. 
If we do want to characterize the industry, I think we can 
say a couple of things largely deal ing with this idea that you 
have to have a large capacity to guarantee a large share of the 
seats. It is what's called a heavy fixed-cost industry. The 
marginal cost, the additional cost of putting you on a plane 
when the plane is not full, is obviously very close to zero. 
Except for the amount of food and beverage service you may 
get on board and maybe a couple of minor things, such as losses 
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on baggage, etc.--that's it: and the entire cost is peanuts. 
In the short run you have a fixed number of planes which are 
on set routes, these routes are scheduled flights (you must 
fly them according to the regulations) and so there's very 
little you can do. Even your labor is fixed (you have strict 
contracts on your labor). It takes time to train 
a pilot. You cannot overnight say, well, "I'm busy tomor-
row on this flight so I'm going to take a 707 out and put a 
747 in." You may not have a 747 pilot or a whole 747 crew. 
You may have the aircraft but you don't have the labor to 
switch. You have a very restricted industry which really 
has to live within the constraints of the schedule. There 
is very little ability to get around it. As a consequence 
you have massive price discrimination. The people flying 
on the same plane are paying a large variety of fares, 
particularly on a long flight such as from N.Y. to the West 
Coast. You have family plans, you have youth fare, you have 
military fares, you have military stand-by, military reserved, 
youth fare reserved, so the airlines get to pick and choose 
by offering different types of service and different contin-
gencies under which they mayor may not board you. They get 
to offer these lower fares to people who might otherwise take 
another way. Eastern's Leisure Class, I guess, is a particularly 
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good example. 
The other thing that is characteristic of the airlines 
is cross subsidization. There is no passenger who pays 
exactly average costs. Every passenger is being subsidized 
by some other passenger or he in turn is subsidizing some 
other passenger. This is particularly true on the regional 
carriers where there is a formal subsidy program whereby the 
CAB each year requests Congress for enough money to subsi-
dize these carriers so that they don't lose money for servi-
cing small points which board very few people. What the CAB 
does is grant route strengthening awards. The way you 
stabilize an airline in financial trouble is to give it a 
profitable route. What this means, of course, is that the 
people who are flying on that route are making money for the 
airlines and in turn are being used to subsidize fares on 
another route. Everybody charges the same fare. In Califor-
nia there isPSA (Pacific Southwest Airlines) which is an 
intrastate carrier which flies you from L.A. to San Fran-
cisco and vice versa for about ~ of the fare that you would 
pay if you ~e. flying an interstate car;r::i.e.r,,~.:ul>ject to CAB. rules. 
<: ".~:.' - -'"', !. ";,"'::' -:-) 'j. ,,'- •... --" .• ,\~ ••.•• " :. ~ \. 
The CAB pricing formula is basically a cer.tain fixed amount 
~;::i:. ,; ' .. "" \'; .C.-. )'.' ,': "'.: \> ;,t- .\ ',' "; 1:;;,-'- .' ' .. i:- 1',: . .' .. ';.J ,;;:;1" .. ' 'j,'-;" 
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J .. :: '.: :.': ,"". ',; " { ', ... ' -: .. . : .. /."' " '. ".. :. "1,,_ 
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are much cheaper fares at PSA, so there has been consider-
able question about how justified the high fares are from 
Washington to Boston. If you had PSA flying Washington to 
Boston the fare would be just half as much. 
The last thing that we want to talk about is the fact 
that we are dealing wit h the regulators. The trunks and the 
regional carriers are completely under the control of the 
CAB. The CAB has numerous powers. They must approve all 
tariffs. This means they must set all prices. To determine 
if a tariff is fair or not they determine what should be 
rate base of the company. By this they add up in some way 
to determine the total amount of capital invested in the firm. 
Secondly, they try to determine the fair rate of return. Now 
both of these are nearly impossible questions to get a com-
pletely solid analytical answer to. HoW do you value planes? 
Do you value them at their new cost? Replacement costs? What 
you sell them for in the market? How do you eva'luate a fair 
rate of return? There are some risks involved for the air-
lines certainly because of the fact that they are scheduled 
carriers; they must fly. 
The most important power is the power to gain control 
of routes. The CAB controls which route you are able to fly. 
Now this can be crucial. If you're a regional carrier and 
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you just bought some long distance airplanes and you're 
flying a lot of short hauls, you may desperately need some 
longer routes. North Central Airlines, for example, flies 
nonstop Milwaukee-New York, which is totally non-regional 
service. These routes were given in an effort to strengthen 
the airline so they could lower the subsidy. What this means 
in effect is that these people who fly North Central from 
Milwaukee to New York, or Minneapolis to Denver are in 
effect subsidizing the people who fly on North Central from 
Grand Forks to Hibbing and something like that. When you're 
flying on these puddle jumps you're being subsidized by the 
larger, longer routes. The same airplane which is flying you 
on the short haul may as soon as it gets to Milwaukee or 
Minneapolis or Madison turn around and become a long haul 
plane and fly to New York. How do you once again separate 
the costs? You can't do it. Anything that you came up with 
would be purely a mrt:t:e r of convention. 
The CAB also controls entry, but the more important 
issue is that they control mergers. This relates to the 
economies of scale. If you get larger and larger airlines, 
are they going to be more efficient in providing service? 
There is some argument for this: you use your plane more 
intensively, you can guarantee the use of your pilots, you 
-18-
have one reservation center, you may be able to handle a 
lot of people, and a lot more cities very easily. Once you 
set up the software and the hardware to handle all your 
division centers, it's good enough to handle maybe double or 
triple what you have so that there are clearly some economies 
of scale. Is competition good? Is service to an area really 
improved by having competition? Well, what is all this saying? 
There really are an enormous amount of things that you have 
to consider when you try to determine analytically whether 
should we do this or that. The issues involved are extremely 
complex. They involve the industry, the product, the market, 
what the competition is on the route, and, particularly here, 
social concerns. In Washington National you have the noise 
pollution of the planes flying over Georgetown. In fact 
there are some safety factors involved; there have been a couple 
of air crashes that have been attributed to trying to lower 
noise in flight procedures. 
On the other hand it is clear that a flight from Boston 
to Dulles is not the same as a flight from Boston to National 
for most people. So the product that the airlines provides is 
in terms of transportation from inner city point to inner city 
point. It involves a lot of variables which are beyond the 
airlines' control in a direct sense is limited. 
&33 
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Objectives of the Airline Firm: Theory 
I. Introduction: Models of the Firm 
James T. Kneafsey 
Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology 
Friday, July 14, 1972 
Most analyses of dynamic pricing strategies in the economics 
literature have adhered to the assumption that business firms seek 
to maximize profits. Newer models of the behavior of large corpora-
tions have recently been developed in which a variety of assumptions 
about business motivation have been inserted into traditional static 
frameworks, steady-state growth models of the firm, and non-maximizing 
"behavioral" analyses. These new models have paid increasing attention 
to the nature and determinants of the forces governing the size and 
growth of the companies of which they are composed. In particular, 
the theoretical models of the growth of the firm are rapidly becoming 
more rigorous, comprehensive, and widely accepted. 
Since firms in the trunk airline industry compete in money and 
capital markets with numerous other firms in both the regulated and 
unregulated sectors of the economy, these models of firm behavior 
can be applied directly to the airline industry. The subject under 
discussion will revolve around alternative formulations of managerial 
goals whichairl ine firms may be pursuing in practice. The focus will 
be on the consideration of different objective functions which the 
companies may be following in lieu of profit maximization. Since these 
models reflect the behavior of any single firm in any industry, the 
analysis is one of partial equilibrium which assumes the activities of 
, 
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all other competitors as given. l 
This paper has two general purposes. It is intended mainly to 
provide a frame of reference from which alternative hypotheses can 
be stated concerning the objectives which managers and executives 
in the airline industry may be pursuing. It also incorporates as 
comprehensive a list as possible of alternative objective functions 
and demonstrates graphically that each separate objective may result 
in its own unique price (fare) and output (volume) combination when 
equilibrium occurs. 
II. Some Simplified Specifications of Alternative Objective Functions 
Using the revered goal (objective) of profit maximization as a 
base, we propose to analyze the following alternative objective 
functions: 
A. Short-run profit maximization 
B. Revenue maximization 
c. Sales maximization (break-even) 
D. Volume maximization 
lThfS restriction is severe with respect to the scope of economic 
questions, both analytical and practical, that can be answered. 
Economic analysis also seeks to investigate important subjects 
which concern systems of many firms, or of all firms, which require 
consideration not only of how all firms individually behave, but 
also of how their individual activities interact with and constrain 
each other in markets, broad sectors and the whole economy. 
-3-
E. Cost minimization 
F. Constrained sales maximization 
1. Minimum value profits 
2. Ascending buffer 
3. Descending buffer 
G. "Satisficing" 
H. Other specifications (non-graphical) 
1. Utility maximization 
2. Growth maximization 
3. Stockholder equity maximization 
4. Security maximization 
5. Market share equalization 
Each case will be examined separately to determine the resulting 
price-output combination which optimizes each alternative objective 
function. By nature these models are simplistic yet the underlying 
importance of the basic demand-supply relationships is reflected in 
the sharply different results of each model. In essence the shapes 
of the revenue and cost functions (or demand and supply) determines 
the optimal price-output combination for each alternative objective. 
A. Short-run Profit Maximization 
Revenues are derived from the demand function and are depicted 
in Figure 1 (top) as a concave function (to the origin), that is, 
RR = P x Z where P is fare and Z represents output (or volume of 
passengers). Assuming that fares can be changed and that the law of 
demand applies (dZ /~P < 0), R reaches a maximum at point B. 
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However. to generate profits. a knowledge of costs is necessary. 
If costs are a function of volume. they can be depicted typically as 
CC in Figure 1 (top). Profits are simply the algebraic difference be-
tween RR and CC at each alternative level of Z, and are maximized 
when RR exceeds CC by the greatest amount (point A in Figure 1). the 
result being a profit curve TI (Figure 1. middle). The equating of 
marginal costs (MC) and marginal revenue (MR) (Figure 1. bottom) for 
those of you who prefer to think in unit terms will occur exactly 
at point A. 
B. Revenue Maximization 
With the shape of the present RR curve. revenues are maximized 
at its peak (point B in Figure 1, top). This result also obtains 
where MR = 0 because additional Z can only occur with a decline in 
revenues as a result of the law of demand in operation. MR is simply 
the slope of the RR curve (dRR/ AZ). 
C. Sales Maximization (break-even) 
There are different variations of the sales maximization hypothesis. 
In this case we are referring simply to carrying as many passengers (Z) 
out to the break-even point C. For reasons of market penetration, the 
airline may neither be interested in the short-run in profits nor in 
revenues. but rather it is interested in trading off less profits or less 
revenues for more customers. 2 
2The typical distinction between cost in the economic sense and in the 
accounting sense should be made. In economic terms. CC includes as a 
component a normal rate of return such that TI really refers to "excess" 
profit. In the account sense. CC is the conventional income statement 
figure which excludes profit. 
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Figure 1: Total Dollars ($), Profits (~), and Dollars 
per Unit ($jZ) Plotted Against Output (zl 
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D. Volume Maximization 
An extension of the sales maximization hypothesis is that an 
airline firm may wish to carry as many passengers as possible, even 
if it results in a short-term loss. The result is in effect an objective 
of maximizing all available capacity (point 0 in Figure 1, top). Note 
that a large bias would be incurred with the pursuit of this objective 
function with the present revenue and cost relationships. 
E. Cost Minimization 
Sometimes companies become extremely cost conscious and pursue 
the goal of cost minimization (point E in Figure 2). This output 
level occurs at the bottom of the average cost curve (AC) where MC = 
AC. It is an objective completely independent of demand influences, 
unlike the goals discussed above. A danger which companies occasionally 
and regrettably experience is that they may minimize themselves to death 
if revenue considerations are ignored. If the demand curve (AR in unit 
terms or RR/Z)lies far below where it does in Figure 2, then cost 
minimization as a corporate objective still would not help. As it 
turns out in the present case, total profits are depicted by the 
hatched area in Figure 2. 
. Figure 2: 
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F. Constrained Sales Maximization 
1. Minimum Value Profits 
This hypothesis has been advanced by a number of economists with 
W. J. Baumo1 in the Vanguard. In the most complete statement of his 
proposition, Baumo1 argued that firms with market power tend to 
maximize sales subject only to the condition that profits not fall 
below some specified minimum va1ue. 1 In Figure 3, profits are 
maximized at A. However, if management feels that a certain level of 
profits is satisfactory or even necessary to maintain (OM in Figure 3, 
bottom) irrespective of volume (Z), then the company's goal is over-
fulfilled at volume OA. It can increase volume to O(F1) while earning 
at least OM in profits, enjoying higher "sales" than it would under 
a short run profit maximization policy. If the company's managers 
insist on earning profits of ON before seeking to satisfy other objectives 
such as sales maximization, they will not be in a position to increase 
revenues beyond the short-run profit maximizing level since the profit 
objective lies out of reach. The most important implication of this 
analysis is that if firms in the airline industry in fact strive to 
increase revenues for its own sake and if they require less profit to 
meet capital needs (e.g., OM in Figure 3), then they can charge lower 
fares and offer more volume than they would under the goal of profit 
maximization. Two variations of this objective are the ascending and 
descending buffer objectives. 
1See William J. Baumo1, Business Behavior, Value, and Growth, rev. ed., 
New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1967, pp. 45-82 and 86-104. 
N---' 
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2. Ascending Buffer 
In Figure 3, OM represents a "buffer" of profits which the 
firm desires to earn. These profits may be used for unexpected 
financing purposes, for dividend declarations, or for retained 
earnings. As long as OM is earned, the company will sacrifice additional 
profits for more sales. In Figure 4, KK represents a buffer stock of 
profits which increases with volume 2. With more and more volume pre-
sumably the firm should be in a stronger position to increase dividends 
or to finance additional expenditures. An allowance for this growth is 
reflected in the rising slope of KK. In this case the company will 
select volume (F2) in Figure 4, where sales are maximized subject to the 
buffer (KK) constraint. 
3. Descending Buffer 
Alternatively firms may be willing to sacrifice substantial short 
run profits in order to generate volume which would result in a buffer 
stock LL that varies negatively with volume. If volume during a given 
period is decreased sharply. say as a result of a strike, the company 
may wish to have a larger profit buffer at low ranges of Z. As volume 
increases though, the tradeoff with profits becomes apparent and the 
company wouid opt for output (F3) in Figure 4. 
G. "Satisficing" 
In the early 1960's, several economists in the Graduate School 
of Administration at the then Carnegie Institute of Technology developed 
the "behavioral" theory of the firm. At the heart of this theory lies 
the concept of "satisfi cing", usually attributed to the work of Herb Simon. 
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Essentially satisficing refers to the fact that firms may not be 
maximizing at all but rather may be pursuing a number of goals 
simultaneously resulting in accepting a "satisfactory" level of 
profits. Graphically, this means that the firm can select any volume 
in Figure 4 as long as some satisfactory level of profits is attained. 
In the case of pursuing any profit at all, the range would be QC 
within which the firm would be "satisfied". 
H. Other Specifications (non-graphical) 
Numerous other objectives could be pursued by firms in practice 
either individually or jointly. These goals might include the 
maximization of a firm's utility function, of its rate of growth of 
output, or of its stockholders' equity. Since ownership and manage-
ment are separate functions of airlines and other large companies, 
an important objective to analyze might be the maximization of the 
management's own security and stability. Also, the companies might 
be satisfied with maintaining or increasing market shares as an 
objective independent of any other one. 
The goals in this section cannot be demonstrated graphically as 
we have done with the other alternatives. For those objectives which 
we have discussed, a summary version of each alternative volume 
appears in Figure 5. 
III. Concl usion 
No one has yet succeeded in demonstrating conclusively whether 
or not airlines or other business firms behave in the ways and for 
-12-
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the reasons postulated in the above models of selecting alternative 
objective functions. One obstacle to enlightenment is that the be-
havioral differences between long run profit maximization and various 
short run alternative goals are so subtle that econometric tests 
with existing data are not sufficiently powerful to discriminate 
among the contending hypotheses. Since it is clear that airlines do 
pursue one or more of these objectives in practice, the present state 
of knowledge certainly must be extended through more sophisticated 
econometric research and by more detailed case studies than any here-
tofore attempted. 
PROBLEMS OF EXCESS CAPACITY .. ~ 
by George Douglas 
University of North Carolina 
July 12, 1972 
Abstract 
This lecture discusses the problems of excess 
capacity in the airline industry and focuses on the 
following topics: load factors; "fair" rate of return 
on investment; service-quality rivalry among airlines; 
pricing (fare) policies; aircraft production; and the 
impacts of excess capacity on operating costs. The 
lecture also will include a discussion of the interrela-
tionships among these topics. 
~ Reprinted here with author's permission. 
".:'J 
Excess. Capacity, Service Quality and 
the Structure of Airline Fares 
by George W'. Douglas" 
I. INTRODUCTION 
'A CHAUACTERISTIC, common to most scheduled transportation systems, is 
that "demand"only rarely equals "supply." Because of the discrete 
nature of the "supplyi' or capacity offered, and the stochastic nature of de-
mand, the equiHbrium of any scheduled transportation syst~ril is characterized 
over time by "excess" capacity. A measure commonly used to denote this ex-
cess capacity in the airline industry is the average load factor, the ratio of the 
number of passengers carried to the ~umber of seats available. Moreover, 
since the costs of a scheduled transportation system are largely determined 
by tire capacity offered, the cast per passenger is quite sensitive to the average 
load factor. 
The average load factor in the scheduled. airline industry has, 'in the 
part; been implicitly r~garded as an exogenous parameter, charactedstic 
of the nature of the industry and not subject to control by the airlines or the 
regulators. FoIlm.ving that assumption, average and 10ng run marginal costs 
per passenger can be defined, with respect to the costs cf capacity and the 
given average load factor. One might describe in this manner the costs and 
fare determinaticn procedure as followed by the C.A.B. in the past. 
It can be shown, however, that the system's equilil:rium average load 
factor, rather than being exogenous, is detcnnined endogenously by the mar-
ket, given the costs and fares facing the carriers. In compditive markets, the 
existence of scheduling competition tends to bring about an equilibrium ALF 
at or near the .. ltreak·even" ALF defined by the costs of production and the 
fare level chosen. Similarly. the average load factors in ncn·competitive mar~ 
kets arc higher, ceteris paribus, but their level is also related to the costs 
and tIle fare levd chosen by the regulators. Most airline markets, moreover, 
can operate over a Significant range of prices. or fare, each price level de-
fining. in equilibrium, the average load factor of the system. Only recently 
has the C.A.B. recognized that by setting fares it impliCitly determines the 
average load factor of the system, and that the setting of expliCit load factor 
standards for use in computing fares is desirable and propcr) 
We will seek to describe in this paper the issues relevant to the selection 
·AS8·istant Profes8or of Economicf!, University of North Carolina at Chapel 
Hill. The author wishes to thank James C. Miller III, of the U.S. Department 
01 Transportation, with tvhom many of these concepts are shared, and which 
ll.'M'e in pa.rt developed jointly. The author bears sole responsibility, however, 
lor the 'Views expressed here. 
1 See C.A.D. Or,ler 71·4·54. April 12, 1971. In this decision on the "Load Factor Phase" 
(Jor th~ General Fnre Investigation, the Board'lI dedsion reversed the Examiner's opinion Bnd 
",labh,hed for the first time desirable load fador standards (or ratemaking purposes of 5&% 
tor Trunka, and 44.4% for the Lac!.!1 Service Carriers. 
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of load factor standards, and by analyzi,ng the implications of the ALF for the 
system's level of service quality, suggest various characteristics ~f an efficient 
price structure. . 
n. SERVICE QUALITY AND THE AVERAGE LOAD FACTOR 
Although a scheduled transportation system can feasibly operate over a 
wide range of average utilization, we should expect that the quality of service 
provided to be closely related to the excess capacity offered. The aspect of 
quality of crucial importance for us in this regard, relates to levels of delays 
Incurred by passengers using the system. These delays arise from two sources: 
(1) that a departure is not scheduled at the time a passenger desires to de-
part, and (2) that the preferred flight might be filled, causing the traveler 
to take another, less desirable flight. From the first source, we might compare 
the scheduled departure times with the daily profile of desired departure 
times, and compute the absolute values of the time differentials. The mean 
absolute difference between the travelers' desired departure times and the 
scheduled departure time we denote as "frequency deLly." The expected 
frequency delay should be a function then of the pattern of desired departure 
times for the route, and the number of Hights scheduled.' As the daily fre-
quency of flights increases, we would expect frequency delay to be decreased. 
The second source of delay encountered is a queuing phenomenon, gen~ 
erated by the fixed scheduled capacity faced by the stochastic demand. We 
would expect that as addltional flights (capacity) are olfe.ed, the probability 
of being delayed and the expected time of the delay would be decreased. 
The sum of these two kinds of delay we denote as expected "schedule 
delay," measuring the expected absolute difference between a traveler's de-
sired departure time and the actual departure. The level of expected sched-
ule ~elay can h~ considered a characteristic of service quality, and is a sig~ 
nificant detennillant of air travel demand, particularly in short to intermediate 
distance markets, where substitution among modes is feasible. As the capacity 
is increased by increasing the flight frequency (of a given aircraft type), we 
would expect the stochastic delay and frequency delay to both decrease, 
thereby decreasing schedule delay. However, as frequencies arc increased, 
the average load factor would decline (in spite of the additional travel in-
duced by the better service), thereby increasing the average cost per pas-
senger. 
We have simulated these delay processes (described in the .ppendix) 
and can approximate the level of frequency delay by: 
(1) T. = 92F-·". 
The stochastic delay is approximated by: 
N 5-N (2) T, = .445(-)-·"'(_)-1.790 
U' 
2: Ideal1J'. we mIght extJect that the flights would be scheduled 80 U to minimize T( for 
any given number of flights. Tn practice, constraints on scheduling flights over a rout'!, and 
potential "elustel"ing" effects of competition may prevent the adual scheduling pattel'n from 
bemr locally efficient. 
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where S = capacity (seau) per aircraft, 
N = mean flight .demand, 
er = standard deviation of flight's demand 
Expected schedule delay, T, is the sum of expected frequency delay and ex· 
pected stochastic delay 
(3) T = T, + T. 
For a route with the distance and the aircraft type specified, we may cem· 
pute the relationship hetween the cest per passenger, and the average load 
factor, as described in figure 1. The operating cests were estimated using a 
Average Calf as Related to Average Load Factor 
.... 
.... 
$30. 
I.", '::-__ -+. ___ ~-_~,.,..,--_=_--""'! 
.30 .41) .50 • .;0 . .70 .80 
Hypothetical Trip: 
Distance = 600 mill;1s 
Aircraft = Three tngine;; Turbo~FQn 
fiGURE 1 
model developed by the C.A.B., which relates the cut per passenger to the 
ALF, and the perfonnance and factor price parameters of the various air~ 
craft types.' For a specific level of mean daily demand (and its variance), we 
ean then compute the expected schedule delay (or any assumed level of ca-
pacity (or the ALF). On table 1 we indicato'the levels of these delays that 
might be expected for a hypothetical route. As might be expected, as excess 
3 Civil AeronautiC!'! Board, Cogtlnlr Methodolop-. Version 6 (August HI'lO) and Domestic 
Fare Structure; Costin&: Tabulations fox 1969 (Sept. 1970). 
-: • 0 .. PC Pl' ,.ref!' i,' u; ~~".,.I._ , , •. !:IIJ'!If! .• '~""'"'l' 4 i,;'; d ,\iE ,,($:Mm.'?i!i.H.I?A WH?:.Ji".¥4f1! • e .... .E,i" ... ~ ...... 
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ALF 
040 
.44 
048 
.52 
.56 
.60 
.64 
.68 
.72 
.76 
.80 
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EXPECTED DELAYS PER PASSENGER; 
Hypothetical Route with 
Distance = 600 miles 
Avg. Passengers/Day = 800 
Aircraft = Three Engine Turbo-Fan 
Stochastic Frequency Schedule 
Delay Delay Delay 
6.90 23.86 30.76 
9.07 24.92 33.99 
11.87 25.93 37.80 
15.54 26.90 42044 
20040 27.82 48.22 
26.97 28.71 55.68 
36.05 29.57 65.62 
48.96 30.40 79.36 
68.03 31.21 99.24 
97.60 31.99 129.59 
146.63 32.74 179.37 
Delays measured in minutes per passenger. 
Cost/Pas. 
43.84 
40.99 
38.61 
36.59 
34.85 
33.34 
32.01 
30.84 
29.79 
28.85 
28.00 
Cost is weighted overage of coach and first closs costs, inclusive of "foir" rate of 
return on capitol. 
TABLE 1 
capacity is reduced, and approaches the mean demand (i.e., the ALF in-
creases) the stochastic delay increases exponentially. On figure 2, we graph 
the relationship (in this market) between the average load factor and the 
expected level of schedule delay. 
With the information contained in figures 1 and 2, we are now pre-
pared to relate the costs per passenger with the level of expected schedule 
delay, or service quality. This "tradeoll" relationship is depicted in figure 3. 
This might be interpreted as the opportunity locus faCing the regulatorS; if 
a high fare is chosen, the market equilibrium will generate a low ALF, and 
a high level of service quality; reduction of the fare implies an eqUilibrium 
with a higher ALF and a greater delay (or a lower level of service quality).' 
m. THE OPTIMAL REGULATED PRICE STRUCTURE 
Having the information necessary to describe the technical tradeoll be· 
tween price (cost) and service quality, the selection of an "optimal" price 
4 The tradeoff eurve is drnwn over a btoad range, and wtthout regard to demand elllStici-
ties. Since we assume that total revenues must equa.l tot.u.1 COOts, the range of feasible [loint. ... 
of equilibrium would be constrAined to be between SOme critical boundary prices. The feasible 
range, however, ~ rather wide in moot markets. 
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and Implicit quality level may be investigated. It appears on flrst glance to 
be a straightforward max.imization problem, in which one should choose that 
point where the technical tradeoff is consistent with that of the customers' 
preferences. This is a particularly difficult problem. however, if, as in this 
case. quality differentiation is conslrained.5 The regulators must select a qual-
ity level for a population of customers whose preferences for quality may be 
diverse. The level chosen" then, must compromise those aspects of service 
quality that are not Geparable among these customers. 
The Simplest approach to this problem is to attempt to discover the 
tradeoff preferred by the typical traveler, or the implicit value the traveler 
places on time he is delayed.6 By assigning such a price, we can determine 
an ·optimal" level of price and quality, which minimizes total trip cost for 
5 Conuivably, the stochastic deloys could be priced and thereby differentiated nlnl)ng CUII-
tomen by the sale of "priorities." FreQ.uency delay, however, could not be reasonably differen-
tiated amoq eustomcrs. 
6 This approach, while used persuasively in valuing somc delnys in tr::nsportation, such 
U eoDCt!II!Ition delaYIJ. should be approached cautiously here. The time loot through eonge!tion 
la irretrievably 106t. whereJUJ Bcoedule delays may hnve Illternative Uges. Ideally, we would 
llke to disoover the tradeoff of demand 'OT I . 
oPI N = <on.'. 
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Cost as Related to Schedule Deloy 
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that "typical" traveler, inclusive of the value of delay times. In figure 3 we 
indicate that optimal level where the slope of the technical tradeoff between 
eost and delays equals the assumed value of time. Alternatively, we may rep-
resent the minimization problem with a marginal analysis, such as contained 
in figure 4. Here we indicate with the curve labeled "C6," the reduction in 
cost per passenger (fare) of a 2% increase in the average load factor, as a 
function of the load factor. We also indicate with the curves labeled MDC, 
the implicit value of the additional delay caused by a 2% increase in the aver-
age load factor, with time valued at $5.00 and $10.00 per hour. Cost mini-
mization occurs at that ALF where the fare reduction caused by the increase 
of the ALF by 2% just equals the marginal delay eost (MDC); in this market 
between .59 and .66. 
As pointed out ahove, the technical tradeoff hetween price and service 
quaUty varies with changes in the distance, size and dispersion of demand. 
This has the effect, then, of changing the optimal ALF chosen for markets 
with different characteristics. We should expect, for example, that the opti-
mal load factor should be greater, ceteris paribus, for a long flight than a short 
one. The delay for either route is related to the average load factor of the 
system, or the relative number of empty seats flown, on the average. Thus, 
{;s+, , 
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time valued ot $1 a.OO/hr. 
Curve'MOC- Marginal delay cost; 'time valued ot $5.00/hr. 
FIGURE 4 
while the delay associated with any given load factor is equal for both routes, 
ceteris paribus, the cost reduction (in dollars) per passenger, of a slight in-
crease in the average load factor is much greater for the long route than the 
~hort one. In figure 5 we demonstrate this effect graphically. The eurve C22 
represents the cost reductions for a trip of 2200 miles, from an increase in 
th,e ALF of 2%. As can be seen, the least trip cost occurs at an ALF of .59 for 
the 600 mile trip, and at approximately .68 for the 2200 mile trip. On ligure 
6, we portray the range of "optimal" ALF's for a market of a given size, as 
the distance is increased. 
We should also expect that the market size should affect -the optimal 
average load factor. The stochastic delays are derived hy first computing the 
probabilities of being delayed one, two, three or more flight intervals; and 
then multiplying each by the average interval between flights. In comparing 
a large and small market, with all other characteristics being identical, we 
Bnd that the probabilities of being delayed are similar for operations at a 
given average load factor in either market. However, tile expected delays 
are less in the larger market, as the flight frequencies would be greater, and 
the average interval between Bights would be shorter, for any given ALF. 
Hence, we would expect that the optimal average load factor in the larger 
marlcet would be greater than that in the smaller market. On figure 7, we 
describe the analysis graphically. In this case, the marginal cost reduction 
.it,.(ti,:,tf(H"' ~"'1''*flsi1Z'it i) "Jew §S'&1""'tntre:itt titz" 
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curve, C6, is identical for both markets. The marginal delay costs associated 
with a market of mean demand of 3200 (labelled MDC32) lie below those 
associaled with a mean demand of 800 (labelled MDC8). Hence, we find 
that the optimal ALF for the smaller market is approximately .60, while that 
of the larger market is approximately .64. Figure 8 describes the optimal 
average load factors continuously against market size, as measured by mean 
daily demand. 
The delay model by which the relationship between the cost and the 
level of service delays were estimated contains a number of asswnptions 
and approximations from limited data of the characteristics of the sto-
chastic demand distributions. Hence, the relationship should be consid-
ered tentative in the quantitative sense. However, the model, when tested 
indirectly by comparing the forecast distributions of average load fac-
tors in specific markets with those observed, was found to be reasonably 
accurate. In any case the qualitative assumptions of the model (i.e., the 
signs of the partial derivatives) are reliable, and we are thus prepared 
to defend the qualitative conclusions; i.e., that load factors on long 
hauls should be higher than on short hauls, ceteris paribus, and higher 
in dense markets than in thin markets. The measure of the delay, re-
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Curve H represents optimal lood factors consistent with time valued ot $5.00/hr. 
Curve L represents optimal lood factors with time valued ot $10.00/hr. 
FIGURE 6 
lationship could be refined with more extensive data on the demands for in~ 
dividual Highfs over a wide variety of city pairs. 
IV. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE EXISTING STRUCTURE 
OF AVERAGE LOAD FACTORS 
It is interesting to compare the pattern of average load factors that has 
developed in the industry, with the pattern we have suggested. In one in· 
stance, the relationship of fares and the average load factor to length of 
haul (distance), the industry's pattern has been mildly perverse. 
One wen known characteristic of airline costs is that the average cost 
of capacity per mile declines Significantly with increases in distance. On 
figure 9 we describe the average cost per passenger mile at various distances, 
assuming that load factors are held constant. The source of this nonlinearity 
is the rather substantial fixed or «tenninal" cost per flight, which docs not 
vary with distance. The C.A.B. has. from time to time, investigated the cost 
and fare "taper," to see if they were in close correspondence. The Domestic 
Air Fare Study of 1967, confused the issue, however, by principally comput· 
ing the cost "Iaper" with load factors that varied with distance.' Although 
actual load factor relationships with distance were not exhibited in this study, 
7 The prineipal analYBe8 and diaeussions centered on a COEIt taper derived with load lactora 
varying from .585 at 200 miles to ,64 at 1000 miles to ,46 at 2,500 mUes. See Domestic Ail' FarM: 
A Study. Civil Aeronautica Board, Jan. 1968. 
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Least Cost Average Load Factor Analysis 
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one can only assume that the varying load factors chosen wc;c typical of the 
existing pattern. The determination of the study was that the fare (actually 
the weighted "yield") taper was not as steep as the cost taper; if this were 
so it would explain why the load factors were lower for long hauls. Following 
that study, a number of fare adjustments have been made to increase the fare 
taper, presumably to be consistent with a cost taper with constant 10ad fac-
tors, 
The only data currently available to the public concerning the ALF's in 
the various markets, is that generated by the current General Fare lnt;estiga-
tion. From this, we have data on capacity and traffic on each of 353 non-stop 
routes, by aU certificated carriers during selected months of 1969, \Ve are 
thus able to analyze the relationship of average load factors to the market's 
characteristics with cross section regression analysis. This analysis indicates 
that the average load factor is most strongly influenced by the level of com, 
petition, e.g" the number of carriers serving the market. The load factors 
tend to be higher in large markets than in small markets, but even after ad. 
jusUng for these effects, there yet remained (in 1969) an inverse relation 
between the average load factor and distance. The results of these regressions 
are summarized in table 2 . 
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We have demonstrated that the price level and structures set by the 
C.A.B. tends to determine the average load factor of the air transport system. 
Moreover, the levd of service quality and the avcf.:\ge Costs of the system are 
duscly related to the average load factor. Dy qualitative analysis with simple 
assumptions concerning the relationship, one t..'an conclude that average load 
ractors should be higher in long haul markets than in short haul markets, and 
higher in dense markets than in thin markets. The actwtl specification of 
desirable load factor standards depends on the quantitative description of the 
Ircimical tradeoff between price (cost) and service quality, and a meaSUre of 
the traveler's preference (tradeoff) between price and service quality. With 
the limited data currently available, delay models were constructed to approxi-
mate these tradeoIfs, and from these a range of "optimal" average load fae· 
lors were computed. 
APPENDIX 
THE ESTIMATION OF SCHEDULE DELAYS 
Schedule delay arises from two sources: 
(a) That a traveler·s desired departure time does not coincide with a 
scheduled flight ("frequency delay"), and 
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(b) That the desired flight is filled. and the traveler must take another 
flight (stnchastic delay). 
Frequency delay (lype "(ar') was estimated by simulation. The daily 
pattem of demand (Figure 2) of a typical route was transformed into a dis-
crete frequcncy distribution. A procedure was used to schedule "F" flights 
during tlle day, such that each flight faced ciemrLlld of equal size, The dif-
ference between each traveler's desired departure time and the nearest 
scheduled flight was computed, and their absolute values summed for all 
travelers_ The mean, or average delay for each traveler was computed. The 
procedure was repeated for F + 1, F + 2, etc., thus generating the average 
or "expected" value of frequency delays as a function of the daily flight fre-
quency. These observations were fitted to the function 
(l) T, 0= 92F-·456 
where Tr is the expected frequency delay, per passenger (measured in min-
utes) and F is the daily Right frequency. 
To c~tirnate stochastic delay, we characterized the problem as a queuin~ 
phenomenon, and described it as a Markov process, To do this, we assumed 
that each flight faces a random demand with mean Nr and standard tlc\·ia· 
tion O""F. We describe the state of the system by a variable "Q," defined as 
the number of passengers desiring space on a given flight. Assuming that the 
distribution of demand is nomlal, we can then assign probabilities to it OIlC 
step transition matrix, Au example of such a one stcp transition matrix is 
""~"'''Q~,'''l .. ;'1iltn"".*\III''l_.l1;11I4 •• aw:z.1I!!!!L:I\tC;:a:I",~£C.,ii12!III!I!I!!IIlIlIIlIt!l=.III!.I!I.""D'----------""T" .. - • 
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CROSS.SECTION ANALYSIS BY MARKET OF AVERAGE LOAD 
FACTORS 
"t" 'Statistics in Parentheses 
1<11 M ..... h: 
I I<lF = .588 - .2xl~ X DISTI<NCE + .8Xlo-' X PI<X - .07 NO CARRIERS 
. 0.4) (9.1) (6,5) R2 = .213 
2. I<LF = .244 - .018 lOG DIST + .073 LOG PAX - .146 LOG C 
0.8) (7.1) (5.5) R2 = .144 
0", Corrier Market5-: 
,. I<LF = .494 - .3Xl~ DISTANCE + 1.4xlo-' PAX 
(1.6) (4,1) R2 = .128 
4 .• UF = .303 - .016 LOG DIST + .059 LOG PAX 
0.25) (6.4) R2 = .238 
Two Corricr Markets: 
So I<LF = .349 - .3Xl~ DISTANCE + 1.9Xl1)--6 PAX 
(0.1) 06.10) R2 = .572 
6. 1M = .153 - .019 LOG DIST + .121 LOG PAX 
(0.8) (4.5) R2 = .145 
Three Corrier Markets: 
J'. 1M = .495 - .2 X 1~ DISTANCE + .1 X 10-' PAX 
(0.8) (0.8) R2 = .024 
t. AlF = .371 - .017 LOG DIST + .OJI LOG PAX 
(1.42) (2.2) R2 = .105 
four Carrier Markets: 
9. AlF = .464 + .5Xlo-' DISTANCE + .1 Xlo-' PAX 
(1,0) (2.8) R2 = .62 
10. AlF = .107 + .013 LOG DIST + .045 LOG PAX 
(0.5) (2.2) R2 = .495 
TABLE 2 
J,!iwl1 in Table AI. The row and column headings identify the state of the 
~~·5!('m. or the number of travelers desiring a seat on the flight. The row 
hf':ldings indicate the possible slates of the system at any time To. while the 
c'u!mnn headings indicate the possible states of the system at lime To + 1. 
'11(, {'ntries in the matrix arc the conditional probabilities. For example. i[ 
tlu~ slate (number of passengers) at time To were .4 of the mean demand, 
Iii,· prohability that at time To + 1 there would be a demand of ANr is ,Ii 
110,1 Ihere would be a demand of 1.2Nr is .187. elc. If at time To. the dc-
1I1:llld exceeded the capacity, then of (.'Ourse the demand at time To + 1 
mmt rrnect this ""overflow." Hence, the conditional probabilities would 
dl;UI~e. ns indicated in the matrix. These probabilities are defined with re-
'I)('d to a given capacity. measured in units of "X" where 
(2) X = S - Nr 
ur 
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where S = aircraft capacity. 
The "steady state" of the Markov process defines the probabilities that 
Q is of any given size. Comparing these probabilities with the aircralt co-
pacity, we can estimate the probability of being delayed by one, two, three or 
more Hights. By multiplying these probabilities by the average headway in-
terval, we can estimate the expected delay associated with any relative ca. 
pacity, "X." By computing many values of delays, as X is changed, we then 
fitted the function: 
(3) N S-N T. = .455(-)-·'" (_)-1.790 X (headway interval). 
fT fT 
One Step Transition Matrix X = .575 
State (queue length) at To + 
State .133N .(ON .67N .93N 1.2N 1.47N 1.73N 2.0N 2.27N 2.53N 3.0m 
atTo·IBN .049 .100 .158 .194 .187 .141 .084 .039 .014 .004 .028 
.40N .049 .100 .158 .194 .187 .141 .084 .039 .014 .004 .028 
.67N .049 .100 .158 .194 .187 .141 .084 .039 .014 .004 .028 
.93N .049 .100 .158 .194 .187 .141 .084 .039 .014 .004 .028 
j.2N .049 .100 .158 .194 .187 .141 .084 .039 .014 .004 .028 
1.47N 0 .049 .100 .158 .194 .187 .141 .084 .039 .014 .032 
1.73N 0 0 .049 .100 .15~94 .187 .141 .084 .039 .046 
2.00N 0 0 0 .049 .100 . ~.194 .187 .141 .084 .085 
2.27N 0 0 0 0 .049 .100 .158 .194 .187 .141 .169 
2.53N 0 0 0 0 0 .049 .100 .158 .194 .187 .210 
3.07N 0 0 0 0 0 0 .049 .100 .158 .194 397 
Note: Matrix condens.ed 
33 X 33 matrix. 
for expository purposes; computations were mode using 
N re;>resents the mean demand per flight period. 
TABLE Al 
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THE ROLE OF THE MANUFACTURER IN AIR TRANSPORTATION PLANNING 
by James MacKenzie 
Douglas Aircraft 
July 12, 1972 
Abstract 
This lecture deals with the role of the aircraft man-
ufacturer in the airline industry. The process will be illus-
trated by using a fictitious airline as an example--that is, 
a case study approach with "Mid-Coast Airways" serving as the 
example. Both in slide form and with supporting papers, a 
brief history of the airline, a description of its route 
structure and a forecast based on econometric analysis are 
presented. Once the forecast rationale is explained, in-
formation will outline the requirements for additional air-
craft and the application of new aircraft across the system 
using alternative fleet plan options. The fleet plan will 
be translated into financial summaries which will indicate 
the relative merit of alternative aircraft types, or operating 
plans. 
I'm going to talk about the role of the manufacturer 
in the aviation and commercial field wi th particular emphasis 
on the marketing aspects of commercial aviation. 
The last time I looked, our advanced research and 
systems group had several proposals in various states of 
preparation or submission to NASA relating to a broad 
spectrum of projects. These included retrofit programs 
for the JT3D/JT8D engine, two segment approach programs and 
studies, experimental STOL vehicular development proposals, 
composite materials for STOL aircraft and a whole host of 
wide ranging projects. Now, this relationship has been going 
on for some time but it's primarily been handled by this 
group which has previously been part of our military organiza-
tion. We recently reorganized and brought into an overall 
marketing structure of what was formally our military sales 
group and is now called government marketing and I think the 
emphasis or the shift in NASA's approach to truly commercial 
problems signals a change in our company where we now, and 
I represent the commercial side strictly, will be dealing 
more and more in these kinds of problems. We are presently 
supplying people to a task organization to conduct a funded 
STOL system study and I'll talk a little more about that 
later. But, I think the shift of NASA's interest into 
- 2 -
commercial programs of large scope signals or represents 
growing awareness on the part of the Federal Government 
through sociological and economic problems and I think 
that this interest is needed and certainly welcomed by the 
manufacturers and a discussion I had some time ago with a 
representative of the Port of New York Authority, he 
mentioned that the area encompassed by their jurisdiction 
crosses over some 1500 different political and labor 
entities and so I think that if we are about to achieve an 
effective STOL system we certainly need policies and 
institutions of the highest level for the federal government 
to cut across these jurisdictions and interests to establish 
an effective, viable, system where we can have land as 
required where we can develop safe control techniques or 
systems. I think that it is particularly important, however, 
that we recognize that if we are to achieve true sociological 
and technical advances that it has to be done recognizing 
the economic constraints that are applied to both the aircraft 
builder and the manufacturer. We're talking now about 
programs where the development costs exceed the net worth 
of the companies that are asked to develop the vehicles. 
The inability of private institutions to financing these 
entirely such as the programs of the SST and I am sure that 
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this will apply to any future major system development, 
demands that we get better ways of financing funding 
programs of this type. The second thing in these economic 
constraints applied to the users of the airplanes and if 
you look at the foundering of the SST program with the 
prolonged delays and high speed rail development in this 
country there is a doubtful future of aircraft like the 
Concord and I think you can relate more to the fact that 
those systems have yet to prove their economic merit than 
you can to ecological considerations although the ecologists 
may take credit for torpedoing the SST program. I wonder 
what the outcome would have been if that aircraft really 
had the economic promise that more conventional aircraft 
have. 
I think that it also is important to remember that 
whatever the Government does in terms of establishing 
policies and institutions to assist the industry we have to 
remember that it will be accomplished through private enter-
prise, that's the builder and the airline and the banking 
institutions. 
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Q. Are you stating that the Congress was aware that the 
SST did not have the economic problems? 
A. I think that there are many people that seriously 
questioned the economic viability of the SST. They certainly 
knew the Concord was not as economically attractive as the 
U.S. SST, but the cost of the airplane and the technical 
unknowns about its terms of maintenance and reliability I 
know had the airlines concerned. I think that that is a big 
part of the problems involved. If the airlines had aggres-
sively stated the case and I think that this was part of the 
problem of the entire SST presentation that really wasn't 
marketed very well. My hunch is that is was because the 
economic benefits were very difficult to prove. 
Q. Are you suggesting that there might have been some kind 
of a consensus that it was not economically viable. 
A. That may be too strong a statement, but in discussions 
that I had with various representatives of airlines the com-
mon theme was concern, doubt as to whether it was really 
going to be a money problem. That kind of question as far 
as operating costs, seat mile cost, etc., were never in 
question with the 747 or the rest of the subsonic airlines 
and you see now in the Concord to a much higher degree and 
it's a much smaller airplane, rising price tag. 
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Q. Of course, that was not a secret that -
A. That's right, but I think the focus was on ecological 
aspects and the noise factor. 
Q. I think that it was also a question on timing, too. 
Maybe the airlines would have been ready for something 
like that. 
A. Well, that's right, they were saddled with a tremendous 
investment for 747's and DCIO's and L-IOII's all at the 
same time or just preceding it. And then, you throw on 
that an economic recession starting in '69 when all airlines 
were all in trouble anyway. All I'm suggesting is that when 
your technology enables you to propose cert~n kinds of 
vehicles, I think that it's essential that those vehicles 
offer some sort of economic incentive to the ~r otherwise 
you might find that the operating costs are so high that they 
are not marketable. 
Q. We followed the vote very closely from the Aeronautic 
Space Council Staff's point of view on the SST and several 
votes throughout its history and my observation was that the 
final vote was more of an economic vote than an ecology vote. 
The Congressman who had initially voted in previous years 
against it on ecological grounds was now convinced that the 
threat was well enough defined to vote against it, but on the 
other hand, and it wasn't necessarily concensus, but there 
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was a big uncertainty and they just didn't have the right 
answers from the manufacturers or the Government on the 
economics of the aircraft. 
A. Although that didn't get us many headlines. 
Q. Oh, no, the papers picked up the ecology issue. 
A. That's correct. Since 1920 when the Douglas Aircraft 
Company was founded, we've watched the phenomenon of com-
mercial aviation grow from an experiment to a national 
necessity of the first priority and because of this growth 
there has been a great many entrants into the manufacturing 
field, very few of them have survived. There are three 
manufacturers today in the united States competing for 
commercial markets: Boeing, Lockheed and McDonnell-Douglas. 
Each of those companies has the productive capacity to satisfy 
close to the total demand. So we have an industry that is 
characterized by over capacity. This means that the com-
petition between builders is intense. It's resulted in very 
spotty earnings records through the years, not only for the 
three that survived, but for previous entrants. It means 
that there's tremendous competition between them for product 
differentiation. Each one strives for higher speeds, more 
passenger service features, larger capacities, all those 
things that drive development costs upward, at the same time 
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price competition working to keep the margin between costs 
and sale price very narrow. It also drives the break even 
point of the aircraft much higher than the builders would 
like to see it and this competition is passed on to the 
airlines because as a regulated industry where they are 
regulated in respect to what they can charge for a seat to 
the public they too seek product differentiation and they 
seek advantages that they can advertise in order to maximize 
their share of the market. So we have a combination of high 
development, high competition between both builders and users 
and it might be argued that what the industry really needs 
is either fewer competitors or more regulation within the 
industry. But, I would argue that given those as problems 
we can still say that the 707 and DCa are better airplanes 
because of that competition and that the 737 and the DC9 
are better airplanes because of tlE competition and that the 
LID-II and the nclO are better because of competition. So, 
I'm submitting that there is a great deal of merit in the 
basic structure where you have a highly competitive situation 
in terms of the quality of the end product. I think that one 
factor overrides the easy way out which would be to control 
capacity or to regulate it in such a way as to minimize the 
problems attendant to both the airlines and the builder. One 
other thing about this competition was the carrier seek or 
u1D 
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or the builder seek product differentiation as to the 
carriers. This means that the airlines are going into 
re-equipment cycles before their existing aircraft are 
fully depreciated or obsolete. What I think we need are 
Government policies which sustain competition, which are 
aimed at protecting the economic health of both the aircraft 
manufacturers and the airline. 
I mentioned that I am going to focus tOday on marketing 
and this is merely the beginning as to where it all started 
as far as how you go about developing an aircraft. I think 
that marketing is appropriate here because it is in the 
marketing area where all the social, technical, economic 
barriers are brought to focus. It is there that the success 
or failure of a given idea is going to be achieved. Marketing 
is also the principal line of communication between tre 
builder and the airline. At Douglas we have a fairly con-
ventional marketing organization. Sales is the most visible 
group, it's the principal agency of contact with the airline 
and they are the spokesman to the outside world, but the 
sales group represent less than 15% of the total marketing 
organization. The rest is composed of engineers, economists, 
financial analysts, schedulers, a whole host of specialists 
that develop and support a case for the aircraft. TO this 
you can add the entire resources of our engineering organiza-
tion, our legal and contract group and the products support 
&'1{ 
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groups for after sales support. The marketing process 
encompasses a very large number of men. If we look at the 
sub groups within our marketing organization we can first talk 
about our advanced transportation concept groups. Now, this 
organization is charged with the responsibility of relating 
technical possibili till s downstream against what they see of 
the environmental needs to be out into the future and they 
are going out tOday to about the year 2000. Their purpose 
is to keep Douglas Aircraft in the mainstream of air trans-
portation and it's easy to get off track as you can see by 
the number of companies that have been in the field and have 
somewhere failed to come up with the right product at the 
right time. We have a similar group relating the cargo 
development where they're studying the emerging infra structure 
of inter-modal transport of containerized cargo and their 
emphasis is todetermine how and when the very large cargo 
airp~ane will make economic and technical sense for both 
this nation and other nations throughout the world. At this 
point, maybe if we can turn the projector on .... 
The advanced transportation concepts group prepared this fore-
cast of world traffic and they've done this in a factor 
technique where if you say we're at about an index of one 
here by the year 2000 we're going to be up past 20, which 
means that there is a great tremendous growth potential world-
I 
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wide for air travel. These two lines represent out to this 
point, the low band and the high band in our market research 
forecast through the year 1980. Beyond they've taken a 
number of techniques to extrapolate out into the year 2000. 
They've used delphi techniques and a lot of intuitive judge-
ment. The band out here as you can see is quite wide so there 
is, the further out you go in the time the vaguer it gets 
and grayer it gets, but, even if you assume that the low band 
is the more reasonable, we're still talking about the factor 
of 8 times the growth by the year 2000. 
There will be a definite break in the period around 
1985. I don't know why they did that. It could be that 
they're saying that at that point of time they can't tell any 
more but they think that there is a maturing of world markets. 
The group that I'm responsible for is presently going out to 
1981 and these fellows simply take it beyond there. 
Another interesting part of this growth pattern though, 
is what they see as how that travel is going to be accomplished 
and this is the greatest pointer that l've ever seen. It's 
very appropriate. What they're saying is that really the 
classic modes are going to persist clear out into the year 
2000 with short range aircraft accounting for about 13% of the 
total,medium range 19% and transcontinental 13%, interconti-
actually coming down, SST is now becoming a very big factor 
ft;73 
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by that time, long ,range represents aircraft going some 
5000 miles or beyond, equivalent to the 747 or the long 
range DCIO's and STOL now is beginning to emerge as a real 
factor. I should point out that this is in terms of RPM's. 
Now you say that 8% of the total may not seem like very much, 
but it terms of people it could be a great deal. One man 
traveling from here to London accounts for 6000 RPM's, excuse 
me, say from Los Angeles to London, and that's the equivalent 
of say, 20 people going from Los Angles to San Francisco. 
So we could be talking about a very large number of people 
but yet generating a few RPM's out of the total. 
I think what we're saying here is that STOL and Feeder 
Aircraft do not necessarily, they're doing the same service 
but they're not the same airplane. It's a mix. 
Q. Is this the world market or is this the domestic market? 
A. That's world. 
Q. DO you see any VTOL by 2000? 
A. No. That did include helicopters. 
Q. How do you differentiate the long range and trans-con? 
A. Transcontinental is, let's say, 2500 miles. 
Q. Is that somewhere in long, short or medium range? 
A. This we're talking about 727 type range capability. Out 
to trans-con 2500 miles, inter-continental is 3500 and long 
range is beyond that. The Tel/Aviv/New York type are going 
~74 
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above 5000 miles. 
Q. If I perceive correctly,you're present short range are 
in three segments; STOL, short range and medium range on 
both of the diagrams. Are you saying that the medium to 
short range are going to be unchanged? 
A. But the mix between STOL and DC9 and 737 and the kind of 
equipment that we are shifting towards. STOL 
Q. Does this include charter service? 
A. I believe that this is scheduled. Well, no, I take that 
back. I think it does include charters. 
Q. I think a way to look at that is that the STOL Feeder 
business might be as much as 8~/o of the day's total. 
A. I'm sure it is. You'll see later that I have some fore-
cast of aircraft numbers by type and I think that we're saying 
that by 1980 that there are some 480 STOL aircraft. 
Our Market Research Group is charged with more near term 
responsibilities and I mentioned earlier that we are working 
on a funded NASA study STOL system and we have actually as-
signed or loaned people to a task-oriented group and they're 
presently going through exhaustive analysis of a major po-
tential STOL system as to what the capture would be within 
the market. What the trade-offs are in terms of range against 
surface desireability on the part of the consumer and what 
the economics of the aircraft would have to be the make of 
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the craft. It's a pather interesting study and a rather 
complex one. We went through the same kind of analysis 
several years ago when we were trying to decide whether to 
build the DCIO and it all started with an analysis of the 
potential economics of an aircraft and big discussions with 
airlines as to what kind of operating costs levels they were 
seeking, what comfort standards were they after, what kind 
of improvements in systems in terms of all-weather capabilities 
and a whole host of trade studies in which you try to deter-
mine what kind of an airplane truly makes sense in the market 
for the period you are designing the building to. Our goal 
was to develop an airplane that would have as broad an appeal 
as possible and you achieve this through what we call opera-
tional flexibility. This involves a number of considerations, 
the effective range of treaircraft, its takeoff and landing 
performance to enable it to work out of a host of airports, 
the all-weather flexibility, there are a number of keys that 
we focused on. The total market estimate was very critical 
to this decision because we knew we were going to invest over 
a billion dollars in developing the aircraft and that exceeded 
our net worth, so you have to get to some pretty reasonable 
estimates of how many of these airplanes you can sell or 
you are really facing a disaster. When you think of the 
experience with the 10-11 and the engine problem you find 
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out how critical this can become. You may recall that at 
the time we were offering the airplane we said we'd build it 
if we had a total of 50 firm orders from at least two major 
airplane manufacturers. We got American Airlines to commit 
to 25 firm and 25 options. Following that Lockheed, who was 
also in the race got a spate of orders from TWA and Eastern, 
Northeast, Delta, and Air Canada, and at that point our 
program was really on the ropes. united then committed 
to the DCIO and with that we had our quota. (They bought 
30 firm and 30 options). With that we had sufficient orders 
to commit to a firm program and we started building the 
airplane. Because of the lead that LOckheed had jumped into 
we wanted to overcome this and broaden our customer business. 
We were fortunate in that we had committed to the General 
Electric company for our engine development and that they 
had early in the game come up with a growth version of the 
CF6 engine. We were able to convert this additional thrust 
into higher design weights in order to achieve greater range. 
We now have four models and as you can see, the basic airplane, 
series 10, which American, United and National are operating 
tOday, is pm·,,·ared"by a 40,000 lb. thrust engine. It's 
maximum takeoff Weight is 430,000 Ibs. and its range is 
about 3670 nautical miles. When we go to the long range 
version, the CF6-50C our thrust is gone up to 51,000 Ibs. 
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We can then go to higher design weights, greater fuel 
capaci ties and increase the range up ,to 5300 nautical miles. 
We also had Pratt Whitney in the competition with their 
derivitive engine of the JT9-D which produces 50,000 Ibs. 
of thrust and again the same design weights, the airplane 
is slightly heavier than the GE version so the range is not 
quite as great but it is actually the next one that will be 
certified and that will happen this fall. We also went to 
convertible freighter versions and we've sold those in CF 
powered versions. They can carry 158,000 Ibs. payload for 
3150 nautical miles so in the passenger version the range 
is about equal or in the passenger mode is about equal with 
the standard passenger airplane, so that's given us additional 
flexibility and because of this we have now broadened our 
customer base to 25 airlines. Seven carriers have bought the 
series 10 airplane: American, continental, Delta, Lakair 
is the next one (it's a charter carrier based in London), 
National has bought the basic airplane, united and Western. 
Northwest bought the series 20 with Pratt Whitney engines 
primarily because they believe very strongly in engine com-
monality. They're a large 747 operator and they felt that 
the common overhaul line would justify that going to an 
airplane with slightly lower performance levels. The con-
vertible aircraft has been bought by Martin Air charter 
~1g 
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which is an operator based in Holland, 0 & A, Sabena, and 
TIA and the long range GE power aircraft has been ordered by 
El Mexico, Air Afrique, Air New Zealand, Alitalia, Atlantus, 
Fin Air, Iberia, KLM, Luftansa, National bought the long 
range version for their Miami/London flights and finally 
SAS, Swiss Air, UTA and Viasa. Now there are a number of 
carriers that have yet to come into either the 747, the 
LIO-ll or DCIO. The competition is very keen for those 
remaining operators and now we have the A300B, the French-
British product, coming into the scene actively marketing 
in the united States throughout the world within a twin 
powered wide cabined aircraft. 
Q. Do you know the total rack up of the three airplanes? 
A. We sold, including options, 240 airplanes. I think 
the 747 is about 210. I'm not sure on the count. 
I might mention here that despite Lockheed's problems, 
they're tough competitors. I think that their airplanes are 
going to work fine. They've been hurt because of the engine 
delays because we've broadened our customer base. But the 
future looks very bright for them in Great Britain and there 
are still a lot of people out there who haven't bought them. 
Q. As I recall, Lockheed preceded you people in this type 
of aircraft. Can you elaborate a little bit on that and 
your view of the 747 and this type of aircraft and why you 
felt you should go into this type of aircraft as opposed to 
perhaps some other area. You knew that you were going to get 
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high competition. It seems to me that when two or three 
companies are all competing for the same market perhaps 
they would do better if they would kind of divide their 
market upsurge. That's an over-simplified way of putting 
it, but I'd like it if you would elaborate a little bit more. 
A. I think there are a number of reasons. One, our growth 
estimate told us that there was healthy growth despite the 
immediate problems that were facing us. The 747, we believe, 
was going to have tremendous passenger appeal and here we 
we~e building stretched DC8's that we saw just could not 
compete around the major routes of the world against the 
wide cabin airplane, so our choice then was whether to enter 
it or abandon the field and I think at this point that emotion 
creeps into it. We just hate to give up without a fight. 
Secondly, we felt the 747 was oversized for the 1970's. It 
represented about a tripling in capacity from the standard 
DC8/707's and this jump and there were reasons why the 747 
was the size that it was. A lot of developments on that 
airplane had been accomplished through the C5 competition. 
We felt that there was logical gap in size between standard 
body forms in jets and the 747 that would serve as a better 
vehicle for less dense routes and that's a compliment to 747 
service on off time, off day service and I think we proved 
right. I think that the airplane is going to be quite successft 
bOO 
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We started out with twin engine air bus and American 
Airlines had written us back for a twin engine air bus, 
but when we went around to the other airlines we couldn't 
find anyone else that wanted that airplane. They all 
wanted more range, more takeoff flexibility. They 
wanted to be able to operate out of Denver and Mexico City. 
You just can't do it with two engines and go anywhere so 
the trade study said that it had to be a three engine air-
plane. If you go to three engines when you've got the 
takeoff performance and the enroute cruise performance to go 
to transcontinental and of course when we got the growth 
engine we could go a long way. 
Q. I have been told that the market analysis groups of both 
Lockheed and Douglas predicted more than break even sales for 
both companies building essentially the same airplane. Is 
that true? 
A. Yes, that is true. And I think that the total market is 
there if we assume that everybody gets an equal share. I 
think they will. While we've done all this product differ-
entiating we haven't done that without a price either. We 
might break even here. 
Q. What are the numbers up to 500/600? 
A. I can't answer that question for two reasons. It's a very 
closely kept number but at the time of the congressional 
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was to reduce their price and they were very successful 
and sold five of the airlines practically within a week. 
We met that price and made a comparable reduction and passed 
that back to American and the competitive factors keep both 
cards pretty neat. The bankers get involved where they look 
at your estimates,do they believe the costs estimates of 
manufacturing. And then in turn do they believe that you 
are going to be successful. They do have a lot to say about 
whan an aircraft company can do if it's heavily committed to 
a long term gap, as to new programs, derivitive programs, 
developmental programs. 
Q. What would happen if you had gotten to a point where you 
would never break even. What would trebanks have to do then? 
A. I can't answer that, but I think that it's a pretty 
fundamental thing, unless you make some money somewhere along 
the way, you're going to cease to exist. In 1966, Douglas 
was selling aircraft faster when our bankers forced us into 
a merger simply because the cost of the manufacturer was 
exceeding the sales price of the aircraft. Now, what 
MCDonald brought to the Douglas company was a lot of money 
and there was a lot of restraint on his part as to how to 
get Douglas Aircraft out of trouble. We elected to middle 
management and we felt that we had a sound engineering group 
and a sound basic middle management and they left us pretty 
much alone with some key people coming in with manufacturers 
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wondering what they could look at and what we were having 
some problems with, but within a couple of years we have 
turned around and we/ve been fairly profitable since and, 
by industry standards, profitable. 
Q. Were you not experiencing a very difficult training 
period? 
A. Oh, yes. We had, I can't remember, I think there was 
something like 3/4 of the people in production that had been 
there less thana year. 
Q. There was a high turnover as I recall and many people who 
you were training would work for a couple of weeks and then 
leave. 
A. Turnover was high and experience was low, coupled with 
some vendor delays of engines and landing gears. 
There was a kind of a remarkable recovery but to come 
back to another question, why did we get in, here is a more 
current forecast of where we see us going from today up until 
1980. It's a healthy growth rate close to 12% per year for 
total services with a growing in non-scheduled areas as we 
go up toward 1980. 'That means that in order to supply that 
there are going to be a lot of new airplanes built and here 
are estimates as to what is going to happen to the world 
fleet composition through the year 1980. There will be a 
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phase out of the conventional props and turbo props, they'll 
be down to about 700 by the end of the decade. The DC9, 737, 
Caravelle, BAClll still had some growth left in them primarily 
because operating airlines are still reordering and it looks 
like we're estimating that the fleet will grow to a maximum 
of about 1560 by 1976 and at about that time we see those lines 
closing down and then a gradual decay as we go out into time. 
727 -- there is a lot of life left in the 727 and Boeing has 
done a remarkable job of modernizing that airplane and 
stretching and increasing its range, making the interior more 
attractive and it's showing up in the past few months in rather 
remarkable sales. The older DC8's, 720's, 990's we see phasing 
out and they've already started going out and will be down 
quite low by 1980 and the conventional 8's and 707's also 
starting downhill about now getting down to the low 900's by 
1980. TO replace that and to accomodate the growth that we 
have shown on the previous chart, we'll see a remarkable 
growth in numbers of short and medium range wide cabin air-
craft that includes now the A300B, the DCIO twin if there 
is one or any other competitive twin in the U. S. plus LIO-Il's 
and DelO's. Long range aircraft are composed primarily of 
747, long range DCIO's and long range 10-11's and you can see 
that there is a lot of aircraft to be built in the next ten 
years. STOL just emerging will be growing by 1980 to 470 units, 
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supersonic aircraft primarily. Now the Concord coming in 
1976 and we are saying 87 units by 1980. 
Q. Would you comment on the USSR? 
A. That excludes the USSR. I don't know much about them 
except that they're beginning to aggressively market in 
neutral and satellite countries and in some of the countries 
in Western Europe and they have a pretty good family of con-
ventional aircraft jets. They've got the Illutian family 
of aircraft, the tri-jets, four engine jets, long range air-
planes, YAK-40's. They've got a lot of airplanes and they're 
trying to sell them. I think they've got some very difficult 
problems in marketing the Western countries because they have 
a very bad track record at home and among their satellite 
nations as far as product support goes. The SST is anybody's 
guess. 
Q. How about Communist China? 
A. That's an interesting area,for Boeing, as you know, has 
had a sales team there and the going export license was 
granted last week and I think that somebody will sell them 
some airplanes and we have people in contact with them as 
well. How much is there and how soon is a difficult question. 
The country is under-developed in all modes of transport as 
far as rail and highway systems and it could be argued that 
maybe air would be the cheapest and the fastest way to get 
a travel system and a domestic transport building in China 
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although I don't know their labor costs are bound to be low 
and maybe building highways would be cheaper, but for foreign 
international travel they've indicated that they are inter-
ested in going into other countries and I think we'll see 
some action. In the long range the potential is huge, with 
800 million people. 
Q. What are your estimates as to the passenger capabilities 
on the STOL feeder jets? 
A. That's in the trade study area now, and the last I heard 
they were talking about 100 seaters. It's very tough to 
get very good economics with 100 seat STOL aircraft. I 
think in the long run it might be bigger but then if you do 
that you cut down on the size of the network so I don't think 
it's any better now than to just guess from my point of view. 
Q. Why did Douglas close the DC8 while Boeing kept open the 
707? 
A. We just couldn't sell any more DCS's. 
Q. I thought that it had the lowest operating costs in the 
country. 
A. It is, the DC8-60. But the problem you run into is one 
of who are your customers, your established customers? The 
DC8-61 is not a long range aircraft and I think Boeing 
production is pretty much limited to their 320B's which is 
the intercontinental aircraft. Now they're kind of struggling 
~g0 
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as well and I don't see so much more in the way of sales 
for their company. 
Q. Will the continued production of the DCS steal from the 
DClO? 
A. Yes, but if we had had our way we would have delayed 
the DClO because we have a very good airplane and a very low 
cost airplane and we built a lot of them and we're making 
money on them. Everything argues the delay except the com-
petitive factor with the 747. 
Q. You made a reference to the economics of a 100 passenger 
airplane as pretty poor. Is this an implication that its 
technology that has to be developed in this area or is this 
an implication that manufacturing structures are so hard, or 
have they gotten so big? Has this created a problem, or is 
it something that just relates to a 100 passenger airplane? 
A. I base that on what I understood the study price to be 
and I think it was somewhere around $12 million. Now you're 
getting a lot for this, you're getting STOL capability, but 
with a hundred seats and $12 million the cost per seat mile 
ran very high so unless you can increase the capacity and once 
you've got a basic airplane you can stretch it once you've 
got 50 more seats as this would just improve the seat cost 
tremendously. 
Q. Is the cost of the technology STOL performance as great 
in the transcontinental area? 
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A. Sound is one thing, smoke, all weather are all part of 
the performance. There are a lot of variables and you Can 
compare the costs against all these things and you'll find 
that you just can't get them for nothing, and eventually 
it's tested in the market place. 
Q. When you say STOL, what band of runway lengths do you 
mean? Does that include up to 4000 feet (RTOL)? 
A. Yes, but we'll say down at 1500, 2000, 2500, 3000 and 
for each one you've got a different price level and a different 
engine problem and different augmentor systems. Now let's 
assume that from our own internal purposes we've got an 
airplane that needs some real requirements for the future 
and we're going to go ahead with it but the problem then is 
to convince the airlines that they really ought to buy it 
against competitive aircraft being marketed. We see our 
development sales case as a two faceted problem and the 
first being performance. We have a large sales engineering 
group that looks at the aircraft being offered to the airline 
in terms of the airlines operating environment. We're blessed 
at Douglas and the same is true of the other manufacturers 
with very extensive computer facilities that are there 
primarily because of design and manufacturing requirements 
but since we do have them we can use them for other things 
and a lot of our marketing efforts depend on computer support. 
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When we look at performance of an airplane, we have flight 
simulation models, which will fly the aircraft over every 
route that we anticipate the airline using the aircraft and 
these models compute the allowable takeoff weights, taking 
into account runway obstacles, temperatures, elevation, wind, 
they compute fuel burns for the route taking into account 
any airline ground rules that are in imposed such as enroute, 
navigational tolerances, delays, reserve requirements of 
destination, fly through capabilities, it's a very flexible 
program and it also computes costs for the flight according 
to the ground rules specified by the airline. So, when 
we are done with the performance analysis we can go to the 
customer and with some confidence say yes, the airplane will 
satisfy every mission which you would ask of it or it will 
do them all except one, two or how many routes there are or 
perhaps because of runway lane, all up loading limits on the 
airfield or routes that exceed exchange capabilities, but 
anyway the airline then knows what the aircraft will do. But, 
it's not enough that the airplane can do the job that it has 
to do in an economic fashion. 
That just says that a DClO-IO when compared against a 
DC8 or 707 has a much lower break even load factor and a much 
greater profit potential primarily because the seat costs 
are 25% less. Now it is true that it takes more passengers 
to break even but if you put in routes where the traffic is 
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indicated to be reaching levels that will generate some 
good profits for the airline. This is based on a 140 seat 
airplane against a 270 seat airplane and assuming a yield 
of 6¢ per passenger mile and it assumes the transcontinental 
flight. 
Q. DO you mean costs, not profit? 
A. That's the fare divided by the number of miles and 
diluted to account for non-revenue passengers, discounts, etc. 
Q. What's the primary reason for the DCIO's being more 
sufficient than the standard jet? 
A. It's just a lot bigger and a lot more efficient engine 
and when you break it down in terms of costs per seat, cost 
per mile and cost per seat mile, it's just a more efficient 
airplane and that's the productivity game of the jumbo jets 
or wide cabin jets are bringing (economy of scale). 
Q. Isn't the thesis being advanced that the 727 even with 
2~fo higher SFC that you can have more seats because it costs 
30% less per seat comes out to the seat mile operating cost 
total and that's the interest? 
A. Well, what we're showing here is profit based on total 
operating costs where we're taking into account all the de-
preciation charges and later on in the financial step I'll 
show you how interest can effect this total. The original 
type aircraft we mentioned is. 
Q. The 727. It seems that its been hitting the DCIO and 
6~ 
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a couple of others head on because of its lower cost per seat 
encourages 30% lower and because of the economy of scale in 
the lower SFC of the DCIO and all its tradeoffs don't make 
it look like its always an economic advantage. 
A. Well. we say we'll beat the 727's. 
Q. What we're trading off here seems that the airplane 
costs per chairs is lower on the DCIO but what you're trying 
to do does not require the larger airplane than the effective 
seats that you're utilizing have a higher cost than the DCIO 
and so it's essential that you can't put a big airplane on a 
low demand market and it's the market that needs replacing. 
A. The most critical decision that the airline has is to 
put the right sized airplanes on routes where traffic will 
support it in two ways; in capacity we have to have a reason-
able load factor and you have to be able to provide a 
competitive level of frequency. It's a nice balance. Well. 
so we've proved that the airplane is economic and can make 
money;there are other ways to improve your competitive 
posture and one is by offering more comfort and this cross 
section shows the kind of things we're working with when 
you're comparing a wide cabin airplane with a standard jet. 
You get out of the tube. you've got the 8 feet high ceilings, 
the broad aisles, broader seats, the flexibility that comes 
under the deck with lower galley arrangements, the contain-
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erized cargo possibilities, it's just a much more appealing 
airplane and the passenger benefits from both of these factors. 
The airplane can operate under a much lower fare structure 
than it would otherwise because it has more productive air-
craft. The airplanes are more comfortable and are more 
reliable and have more passenger service features and there 
are two way benefits. But, even given all this,and I'm 
coming back to your question, it's a great airplane, it's 
got a lot of passenger field and still can mean a financial 
disaster if it isn ',t matched to the market. What happened 
to the airlines in 1970 is that they had a tremendous 
amount of 747"s, pre-delivered payments on the DClO's and 
10-11's and at the same time a recession occurred and load 
factors fallout and highly competitive system and there 
just wasn!t enough revenue to cover all the costs that kept 
recurring. The result was that the industry lost something 
like 100 million dollars. So, we spend a lot of time at 
Douglas trying to develop better ways to forecast traffic. 
Increasingly, as far as forecast in the united States goes, 
we are relying on econometric techniques and basically we're 
saying that revenue passenger miles are a function of personal 
consumption expenditures with the velocity of many being simply 
the GNP being divided by the money supply. The yield that 
the airlines charge and the passenger trip length which is 
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the major service standards. It grows and grows because 
more and more non-stops services are being provided between 
cities so that what use to be a 2 or 3 segment flight may 
now be a non-stop and so that your average passenger trip 
length is one. Now when we do this, and I'm talking here 
about forecasting u.s. traffic in total. You're forecasting 
a lot of other variables instead of the depending variable. 
We go to the Wharton School in Pennsylvania for estimates 
of the various economic indices such as gross national 
product and personal consumption expenditures and then we 
plug that back in to this variable. The one that has given 
us the most trouble is yield because its tough to know where 
yields are going, and I'd defer getting into that for just 
a few slides because I think that I have a chapter that 
explains it a little better. But, when we compare what we 
estimate in the econometric models and this one happens to 
be a model of the U.S. scheduled service against historic 
performance where we plug in the achieved explanatory 
variables we get almost a perfect correlation of the past 
traffic growth, which says that if you forecast the variables 
that we are putting into your format accurately you're going 
to get a very accurate traffic course. 
Q. What's the number of years before the actual estimate 
is made? 
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A. It doesn't matter when its made. We could make this chart 
today. All we have to know is what the PC yields, the 
passenger trip lengths, etc. 
Q. Can the estimate be made before the actual or is it a 
result of correlation of the actual? 
A. The task of whether your model is good is whether it 
can reproduce history. Now the future will only be as 
good as our estimate of both variables that go into the 
formula. I should say that those variables are more stable 
and more subject to analysis than the dependent variable 
which is RPM's. 
Q. So the estimate really reflects the information taken 
from historical data. 
A. The validity of the model depends on testing it against 
actually what happened in the test. So, using that we can 
then say that this is a forecast of U.S. domestic traffic 
and we're coming up with a total of 11.2% for scheduled 
service within the U.S. These are the eleven trunks. This 
is the local service plus intrahawaiin and intra-alaskan 
trunk. Now, we also have models that will forecast actual 
airline traffic using the same econometric techniques. Now 
here you get some differences in variables such as what's the 
historic share of the market, of the carrier within the total 
industry. But, I've gone here to ficticious airlines because 
once we get into real airline forecast we're 
~q1 
talking about 
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proprietary information. NOw, moving on knowing the 
forecast, knowing what the airlines are planning to do 
about its existence, knowing what it has on hand and on 
order, we can generate a seat mile demand and what current 
aircraft on hand and on order will supply and this then 
represents the gap that must be filled by adding on an 
aircraft and so you can see what Mid Coast, which is a 
very large airlines, operating both internationally and 
domestically. We're forecasting a tremendous growth on the 
DClO equipments, wide body twin equip, to satisfy the seat 
mile gap which I had shown earlier. But even this is not 
enough for an airline to make a decision as they have to 
have city fare forecasts so that they can relate aircraft 
schedules to expectant passenger travel. So, we then look 
at each city pair within the airlines networks and we take 
into account a host of demographic and social factors, 
political considerations, competitive factors on their systems 
and taking historic data to establish a time series. We then 
project taking into account these influences to come up with 
a city pair forecast. Once we've done this then we can show 
how many weekly passengers are expected between each city 
pair on their system. Given this we can then go to our 
airline planning group which has got a scheduled planning 
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group which has got a scheduled planning and evaluation 
level which will flow that traffic over the airline system 
and develop successive aircraft fleet schedules out as far 
as we care to go and this schematic simply says that on 
Flight 10 originating in San Antonio and ending Chicago 
we have 967 passengers in an average week joined by 6 on 
line connecting passengers from Portland and Seattle, 5 
from Mexico City, 23 from Corpus Christi. Those totals 
then flew to Houston where 695 got off, 1310 originated, 
25 connected from Corpus and we got 1647 ending up in 
Chicago, and we do that for the entire airline system. In 
short, what we do is develop a liable flight plan and a 
viable schedule which takes many years of forecasting. Now 
the model allocates on the basis of looking at each routing 
and comparing against the total service·offered on that 
route. The variables if it is a daily service, bi-weekly or 
five a day or whatever it is. The air traffic capacity and 
the customer attributes of the aircraft, what are the departure 
and arrival times, etc. Once you develop a rating for that 
particular flight you can compare it against all the flights 
being offered in that market and assign it a percentage of 
the total traffic and that's the way the model flows the 
traffic. So, given a reasonable estimate of the traffic 
this is also a reasonable estimate of how that traffic will 
flow. Once we've developed an operating plan we can then 
translate that plan into the financial forecast for the 
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carriers and here we're showing an income statement 
generated in successive years '72, '73 and '74 for Mid-
Coast Airlines where we take into account all the revenues, 
all the expenses, develop operating income levels and 
finally net income levels in successive years. This also is 
computerized and can be generated over night in a very 
timely fashion. We develop sources and applications of fund 
statements which show the airlines where the money can be ex-
pected to corne from and where it will be applied and we can 
plot then the relationship between costs and revenue over a 
time frame. This is fairly typical of historic performance 
by most trunks where they were enjoying very profitable years 
because of this spread in the middle 1960's and then the 
tremendous squeeze that was put on them in 1970 and then 
we're forecasting a return to normal now. I mentioned that 
the yield is a problem. This reduction in cost per ton mile 
through the 1960's was achieved primarily because of transition 
from props to jets. Although we've had larger, more efficient 
airplanes coming in now in the terms of wide cabin equipment, 
the productivity gains are not enough to offset inflationary 
trends so we're seeing 1971 as a kind of water shed year 
where we're looking at rising costs in the rest of this decade, 
and we're making a further assumption that the CAB and the 
airlines through prudent and intelligent fare structure manage-
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ment will recognize this rise in costs and adjust fares 
upward to account for it. If that should occur, then I 
think we'll see airlines returning to a condition relatively 
good economic health through this decade. 
This shows the picture of the airline and with the event 
of these new aircraft corning in, how their debt structure is 
rising to over a billion dollars, but because they're growing 
tremendously and they're generating profits, their debt 
equity levels are holding fairly low, just quite a bit lower 
than they were a few years ago. 
Net income. It looks like a pretty impressive gain in 
net income. Again, the airline is tripling in size, so this 
kind of level is not terribly out of line and as you'll see 
on the next chart where we plotted the expected return on 
investment in the airline where they were down here at practi-
cally no return, now rising up by about 10% by the end of the 
decade. The CAB guide line for a reasonable rate of return 
from the airlines 12%, so I think what we're saying there 
is that things are going to get better, but not excessively. 
Q. Has the consideration of a four day week entered into 
any of your discussions? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Do you think that might occur? 
A. Yes, it sure could. 
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Q. Are you doing a twin jet? 
A. We're talking very seriously about building it, but we 
don't have it proven, but we are discussing it with many 
airlines. 
Q. If you built your usual quality, twin wide body,do you 
think you could crack the European market or do you think 
that they would buy they're own? Will they be forced .to 
buy their own? 
A. I might say that some of them would be forced to buy 
their own and that the preference factor for a European air-
line for an A300B would be in the order of maybe 15%. Other 
things being equal you could split the market and I think 
you would have to bias in favor of a European manufacturer 
because of the 15%. I think that the reverse would be true 
in the united states. 
Q. DO you think the civil Aviation Production and Finance 
Act has solved all, some or none of their financial problems? 
A. I'm not familiar with the details of the act. 
Q. What is the stopping order of the nelO twin. Is it the 
Chairman of the Board; is it a bank not lending the money? 
A. It's airline interest. 
Q. You can't get 2 or 3 airline orders? 
A. I'm not saying we can't, I'm saying we haven't yet, but 
think if we had the orders we'd build the airplane. 
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Q. Do you have an idea as to how many firm orders it would 
take? 
A. Yes, and that varies. The Chairman said he would like 
to have a hundred of them. 
Q. How long would it take if you decided to go ahead with 
this? 
A. About two years. We're talking now if we committed this 
summer. We'd be delivering in late '74, so slightly over 
2 years. 
Q. Are we going to have 3 companies building them again, 
do you think? 
A. I really doubt it. I think that if we enter it I doubt 
if Boeing would. Although Boeing might come along with an 
airplane with a super critical wing or an advanced 727 type 
or something like that. 
Q. You don't believe in a 747 twin? 
A. I don't know enough about it. I think that they have to 
cut the weights tremendously to make an effective airplane 
with the engine thrust that's available. If you can get the 
thrust up to say 55,000 lbs., it might be a pretty good airplane. 
Q. One more question. Your projections of the passenger miles 
were that you pretty well assumed that that was all going to 
be in the long haul of the large jet and that the difference 
between the characteristics between the large jet and the 
700 
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smaller type airplane the sensitivities are such that one 
less larger aircraft means several less smaller aircraft so 
there's a great deal of leverage there and with a slower less 
sensitivity (this is one thing that I'm interested in) and 
the other thing that makes me ask this question is that it 
looks like a great market in the future are the non-U.S. 
domestic and non-European domestic but the rest of the world 
and it seems to me that the market there is for smaller airplanes. 
Have you looked at these sensitivities and what that means 
to the profits of the manufacturer? Are the profits low for 
a smaller airplane? 
A. Well, let's tackle the first part first. I assume you're 
relating to the forecast for MidCoast Airways with the increase 
of fleet? 
Q. No, your general forecast. How many long haul, large 
jumbo jets are going to be sold and then how many smaller 
aircraf~ are going to be sold, etc. 
A. We're assuming there that the bulk of that growth and that 
you're talking about the u.S. forecast is really going to be 
in the 11 domestic trunk carriers. They represent about 90% 
of the total productivity of the airlines structure in the 
u.S. The local service carriers are growing and have grown 
at a slightly faster rate than the trunks in the last couple 
of years, but they've got an awful long way to go to really 
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- 39 -
penetrate or to alter drastically those relationships. Now 
in that area I would see perhaps quite a shift in the STOL 
type aircraft, but I guess what we're saying is that conventional 
aircraft is still going to be doing the lion's share of the 
work for the next ten years or so. 
Q. You didn't say what the future wide bodies are going to 
be for third generation. 
A. I don't really know. I think that there will be super 
critical wing airplanes, cruising close to Mach I and com-
posites, but we're also talking about slow supersonics that 
swing with a pivotal wing. 
CONSUMER MARKETING AND THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY 
by William R. Roy 
Pan American World Airways 
July 18, 1972 
Abstract 
A brief discussion on the fundamentals of consumer marketing 
as applied to the airline industry. An attempt will be made to 
boil down the mystique and jargon which frequently surround the 
subject of marketing. Topics to be covered include: (1) What is 
"the marketing concept"? (2) How do we find out what consumers 
want from an airline? (3) Once we know their wants, how do we 
plan "marketing strategy"? (4) What are the roles of advertising, 
sales, and middlemen in the process? 
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Consumer Marketing In The Airline Industry 
I am going to try to give you some perspective into key ele-
ments of consumer marketing. What it means, how it works, the 
consumer value it creates. 
Third point, frequently one of controversy, today it's popular 
as part of surge of consumer advocacy to knock marketing's role in 
the economy, to accuse marketing of creating waste and foisting un-
wanted goods on to an unsuspecting public. 
sometimes I wish that marketing techniques had the powers that 
the Nader's Raiders sooth sayers of gloom and doom attribute to it. 
Unfortunately or fortunately, depending on your perspective, it does 
not. 
Defining marketing is a little like defining sex. It's intuit-
ively understood by the participants but damn hard to put into words. 
The best definition I came up with trying to synthesize a number of 
various veiwpoints is to say: "The business process by Which goods 
and services move from the producer to the user." 
As the economists say, "marketing creates place, time and 
possession utility." In English, that means the marketing pro-
cessing enables a customer to find the kind of goods he wants 
when he wants them and ideally at the price he is willing to 
pay. 
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In the airline industry this concept of time utility becomes 
very important because of the perishable nature of our product. The 
skill with which we pursue the consumer marketing process in our 
industry makes the difference between seats going out empty or full. 
When that plane is sitting on the apron, if we can't fill it, those 
seats are going out empty and as a result we have lost our opportun-
ity to sell that particular component of our product. 
Once we define what marketing is - moving goods from the pro-
ducer - we realize there are two ways of looking at the process -
from the producer's side or the consumer's side. 
If we go at it from the producer's side, in other words, how 
we are going to convince people to buy the product we have avail-
able, we don't really have a complete marketing process. We end up 
trying to get the customer to want the goods or service we are sell-
ing. 
The real marketing approach takes the consumer's viewpoint and 
tries to figure what his wants and needs are. Then determine how our 
product can fill those needs. 
This is called the marketing concept - try to understand what 
the consumer wants. This is a concept which is easy to pay lip ser-
vice to and hard to put into actual practice. 
In my opinion, airline industry has not done a very good job in 
this respect. 
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Because of airline scheduling, crew and equipment logistics, it's 
often easier to fit the customer to our products than fit our products 
to the customer. It's a little like Henry Ford's well-remembered 
statement that the customers could have any color car they wanted so 
long as it was black. We have had a bit too much tendency to do that 
in the airline industry. 
A good example of an enlightened marketing concept approach, 
whether it was intentional or not, was the introduction of the 
coach lounge. It gave the consumer a chance to get up out of his 
seat, a rather confined space, walk to another area of the plane, 
sit down, relax and move around the plane. So as I say, whether 
it was intentional or not, this was a good example of the marketing 
concept in action. There was knowledge on the part of various air-
lines that the consumer wanted more options on the plane and the idea 
of developing the coach lounge gave more of these options. 
Here are the ways I'd describe what it takes to get the market-
ing concept juices flowing. I see it as a five-part process. There's 
nothing sacred about five. I am sure other marketing practitioners 
could combine or subdivide the components differently and make it a 
four-step or ten-step processing depending on their bent. These are 
the five steps. 
Beginning with marketing research and analysis, we must find 
out what the customers' real needs and wants are. Most people don't 
buy a garbage can for the aesthetic impact but so they have someplace 
to put the garbage. 7D~ 
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Neither do most customers get on an airplane for the sheer ecstacy 
of flying through the air. As Carl Ally, Chairman of Pan Am's Ad 
Agency once put it: How may people would pay 250 bucks just to get 
in a 747 for seven hours to have dinner and watch a movie while cir-
cling over beautiful downtown Newark? You get in a plane to go someplace. 
Getting from point A to point B has value as far as the consumer's 
concerned. It's that destination impact that is imperative if you 
use a marketing concept in the airline industry. 
Next, we've got to find out how well our product fills those 
needs and how we stack up against the competition and their ability 
to fill the same customers' needs. 
Finally, a market analysis is needed to determine what our 
chances of success are. There very likely may be cases in certain 
product areas, and I keep referring to product areas because I think 
of the aeronautical business as a product. It is generally referred 
to as a service but I think you can justify calling it a product. 
It competes for discretionary income just as other products compete 
for discretionary income. 
If certain customer needs are being filled infinitely better 
by the competition, it's best to look around for some other needs 
which our product can fill or to consider making some changes in the 
product. 
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One caveat on research - as a former airline research director, 
I can take certain liberties in knocking research - the best research 
is often that which confirms intuitive convictions. people close to 
their industry generally have some idea of what customers think. Be-
ware of startling research results. All you might really have is a 
piece of poorly executed or badly interpreted research. 
I would put limited stock in Freudian-type research where an 
airline would go out and administer a series of Rohrscharch tests 
to customers and, based on that, determine what really makes people 
fly. When the 747 first carne out there was a tendency in this dir-
ection. People said they were afraid of the 747. Some Freudian-
type researchers came up with the idea that people thought of the 
airplane as womb. That people were afraid of the 747 because it was 
unlike the intimacy of the 707 womb is a lot of bull. They were 
afraid it couldn't stay up in the air and said so. If you ask 
people directly and with some depth probes, most people will tell 
you what they are thinking. Don't let anyone ever let yoa believe 
that there isn't a fear of flying which some surprisingly frequent 
travellers will tell you. We have had large numbers of travellers 
who make up to 15 international and 40-50 domestic tr.ips per year who 
·.,ill tell you that they still have a fairly fearful approach to fly-
ing. Many people feel that if man were meant to fly the Lord would 
have given them wings and they are a little uneasy aboat it. 
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So, in establishing marketing objectives, O[lce we know the 
custOlTIe,r. needs, our own product strengths and weaknesses and com-
petitive potential, we begin the formal ':na;7keting planning process. 
First we C!stablish marketing objectives - these are the basis 
on '",hich we build our action. plan. Some examples would be: in the 
case of Pan Am or TWA. to increase the sha:7e of the New York to Lon-
don Market by 15%. This is a competitive strategy. It is trying to 
get a bigge:c chunk of the market at the expense of the competition. 
Another kind 0::: objective is one that stimul"ltes primary dem~nd. 
For example. to get 10% more wives to travel 'tlith h'lsbands O!l :llYC-
LAX Transcon. The sort of thing united has been promoting. This i>3 
tryi:1.g to get peopV~ who are haraly in the marke't into the market. 
So v"'; have two kinds of marketing objectives. 
Objecti-ves need to be realistic. One of the problems that air-
line i'ldustr'j" and all Ll1dusl:r.ies face Ls this whole q11estion of mak-
ing the objective realistic. If we were to say that Pan Am should 
get a 35% increase in the share of the NY/London market, that would 
not be realistic. If an objective is unmeetable we should not come 
up with it. 
They also need to be reasonably specific. An objective that is 
too vague, for example wanting to increase our share by 10%. that's 
too vague to have much meaning. 
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It is expedient that marketing objectives are consistent with 
corporate objectives. That may sound silly but frequently a semantic 
problem exists and all top management are not committed to the same 
objectives. 
In the airline industry, as with other industries where regu-
lation plays an important role, it is important that regulatory 
policy is clear or serious conflicts will develop which ultimately 
impact the company's ability to meet the customer's needs. 
What's a strategy? It's a plan for meeting the marketing ob-
jective. There are four basic types of strategy. Let's take an 
example of getting more wives to fly Transcon and follow that through 
the strategy building process. First we use research to determine 
what needs are present and what kind of product will best fill those 
needs. Realistically, the airline seat is not the product. Trying 
to sell the trip to California on the basis of the great airplane 
ride is like trying to sell a new car on the basis of its great 
tires. 
user. 
Price is, of course, a factor and we need to understand it. 
Distribution means getting the product into the hands of the 
Promotion covers all those things we do to tell people about the 
product. 
7/0 
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The basic idea behind developing a product strategy is to figure 
out how to make your product stand out from the competition. This in 
trade jargon, is called product differentiation. 
There are two components to product differentiation: 
The first is the ease or complexity with which we can dev-
elop unique product features. 
The second is the importance the customer places on that 
feature in his decision-making process. 
The chart shows the consumer value on vertical axis and ease of 
developing unique product features on the horizontal. Note the color 
shading -- assume this represents all the product features available 
to consumers. 
It's realtively easy to come up with the low-value unique fea-
tures like the kinds of costumes the stewardesses wear. 
It's also easy to come up with the high-value items like a 747 
but if one or two competitors also offer 747's, you hardly have a 
unique feature. 
What to strive for is that nugget of a product feature that 
has a high-value in the consumer's mind and is also clearly unique 
to our product. 
DIFFERENTIA TING THE 
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711 
HIGH 
V 
A 
L 
U 
E 
" 
, 
, 
" , , 
, 
, 
, 
, 
Intense color " 
shading to lighter "" 
LOW 
SIMILAR PRODU CT 
FEATURE 
, 
, 
" 
UNIQUE 
- 9 -
As a general rule the life cycle for new ideas is fairly short. 
Particularly in the case of many of the things we will come up with 
which are not patentable so the competition will emulate it very 
quickly. The idea is to try to come up with unique features that the 
competition will not be able to emulate. 
For example, at Pan Am we stress the experience concept. We 
know that it has one of the highest values in the consumer's decision-
making process. We also know that Pan Am enjoys a unique position 
in this respect since no competitor can offer a product based on as 
much international experience as Pan Am. This is one example of the 
sort of things that are hard for anybody else to take away from you. 
If the consumer begins to feel everyone is experienced and no one 
stands out we have lost the edge that we had. This is one of the 
reasons in the last couple of years for the basis of the world's 
most experienced airline theme. 
If we return to the example of getting wives to travel Transcom, 
maybe not in-flight at all but at destination can be used as part of 
a unique ground package featuring items of high value to wives like 
a free visit to Elizabeth Arden's in LA. Something they won't get 
from anyone else. It is enough to make the difference in their de-
cision making process. What I am leading up to here is, maybe the 
decision-making process is not based exclusively on the in-flight or 
airline experience. It is basic to the total travel experience. 
11~ 
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It is tied into this idea of the person's going to a destination. 
He thinks about destination and is concerned in that respect more 
than being concerned about what is going to happen in-flight. 
Looking into your agenda, you have already had a lot on the 
subject of pricing so what I would like to do is position it as a 
marketing concept rather than going into details. 
Under marketing concept, price is a function of what the user 
will pay and whether the producer can recover his costs, including 
a reasonable return on investment. 
At the same time the consumer-oriented seller will be suffic-
I 
iently sensitive to market elasticity to determine what impact a 
change in price will have on customer demand and this goes back to 
the idea of the whole travel experience. 
In the travel industry price in the consumer's mind is diff-
erent from price in an airline's mind. 
The consumer is concerned about what the total trip will cost -
only to the extent that changes in air fares affect the total cost 
is the customer going to be influenced. From the time he leaves his 
door until he gets back - parking, meals, etc., pricing strategy 
has to take the whole picture into account. 
If the consumer perceives that there is a major cut such as the 
winter 8-dayGIT'S we. had this past year in the Atlantic which result 
in much lower total cost to him then price can impact his decision-
making process. 
7/3 
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QUESTION: Why do you think the airline consumer is smarter than 
the automobile consumer who historically doesn't perceive the cost 
of operating an automobile? 
ANSWER: He isn't. 
QUESTION: Why do you always talk about total costs in the airline 
markets but nOL in the automobile? 
ANSWER: I am not really talking about total costs in that respect. 
I am talking in terms of a guy envisioning he is going to get some-
thing, he is going to get a travel experience just like he is buying 
a new car. He is willing to invest $X in that new car. He is also 
willing to invest $X in that travel experience. The costs of oper-
ating that car are not perceived because it is at smaller amounts 
over a long period of time. If a guy is going to take an inter-
national trip and has to layout, let's say, $1500 that becomes very 
real to him. If it is $1500 or $2000 he can discern the difference 
between them. Again I am talking about differences in total expense -
not 40 or 50 dollars, but 20% or more change in the product he is 
buying. One of the things we should light on here is to determine 
the level of visibility. This is part of the pricing strategy. 
Where does a company want to be in terms of pricing visibility. Do 
we want to be one of the pricing leaders, taking the role of giving 
some impetus to the industry in the way pricing should go. Do we 
want to be part of the pack or do we want to drag our heels. This 
is very important in terms of the role a company is willing to play 
within its industry and really needs a basic strategy to position 
that effectively. 1/4 
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When we talk about distribution startegy or how we move the 
product from the producer to the user, we first need an understand-
ing of the various steps that are involved in the process. While 
airlines perform a service, for all intents and purposes, we can 
think of the airline ticket as a salable product moving through a 
distribution channel just as color TV sets, refrigerators, or fash-
ion clothing would move through a distribution network. 
In the airline industry the channels of distribution are fairly 
complex. We can sell an airplane ticket direct in our own sales 
offices. Have it sold by another airline in one of their ticket 
offices, have it incorporated as part of a wholesaler's package 
tour, sell it through a travel agent or via commercial account. 
As we can see from the following chart, frequently two or three 
steps are involved in the distribution of the product. In the case 
of a commercial account sale it might be either direct to the air-
line or through a travel agent or it might even be to a travel agent 
who then goes to another airline, who actually writes the ticket 
selling our product. 
One problem fairly unique to the airline business is the vast 
number of outlets through which a relatively high priced product 
is sold. For example, in pan Am's case, worldwide there are roughly 
17,000 travel agencies and 12,000 ticket offices belonging to other 
carriers, all of which can write a ticket on Pan Am. 
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These numbers make this distribution system fairly unique to the 
airline industry. I was trying to think the other night of what 
other large big ticket items like automobiles, color TVs, etc., 
the traditional sorts of things have distribution systems where 
as many different outlets are involved in selling a product and it 
is very hard to come up with anything. In most cases the big ticket 
producers have franchised operation where only their product 
is sold. In the case of GM cars - only GM cars will be sold through 
a dealership. In the case of major appliances a dealer may carry 
2 or 3 other competing brands but there really aren't any situa~ 
tions where, as there are in the airline industry, the retailer 
carries a multitude of competing brands. For instance, in Inter-
national air travel, the travel agent will carryover twenty diff-
erent transatlantic carriers' tickets available. In other words, he 
can write a consumer's ticket on any of those 23 some odd carriers. 
He also has the ability to write on any of the domestic carriers. 
So he is handling a multitude of different products. 
I think Pan AM is fairly representative. We may be on the 
low side. Someone like United who has more domestic offices than 
we do might very well have more outlets for the sale of their pro-
duct. 
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In the united states alone, there are probably an excess of 
15,000 travel agent and airline ticket offices where you can buy an 
airline ticket. 
As a result, it's extremely difficult to control the sale of 
the product the way producers of other big ticket items like TV's, 
home appliances, or automobiles are able to operate through, in 
many cases, franchised dealerships who feature either no competing 
products or only one or two competing products. 
In the airline's case, almost every travel agent can sell not 
only all the competing domestic carriers' tickets, but also all the 
competing international carriers' tickets. This makes it extremely 
rough to develop any form of exclusivity with the middlemen who 
sell your product to the ultimate user. 
Back to the example of the wives to L.A. Assume we develop 
a tour package with unique features -- HOW do we get the work to 
possibly 60,000 sales people in 15,000 retail points, especially 
when our product is one of maybe 250 others we offer and maybe 2,000 
offered all together by us and our competitors? 
Our distribution strategy must be able to cope with the kind of 
situation which results when Mrs. Smith goes into her friendly 
travel agent and asks about our special wives package. 
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This takes us to the fourth strategy which is promotion. 
Because of the limits in the air travel distribution system, pro-
motion becomes a key ingredient in the attempt to make potential 
customers aware of your product and its features. 
Essentially, there are four kinds of promotions: 
Advertising, which includes radio, TV, newspapers, maga-
zines and trade publications. 
Sales promotion, which includes everything from direct mail 
to letters to folder racks, to motion pictures of travel 
destinations. to window displays. 
Sales development is a form of missionary sales activity 
in which we use opr headquarters and local sales people to 
work with key travel agents, travel agency associations, 
commercial accounts and the like to keep them aware of our 
product's capabilities. 
Finally, word of mouth is an important form of promotion. 
A satisfied customer is one of the best forms of advertising 
or promotion an airline could have. From research we found 
that first-time travelers frequently depend on recommendations 
from friends, relatives, doctors, or dentists in making a 
decision on where to go, where to stay, and what airline 
to use. 
Let me spend a few minutes on what promotion can or cannot do. 
Promotion vehicles, like advertising, sales promotion, etc., can be 
used for either a push or pull effect. What does this mean? Pull 
type advertising and promotion means developing awareness, interest 
or preference for our product in the mind of the consumer so that 
he in fact goes into a retailer and asks for our product. In effect, 
we are using promotion to pull our product through the distribution 
channel. 
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Push promotion, on the other hand, is the kind of promotion 
aimed at getting the middleman to promote the virtues of our pro-
duct to the end user. 
Trade advertising, direct mail to middlemen, and the mission-
ary sales development activity are three of key ways in which we 
build enthusiasm for the product among middlemen. A fourth method 
which is frequently used in other industries and is known as push 
money, or special incentives to sell a certain product, is illegal 
insofar as air transportation is concerned. Many tour wholesalers 
selling package tours do, however, give retailers a special override 
commission on the land package for selling large quantitites of 
their tours. 
One word on advertising -- advertising has been one of the 
most maligned of the promotional vehicles available for use. No 
question that advertising has in the past occasionally been used 
to mislead the consumer. However, when one reviews the various 
theories on consumer buying behavior, he finds that a key to the 
consumer's ability to make a buying decision is the information 
which he can obtain on the product and its features. 
Advertising is, in the final 'analysis, one of the least expensive 
ways of providing product information to the consume~. 
7/9 
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The idea that advertising can, through subliminal means, 
force the consumer into buying products he doesn't want or need 
is pure garbage. The most advertising can do is make a customer 
more aware of the ability of a given product or service to fill 
the customer's needs. Now, in all fairness, let's admit that these 
needs may be somewhat latent and advertising a product feature may 
help to bring them to the surface. But advertising per se cannot 
create the basic need. 
Maybe this wife who is going out to the West coast really 
wasn't chafing at the bit until she saw the ad that said now you can 
go and experience this glorious time with Elizabeth Arden and your 
husband will now accept you, and you can do it at a low cost. That's 
basically appealing to her latent desire to get out someplace - to 
make herself look different so her husband will think of her as 
newly married. It is not building a need within her, it's simply 
bringing that need a little more to the surface. 
Once we have developed our four strategies -- product, price, 
distribution, and promotion -- we're ready to bring them together 
into the overall marketing mix. 
By marketing mix, I mean the way we combine the various mar-
keting tools to move the product or service. For example, in some 
cases, we might use more advertising and less missionary or devel-
opmental sales effort. 
7~O 
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We might depend more on low price to sell the product or we might 
concentrate on unique product features. 
Frequently, if the porduct doesn't move very well, we make 
adjustments in the mix like a little more advertising or other 
forms of promotion. 
Since departure time, in the airline industry, is a product 
feature, we might decide to make minor changes in this area. 
However, whenever, major changes in the mix appear to be needed, 
it is appropriate to pause and review the marketing objectives 
and strategies to determine whether a more fundamental rethink 
is necessary. 
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Measuring the Results: 
This is the area most frequently overlooked. It is important 
as part of the planning process to establish measurement criteria. 
How are we going to measure success? What level of success means 
we have a hit? How bad do we let things get before we declare a 
miss? 
After the fact decisions on what constitutes success are also 
dangerous since they frequently result in lowering our standards 
for success or failure. Once we are three months down the road and 
we see some of the problems that exist we are not quite so apt to 
say we need $X million before declaring this a success. This is 
unfortunate because the thinking that went into the process orig-
inally is the thing that should be used to measure that. 
Without-pre-established measuremnt criteria it's also hard 
to determine whether minor modifications in the marketing mix 
can have the proper effect. 
That sums it up. I congratulate you on wading through this 
exercise with me. As I recall, one of the fundamentals of learning 
theory says if an indvidual can remember 10% of what he hears, he is 
doing quite well. 
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The 10% of our visit together here today that I hope you remem-
ber is: 
marketing begins with the customer: 
consistent sucess depends on_ finding a product or serv~ce that 
fills his needs: 
start with research and analysis to determine what the 
consumer wants, how the product is positioned in the 
market place and how we have to modify our product, if 
necessary to meet those consumer wants: 
establish realistic marketing objectives, things we are 
striving for in that process: 
develop strategies on: products, price, distrbution and 
promotion: 
Based on these strategies create a mix of marketing elements, 
activate the marketing process, hopefully to achieve success but 
also to establish, ahead of the game, the measurement criteria that 
we are going to use in measuring the success. It seems to me that 
the airline industry has a long way to go compared to other big 
ticket item products which implemented the marketing concept in a 
big way a number of years ago. That sounds a little pessimistic. 
On the optimistic side in the last few years I have seen what I 
consider to be quite an increase of marketing interest in the air-
line industry. I predict that we will see in the next decade a 
real growth in the marketing concept in the airline industry as it 
becomes more consumer oriented. In my next talk later on this morn-
ing with Dan Colussy, I will explore that in more depth. 
FUTURE DIRECTION IN AIRLINE MARKETING 
by Dan A. Colussy 
pan American World Airways 
July 18, 1972 
Abstract 
The rapid growth and broadening of the air travel 
market, coupled with a more sophisticated consumer, will 
dramatically change airline marketing over the next decade. 
Mr. COlussy discusses the direction this change is likely 
to take and its implications for companies within the 
industry: New conceptualization approaches will be required 
if the full potential of this expanding market is to be 
fully realized. Marketing strategies need to be developed 
that will enable various elements of the travel industry 
to compete not only against each other but also with other 
products that are competing for the consumer's discretionary 
income. 
Airline marketing will change dramatically over the next 
decade. There will be the potential for a rapid growth and 
broadening of the air travel market, but new conceptual marketing 
approaches will be required to fully develop this new business 
potential. 
Airline marketing management will face the challenge of 
re-evaluating and restructuring its activities to be consistent 
with an environment quite different from the 1950's and 1960's. 
Even the definition of the airlines' role in the travel industry 
and the product they provide will be subject to significant change. 
Let's take a look at some of these changes in the marketing 
environment which the airlines will face in the next 10 years. 
There are five key elements of the marketing environment: 1) Total 
market growth, 2) Consumer expectations, 3) Competition, 4) Reg-
ulation, and 5) Technology. 
within the past 10 years we have seen leisure travel grow 
from about 1/3 of total airline traffic to approximately 50%. 
Over the next 10 years pleasure or vacation travel could well 
reach 2/3 of total airline volume. In fact, at Pan Am leisure 
travel already represents about 2/3 of our total passenger traffic. 
This does not reflect an anticipated reduction in business travel, 
which should continue to grow moderately, but rather a more rapid 
growth in leisure travel. This is the area of greatest potential 
for the airlines during the coming years. 
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The growth of pleasure travel will reflect an accelerated 
change in several key socia-economic factors. These factors 
should, in fact, contribute to a greater growth in leisure travel 
than has been experienced during the past 10 years. These factors 
include: 
1. GREATER DISCRETIONARY INCOME THROUGHOUT ALL STRATA 
OF THE POPULATION. While perhaps difficult to be optimistic 
about our general economy based on our experience during the 
past two years, most economists are in general agreement that 
the next decade will present unique opportunities for a broader 
distribution of our country's wealth and greater per capita 
discretionary income at all levels. 
2. WE WILL FIND OVER THE NEXT 10 YEARS THAT PEOPLE WILL 
HAVE CONSIDERABLY MORE FREE TIME. This will result primarily 
from the trend toward longer vacations. In a recent behavior 
science corporation study conducted for Pan Am, 37% of the re-
spondents who earned over $15,000 a year, had 4 or more weeks of 
vacation. Of the total sample, almost 60% stated that they split 
their vacations. The combination of longer vacations and a 
splitting of the vacations creates new potential for multiple 
air travel each year. 
I might note that we recognize there is some traffic 
potential created by the movement to shorter work weeks, as a 
result of 4 day weeks and 3 day weekends with the new holiday 
schedule. However, the market growth resulting from this move-
ry~1p 
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ment may be smaller and slower than many in the industry now 
anticipate at least in the international travel markets. 
3. THERE IS AN OBVIOUS CHANGE IN LIFE STYLE, REFLECTING 
A TREND TOWARD GREATER EMPHASIS ON PERSONAL ENRICHMENT. In the 
past, travel has had some difficult in competing with tangible 
durable goods because it was not an item with a "useful life" 
that could be utilized over a period of time. However, it now 
appears that travel is being perceived more as a personal invest-
ment and this will lead to further growth in travel. The extended 
3 to 4 week trip is becoming more important in the international 
market. A recent Stanford Research Institute study reveals that 
self-expression and individualism are becoming more important 
value trends while status achievement and conformity are re-
ceiving less emphasis. In the 30's and 40's a trip to Europe 
was made for status. Today's younger generation make the trip 
for personal enrichment. This reduced emphasis on "materialism" 
is also shown in the Behavior Science Study. When asked how they 
would spend a windfall gift of $1,000, foreign travel was rated 
number 2 just behind home improvements but ahead of domestic 
travel or a new automobile. New automobile placing behind travel 
is a significant change in the typical American's attitude. 
TO summarize, leisure travel has become an 'integral element 
of the life style of a greater number of people than ever before. 
Over the next 10 years it will become a key element of the life 
style of millions of new people not previously in the market if, 
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of course, the travel industry does a proper marketing job. 
The business and marketing significance of this can be best 
illustrated by reviewing what we believe to be the 3 key con-
sumer market segments: 
1. The Experienced Traveler - The "heavy user" of leisure 
travel, through multiple annual trips, will grow substantially 
in absolute numbers and relative importance. Primarily composed 
of people who have grown up in the '60's and '70's accepting air 
travel as a commonplace event, this segment of consumers has no 
reservations about flying and indeed look upon travel as a re-
warding and desirable experience. 
2. The First Time Traveler - Airlines, in our preoccupation 
with battles for share of market, have perhaps lost our perspective 
on the fact that only a small proportion of our population flies 
in a given year. There is ample evidence, however, that each 
year millions of people discover for the first time that air 
travel is easier and more affordable than they thought possible. 
Less than 10% of the U.S. population has ever left the North 
American continent. And once they try it, they like it. They're 
hooked. Participation in just one charter or a group of local 
friends is all it takes to introduce these people to air travel. 
This market segment, (the great middle America) because of its 
absolute size, represents truly substantial business potential. 
The motivations which bring these people into the travel 
market are diverse. They include special interest activities such 
as sport related, religious, and study groups. Additionally, 
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strong cultural ties and increased pride of identity among the 
various ethnic groups in our country represent a key motivation 
for international travel. There is a real tendency for second 
generation Americans to go back to their homeland for a visit. 
3. The Youth Market - This is a market segment which has 
perhaps been overworked and over-emphasized in other industries. 
But in the travel industry, the youth market, because it is 
traveling more frequently and at earlier ages, will continue 
to represent a key source of traffic. 
The second key element shaping the marketing environment 
over the next decade will be the nature of consumer expectations. 
In general, the air traveler will be smarter and more knowledgable. 
This will be partially a reflection of the increased number of 
consumers with accumulated travel experience which is far beyond 
that which characterizes today's consumer. People coming back 
and talking about their trips improves the whole security thing. 
This accumulated travel experience will cause and permit the con-
sumer to be more discriminating in terms of his travel decisions 
relating to choice of destination and selection of airline. The 
current wave of consumerism, sharpened by the consumer's own travel 
experience, will lead to a new emphasis on travel value. This 
value consciousness will be the key factor influencing the 
consumer's travel decisions. 
The consumer will be offered more diverse travel options, and 
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he will be more skillful and discriminatory in his selection of 
travel products. As a result, he will not be motivated by the 
types of promotional techniques currently employed by many air-
lines. 
The third key element of the marketing environment will be 
the competitive situation which individual airlines will face. 
This competition will exist at 4 levels. First, there will be 
competition between the various scheduled airlines. Secondly, 
there will be competition between the scheduled airlines and 
the supplemental airlines. ThirdlY, there will be competition 
between the airlines and other modes of transportation. Fourth 
and probably most important, there will be competition between 
travel and other applications of the consumer's discretionary 
income. 
Competition between the scheduled carriers will no doubt 
continue undiminished as each tries to capture its fair share of 
the market. Depending on each airline's route structure, the 
competition will be for both the business and leisure travel 
markets. The focus of competitive efforts directed to the 
business market will be on special services and schedules. Com-
petition for the leisure market will focus on destinations and 
service features. 
The competition that now exists between scheduled airlines 
and the supplemental will be 'considerably blurred as more scheduled 
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carriers offer a product comparable to the supplementals. 
Through their own charter activities, the scheduled carriers 
will eliminate the price advantage previously maintained by the 
sUpplementals. Market share in the charter business will then 
become a function of effectiveness in product structuring and 
promotion. At PAA, we feel there has been no major mass mar-
keting effort directed at general leisure market to develop 
charter traffic. This is changing today. 
competition between the airlines and other modes of trans-
portation will be primarily limited to the automobile. Steam 
ships have adopted a marketing strategy of positioning themselves 
less as a mode of transportation, and more as a destination. As 
a result, combination fly/cruise programs should be expected to 
expand, making the two industries complementary rather than com-
petitive. 
The automobile will be a more important factor in the domestic 
market place, where it competes both as a substitute and as an 
alternative to air travel. However, it also represents competition 
to international travel, since a consumer must choose between a 
traditional family vacation by auto and a vacation by air to a 
more exotic or unfamiliar location. The consumer may prefer to 
have a summer home in N. H. than spend $4,000 to $6,000 on an 
international trip. 
Competition between travel and other applications of the 
731 
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of the consumer's discretionary income will become even more 
intense. New products for the home, such as entertainment and 
household appliances now on the drawing board, will be expensive 
and capture a substantial portion of the consumer's discretionary 
dollars. perhaps even more importantly, the trend toward purchase 
of second homes, campers, boats, and other high cost leisure 
products can be expected to cause significant competition for 
the consumer's discretionary income. This competition will exist 
both in terms of the initial financial investment and in the 
subsequent income and leisure time spent in utilizing the purchase. 
The fourth element of the marketing environment involves the 
area of industry regulation. Trends toward both u.s. and foreign 
governments action to stimulate air traffic, particularly through 
bulk travel concepts, are accelerating. In particular, we can 
expect relaxation of the limitations on the number of off line 
charters permitted entry overseas, particularly at Pacific 
destinations. Second, we can anticipate relaxation of qualification 
requirements for affinity and ITC charters. Additionally, we can 
expect continued downward pressure on air fares, both for scheduled 
and supplemental services. Pan Am advocates part charters. 
The fitth element of the future marketing environment relates 
to technological changes within the industry. Supersonic aircraft, 
beyond the Concord, with more favorable economics and true inter-
continental range capabilities may be expected in the early 1980's. 
However, in the upcoming decade they will impact principally in 
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the high priority business travel mar~et, where time is the 
critical factor. Their impact on leisure markets will be limited 
to high income consumers willing to pay a premium for travel to 
more distant locations in shorter time periods. 
As far as large subsonic transport aircraft are concerned, 
in the next decade we will see only evolutionary growth in existing 
models of aircraft with no major technological breakthroughs. The 
DC 10 and L-IOll will probably be stretched in both size and range 
capability. The maximum capacity for an intercontinental 
aircraft will probably be limited to approximately 600 seats 
for an all economy 747. Improved comfort features for narrow-
body equipment will assure maintenance of their value for use in 
less dense markets or those with high frequency requirements. 
Other advances may be expected to improve reliability, 
utilization and all-weather capabilities. All these factors which 
should contribute to better cost efficiency of existing aircraft 
and will hopefully permit airlines to begin to realize an 
adequate return on the massive investments we have made in these 
aircraft. 
At present, our passenger handling systems on the ground are 
very labor intensive. Without advancement of these systems, the 
expected traffic growth would result in poorer standards of service 
and/or spiraling costs. Automated chec~-in and seat selection 
should be a reality within the next 10 years. An alternative to 
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the present high cost reservations system, for at least some 
routes, should be a possibility. 
In general, technological change within the airline industry 
will not be dramatic. Advancements should enable us to keep 
pace with traffic growth but not contribute to it, as did the 
introduction of the jets. Additionally, we might expect cost 
efficiencies to keep requirements for fare increases at rates 
lower than for most other goods and services. 
outside the airline industry there will be requirements for 
other elements of the travel industry to introduce technological 
advancements. Hotel handling of passengers at check-in and 
check-out, tour operations, and surface transport to and from 
airports must all be upgraded to accommodate efficiently the 
growth in traffic. At this time there is limited coordination 
among the airlines and these other elements of the travel industry 
in terms of advance planning. I expect the airlines will take 
a more active role in assuring that all elements of the travel 
industry are better integrated and prepared for handling pas-
senger growth. This is a real change in direction for airline 
intent and interest. 
Having identified these 5 elements of the marketing 
environment -- specifically, total market growth, consumer 
expectations, competition, regulation, and technological changes--
what are the implications for the airline's marketing management. 
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! believe these implications can be summarized in 3 key areas. 
First, the airline industry faces a period offering greater 
business growth potential than we have ever known before. This 
will result from continued growth in business travel and a boom 
in leisure travel stimulated by greater discretionary income, more 
free time and multiple vacations, plus a change in life style 
emphasizing personal enrichment. The primary consumer segments 
accounting for the leisure travel growth will be the experienced, 
frequent flyer, the first time travelers, and the youth market. 
The major obstacle to exploiting this growth potential will be 
the alternative uses for the consumer's discretionary income. 
Secondly, the transportation element of travel will become 
less important in the consumer's travel decision. Instead, more 
consumers will be interested in buying a total travel experience. 
Essentially, he will expect to purchase a package of services 
that will facilitate his movements virtually from his door to 
his destination and back home. The leisure traveler will expect 
much more help in planning his trips and assistance during his 
trip. The business traveler will expect a similar total travel 
service, with of course, a different package of features more 
suited to the nature of his travel. 
The airlines are the logical element of the travel industry 
to assume the responsibility of providing the consumer with a 
satisfactory total travel service. More than any other element 
of the industry, the airlines are perceived as already having this 
735 
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responsibility as far as the consumer is concerned. It is the 
airlines that give the greatest promotional support to the 
stimulation of travel and it is the airlines who are best able, 
in terms of resources and potential gain, to assume this responsi-
bility. 
Concurrent with this consumer emphasis on a total travel 
experience, the airlines must become more involved with quality 
control for the total trip and pricing of the total trip. Pricing, 
in particular, will be a key element of competition both in 
pricing of the air transportation as well as the land portion 
of the trip. 
Finally, the growth in the travel market will support and 
require even greater market segmentation through product diversity. 
The travel industry will be similar to the automobile industry, 
where total market growth has permitted virtually unlimited model 
and option offerings. Because travel and the objectives for travel 
are so strongly related to differing personal interests, experience 
levels, and personality characteristics, the trend to market 
segmentation in our industry through product diversity can be 
expected to accelerate rapidly. This is giving the customer more 
options, even in a mass travel market situation. This product 
diversity will be required to develop frequency of travel. It 
will be made possible by a total market so large that there will 
be adequate volume to support very specialized travel products. 
The growth in international air travel is very high. The product 
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line will range from charters sold only as basic, economy trans-
portation to special ground and inflight service packages for 
first class travelers and from large, standardized group tours 
to individualized special interest travel itineraries. 
Before defining what I believe to be the future direction of 
airline marketing strategies, I would like to review quickly 
the key elements of the changing marketing environment and their 
implications for airline marketing management. 
Within the marketing environment the airlines face changes 
in total market growth, consumer expectations, the nature and 
degree of competition, regulation, and technological advancement. 
These changes will result in significant new business potential; 
a consumer emphasis on the total travel experience, with a resultin( 
priority on quality control and pricing of the total trip; and 
increased market segmentation through product diversity. To meet 
these challenges, I believe the industry will move toward new 
marketing strategies in 6 key areas. 
First, the airline industry can be expected to expand its 
diversification activities both vertically and horizontally. Many 
airlines, including Pan Am, have hotel subsidiaries. Others, 
including Pan Am, market their own brand name tours, for which 
they control pricing and quality. Some airlines, including TWA 
and Pan Am, have recently announced new emphasis on charter travel. 
And Pan Am has just announced its entry into an auto rental program 
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in Europe. Pan Am's network of 650 locations in Europe is as 
large as Avis or Hertz in Europe. Recognizing the potential and 
the obligation for assuming the responsibility for the consumer's 
total travel experience, the airlines will move much faster into 
all key elements of the travel industry. 
The second element of the new marketing strategies to be 
employed by the airline industry involves consumer priorities. 
During the past decade we have seen the airlines shift their 
priorities between frequent business travelers and new or in-
experienced pleasure travelers. within the next 10 years, a 
further change will lead to new consumer target priorities. The 
three primary targets will be the frequent business traveler 
who is primarily traveling first class; the "frequent" leisure 
traveler, who will make two or more trips per year; and the first 
time traveler. Each of these groups offer significant leverage 
for increased busine"ss and all product and promotional strategies 
will be heavily directed toward these consumers. 
Thirdly, the airlines' definition of their product will 
change to be consistent with their new role as the supplier of a 
total travel experience. The present emphasis on inflight amenities, 
such as coach lounges, decor, meals, and movies will be pushed into 
the background and the airlines will be more concerned with 
structuring and providing a pleasant trip. 
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There will be significant increases in the variety and 
number of tour packages available to the consumer. This is not 
to imply that the market will be characterized by increased 
escorted group travel. Quite the contrary is true. While people 
may travel in groups for the air transportation, their land pack-
ages will differ considerably from one traveler to the next. 
The airlines will have incentive to become even more in-
volved in the development of the tourist infra-structure at the 
destinations along their route system. This will include such 
activities as sightseeing, hotels, car rentals, transfer services, 
and support industries. 
This involvement by the airlines will result from the 
emphasis on quality control and the need for competitive pricing. 
The demand for new destinations and new travel experiences by the 
experienced traveler will also stimulate participation by the 
airlines in developing new vacation markets. 
There is going to be a consolidation into a smaller number 
of total travel conglomerates. The airlines are in a stlnng 
position to head these up. Alternatively, someone like American 
Express could gain aircraft capability. 
Finally, the product distinctions between scheduled airline's 
service and that of the supplements should be significantly 
diminished if not completely eliminated. A good percentage of 
the pleasure travel will be based on movements of people in large 
groups on either plane load or part charters, using both affinity 
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and non-affinity concepts. 
The fourth key element of marketing strategy relates to 
pricing. In general, there will be an effort to simplify air 
fares in order to facilitate sales activities, consumer under-
standing and acceptance, and a profitable balance between fares 
for both business and pleasure markets. Most people in the 
industry realize that the fare situation is very complex and 
difficult from a sales standpoint. Developmental fares will be 
utilized to increase frequency of pleasure travel and to bring 
new consumers into the market. These pricing incentives, to 
the extent practical must, however, also be directed at off-
setting seasonal and day of week traffic imbalances. This will 
tend to maintain some degree of complexity in fare structure, 
but this will be necessary if airlines, hotels, and other elements 
of the travel mix are to maintain traffic flow at some stable 
levels. The basic economics of our industry dictate that our 
resources must be effectively utilized on a year round basis. If 
this can be accomplished the comsumer will ultimately benefit 
in that we can be offered the lowest price pqssible and the widest 
number of travel options to meet his own unique set of values and 
needs. pricing strategy then will playa vital role in developing 
new business as well as ensuring fair and equitable prices to 
those consumers already in the travel market. All of this must 
be accomplished and still permit the airlines to maintain a 
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reasonable rate of return and stable financial condition. 
There will continue to be fare differentials, but they 
will be more like 10-2~/o rather than the 40-50% differentials 
we see today. The dumping of seats will not continue, but 
differences in overall service will be charged different fares. 
The fifth key element of future marketing strategies involves 
the channels of distribution. At present, the airlines have 
limited control over their channels of distribution. This must 
change if we are to ensure the quality of the travel products 
being offered. Consumers are expected to demand better and 
more informed travel counseling. This requirement for more 
extensive travel counseling and the airlines desire and incentive 
to gain greater influence over the sales outlets which sell our 
products should lead to a more selective appointment procedure 
of retail travel agents. Retail travel agents will continue to 
playa vital role in the selling of air transportation essentially 
for airlines like Pan Am who do not have a large number of their 
own retail outlets throughout the U.S. In the area of packaged 
tours, distribution changes are also likely as airlines strive 
for better quality control and better brand identification in an 
effort to develop stronger consumer interest and confidence in 
new tour products. This should result in a consolidation in the 
number of current packaged tour wholesalers and a closer working 
relationship between airlines and wholesalers in an effort to 
provide a more attractive and higher value consumer product. 
71/ 
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The sixth and final element of marketing strategy involves 
the advertising and promotion activities of the airlines. First, 
there will be an increased priority on promotional efforts 
directed toward the stimulation of primary demand. This will 
reflect the objective of increasing the frequency of pleasure 
travel and the positioning of travel as an alternative to other 
applications of the consumer's discretionary income. Competitive 
advertising between airlines will focus more on the greater appeal 
of one carrier's destinations versus those of its competition. 
The primary emphasis, however, of airline advertising and pro-
motion will be on the appeal, value, and quality of the total 
travel experiences which it can offer. This emphasis on the 
airline's ability to provide a total travel experience will be 
an important part of its promotional efforts. 
Continued focus on inflight amenities concerned principally 
with the air portion of the total travel experience will have 
to be de-emphasized if our promotional resources are to be most 
effectively utilized in developing and capitalizing on the future 
traffic potential. Heavy promotion on special lounges will not 
properly compete for the consumer's discretionary dollar given 
the wide variety of non-travel options he has for these expenditures. 
It's our belief that airline marketing has matured to a point where 
more sophisticated techniques will be brought to bear on our total 
marketing problem. 
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I have tried to outline the challenges and opportunities 
that face the airline industry. and in particular its marketing 
management. I have described what I believe to be the direction 
that the airlines will pursue in six areas of marketing strategy. 
TO recap these areas, they are: Increased vertical and horizontal 
diversification in the travel industry, the placement of priority 
on the "heavy user" of pleasure travel, an emphasis on structuring 
and providing a total travel experience, the development of new 
pricing concepts for air transportation and travel packages, a 
restructuring of the channels of distribution, and a promotional 
effort that is consistent with the airline's definition of its 
product and target consumer. During the past 15 years, the 
airline industry has experienced both feast and famine several 
times. The lessons learned during this period and the total 
business potential resulting from the social and economic changes 
that can be expected provide the basis for being more optimistic 
about our industry than we have ever been before. 
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